Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 16
Quaestio II. Utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Fundamenta. Quod inest alicui a sua prima origine inest ei naturaliter1; sed esse imaginem Dei convenit homini a sua prima conditione: ergo est ei naturale2.
2. Item, quod inest omnibus communiter et
inseparabiliter, inest naturaliter3; sed esse imaginem convenit homini universaliter et inseparabiliter: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod convenit alicui secundum naturales eius proprietates convenit ei naturaliter; sed esse imaginem convenit homini secundum intrinsecas potentias et naturales: ergo convenit ei naturaliter.
4. Item, esse imaginem Dei non est homini accidens, sed potius substantiale, sicut esse vestigium nulli accidit creaturae: si ergo homo non est imago Dei naturalis, ergo non est res naturalis, sed artificialis. Si igitur hoc est plane falsum, scilicet quod homo sit artificialis: ergo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.
5. Item, asinus artificialis non est asinus verus, ergo imago artificialis non est imago vera; sed homo est imago vera: ergo non est imago artificialis; et est artificialis vel naturalis: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Ad oppositum. Hilarius in libro de Synodo4 definiens naturalem imaginem dicit: «Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens»; sed homo non est species indifferens ipsius Dei: ergo non est imago naturalis.
2. Item, Augustinus de Decem Chordis5: «Sicut differt imago imperatoris in filio et in nummo, sic differt imago in Filio Dei et in homine»: si igitur imago in filio imperatoris est naturalis, in nummo est artificialis, videtur, quod solus Filius Dei sit imago naturalis, homo vero solum artificialis.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Sicut proprium est personae Filii esse filium, ita proprium est esse imaginem6; sed sola persona Filii est filius naturalis, et non homo: ergo pari ratione sola persona Filii est imago naturalis, et non homo.
4. Item, quod est a voluntate non est a natura7; sed productio hominis est a voluntate Dei: ergo non est a natura. Sed ab eo habet esse imaginem, a quo habet et produci: si igitur anima hominis non producitur a Deo secundum naturam, sed secundum voluntatem, non erit imago Dei naturalis, sed voluntaria.
5. Item, imago dicit imitationem et similitudinem: ergo si aliquid est imago alicuius naturalis, assimilatur cum eo in natura; sed homo cum Deo in natura assimilari non potest8: ergo non potest esse eius imago naturalis.
### Conclusio. Homo est Dei imago nec artificialis nec connaturalis, sed naturalis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum imago dicatur ab actu repraesentandi9 — nam imago refertur ad prototypum, ut dicit Damascenus10 — et repraesentatio dupliciter possit convenire alicui: vel per formam naturalem, vel per formam artificialem; Duplex imago. quod duplex est imago, naturalis scilicet et artificialis. Et cum homo non repraesentet per formam artificialem, sed per suam formam naturalem et potentias ei naturaliter inditas; Conclusio 1. homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.
Tertia species Imaginis. Differt autem dicere imaginem naturalem et connaturalem. Nam imago naturalis est, quae repraesentat per id quod habet a natura, sive cum illo quod repraesentat, conveniat in natura, sive non. Imago vero connaturalis dicitur, quae imitatur et refertur non solum per id quod habet a natura, sed per convenientiam in eadem natura. Conclusio 2. Ideo, etsi esse imaginem11 conveniat homini, esse tamen imaginem connaturalem non convenit homini, sed soli Filio Dei.
Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod Hilarius definit imaginem connaturalem, non naturalem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum, quod non intendit ponere similitudinem quantum ad naturale et artificiale, sed quantum ad convenientiam et discrepantiam in natura. Sicut enim nummus cum imperatore in natura non convenit, sed filius eius convenit; sic in proposito intelligendum est.
3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod sola persona Filii est filius naturalis; dicendum, quod non est simile. Notandum. Aliter enim accipitur naturale, prout adiacet Filio, aliter, prout adiacet imagini; non enim differt dicere Filium naturalem et connaturalem, sicut differt in imagine. — Ratio Et ratio huius est ista: quia Filius dicit ut a quo, quantum est de suo principali intellectu; imago dicit ut ad quem. Ideo naturale, dictum de Filio, significat, quod egressus Filii sit per modum naturae, et ita, quod cum Patre conveniat in natura; sed cum dicitur imago
naturalis, significatur, quod illa repraesentatio est a naturali principio sive proprietate; et propter hoc non datur intelligi, quod sit inter imaginem et eum cuius est imago, convenientia naturae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est a voluntate non est a natura; dicendum, quod verum est ex ea parte, ex qua est a voluntate; unde, cum creatura a Deo producitur voluntarie, Notandum. non dicitur ab eo exire naturaliter, sed voluntarie; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod voluntarie repraesentet, immo est ibi accidens12. Quamvis enim Deus voluntarie produxerit hominem, homo tamen habet operationes naturales, quia divina voluntas fabricavit et fecit ipsam naturam; non sic autem est de voluntate artificis creati, qui naturalem formam non potest producere.
