Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 9
Articulus unicus. De ordinibus Angelorum.
Quaestio I. Utrum Angeli diversorum ordinum sint diversarum specierum per naturam.
Primo igitur est quaestio de ordinibus Angelorum in comparatione ad naturam substratam, et est quaestio, utrum Angeli diversorum ordinum sint diversarum specierum per naturam. Et quod sic, videtur.
Ad oppositum. 1. Multiplicatio Angelorum maxime manifestat divinam potentiam et sapientiam et bonitatem, et maior multiplicatio ad maiorem spectat manifestationem; sed maior est multiplicatio, quae est secundum numerum et speciem, quam quae est solum
secundum numerum: ergo1 in Angelis reperitur utraque: ergo Angelus differt ab Angelo secundum speciem. Sed maxime differunt Angeli diversorum ordinum: ergo videtur, quod secundum speciem distinguantur.
2. Item, Angeli diversorum ordinum magis differunt quam Angeli eiusdem ordinis in simplicitate, quod est primum attributum2, ergo pari ratione et in personalitatis discretione: ergo cum Angeli eiusdem ordinis saltem differant numero, Angeli diversorum ordinum differunt plus quam numero. Sed maior differentia, quam ea quae est secundum numerum, non est nisi ea quae est secundum speciem: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod differunt magis aliqua differentia accidentali, sicut aqua diversorum fontium magis quam aqua eiusdem fontis; obiicitur contra hoc, quia magis differunt in simplicitate essentiae; sed simplicitas essentiae non est accidens Angelo, cum nullo modo possit intendi et remitti in eodem Angelo, sed est essentialis proprietas: ergo facit essentialiter differre: ergo idem quod prius.
3. Item, hoc videtur a simili: cum sint tria genera viventium, scilicet vegetabilium, sensibilium et intellectualium3, in genere eorum quae vivunt vita vegetabili, est ponere diversitatem non solum secundum numerum, sed etiam secundum speciem, sicut in plantis; et similiter in genere eorum quae participant vitam sensibilem, sicut in animalibus: ergo pari ratione in his quae participant vitam intellectualem, sicut in angelicis spiritibus. Si ergo est ibi differentia secundum speciem, cum maxime attendatur Angelorum differentia in diversis ordinibus, patet etc.
4. Item, sicut corpora luminosa sua varietate decorant caelum, et tamen sunt omnia luminosa, ita Angeli suo modo decorant empyreum, unde dicuntur astra matutina, Iob trigesimo octavo4; sed luminaria caeli differunt specie, non numero solo, quia habent operationes et impressiones omnino diversas et speciales: ergo pari ratione et Angeli, qui sunt ornatus empyrei.
Fundamenta. Contra: 1. Omne quod est procul ab origine, dispergitur, et quod approximatur origini, colligitur et unitur, sicut patet in numeris, patet etiam in lumine et in aliis5; sed Angeli sunt proximi causae originali omnium, scilicet Deo: ergo debent habere unitatem. Sed non possunt uniri secundum numerum; ergo debent secundum speciem completam.
2. Item, contingit reperire spiritualem sive rationalem naturam coniunctam et separatam; sed coniuncta non est nisi unius speciei: ergo nec separata. Si tu dicas, quod hoc venit ex parte corporis; hoc nihil est, quia non anima propter corpus, sed corpus propter animam6. Et iterum, quid impediret, corpora secundum speciem diversa fuisse facta ab initio, si congrueret, spiritus rationales esse secundum species diversos?
3. Item, multitudo Angelorum facta est ad illius civitatis plenitudinem et decorem; sed in illa civitate maxime attenditur unitas et nexus et conformitas: ergo cum conformitas unius naturae faciat connexionem in caritate et ipsam adiuvet — propter quod etiam, ut Sancti dicunt7, Deus voluit non tantum homines facere similes, sed etiam omnes ex uno homine — ergo videtur etc.
4. Item, angelica natura est caput universi: ergo cum caput sit ratione speciei, non unius individui, et caput et status debet esse in uno, sicut arca consummata est in cubito8, ergo maxima debet esse unitas: ergo et secundum speciem.
5. Item, ruina angelica reparatur per hominem, qui est idem specie: si ergo competenter et congrue reparatur, videtur tunc, quod omnes ruentes fuerint unius speciei. Sed de quolibet ordine sunt lapsi9: ergo omnes eiusdem speciei.
Conclusio
Magis probabile esse videtur, quod omnes Angeli sint eiusdem speciei.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex est opinio, et utraque probabilis.
Opinio 1. Una est, quod in Angelis est diversitas secundum speciem et etiam secundum genera subalterna, ut hierarchia sit quasi unum genus, et ordines tres10 faciant species. Et ad hoc ponendum moti sunt tum propter divinae bonitatis ostensionem, tum propter simile in aliis creaturis, tum etiam propter gradus repertos in ipsis Angelis. Cum enim Angeli eiusdem ordinis aliquo modo se excedant, videtur, quod Angeli diversorum ordinum et hierarchiarum adeo se excedant, quod etiam habeant in specie et in genere diversitatem.
Opinio 2. Alia positio est, quod Angeli omnes sunt eiusdem speciei, tum propter illius civitatis unionem, tum propter universi perfectionem.
Licet autem utraque istarum positionum habeat aliquam probabilitatem, quia tamen per Scripturam non innotescit nobis diversitas operationum; et videtur, quod illi qui aggressi sunt hanc materiam determinare, sicut Dionysius11, divina inspiratione cognoverint et officium et naturam, et ipsi dicunt, quod omnia, quae sunt omnium ordinum, in omnibus reperiantur, licet magis excedenter in uno: videtur magis theologica et probabilis positio, nisi occurrat manifesta auctoritas in contrarium, quod Conclusio. omnes Angeli sint eiusdem speciei, sicut et omnes homines. Et quemadmodum in hominibus sunt gradus et ordines et quoad naturalia et quoad officia commissa sive dignitates et quoad gratuita, salva tamen unitate speciei; sic intelligendum est in Angelis. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de manifestatione, dicendum, quod Deus non manifestat bonitatem, nisi salvo ordine sapientiae ordinantis mundum, et salva proprietate naturae, similiter salva condecentia et perfectione civitatis supernae. Notandum. Quoniam igitur creatura completior in mundo dat ei consummationem, ideo una est in specie. Rursus, quia supremum et optimum Angeli, quod est deiformis intellectus, unum12 est nec habet coniunctionem cum inferiori, ideo natura angelica debet esse una. Rursus, quoniam illa civitas debet esse unita et perfecte restaurata, ideo debet esse una. Et hae rationes possunt etiam assignari suo modo circa homines. — Homines ab Angelis differunt specie. Si quis autem vellet per hoc ostendere, quod homines et Angeli essent unius speciei; diceremus, quod Angeli non coniunguntur hominibus unitate naturae, sed obsequio beneficentiae; et homo similiter Angelo, quia ille istum adiuvat, iste illum reparat13, quod non esset, si essent eiusdem naturae; et ideo utrumque congruit civitati supernae.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de magis et minus, dicendum, quod intensio et remissio secundum proprietates inseparabiles non variant speciem per se, etsi aliquando concomitentur diversitatem speciei in his formis, quae concernunt diversam mixtionem elementorum, quae attenditur secundum qualitates activas, sicut dicitur calidum in quarto gradu differre a calido in primo. Simpliciter autem loquendo, non habet veritatem; quod patet, quia maior est intensio et gradus in gratiis et praemiis quam in naturalibus proprietatibus, et tamen non differunt specie, sed solum accidente. Nec valet: si non intenditur in eodem, ergo est essentialis14, sicut nec de gloria.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile de aliis viventibus et de luminaribus, patet responsio, quod non est simile nec in re nec in ratione. In re non, quia illa habent diversas operationes specificas; non sic Angeli. Rursus15, illa sunt ordinata ad diversas necessitates, Angeli vero omnes ad unum principale. Rursus, in vita contemplativa est unitas, in activa multiformitas, et habitatio Angelorum est uniformis. Et praeterea, illa16 magis distant ab uno et summo: ideo etc.
I. Praeter ordinem consuetum tractationi quaestionum hic praemittitur additamentum, in quo agitur de distinctis nominibus, hierarchiis, ordinibus Angelorum, eorumque sufficientia secundum doctrinam librorum, qui dicuntur esse Dionysii (de auctore cfr. pag. 241, nota 4.), nec non S. Gregorii et Bernardi. In nonnullis autem dissentiunt et illi Patres et Scholastici. Nam S. Thomas non admittit locutionem hierarchiam supercaelestem, sive ipsam increatam Trinitatem, quam S. Bonav. docet secundum antiquos magistros, et quam recte intellectam admittunt B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. Profecto vocabulum hierarchia (sacer principatus) non convenit personis Ss. Trinitatis, si intelligitur ut ordo principandi, quasi una persona increata dominetur aliis, sed ut ordo principiandi, quo Pater a nullo est, Filius a Patre solo, Spiritus S. ab utroque, ut bene observant Petr. a Tar. et Richardus a Med. — Aliae differentiae, quae respiciunt interpretationem Dionysii et S. Gregorii, vel minoris sunt momenti, vel respiciunt res non certe, sed tantum secundum quandam probabilitatem determinandas. Ingeniose de hierarchiis et ordinibus Angelorum disserit S. Bonav., Hexaem. Serm. 21. (ante med.). — De omnibus istis tractant commentatores Lombardi distinctis quaestionibus in hac 9. distinctione, et Alex. Hal., p. IV. q. 10. tr. de officio Missae, p. II. § 1. circa med.; S. Thom., S. I. q. 108. a. 1. 2. 5. 6; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 10. q. 37. 38. 39.
II. De principiis, quae ad hanc 1. quaestionem spectant, cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 1, ubi in scholio n. II. etiam de diversis Scholasticorum opinionibus mentio fit, atque loci auctorum citati sunt, quibus subiungimus Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 11. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.
III. Sequentem quaestionem, de qua cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. 2, alii Scholastici in eodem sensu solvunt, speciatim S. Thom. (hic q. unica, a. 7.), qui dicit: «Distinctio ordinum est per diversum donum gratuitum sicut per principium formale, et per diversum donum naturale sicut per principium quasi materiale et dispositivum». De eadem quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 37. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. et S. I. q. 108. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 10. q. 42. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 7. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Sole Article. On the orders of the Angels.
Question I. Whether the Angels of different orders are of different species by nature.
First, then, there is a question concerning the orders of the Angels in comparison to the underlying nature; and it is the question whether the Angels of different orders are of different species by nature. And that it is so seems [to be the case].
To the opposite. 1. The multiplication of the Angels most greatly manifests the divine power and wisdom and goodness, and a greater multiplication pertains to a greater manifestation; but greater is the multiplication which is according to number and species than that which is only according to
number: therefore1 in the Angels both are found: therefore an Angel differs from an Angel according to species. But the Angels of different orders differ most of all: therefore it seems that they are distinguished according to species.
2. Likewise, the Angels of different orders differ more than the Angels of the same order in simplicity, which is the first attribute2; therefore by parity of reasoning also in the distinctness of personality: therefore, since the Angels of the same order differ at least in number, the Angels of different orders differ by more than number. But a greater difference than that which is according to number is none other than that which is according to species: therefore etc. If you say that they differ more by some accidental difference, just as the water of different springs [differs] more than the water of the same spring — it is objected against this that they differ more in the simplicity of essence; but the simplicity of essence is not an accident to an Angel, since it can in no way be intensified and remitted in the same Angel, but is an essential property: therefore it makes [them] differ essentially: therefore the same as before.
