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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 102

Articulus II. De discretione personali.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo attributo, scilicet de discretione1 personali. Circa quam tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum in Angelis sit mera discretio personalis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec proprietas sit accidentalis, aut substantialis. Tertio vero, utrum sit materialis, vel formalis.

Quaestio I. Utrum in Angelis sit mera discretio personalis.

Quod autem in Angelis sit mera discretio personalis, ita quod Angeli aliqui differant solo numero, videtur.

1. Danielis septimo2: Millia millium ministrabant ei; et constat, quod non tot habebant ministeria differentia specie, quot Daniel enumerat: ergo nec ministri omnes differebant specie: ergo aliqui, vel omnes differebant numero solo. Quodsi dicas, quod tot, quot3 ministeria; obiicitur de secunda parte auctoritatis: Et decies centena millia p. 103 assistebant ei. Constat, quod tanta diversitas non poterat cadere nisi secundum numerum, cum haberent unum statum, scilicet assistere.

2. Item, gloria est regi habere multos ministros uniformes: ergo si « gloriosum est regnum, in quo cum Christo gaudent omnes Sancti4 », videtur, quod multi sint uniformes in illo superno palatio, et ita solo numero vel persona differentes.

3. Item, personalis discretio est in Deo, Angelis et hominibus; et cum natura angelica sit divinae propinquior quam humana, ergo et discretio personalis; sed in Deo sunt plures personae differentes sola personalitate, similiter in hominibus: ergo videtur, quod similiter in Angelis: ergo sunt ibi aliqui solo numero differentes, aut omnes.

4. Item, omne animal per naturam desiderat societatem similis in specie — nam omne animal ad sibi simile copulabitur, et volatilia ad sibi similia conveniunt5 — ergo Angelus per naturam desiderat societatem similis in specie. Sed desiderium eius non est frustra, maxime in Angelo beato: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud est verum in animalibus, non in substantiis spiritualibus; tunc quaero a te, utrum in Angelis sit socialis et amicabilis affectus. Constat quod sic; sed in quocumque est ponere affectum talem, est amare similem et appetere habere: ergo redit idem quod prius.

Contra: 1. Diversitas, quae est numero solo, causatur ex divisione materiae6; inde est, quod sol non multiplicatur, quia eius essentia est ex tota sua materia, ita quod materia eius non est divisibilis nec multiplicabilis; sed talis ratio est in Angelis: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratio finalis multiplicationis secundum numerum venit ex parte corruptibilitatis; ideo enim multiplicatur secundum numerum, ut, quia non poterat salvari in uno, ipsa species salvetur in pluribus; unde sol et luna, quia perpetua sunt, non habent nisi unicum individuum in eadem specie7; ergo etc.

3. Item, si reperire contingit extrema, et medium, si illud est possibile esse8; sed contingit reperire pluralitatem personarum in una natura in Deo, et e converso pluralitatem naturarum in una persona, ut in homine et in Christo: ergo contingit pluralitatem naturarum reperire in pluribus personis, ut tot sint naturae differentes, quot sunt supposita, et tot species, quot individua.

4. Item, distinctio personalis pura est in Deo quantum ad originem et in homine similiter, ergo videtur, quod origo sit tota et principalis ratio discretionis personalis: cum ergo in Angelis non reperiatur origo, nec pura distinctio personalis per consequens9.

Conclusio

In Angelis, vel in aliquibus vel in omnibus, est discretio solummodo quoad personalitatem, non quoad speciem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic fuit duplex positio. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod in Angelis est discretio personalis, sed nunquam pure, immo sunt ibi tot species, quot individua; similiter dicunt in luminaribus mundi. — Sed licet hoc aliquam probabilitatem habeat in corporibus, non tamen videtur rationabile in spiritibus, ut nullus communicet cum alio in natura speciali10. Sicut enim innotescit per Scripturam, multi Angeli ad idem officium ordinantur et communem videntur habere operationem eandem. Nobis autem nec per Scripturam nec per dicta Sanctorum nec per officia innotescit tanta diversitas11; ideo non videtur nisi praesumtio hoc dicere, maxime cum non appareat in promptu aliqua ratio cogens.