5. Notandum. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago dicit similitudinem in natura; dicendum, quod haec determinatio naturaliter, addita alicui termino, qui quidem nec dicit habitudinem ut a quo, nec ut ad quem, ambiguam reddit locutionem, quia potest dicere habitudinem vel in ratione causae, vel in ratione formae13. Unde haec est duplex: iste naturaliter assimilatur illi: vel ut intelligatur causaliter, quia assimilatur in eo quod habet a natura; vel ut intelligatur formaliter, quia assimilatur in ipsa natura. Primo modo accipiendo, haec est vera: homo naturaliter assimilatur Deo; secundo modo falsa; et primo modo sequitur ad hanc: homo naturaliter est imago Dei: alio vero modo non14.
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Question II. Whether man is the image of God naturally.
Secondly it is asked whether man is the image of God naturally. And that he is, seems [the case].
1. Fundamenta. What belongs to something from its first origin belongs to it naturally1; but to be the image of God belongs to man from his first condition: therefore it is natural to him2.
2. Likewise, what belongs to all in common and
inseparably belongs naturally3; but to be image belongs to man universally and inseparably: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, what belongs to something according to its natural properties belongs to it naturally; but to be image belongs to man according to his intrinsic and natural potencies: therefore it belongs to him naturally.
4. Likewise, to be the image of God is not accidental to man, but rather substantial, as to be a vestige is not accidental to any creature: if therefore man is not the natural image of God, then he is not a natural thing, but artificial. If therefore this is plainly false — namely that man is artificial — therefore he is not an artificial image, but natural.
5. Likewise, an artificial ass is not a true ass; therefore an artificial image is not a true image; but man is a true image: therefore he is not an artificial image; and [it] is either artificial or natural: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Ad oppositum. Hilary in the book On the Synod4, defining a natural image, says: «The image is of that thing to which it is imaged, an undifferentiated species»; but man is not an undifferentiated species of God himself: therefore he is not a natural image.
2. Likewise, Augustine On the Ten Strings5: «Just as the image of the emperor differs in his son and in a coin, so the image differs in the Son of God and in man»: if therefore the image in the emperor's son is natural, and in a coin is artificial, it seems that the Son of God alone is the natural image, while man is only artificial.
3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Just as it is proper to the person of the Son to be a son, so it is proper [to him] to be image6; but the person of the Son alone is the natural son, and not man: therefore by parallel reasoning the person of the Son alone is the natural image, and not man.
4. Likewise, what is from will is not from nature7; but the production of man is from the will of God: therefore it is not from nature. But from him from whom he has to be produced, from him he has to be image: if therefore the soul of man is not produced by God according to nature, but according to will, he will not be the natural image of God, but a voluntary one.
5. Likewise, image says imitation and likeness: therefore if something is the image of something natural, it is assimilated to it in nature; but man cannot be assimilated to God in nature8: therefore he cannot be his natural image.
### Conclusion. Man is the image of God neither artificial nor connatural, but natural.
I respond: It must be said that, since image is named from the act of representing9 — for the image is referred to the prototype, as Damascene says10 — and representation can belong to something in two ways, namely either through a natural form or through an artificial form; Twofold image. the image is twofold, namely natural and artificial. And since man does not represent through an artificial form, but through his own natural form and the potencies naturally implanted in him; Conclusion 1. man is not an artificial image, but a natural one.
The third species of Image. It is one thing, however, to say "natural image" and another to say "connatural." For an image is natural, which represents through that which it has from nature, whether it agree in nature with that which it represents or not. But an image is called connatural, which imitates and is referred not only through that which it has from nature, but through agreement in the same nature. Conclusion 2. Therefore, even though to be image11 belongs to man, yet to be a connatural image does not belong to man, but to the Son of God alone.
The reasons showing that man is not an artificial image but a natural one are therefore to be conceded.
Solution of the opposed [arguments]. 1. To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that Hilary is defining the connatural image, not the natural one.
2. To that which is objected from Augustine, it must be said that he does not intend to set down a likeness with respect to the natural and the artificial, but with respect to agreement and discrepancy in nature. For just as a coin does not agree with the emperor in nature, but his son does agree; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.
3. To the other [objection] which is brought, that the person of the Son alone is the natural son; it must be said that there is no parallel. Note. For natural is taken otherwise as it stands beside the Son, and otherwise as it stands beside image; for it does not differ to say of the Son natural and connatural, as it differs with respect to image. — Reason. And the reason for this is the following: that the Son says [the mode of] that from which, with respect to its principal sense; image says [the mode of] that to which. Therefore natural, said of the Son, signifies that the Son's procession is through the mode of nature, and so that he agrees with the Father in nature; but when one says
natural image, it is signified that that representation is from a natural principle or property; and on account of this it is not given to understand that there is, between the image and that of which it is the image, an agreement of nature.
4. To that which is objected, that what is from will is not from nature; it must be said that this is true on the side from which it is from will; whence, since the creature is produced by God voluntarily, