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Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 398

Quaestio III. Utrum esse imaginem conveniat homini proprie, ita quod nulli alii.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum esse imaginem conveniat homini proprie, ita quod nulli alii. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum.

1. Fundamenta. In solius hominis conditione dictum est1: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem etc.; sed haec est nobilissima conditio, quae si daretur aliis, nullo modo deberet praetermitti: ergo videtur, quod nulli alii quam homini esse ad imaginem suam Deus dederit. Quod si praetermisit de aliis, et non de homine, tunc est quaestio: quare Scriptura fecit?

2. Item, Augustinus in sermone de imagine2: « Ad imaginem et similitudinem suam Deus illum creavit — loquitur de homine — quod nulli alii creaturae dedit ».

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia « quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit »3; sed imago dicit similitudinem expressissimam in genere creaturae: ergo oportet, quod conveniat vel uni soli speciei, vel uni soli individuo.

4. Item, eo ipso homo est imago Dei, quia immediate tendit in Deum4; si ergo universum est ordinatum secundum omnem sui partem, impossibile est, quod aliquae creaturae diversarum specierum ordinentur in Deum ex aequo et immediate: ergo vel homo et Angelus erunt eiusdem speciei, vel esse imaginem convenit soli homini.

5. Item, homo, eo ipso quod est imago Dei, est finis omnium aliorum5; sed hoc non potest pluribus diversis specie convenire, et planum est, quod Angelo non convenit: ergo videtur, quod esse imaginem conveniat soli homini.

6. Item, quia homo est imago Dei, fuit unibilis divinae naturae6; hoc autem est eius proprium: ergo proprium est homini esse Dei imaginem.

Contra:

1. Fundamenta. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus7 dicit, quod « Angelus est imago Dei, manifestatio occulti luminis » etc.

2. Item, « Anima eo ipso est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest »8; sed hoc competit Angelo, sicut animae: ergo non soli homini competit esse imaginem.

3. Item, ista est nobilissima omnium conditionum naturalium, videlicet esse imaginem: ergo nobilissima omnium creaturarum huiusmodi proprietatis non debuit esse expers; si igitur creatura angelica est huiusmodi9, patet etc.

4. Item, imago inest animae secundum superiorem partem, sicut in primo libro10 ostensum est; sed in illa parte homo et Angelus habent convenientiam: ergo videtur similiter, quod in dignitate imaginis conveniunt: ergo esse imaginem non est proprium solius hominis.

p. 399
Conclusio. Esse imaginem Dei proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, cum quibus hoc est ei commune.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod proprium dicitur dupliciter. Est enim proprium simpliciter, et proprium alicui11. Proprium simpliciter est quod convenit omni et soli; proprium alicui est quod convenit omni contento sub illa specie, ita quod quibusdam aliis convenit, quibusdam vero minime; sicut esse bipedem proprie convenit homini respectu quadrupedum, non respectu volatilium. — Dicendum est igitur, quod sicut esse rationale vel intellectuale non est proprium homini simpliciter, quia convenit in hoc cum Angelo, sed est proprium respectu rerum corporalium; sic esse imaginem proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, immo communiter convenit hominibus et Angelis, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta:

Solutio oppositorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Scriptura non exprimit; dicendum, quod Scriptura non determinat conditionem Angeli expresse; ideo non est mirum, si non determinat eius modum nec dicit, eam ad imaginem esse factam. Si autem quaeras, quare non determinat, hoc determinatum est supra, distinctione decima tertia12.

Ad 2. Ad illud Augustini dicendum, quod Augustinus non excludit creaturas spirituales, sed creaturas corporales et visibiles, quando dicit, quod nulli alii creaturae dedit. Item, hoc dicit propter aliquam proprietatem repraesentationis, quam Deus dedit homini, non alii creaturae spirituali, vel corporali, non propter rationem imaginis principalem, quae consequitur omnem naturam rationalem.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similitudo expressissima; dicendum, quod superlativum dupliciter potest exponi: uno modo per suum positivum cum valde adverbio, ut albissimum, id est valde album; et sic intelligitur, cum dicitur ad imaginem; et non oportet, ipsum Angelum superponi. Aliquando superlativum intelligitur respective, et tunc dicit excessum respectu omnium, ad quae comparatur; et hoc modo non potest convenire pluribus; et sic non accipitur in proposito13. Duplex sensus superlativi.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eo ipso quo est imago, est finis; dicendum, quod ista non est tota ratio; immo, quia sic est imago in anima, quod ex parte corporis cum omnibus corporalibus habet quandam convenientiam; et ideo solus homo dicitur omnis creatura14, et omnia propter ipsum quodam modo fieri, et ad ipsum etiam referri.