Alia est positio sobria et catholica, quod in Angelis est ponere distinctionem quantum ad personalitatem tantummodo, aut in omnibus, aut in p. 104 aliquibus. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae tum ex parte ministerii, tum ex parte assimilationis ad Deum, tum ex parte assimilationis mutuae.

1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod diversitas secundum numerum venit ex divisione materiae; dicendum, quod falsum est; sed12 multitudo per generationem venit ex divisione materiae, quia generans dat generato partem suae substantiae. Diversitas autem Angelorum non est per multiplicationem unius ab altero, sed omnium Angelorum13 a Deo. — Et per hoc patet sequens obiectum de fine, quia ille non est finis multiplicationis, sed multiplicationis successivae. Sed ratio potissima multiplicationis in hominibus et in Angelis est divinae potentiae et sapientiae et bonitatis declaratio et collaudatio, quae manifestantur in multitudine et gloriae Beatorum amplificatione, quia amor caritatis exsultat in multitudine bonae societatis. Unde credo, quod erunt in magno numero et perfectissimo, secundum quod decet illam supernam civitatem14, omni decore fulgentem.

3. Quod obiicitur de medio, dicendum, quod Angelus non potest esse medium, quia, sicut in praecedentibus probatum est15, quamvis in Angelo non sit tanta naturarum diversitas, quanta in homine, nihilominus aliqua est. Et praeterea, quamvis non diversificetur in hominibus pluribus humana natura, tamen multiplicatur in illis; et ideo non est quaerere aliud medium.

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de origine, quod est principalis ratio discretionis personalis; dicendum, quod quamvis Richardus16 dicat, quod personae in hominibus distinguantur origine, tamen hoc non habent ratione principii; nam pauci homines sic distinguuntur per illam habitudinem. Ad solum enim unum hominem habeo ego illam habitudinem, et tamen ab omnibus differo personaliter. Sed ratio distinctionis personalis, quantum ad veritatem, venit ex principiis constituentibus et particulantibus, quantum ad notitiam, venit ex qualitatibus17; quorum utrumque est in Angelis reperire secundum diversitatem; diversa enim habent principia individuantia et diversas proprietates innatas. Sicut enim homines diversas habent facies, sic diversas habent mentes et proprietates mentales; ita intelligendum est in Angelis suo modo.

Scholion

I. Cum magnus sit numerus Angelorum (hic fundam. I. et ad 1. 2.), quaeritur, quomodo Angeli inter se distinguantur. Ratio distinctionis numericae et individualis inter Angelos potest concipi vel ut eadem cum distinctione specifica, et tunc tot sunt species, quot individua; vel ut distincta ab ea et facta per aliud principium individuationis, et tunc in eadem specie possunt esse plures proprietate individuali distincti Angeli, et tunc, ut dicitur in corp., est « distinctio quantum ad personalitatem tantummodo», non quantum ad speciem. — Iterum quaestio circa hoc potest institui vel de facto, vel de possibilitate.

II. Quoad quaestionem de facto hoc loco tantum asseritur, saltem aliquos Angelos esse in eadem specie, quod etiam tenet Alex. Hal. Sed infra d. 9. q. 1. praefertur cum B. Alberto ea sententia, quod omnes Angeli sint eiusdem speciei, sicut etiam omnes homines. — Alii putant, Angelos tantum eiusdem hierarchiae vel ordinis in eadem specie communicare. E contrario S. Thomas « in his a doctrina sui Magistri extreme recessit », ut dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3.), et negat tum de facto tum de possibili, duos Angelos esse eiusdem speciei, cum tot sint species, quot individua. Non conveniunt discipuli Angelici, utrum illud impossibile ex mente S. Doctoris intelligendum sit absolute, an secundum potentiam ordinariam. Ratio huius sententiae sumitur ex duplici principio, scil. quod nullatenus sit materia in Angelis, et quod in materia ponendum sit principium individuationis. Idem fere sentit Ægid. R.; Petr. a Tar. autem, saltem quoad factum, has tres opiniones omnes aestimat probabiles.