3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a similitude: since there are three genera of living things, namely of vegetative, sensible, and intellectual3 [things], in the genus of those which live by vegetative life there is to be posited a diversity not only according to number, but also according to species, as in plants; and likewise in the genus of those which participate in sensible life, as in animals: therefore by parity of reasoning [it is so] in those which participate in intellectual life, as in the angelic spirits. If, therefore, there is there a difference according to species — since the difference of the Angels is attended to most of all in their different orders — it is clear etc.
4. Likewise, just as the luminous bodies by their variety adorn the heaven, and yet are all luminous, so the Angels in their own way adorn the empyrean — whence they are called morning stars, in Job thirty-eight4; but the luminaries of heaven differ in species, not in number alone, since they have wholly diverse and special operations and impressions: therefore by parity of reasoning the Angels also, who are the adornment of the empyrean.
Foundations. On the contrary: 1. Everything which is far from its origin is dispersed, and what is brought near to its origin is gathered and united — as is clear in numbers, [and] clear also in light and in other things5; but the Angels are nearest to the original cause of all things, namely God: therefore they ought to have unity. But they cannot be united according to number; therefore they ought [to be united] according to a complete species.
2. Likewise, it happens that spiritual or rational nature is found [both] conjoined [to a body] and separate; but the conjoined [nature] is only of one species: therefore neither [is] the separate. If you say that this comes from the side of the body — this is nothing, since the soul is not for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul6. And again, what would have prevented bodies diverse according to species from having been made from the beginning, if it were fitting that rational spirits be diverse according to species?
3. Likewise, the multitude of the Angels was made for the fullness and beauty of that city; but in that city unity and connection and conformity are attended to most of all: therefore, since conformity of one nature produces a connection in charity and assists it — on account of which also, as the Saints say7, God willed not only to make men alike, but also [to make] all [men] from one man — therefore it seems etc.
4. Likewise, the angelic nature is the head of the universe: therefore, since a head is [head] by reason of species, not of one individual, and the head and the [proper] standing [of a thing] ought to be in one [thing] — just as the ark was completed in a cubit8 — therefore the unity ought to be greatest: therefore [it ought to be unity] also according to species.
5. Likewise, the angelic ruin is repaired through man, who is the same in species: if, therefore, it is repaired suitably and fittingly, then it seems that all who fell were of one species. But from every order [some] have fallen9: therefore all [are] of the same species.
Conclusion
It seems to be more probable that all the Angels are of the same species.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion, and each is probable.
Opinion 1. One is that in the Angels there is a diversity according to species and also according to subaltern genera, so that a hierarchy is, as it were, one genus, and the three orders10 constitute the species. And to posit this they were moved both on account of the manifestation of the divine goodness, and on account of the similitude [found] in other creatures, and also on account of the grades found in the Angels themselves. For since the Angels of the same order in some way exceed one another, it seems that the Angels of different orders and hierarchies exceed one another to such a degree that they have a diversity even in species and in genus.
Opinion 2. The other position is that all the Angels are of the same species, both on account of the union of that city, and on account of the perfection of the universe.
But although each of these positions has some probability — yet because through Scripture the diversity of operations is not made known to us, and [because] it seems that those who undertook to determine this matter, such as Dionysius11, knew both the office and the nature by divine inspiration, and they themselves say that all the things which belong to all the orders are found in all [the Angels], although more eminently in one — the more theological and probable position seems [to be], unless a manifest authority should occur to the contrary, that Conclusion. all the Angels are of the same species, just as all men [are]. And just as in men there are grades and orders both as to natural [endowments] and as to offices committed [to them], or dignities, and as to gratuitous [gifts] — the unity of species nevertheless being preserved — so it is to be understood in the Angels. — Hence the arguments adduced for this part are to be conceded.