Ad 5–6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de unione, dicendum, quod etsi ratio imaginis sit dispositio ad unionem, non tamen est dispositio sufficiens de se, nisi competat hoc personali proprietati et culpabili infirmitati; et hoc est reperire in homine, non in Angelo, sicut infra melius patebit in tertio15. Notandum. Ad praesens autem sufficiat, quod quidquid sit de unibilitate, imago tamen universaliter consequitur creaturam rationalem, ita quod omnis creatura rationalis est imago Dei veraciter et naturaliter. Et ratio huius est expressio similitudinis quantum ad convenientiam ordinis, quae supra in principio quaestionis explanata fuit.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other.

Thirdly, it is asked whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other. And that it does, it seems.

On the affirmative side.

1. Foundations. In the condition of man alone it was said1: Let us make man to our image etc.; but this is the noblest condition, which, if it were given to others, ought in no way to be passed over: therefore it seems that to no other than man did God grant to be made to his image. But if he passed it over in regard to others and not in regard to man, then the question arises: why did Scripture do so?

2. Likewise, Augustine in his sermon On the Image2: « To his image and likeness God created him — he is speaking of man — which he gave to no other creature ».

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason, because « what is said by way of superabundance befits one only »3; but image signifies the most expressed likeness in the genus of creatures: therefore it must befit either one species only, or one individual only.

4. Likewise, by the very fact that man is the image of God, he immediately tends toward God4; if therefore the universe is ordered according to every one of its parts, it is impossible that some creatures of different species be ordered to God equally and immediately: therefore either man and the Angel will be of the same species, or to be an image befits man alone.

5. Likewise, man, by the very fact that he is the image of God, is the end of all the others5; but this cannot befit many things differing in species, and it is plain that it does not befit the Angel: therefore it seems that to be an image befits man alone.

6. Likewise, because man is the image of God, he was unitable to the divine nature6; but this is proper to him: therefore it is proper to man to be the image of God.

On the contrary:

1. Foundations. Dionysius in On the Divine Names7 says that « the Angel is the image of God, a manifestation of the hidden light » etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul is the image of God by the very fact that it is capable of God and can be a partaker [of him] »8; but this befits the Angel as well as the soul: therefore to be an image does not befit man alone.

3. Likewise, this is the noblest of all natural conditions, namely to be an image: therefore the noblest of all creatures ought not to be deprived of such a property; if therefore the angelic creature is such9, the rest is clear.

4. Likewise, the image is in the soul according to its higher part, as was shown in the first book10; but in that part man and the Angel share a likeness: therefore it seems likewise that they share in the dignity of the image: therefore to be an image is not proper to man alone.

Conclusion. To be the image of God properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, with whom this is common to him.

I respond: It must be said that proper is spoken of in two ways. For there is proper simply and proper to something11. Proper simply is that which befits all and only [of a kind]; proper to something is that which befits everyone contained under that species, in such a way that it befits certain others and certain others not at all; just as being two-footed properly befits man with respect to four-footed creatures, not with respect to flying creatures. — It must therefore be said that, just as being rational or intellectual is not proper to man simply, since in this he shares with the Angel, but is proper [to him] with respect to corporeal things; so to be an image properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, but rather befits men and Angels in common, as the reasons adduced for this show.

Replies to the arguments:

Solution of the opposing arguments.

To 1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that Scripture does not express it; it must be said that Scripture does not determine the condition of the Angel expressly; therefore it is no wonder if it does not determine its manner nor say that he was made to the image. But if you ask why it does not determine [this], that has been determined above, in the thirteenth distinction12.

To 2. To that of Augustine it must be said that Augustine does not exclude spiritual creatures, but corporeal and visible creatures, when he says that he gave it to no other creature. Also, he says this on account of a certain property of representation which God gave to man, not to another spiritual or corporeal creature — not on account of the principal account of image, which follows upon every rational nature.

To 3. To that which is objected, that it is the most expressed likeness; it must be said that the superlative can be expounded in two ways: in one way through its positive with the adverb very, as whitest, that is, very white; and so it is understood when it is said to the image; and it is not necessary that the Angel himself be set above. Sometimes the superlative is understood relatively, and then it indicates excess with respect to all to which it is compared; and in this way it cannot befit many; and so it is not taken in the present case13. Twofold sense of the superlative.

To 4. To that which is objected, that by the very fact that [man] is the image, he is the end; it must be said that this is not the whole account; rather, because [man] is so the image in the soul, that on the side of the body he has a certain agreement with all corporeal things; and therefore man alone is called every creature14, and all things are said in a certain manner to be made for his sake, and also to be referred to him.