Haec autem sententia, quod impossibile Deo sit creare plures Angelos in eadem specie, si absolute intelligitur, illa aetate a multis vehementer impugnabatur, immo a. 1276 ab Episc. Parisiensi censurata est. Hoc praeter Richardum a Med. et Henricum Gand. tradit Durandus (hic q. 3.) his verbis: « Illa opinio condemnata est Parisius pluribus vicibus, et de eius condemnatione sunt tres articuli, videlicet 81, in quo dicitur sic: quod quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, Deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere; supple: Error est. Idem habetur articulo 96, ubi dicitur sic: quod Deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia. — Error est. Et similiter articulo 191. dicitur sic: quod formae non recipiant divisionem, nisi secundum materiam. — Est error, nisi intelligatur de formis eductis de potentia materiae ». (Cfr. Collect. iudicior. p. 192. cap. 6. de Deo, n. 41; c. 7. de Angelo vel Intelligentia, n. 17; c. 13. de natura generabilium, n. 1.). Sed vide supra pag. 30, Scholion.

III. Plerique Scholastici hanc et duas sequentes quaestiones in una quaest. tractant. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 6. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 7; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 50. a. 4; S. c. Gent. II. c. 93. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; d. 9. a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 2. q. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article II. On personal distinction.

Next there is asked concerning the second attribute, namely concerning personal distinction1. About which three [things] are asked. First it is asked whether in the angels there is a mere personal distinction. Secondly it is asked whether this property is accidental, or substantial. Thirdly indeed, whether it is material, or formal.

Question I. Whether in the angels there is a mere personal distinction.

That in the angels there is a mere personal distinction, so that some angels differ by number alone, seems [to be the case].

1. Daniel the seventh2: Thousands of thousands ministered to him; and it is established that they did not have as many ministries differing in species as Daniel enumerates: therefore neither did all the ministers differ in species: therefore some, or all, differed by number alone. And if you say that [there were] as many as3 [there were] ministries; it is objected from the second part of the authority: And ten times a hundred thousand p. 103 stood beside him. It is established that so great a diversity could not occur except according to number, since they had one state, namely to stand beside [him].

2. Likewise, it is a glory for a king to have many uniform ministers: therefore if « glorious is the kingdom in which all the Saints rejoice with Christ4 », it seems that many are uniform in that supernal palace, and so differing by number or person alone.

3. Likewise, personal distinction is in God, in the angels, and in men; and since the angelic nature is nearer to the divine than the human, therefore [there is] personal distinction also; but in God there are several persons differing by personality alone, likewise in men: therefore it seems [it is] similarly in the angels: therefore there are there some differing by number alone, or all.

4. Likewise, every animal by nature desires the fellowship of [what is] like in species — for every animal will be coupled to what is like itself, and the flying things come together to what is like themselves5 — therefore the angel by nature desires the fellowship of [what is] like in species. But its desire is not in vain, most of all in a beatified angel: therefore etc. If you say that that is true in animals, not in spiritual substances; then I ask you whether in the angels there is a social and amicable affection. It is established that [there is]; but in whatever it is to posit such an affection, it is to love the like and to desire to have [it]: therefore the same returns as before.

On the contrary: 1. Diversity which is by number alone is caused from the division of matter6; hence it is that the sun is not multiplied, because its essence is from the whole of its matter, so that its matter is not divisible nor multipliable; but such a ground is in the angels: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the final ground of multiplication according to number comes from the side of corruptibility; for therefore is [a thing] multiplied according to number, that, since it could not be preserved in one, the species itself be preserved in many; whence the sun and the moon, because they are perpetual, have but a single individual in the same species7; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it happens to find extremes, also [there is] a middle, if that is possible to be8; but it happens to find a plurality of persons in one nature in God, and conversely a plurality of natures in one person, as in man and in Christ: therefore it happens to find a plurality of natures in several persons, so that there are as many differing natures as there are supposits, and as many species as individuals.

4. Likewise, pure personal distinction is in God with respect to origin and in man likewise, therefore it seems that origin is the whole and principal ground of personal distinction: since therefore in the angels origin is not found, neither [is there] pure personal distinction by consequence9.

Conclusion

In the angels, whether in some or in all, there is a distinction only with respect to personality, not with respect to species.

I respond: It must be said that here there was a twofold position. For some said that in the angels there is personal distinction, but never purely; rather there are there as many species as individuals; they say likewise of the luminaries of the world. — But although this has some probability in bodies, yet it does not seem reasonable in spirits, that no one share with another in a special nature10. For as is made known through Scripture, many angels are ordained to the same office and seem to have a common, identical operation. But to us neither through Scripture nor through the sayings of the Saints nor through the offices is so great a diversity made known11; therefore it does not seem [to be anything] but presumption to say this, most of all since no compelling ground appears at hand.

