Bonaventure

Articulus II. De imagine secundum considerationem relatam.

Consequenter quaeritur de imagine secundum considerationem relatam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum ratio imaginis principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima.

Secundo, utrum principalius in viro quam in femina.

Tertio, utrum principalius reperiatur in cognitiva quam in affectiva¹.

Quaestio I. Utrum imaginis ratio principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ratio imaginis principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argumenta pro parte affirmativa.

1. Super illud Ezechielis vigesimo octavo²: Tu signaculum similitudinis, Gregorius: « Quanto subtilior est natura, tanto in ea imago divinitatis similius insinuatur impressa ».

2. Item, sapiens artifex in nobiliori tabula nobiliorem describit picturam: si igitur imago in creatura est quasi quaedam pictura tabulae impressa, sicut dicit Magister in littera³, ergo perfectiori et nobiliori modo imago divinitatis inscribi debet in Angelo quam in anima.

3. Item, ex eo dicitur creatura rationalis imago Dei, quo capax Dei est⁴; sed angelicus spiritus capacior est quam humanus, cum sit virtuosior et expeditior: ergo in eo imago divinitatis est eminentius impressa.

4. Item, imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate⁵; sed memoria perfectiori modo habet actum suum in Angelo quam in homine, similiter intelligentia et voluntas — memoria enim eius tenet sine oblivione, et intelligentia intelligit sine inquisitione, et voluntas diligit sine retardatione, quorum opposita sunt in anima — ergo etc.

Contra:

Pro parte negativa.

1. Expressius repraesentat summam Trinitatem quod repraesentat non solum quantum ad unitatem substantiae, sed etiam quantum ad distinctionem personarum; sed homo expressius repraesentat distinctionem personarum, quia in homine est personalis discretio per originem, in Angelis autem non⁶: ergo expressius repraesentat Trinitatem homo quam Angelus. Sed in quo est expressior repraesentatio, est expressior imago: ergo etc.

2. Item, evidentius imitatur alterum quod imitatur quantum ad substantiam et modum existendi, quam quod imitatur solum quantum ad alterum; sed anima repraesentat Trinitatem summam, et prout est in se ipsa, et prout est in rebus, ut sic in qualibet parte corporis sit tota, sicut summa essentia est in creatura⁷: ergo expressius imitatur Deum quam Angelus. Sed quod expressius imitatur excellentius sua imagine insignitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, expressius repraesentat Deum quod repraesentat ipsum non solum in se, sed secundum quod est principium aliorum, quam quod aliquo modo tantum; sed homo repraesentat Deum non solum, ut ens est in se, sed etiam, ut est principium aliorum, quia « sicut ex uno Deo omnia, ita ex uno homine omnes homines », sicut vult Glossa, primae ad Corinthios undecimo⁸: ergo, si quod expressius repraesentat, rationem imaginis participat eminentius, patet etc.

4. Item, plenius repraesentat aliquid quod repraesentat ipsum per maiorem accessum ad suam totalitatem; sed homo repraesentat Deum, in quantum est exemplar et spiritualium et corporalium, Angelus autem altero tantum modo: ergo in homine excellentiori modo reperitur imago⁹.

5. Item, quanto exemplum magis unitur exemplari¹⁰, tanto magis conformatur ei; et quanto magis natum est uniri, tanto magis natum est conformari; sed natura humana unitur divinae in unitate personae, quod quidem non facit angelica: ergo expressior est in ea imago, quam sit in Angelo.

6. Item, per considerationem Philosophi¹¹: « Si optimum in uno genere est melius optimo in alio genere, et est simpliciter hoc illo melius »; sed Christus, qui est optimus inter homines, excellentiori modo insignitus est imagine Dei quam optimus Angelus: ergo imago Dei in homine quam in Angelo reperitur excellentius.

Conclusio.

Ratio imaginis in Angelo et anima quoad aliquid est aeque principaliter, quoad aliquid in Angelo magis principaliter, quoad aliquid minus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quidam dicere voluerunt, quod creaturam magis esse ad imaginem Dei potest dici dupliciter: vel extensive, vel intensive. Opinio 1.