To 5–6. To that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that even if the account of image is a disposition to union, nevertheless it is not a disposition sufficient of itself, unless this be joined to a personal property and to a culpable infirmity; and this is to be found in man, not in the Angel, as will appear better below in the third [book]15. Note. For the present, however, let it suffice that whatever may be the case concerning unitability, image nevertheless universally follows upon a rational creature, in such a way that every rational creature is the image of God truly and naturally. And the reason for this is the expression of likeness as regards the agreement of order, which was explained above at the beginning of the question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Gen. 1, 26.
    Genesis 1:26.
  2. Serm. 43. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, serm. 27.) c. 2. n. 3. seq., ubi recenset dona, quae homo et aliae creaturae a Deo receperunt, ac dicit: Sed tamen amplius, quid habemus? Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces: in eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei... Imaginem in nobis Dei deformare potuimus, reformare non possumus. Habemus ergo, ut cuncta breviter retexamus, ipsum esse cum lignis et lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum bestiis, intelligere cum Angelis. Cfr. Serm. 24. (alias 6. ex Sirmond.) n. 3., ubi, enumeratis ceteris creaturis, ait: Nonne istorum omnium artifex Deus? Sed hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam fecit.
    Sermon 43 (alias On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 27), c. 2, n. 3 ff., where he reviews the gifts which man and other creatures have received from God, and says: But still, what further do we have? Mind, reason, counsel — which the beasts do not have, the birds do not have, the fishes do not have: in this we were made to the image of God... We have been able to deform the image of God in us; to reform it we cannot. We have therefore, to retrace all things briefly, being itself in common with woods and stones, life with trees, sensation with beasts, understanding with Angels. Cf. Sermon 24 (alias 6 from Sirmond), n. 3, where, having enumerated the rest of the creatures, he says: Is not God the artisan of them all? But man he made to his own image and likeness.
  3. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 542, nota 2.
    Aristotle, Topics V, c. 3 (c. 5). Cf. tome I, p. 542, note 2.
  4. Sicut supra q. I. in corp. ostensum est.
    As was shown above in question I, in the body.
  5. Vide supra d. 13. a. 2. q. I. Cfr. etiam Ambros., Epist. 43. ad Honoratian. n. 13. seq.
    See above, d. 13, a. 2, q. I. Cf. also Ambrose, Letter 43 to Honoratianus, n. 13 ff.
  6. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. q. I. seq.
    Cf. III Sentences, d. 2, a. 1, q. I ff.
  7. Cap. 4. § 22. Cfr. supra d. 9. Praenotata, ubi haec definitio Angeli exponitur.
    Chapter 4, § 22. Cf. above, d. 9, Praenotata, where this definition of the Angel is expounded.
  8. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — Circa finem arg. multi codd. cum Vat. convenit esse pro competit esse.
    Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — Near the end of the argument many codices with the Vatican edition read convenit esse in place of competit esse.
  9. De quo vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.
    Concerning which see above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.
  10. Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
    Distinction 3, part II, a. 1, q. 2.
  11. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1: Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad aliud... Est autem per se quidem proprium, quod ad omnia assignatur et ab omni separat... ad aliquod autem, quod non ab omni, sed ab aliquo statuto determinat. — Cod. B. et proprium secundum quid vel alicui.
    Aristotle, Topics V, c. 1: The proper is assigned either per se and always, or in relation to another... per se proper is what is assigned to all and separates [it] from all; relative [proper] is what determines not from all, but from some fixed [subject]. — Codex B: and proper in a certain respect or to something.
  12. Art. 1. q. 1. ad 2.
    Article 1, question 1, reply to 2.
  13. Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 materiales.
    Some codices with edition 1 read materiales.
  14. Prisician., III. Grammat. c. 3: Superlativum est, quod vel ad plures sui generis comparatum superponitur omnibus, vel per se prolatum, intellectum habet cum valde adverbio positivi, ut fortissimus fuit Graecorum Achilles, i. e. fortis super omnes Graecos; sin autem dicam: fortissimus Hercules fuit, non adiiciens quorum, intelligo valde fortis. Tale est apud Ciceronem pro Marco Marcello: simillimum Deo iudico, pro valde similem Deo. — Vat. supponi pro superponi. — Nota, quod S. Doctor ad 4. arg. non respondet; sed solutionis principia data sunt hic in fundam. 2, 4, et q. 1. et supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2, q. 2 in corp. et ad 2.
    Priscian, Grammar III, c. 3: The superlative is that which, compared with more of its own kind, is set above them all, or, taken by itself, has the sense of the positive with the adverb very, as "Achilles was the bravest of the Greeks," i.e. brave above all the Greeks; but if I say "Hercules was bravest," not adding "of whom," I understand "very brave." Such is the usage in Cicero, Pro Marco Marcello: I judge him most like to God, for very like to God. — The Vatican edition reads supponi for superponi. — Note that the holy Doctor does not respond to the 4th argument; but the principles of the solution are given here in Fundamenta 2, 4, and q. 1, and above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body and in the reply to 2.
  15. Gregor., in Evang. homil. 29. n. 2: Sed omnis creaturae nomine signatur homo.
    Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels 29, n. 2: But by the name of "every creature" man is signified. ---
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