Another is the position [that is] sober and catholic, that in the angels one is to posit a distinction with respect to personality only, either in all, or in p. 104 some. — And the grounds adduced for this are to be conceded, both from the side of ministry, and from the side of assimilation to God, and from the side of mutual assimilation.

1. 2. As to what therefore is objected, that diversity according to number comes from the division of matter; it must be said that it is false; but12 multitude through generation comes from the division of matter, because the generator gives to the generated a part of its substance. But the diversity of the angels is not through the multiplication of one from another, but of all the angels13 from God. — And through this is plain the following objection concerning the end, because that is not the end of multiplication, but of successive multiplication. But the most powerful ground of multiplication in men and in the angels is the declaration and joint-praise of the divine power and wisdom and goodness, which are manifested in the multitude and the amplification of the glory of the Blessed, because the love of charity exults in a multitude of good fellowship. Whence I believe that they will be in a great and most perfect number, according to what befits that supernal city14, shining with all comeliness.

3. As to what is objected concerning the middle, it must be said that an angel cannot be a middle, because, as in the preceding [it] was proved15, although in an angel there is not so great a diversity of natures as in man, nevertheless there is some. And besides, although human nature is not diversified in the several men, yet it is multiplied in them; and therefore there is no [need] to seek another middle.

4. As to what is objected last concerning origin, that it is the principal ground of personal distinction; it must be said that although Richard16 says that persons in men are distinguished by origin, yet they do not have this by the ground of a principle; for few men are thus distinguished through that relation. For I have that relation to one man alone, and yet I differ personally from all. But the ground of personal distinction, with respect to truth, comes from the constituting and particularizing principles, [and] with respect to cognition, comes from the qualities17; both of which are to be found in the angels according to diversity; for they have diverse individuating principles and diverse innate properties. For just as men have diverse faces, so they have diverse minds and mental properties; so it is to be understood in the angels in their own mode.

Scholion

I. Since the number of the angels is great (here, fundamentum I and in reply to 1, 2), it is asked how the angels are distinguished among themselves. The ground of numerical and individual distinction among the angels can be conceived either as the same as the specific distinction, and then there are as many species as individuals; or as distinct from it and made through another principle of individuation, and then in the same species there can be several angels distinct by individual property, and then, as is said in the body [of the question], there is « a distinction with respect to personality only », not with respect to species. — Again, the question about this can be raised either concerning fact, or concerning possibility.

II. As to the question concerning fact, in this place it is only asserted that at least some angels are in the same species, which Alexander of Hales also holds. But below, d. 9, q. 1, that opinion is preferred, with Blessed Albert, that all the angels are of the same species, just as also all men. — Others think that only angels of the same hierarchy or order share in the same species. On the contrary Saint Thomas « in these [matters] departed extremely from the doctrine of his Master », as Dionysius the Carthusian says (here, q. 3), and he denies, both concerning fact and concerning possibility, that two angels are of the same species, since there are as many species as individuals. The disciples of the Angelic [Doctor] do not agree whether that impossibility is to be understood, from the mind of the Holy Doctor, absolutely, or according to the ordinary power. The ground of this opinion is taken from a twofold principle, namely that there is in no way matter in the angels, and that the principle of individuation is to be posited in matter. Almost the same Giles of Rome holds; Peter of Tarentaise, however, at least as to fact, esteems all these three opinions probable.

This opinion, however — that it is impossible for God to create several angels in the same species, if it be understood absolutely — was in that age vehemently attacked by many; rather, in the year 1276 it was censured by the Bishop of Paris. This, besides Richard of Mediavilla and Henry of Ghent, Durandus relates (here, q. 3) in these words: « That opinion was condemned at Paris several times, and of its condemnation there are three articles, namely 81, in which it is said thus: that because the intelligences do not have matter, God could not make several of the same species; supply: It is an error. The same is had in article 96, where it is said thus: that God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter. — It is an error. And likewise in article 191 it is said thus: that forms do not receive division except according to matter. — It is an error, unless it be understood of forms drawn out from the potency of matter ». (Cf. Collection of Judgments p. 192, cap. 6, on God, n. 41; c. 7, on the Angel or Intelligence, n. 17; c. 13, on the nature of generable [things], n. 1.). But see above p. 30, Scholion.

III. Most of the Scholastics treat this and the two following questions in one question. Besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 20, m. 6, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 7; Reportata here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 50, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 93. — Blessed Albert, here a. 5; d. 9, a. 7; Summa p. II, tr. 2, q. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 hic et infra distinctione.
    Several codices with ed. 1 [read] distinctione here and below.
  2. Vers. 10. [Scil. Dan. 7, 10.]
    Verse 10. [Namely Daniel 7:10.]
  3. Ex cod. aa supplevimus, contextu exigente, quot.
    From codex aa we have supplied, the context requiring [it], quot.
  4. Antiphona ad Magn. II. Vesp. in festo Omnium Sanctorum.
    Antiphon at the Magnificat, II Vespers, on the feast of All Saints.
  5. Eccli. 13, 19. seq.: Omne animal diligit simile sibi... Omnis caro ad similem sibi coniungetur, et omnis homo simili sui sociabitur (alias: copulabitur). Et c. 27, 10: Volatilia ad sibi similia convenient. — Paulo superius plures codd. societatem animalis pro societatem similis.
    Ecclesiasticus 13:19 f.: Every animal loves what is like itself... All flesh shall be joined to what is like itself, and every man shall associate with his like (otherwise: shall be coupled). And c. 27:10: The flying things come together to what is like themselves. — A little above, several codices [read] the fellowship of an animal for the fellowship of [what is] like.
  6. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.), ubi dicit, quod Kallias et Socrates sunt diversa propter materiam, idem autem specie. Cfr. etiam ibid. X. text. 25. (IX. c. 9.). Quae sequuntur nituntur dictis Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.), ubi inter ea quae unica sunt, recenset solem, et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 95. (c. 9.), ubi de caelo ait: Caelum autem est quidem eorum quae singularia sunt, et eorum quae ex materia; sed si non ex parte ipsius constat, sed ex universa, esse quidem ipsius caeli et huius caeli aliud est, non tamen aut erit aliud, aut utique contingit fieri plures, propterea quod hoc materiam comprehendit universam. — Cod. F ratione materiae, plures codd. ordine materiae, Vat. a diversitate materiae pro ex divisione materiae, quod exhibent codd. A K X Y cc et ed. 1 et infra in solutione habetur.
    Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 28 (VI, c. 8), where he says that Callias and Socrates are diverse on account of matter, but the same in species. Cf. also ibid. X, text 25 (IX, c. 9). What follows leans on the sayings of Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 55 (VI, c. 15), where among the things which are unique he reckons the sun, and I On the Heaven and the World text 95 (c. 9), where he says of the heaven: The heaven indeed is of those [things] which are singular, and of those which are from matter; but if it is not constituted from a part of itself, but from the whole, the being of the heaven itself and of this heaven is other, yet neither will it be other, nor does it happen to become several, because this comprehends the whole of matter. — Codex F [reads] ratione materiae, several codices ordine materiae, the Vatican [edition] a diversitate materiae for ex divisione materiae, which codices A K X Y cc and ed. 1 exhibit, and below in the solution it is had [so].
  7. Hanc rationem indicat Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.) et II. de Anima, text 35. (c. 4.). — In principio argumenti cod. cc et ed. 1 multitudinis pro multiplicationis, dein plures codd. corruptionis pro corruptibilitatis.
    This ground Aristotle indicates, II On Generation and Corruption text 59 (c. 10) and II On the Soul text 35 (c. 4). — At the beginning of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 [read] multitudinis for multiplicationis, then several codices corruptionis for corruptibilitatis.
  8. Aristot., III. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 4.): Nam ubi extrema sunt, istic et medium. — Vat. et medium similiter est possibile esse. Paulo inferius cod. I verbis in Deo praefigit ut.
    Aristotle, III Eudemian [Ethics] c. 6 (c. 4): For where there are extremes, there also [is] a middle. — The Vatican [edition reads] et medium similiter est possibile esse. A little below, codex I prefixes ut to the words in Deo.
  9. Hoc arg. formatum est ex iis quae Richardus a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 13. seq. proponit. Secundum ipsum persona sive existentia variatur et distinguitur « aut secundum solam rei qualitatem [proprietates], aut secundum solam rei originem, aut secundum utriusque concursionem... In angelica autem natura nulla est propagatio [origo], sed sola simplexque creatio. Est ergo singulorum simul et omnium unum solum indifferensque principium » etc.
    This argument is formed from those [things] which Richard of St. Victor, IV On the Trinity c. 13 f., proposes. According to him a person or existence is varied and distinguished « either according to the quality of the thing alone [its properties], or according to the origin of the thing alone, or according to the concurrence of both... But in the angelic nature there is no propagation [origin], but creation alone and simple. There is therefore of the individuals together and of all one single and undifferentiated principle » etc.
  10. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 perperam spirituali; Vat. spirituali et specifica; nostram lectionem praebent codd. I L O aa bb. Paulo ante plures codd. conveniat pro communicet. Dein in nonnullis mss. deest communem.
    Several codices with ed. 1 wrongly [read] spirituali; the Vatican [edition] spirituali et specifica; codices I L O aa bb present our reading. A little before, several codices [read] conveniat for communicet. Then in some manuscripts communem is lacking.
  11. Intellige, ut in cod. Q (a secunda manu) adiungitur; scilicet quod omnes Angeli differant non solum numero, sed etiam specie.
    Understand [it], as in codex Q (by a second hand) is added; namely that all angels differ not only in number, but also in species.
  12. Cod. A licet; in cod. I autem post sed multitudo subiungitur quae est.
    Codex A [reads] licet; in codex I, however, after sed multitudo is subjoined quae est.
  13. Cod. E supplet multitudo, Vat. diversitas est. Paulo inferius post finis multiplicationis cod. N addit simpliciter.
    Codex E supplies multitudo, the Vatican [edition] diversitas est. A little below, after finis multiplicationis codex N adds simpliciter.
  14. Plures codd. ut D E I K T bb civitatem Dei.
    Several codices, such as D E I K T bb, [read] civitatem Dei.
  15. Hic a. 1. q. 1.
    Here, article 1, question 1.
  16. Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 14: In humana pro certo natura, quam per experientiam novimus, personarum existentiam tam secundum personarum qualitatem, quam secundum ipsarum originem variari videmus. Certe omni humanae personae est qualitas singularis et propria, per quam absque omni ambiguitate differt a qualibet alia. Sic etiam singulis quibuscumque est origo propria, ab omnibus aliis diversa et singulari proprietate discreta; nam aliud principium est isti et aliud illi, quoniam alius est pater istius et alius est pater illius. Et ubi unus pater est pluribus, alia tamen est paternae substantiae decisio, unde propagatus est unus, et alia paternae substantiae decisio, unde propagatus est alius... In angelica autem natura nulla est propagatio... Sunt autem in angelica natura tot substantiae, quot personae, et idcirco oportet eas qualitate differre. Nam si nulla qualitate differrent, proculdubio plures substantiae non essent. — Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 habet pro habent, et dein plures codd. pro ratione principii substituunt pro ratione principii (codd. Y aa principali), ubi cod. A addit vel non est ratio principalis. Cod. T omittit habent.
    Book IV On the Trinity c. 14: In human nature for certain, which we know through experience, we see the existence of persons to be varied both according to the quality of the persons, and according to their origin. Certainly to every human person there is a singular and proper quality, by which without any ambiguity it differs from any other. So also to each and every one there is a proper origin, diverse from all others and discrete by a singular property; for there is one principle for this one and another for that one, since the father of this one is one [person] and the father of that one is another. And where one father is [father] to several, yet the cutting-off of the paternal substance whence the one is propagated is one, and the cutting-off of the paternal substance whence the other is propagated is another... But in the angelic nature there is no propagation... There are, however, in the angelic nature as many substances as persons, and therefore it is necessary that they differ in quality. For if they differed in no quality, without doubt there would not be several substances. — Not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] habet for habent, and then several codices for ratione principii substitute pro ratione principii (codices Y aa principali), where codex A adds vel non est ratio principalis. Codex T omits habent.
  17. Hae enim nobis manifestiores sunt, et quoad homines hoc versiculo comprehenduntur: Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen.
    For these are more manifest to us, and as to men they are comprehended in this little verse: Form, figure, place, time, stock, fatherland, name. ---
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