Si extensive, sic dixerunt, quod homo magis repraesentat Deum quam Angelus, quia in pluribus ratione corporis sibi uniti, utpote in spiritualibus et corporalibus et in modo existendi in rebus et secundum etiam modum producendi res. — Et sic dicunt procedere rationes ad secundam partem¹². Nam quod de Christo obiicitur, non valet; illud enim est singulare privilegium nec est naturae, sed potius gratiae. — Si autem dicatur una creatura magis esse ad imaginem quam alia intensive, quia expressius repraesentat; sic dicunt, Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei, quam sit homo; sicut ostendunt auctoritates et rationes ad oppositum. Et hoc insinuat Gregorius, cum dicit: « Quanto subtilior est natura, tanto in ea imago Trinitatis similius insinuatur impressa ». Et rationes etiam consequentes ostendunt, quod sicut excellentior est natura angelica, sic excellentiores habet potentias et maiorem habet capacitatem et digniori modo est imagine Dei insignita. — Et secundum hanc viam plana est responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad obiecta.

Non omnino probatur. Sed licet iste modus dicendi probabilis videatur, non modicam tamen habet calumniam ratione utriusque partis distinctionis. Quod enim dicatur imago magis esse in homine extensive quam in Angelis, hoc verbis Augustini non consonat, qui rationem imaginis dicit esse in anima praecise secundum partem supremam, sicut patet in decimo quarto et decimo quinto de Trinitate¹³. Similiter, quod dicatur universaliter expressior esse imago Dei in Angelo quam in anima propter maiorem dignitatem naturae, hoc non videtur consonare Glossae, quae dicit super illud, secundo¹⁴ ad Hebraeos: Eum qui modicum minoratus est ab Angelis; ibi dicit Glossa, quod « natura mentis humanae, qualem Christus assumsit, solus Deus maior est ». Et Augustinus hoc innuit in pluribus locis; et pie creditur et communiter sentitur, quod Virgo Maria magis inter omnes Angelos accedit ad Deum.

Opinio 2. Propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod cum expressio imaginis consistat in convenientia ordinis et proportionis¹⁵, intensio dignitatis imaginis consistit secundum intensionem convenientiae quantum ad proportionem, vel ordinem. Principium generale.

Attendendum autem, quod convenientia creaturae rationalis ad Deum secundum ordinem quaedam est de esse imaginis, et quaedam de bene esse. De Triplex convenientia ordinis. esse imaginis est, quod creatura immediate ordinetur ad Deum; de bene esse vero est, quod creatura, quae est imago, praeponatur aliis, quae tenent rationem vestigii; et quod alia ordinentur in ipsam tanquam in finem. — Et sic triplex est ordo in creatura rationali, secundum quem conformatur Deo. Triplex ordo. Primus, quod immediate nata est Deo coniungi; et hic est essentialis imagini, et in hoc Angelus et anima aequiparantur, quia utriusque « mens immediate ab ipsa prima veritate formatur¹⁶ ». — Secundus est, quo praeponitur creatura, quae est imago, aliis creaturis; et in hoc Angeli praecellunt, quia non solum bestiis, sed etiam hominibus rectores sunt deputati, secundum illud, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo¹⁷: In unamquamque gentem praeposuit rectores, Glossa: id est, Angelos; et iste est ordo, quo creatura irrationalis regitur a Deo mediante rationali. — Tertius est ordo, quo creaturae irrationales ad rationalem ordinantur tanquam in finem, propter quem sunt factae, et mediante illo in ultimum finem principalem¹⁸; et secundum hunc ordinem magis convenit homo cum Deo quam Angelus; magis enim facta sunt et corporalia et sensibilia propter homines quam propter Angelos. — Et sic patet, quod ratio imaginis, prout attenditur in convenientia ordinis, quantum ad id quod est de esse, in homine et Angelo reperitur aequaliter, quia uterque ordinatur in Deum immediate. Conclusio 1. Quantum vero ad illud, quod est de bene esse, scilicet quantum ad ordinem respectu creaturarum, se habent per modum excedentis et excessi. Conclusio 2. Angelus enim magis convenit quantum ad ordinem sub ratione regiminis; homo vero magis quantum ad ordinem, qui attenditur in ratione finis.

Consimili modo reperimus et aequalitatem et mutuum excessum in expressione imaginis, quae attenditur secundum convenientiam proportionis; Duplex convenientia proportionis. quia quaedam est convenientia habitudinis, quae est de esse imaginis, quaedam de bene esse. Illa est de esse, quae consistit in comparatione ad intrinseca sicut ad potentias; et in hac homo et Angelus adaequantur, quia ita bene est distinctio et origo et aequalitas et consubstantialitas in potentiis animae, in memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate, sicut in potentiis Angeli. Conclusio 3. — Illa vero convenientia habitudinis est de bene esse, quae attenditur in comparatione creaturae rationalis ad aliquod extrinsecum, utpote ad corpus, quod est ipsa inferius. Haec autem dupliciter potest esse expressior: vel privative, Subdistinctio. vel positive. Si positive; sic anima est imago expressior, Conclusio 4.