Solution of the opposing [arguments]. 1. To that, then, which is objected concerning manifestation, it must be said that God does not manifest [His] goodness except with the order of the wisdom that orders the world preserved, and with the property of nature preserved, likewise with the becomingness and perfection of the supernal city preserved. Note. Since, therefore, a more complete creature in the world gives it [its] consummation, therefore [that creature] is one in species. Again, because the supreme and best [part] of an Angel, which is the deiform intellect, is one12 and has no conjunction with anything inferior, therefore the angelic nature ought to be one. Again, because that city ought to be united and perfectly restored, therefore it ought to be one. And these reasons can also be assigned, in their own way, concerning men. — Men differ from the Angels in species. But if anyone should wish by this to show that men and Angels are of one species, we would say that the Angels are not joined to men by unity of nature, but by the service of beneficence; and man likewise [is joined] to the Angel, since the one assists the other [and] the other repairs the one13 — which would not be, if they were of the same nature; and therefore each is suited to the supernal city.
2. To that which is objected concerning more and less, it must be said that intensification and remission according to inseparable properties do not vary the species of themselves, even though they sometimes accompany a diversity of species in those forms which involve a diverse mixture of the elements — [a mixture] which is attended to according to the active qualities, as a hot thing in the fourth degree is said to differ from a hot thing in the first. But, speaking absolutely, [the objection] does not hold true; which is clear, because the intensification and grade is greater in graces and rewards than in natural properties, and yet [these] do not differ in species, but only in accident. Nor is this valid: if it is not intensified in the same [subject], therefore it is essential14 — just as neither [does this hold] concerning glory.
3. 4. To that which is objected by the similitude concerning the other living things and concerning the luminaries, the response is clear: that it is not similar, neither in fact nor in reason. Not in fact, because those things have diverse specific operations; not so the Angels. Again15, those things are ordered to diverse necessities, but the Angels all to one principal [end]. Again, in the contemplative life there is unity, in the active [life] multiformity, and the dwelling of the Angels is uniform. And besides, those things16 are more distant from the one and supreme [being]: therefore etc.
I. Beyond the customary order of treating questions, an addition is here prefixed, in which there is treated of the distinct names, hierarchies, and orders of the Angels, and of their sufficiency, according to the doctrine of the books which are said to be by Dionysius (on the author cf. p. 241, note 4), as also [according to that] of St. Gregory and Bernard. In some matters, however, both those Fathers and the Scholastics disagree. For St. Thomas does not admit the expression of a supercelestial hierarchy — that is, the uncreated Trinity itself — which St. Bonaventure teaches following the ancient masters, and which, rightly understood, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla admit. Indeed the word hierarchy (sacred principate) does not befit the persons of the Most Holy Trinity if it is understood as an order of ruling [principandi], as though one uncreated person dominated the others, but [it does befit them] as an order of originating [principiandi], by which the Father is from no one, the Son from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit from both — as Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla well observe. — The other differences, which regard the interpretation of Dionysius and St. Gregory, are either of lesser moment, or regard matters to be determined not with certainty, but only with a certain probability. St. Bonaventure discourses ingeniously on the hierarchies and orders of the Angels in the Hexaemeron, Sermon 21 (before the middle). — On all these matters the commentators on Lombard treat with distinct questions in this 9th distinction, and [so does] Alexander of Hales, p. IV, q. 10, tract on the office of the Mass, p. II, § 1, near the middle; St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 108, a. 1, 2, 5, 6; B. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 10, q. 37, 38, 39.
II. Concerning the principles which pertain to this 1st question, cf. above, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, where in the scholion, n. II, mention is also made of the diverse opinions of the Scholastics, and the passages of the authors are cited — to which we add Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3, 4; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 11, q. 1; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5.
III. The following question — on which cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, 2 — the other Scholastics solve in the same sense, especially St. Thomas (here, the sole question, a. 7), who says: «The distinction of the orders is by a diverse gratuitous gift as by a formal principle, and by a diverse natural gift as by a quasi-material and dispositive principle». On the same question there treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 37, m. 1, 2; St. Thomas, loc. cit. and Summa I, q. 108, a. 4; B. Albert, here a. 6, [and] Summa p. II, tr. 10, q. 42, m. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, the sole question, a. 7; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, dub. lat. 3; Biel, here q. 1.
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- Vat. perperam sed.The Vatican edition wrongly reads sed (but) [for ergo].
- Cfr. supra d. III. lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq. et in Comment. p. I. dub. 1. et 2, ubi etiam tangitur sequens difficultas de intensione et remissione essentiae.Cf. above, d. 3, the text of the Master, c. 1 ff., and in the Commentary, p. I, dub. 1 and 2, where the following difficulty concerning the intensification and remission of essence is also touched upon.
- Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 13. seqq. (c. 2.). — Non pauci codd. incongrue intelligibilium et aliquanto inferius intelligibilem pro intellectualem.See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 13 ff. (c. 2). — Not a few codices incongruously [read] intelligibilium (of intelligible things), and somewhat below intelligibilem (intelligible), for intellectualem (intellectual).
- Vers. 7. — De minori cfr. infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq.Verse 7. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 ff.
- Libr. de Causis, prop. 17, ubi idem ostenditur de virtute.The Book of Causes, proposition 17, where the same is shown concerning power.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 36 ff. (c. 4).
- Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 21.Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XII, c. 21.
- Gen. 6, 16: Et in cubito consummabis summitatem eius. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 210, nota 10. — Vat. ratione unius speciei pro ratione speciei.Genesis 6:16: And in a cubit shalt thou finish the top of it. — On the major [premise] cf. above, p. 210, note 10. — The Vatican edition reads ratione unius speciei (by reason of one species) for ratione speciei (by reason of species).
- Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. De prima prop. arg. vide infra q. 5. et 7.Cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 2. On the first argument [advanced] for the proposition, see below, q. 5 and 7.
- In Vat. desideratur tres; intellige ordines unius hierarchiae. — De hac sententia cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et 5.In the Vatican edition tres (three) is absent; understand [it of] the orders of one hierarchy. — On this opinion cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3 and 5.
- De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. seq., ubi docetur, omnes Angelos convenire in tribus, scil. quod sint caelestes essentiae, quod sint caelestes virtutes et quod sint angeli. — Paulo inferius post in uno cod. bb in marg. a suppari manu addit quam in alio.On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 11 ff., where it is taught that all the Angels agree in three things, namely that they are celestial essences, that they are celestial powers, and that they are angels. — A little below, after in uno (in one), codex bb adds in the margin, by a roughly contemporary hand, quam in alio (than in another).
- Vat. unus. Vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. arg. 3. ad oppositum.The Vatican edition reads unus (one, masculine). See above, d. 1, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, the 3rd argument to the opposite.
- Congruentius diceretur: quia iste illum adiuvat et ille istum reparat. Cod. aa solum primum membrum hoc modo exhibet. — Vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 1.It would be more fittingly said: because the one assists the other and the other repairs the one. Codex aa exhibits only the first member in this way. — See above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, and a. 3, q. 1.
- Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 ergo non est essentialis; perperam. — Quod gratia et gloria per essentiam non differant, probatur infra d. 27. a. I. q. 3.Very many codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] ergo non est essentialis (therefore it is not essential) — wrongly. — That grace and glory do not differ by essence is proved below, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3.
- Vat. In ratione non: quia.The Vatican edition reads In ratione non: quia (Not in reason: because...).
- Retinuimus cum Vat. illa, quod in aliis edd. et codd. desideratur.We have retained, with the Vatican edition, illa (those things), which is absent in the other editions and codices. ---