quae in hoc, quod coniungitur corpori ita, quod per illud est principium aliorum, et per illud totum inhabitat, magis repraesentat Deum, qui est principium omnium, et qui unus est in omnibus. Si autem privative; sic Angelus magis repraesentat Deum, quia Deus est spiritus purus, omnino impermixtus et independens a creaturis omnibus; et hoc repraesentat angelicus spiritus, dum est a corpore secundum actum et aptitudinem separatus. Et pro tanto dicitur esse subtilior a Gregorio, et in eo imago divinitatis esse expressior. Conclusio 5. Et sic patet, quod quantum ad convenientiam proportionis, quae est de essentia imaginis, inter hominem et Angelum potest esse aequalitas; quantum vero ad illam, quae est de bene esse, se habent sicut excedentia et excessa.

Ex praedictis igitur patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Cum enim quaeritur, utrum principalius vel expressius sit imago Dei in Angelo quam in anima; respondendum, quod quantum ad aliquid est aeque principaliter, quantum ad aliquid magis principaliter, quantum ad aliquid minus, sicut explanatum est. Conclusio generalis. — Et in hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem, quae procedunt secundum diversas vias, secundum quas veritatem possunt concludere, quia non habent oppositionem.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 3, 4. Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de maiori capacitate, dici potest, quod non cogit. Angelus enim capacitatem gratiae habet in comparatione ad sursum, in qua comparatione non excedit naturam mentis humanae. Quod autem natura angelica dicatur excedere humanam, hoc est in comparatione ad corpus, ad quod non habet inclinationem secundum quod anima¹⁹; et ideo maioritas dignitatis in natura angelica respectu animae non facit ad excellentiam imaginis sive illius capacitatis, quae est in natura humanae mentis, secundum quod anima est capax Dei. — Similiter nec aliud, quod sequitur, cogit; quia maior vivacitas memoriae vel intelligentiae potius facit ad intensionem similitudinis quam ad imaginis maiorem expressionem. Similitudo enim consistit in proprietatibus naturalibus, imago vero in origine et habitudine; et quamvis potentiae in Angelis sint vivaciores quam in animabus²⁰, et ideo Deo similiores; eundem tamen habent ordinem et habitudinem, sicut ostensum est supra. Unde magis proprie conceditur, quod Angelus sit Deo similior quam homo, quam possit concedi, quod Angelus sit magis imago; et hoc vult dicere auctoritas Gregorii.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa, Ad 5. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt et concludunt maiorem expressionem quantum ad illud quod est accidentale imagini, excepta illa, quae fundatur super unionem; ad quam dicendum, quod non cogit, pro eo quod substantia, quae minus capax est gratiae per naturam, potest effici magis capax per aliquam gratiam gratis datam, quae disponit et ampliat capacitatem naturae ad susceptionem gratiae gratum facientis. Notandum. Unde esto, quod natura angelica esset magis capax gratiae quam humana natura secundum naturalem potentiam — sicut videtur rationabiliter esse ponendum, ut natura angelica sit excellentior, et excellentiori naturae debeatur excellentior potentia et capacitas — nihilominus tamen per aliquod donum divinitus sibi gratis datum potest elevari capacitas animae usque ad capacitatem Angeli, et quodam modo ampliorem. Nam donum gratiae gratis datae disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem; et sic possibile est fuisse in Christo et beata Virgine. Et sic patent obiecta ad utramque partem.

Article II. On the image considered relatively.

Consequently the question is asked about the image considered relatively. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.

Second, whether more principally in the man than in the woman.

Third, whether it is found more principally in the cognitive than in the affective¹.

Question I. Whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.

Concerning the first the matter proceeds and is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul. And that it is so, seems clear.

Arguments for the affirmative.

1. On that text of Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight²: Thou seal of likeness, Gregory: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of divinity is suggested as imprinted in it."

2. Likewise, the wise craftsman draws a nobler picture upon a nobler tablet: if therefore the image in a creature is, as it were, a kind of picture imprinted upon a tablet, as the Master says in the text³, then the image of divinity ought to be inscribed in a more perfect and noble manner in the Angel than in the soul.

3. Likewise, the rational creature is called the image of God for the reason that it is capable of God⁴; but the angelic spirit is more capacious than the human, since it is more vigorous and more unencumbered: therefore in it the image of divinity is more eminently imprinted.

4. Likewise, the image consists in memory, intelligence, and will⁵; but memory has its act in a more perfect manner in the Angel than in man, and likewise intelligence and will — for the Angel's memory holds without forgetting, his intelligence understands without inquiry, and his will loves without delay, the opposites of which are in the soul — therefore etc.

On the contrary:

For the negative side.

1. That represents the supreme Trinity more expressly which represents it not only as to unity of substance, but also as to the distinction of persons; but man represents the distinction of persons more expressly, because in man there is a personal discretion through origin, whereas in the Angels there is not⁶: therefore man represents the Trinity more expressly than the Angel. But that in which the representation is more express is the more express image: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that imitates another more evidently which imitates it both as to substance and mode of existing, than that which imitates it only as to some one aspect; but the soul represents the supreme Trinity both as it is in itself and as it is in things, so that it is whole in any part of the body, just as the supreme Essence is whole in creation⁷: therefore it imitates God more expressly than the Angel. But that which imitates more expressly is more excellently distinguished by His image: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that represents God more expressly which represents Him not only in Himself, but inasmuch as He is the principle of others, than that which does so only in some single way; but man represents God not only as a being in himself, but also as being the principle of others, because "just as from one God are all things, so from one man are all men," as the Gloss has it on First Corinthians chapter eleven⁸: therefore if what represents more expressly participates the formal character of the image more eminently, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that more fully represents something which represents it through a greater approach to its totality; but man represents God inasmuch as God is the exemplar both of spiritual and of corporeal things, whereas the Angel does so only in the one mode: therefore in man the image is found in a more excellent manner⁹.

5. Likewise, the more the copy is united to its exemplar¹⁰, the more it is conformed to it; and the more it is naturally apt to be united, the more it is naturally apt to be conformed; but the human nature is united to the divine in unity of person, which the angelic nature in fact does not do: therefore the image is more expressly in it than it is in the Angel.

6. Likewise, by the consideration of the Philosopher¹¹: "If the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is also unqualifiedly better than that"; but Christ, who is the best among men, is more excellently distinguished by the image of God than the best Angel: therefore the image of God is found more excellently in man than in the Angel.

Conclusion.

The formal character of the image is, as to one respect, equally principally in the Angel and the soul; as to another, more principally in the Angel; as to another, less.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that some have wished to say that a creature is more to the image of God can be said in two ways: either extensively, or intensively. Opinion 1. If extensively, then they have said that man represents God more than the Angel, because in more respects, by reason of the body united to him — namely in spiritual things, in corporeal things, in the mode of existing in things, and likewise in the mode of producing things. — And in this way they say the reasonings proceed for the second part¹². For what is objected concerning Christ does not hold; for that is a singular privilege and is not of nature, but rather of grace. — But if one creature be said to be more to the image than another intensively, because it represents more expressly; then they say that the Angel is more to the image of God than man, as the authorities and reasonings to the contrary show. And this Gregory suggests when he says: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of the Trinity is suggested as imprinted in it." And the reasonings that follow also show that just as the angelic nature is more excellent, so it has more excellent powers and a greater capacity and is distinguished by the image of God in a worthier manner. — And in this way the answer to the proposed question and to the objections is plain.

Not entirely accepted. But although this manner of speaking seems probable, it nevertheless has no small calumny on the side of both members of the distinction. For that the image be said to be more in man extensively than in the Angels does not accord with the words of Augustine, who says that the formal character of the image is in the soul precisely according to its supreme part, as is clear in the fourteenth and fifteenth books On the Trinity¹³. Likewise, that it be universally said that the image of God is more expressly in the Angel than in the soul on account of the greater dignity of nature does not seem to accord with the Gloss, which says upon that text, in chapter two¹⁴ of Hebrews: Him who was made a little less than the Angels; there the Gloss says that "than the nature of the human mind, such as Christ assumed, only God is greater." And Augustine suggests this in several places; and it is piously believed and commonly held that the Virgin Mary, more than all the Angels, approaches God.

Opinion 2. Therefore there is another way of speaking, namely that, since the expression of the image consists in agreement of order and of proportion¹⁵, the intensity of the dignity of the image consists according to the intensity of agreement as regards proportion or order. General principle.

But it must be noted that the agreement of the rational creature with God according to order is partly of the being of the image and partly of its well-being. Threefold agreement of order. Of the being of the image is that the creature be ordered immediately to God; of well-being is that the creature which is an image be set before the others, which hold the formal character of a trace, and that the others be ordered to it as to an end. — And thus there is a threefold order in the rational creature according to which it is conformed to God. Threefold order. The first is that it is naturally apt to be joined immediately to God; and this is essential to the image, and in this the Angel and the soul are equated, because for both "the mind is immediately formed by the first truth itself¹⁶." — The second is that by which the creature which is an image is set before other creatures; and in this the Angels excel, because they are deputed as rulers not only of beasts but even of men, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus chapter seventeen¹⁷: Over every nation he set rulers, the Gloss: that is, the Angels; and this is the order by which the irrational creature is ruled by God through the mediation of the rational. — The third is the order by which irrational creatures are ordered to the rational as to the end for which they were made, and through that order to the ultimate principal end¹⁸; and according to this order man agrees more with God than the Angel does; for corporeal and sensible things have been made more for the sake of men than for the sake of the Angels. — And thus it is clear that the formal character of the image, insofar as it is considered in agreement of order, as regards what belongs to its being, is found equally in man and the Angel, because each is ordered to God immediately. Conclusion 1. But as regards what belongs to its well-being, namely as regards order with respect to creatures, they stand in the manner of excelling and being excelled. Conclusion 2. For the Angel agrees more as to order under the formal character of ruling; but man more as to the order which is considered in the formal character of end.

In a similar way we find both equality and mutual excess in the expression of the image which is considered according to agreement of proportion; Twofold agreement of proportion. for one is an agreement of relation which belongs to the being of the image, another to its well-being. That belongs to being which consists in comparison to intrinsic things, namely to the powers; and in this man and the Angel are equated, because there is just as truly distinction and origin and equality and consubstantiality in the powers of the soul — namely in memory, intelligence, and will — as there is in the powers of the Angel. Conclusion 3. — But that agreement of relation belongs to well-being which is considered in comparison of the rational creature to something extrinsic, such as to the body, which is inferior to it. This can be more expressive in two ways: either privatively Sub-distinction. or positively. If positively; then the soul is the more expressive image, Conclusion 4. in that, joined to the body in such a way that through it the soul is the principle of others and through it inhabits the whole body, it more represents God, who is the principle of all things and who is one in all. But if privatively; then the Angel more represents God, because God is a pure spirit, altogether unmixed and independent of every creature; and this the angelic spirit represents, since it is separated from body according to act and aptitude. And for so much it is called more subtle by Gregory, and in it the image of divinity is said to be more expressive. Conclusion 5. And thus it is clear that as regards the agreement of proportion which belongs to the essence of the image, between man and the Angel there can be equality; but as regards that which belongs to well-being, they stand as excelling and being excelled.

From what has been said, therefore, the answer to the proposed question is clear. For when it is asked whether the image of God is more principally or expressly in the Angel than in the soul; the answer is that in some respect it is equally principally, in some more principally, in some less, as has been explained. General conclusion. — And in this the answer to the reasonings on either side is clear, since they proceed according to diverse ways by which they can conclude something true, because they have no opposition.

To the arguments for the affirmative:

To 3 and 4. To what is objected concerning the greater capacity, however, it can be said that it does not press the point. For the Angel has a capacity for grace in comparison to what is above, in which comparison it does not exceed the nature of the human mind. But that the angelic nature is said to exceed the human is in comparison to the body, to which it does not have an inclination in the way the soul has¹⁹; and therefore the greater dignity in the angelic nature with respect to the soul does not contribute to the excellence of the image or of that capacity which is in the nature of the human mind, according to which the soul is capable of God. — Likewise, nor does what follows press the point; because the greater liveliness of memory or of intelligence makes rather for the intensification of likeness than for greater expression of the image. For likeness consists in natural properties, but image in origin and relation; and although the powers in the Angels are more lively than in souls²⁰ — and therefore are more like God — yet they have the same order and relation, as has been shown above. Whence it is more properly conceded that the Angel is more like to God than man, than it can be conceded that the Angel is more an image; and this is what the authority of Gregory means to say.

To the arguments for the negative:

To the arguments on the negative side, To 5. The reasonings on the contrary side proceed and conclude a greater expression as regards what is accidental to the image, except for the one which is grounded upon the union; to which it must be said that it does not press the point, since the substance which is less capable of grace by nature can be rendered more capable through some gratuitously given grace, which disposes and amplifies the capacity of nature for the reception of sanctifying grace. Note. Whence, granted that the angelic nature were more capable of grace than the human nature according to natural potency — as it seems reasonably to be posited, namely that the angelic nature is more excellent, and to a more excellent nature is owed a more excellent power and capacity — nevertheless, through some gift gratuitously given by God, the capacity of the soul can be elevated up to the capacity of the Angel, and in a certain way to a more ample one. For the gift of gratuitously given grace disposes to sanctifying grace; and it was so possible to have been in Christ and the blessed Virgin. And thus the objections on either side are made clear.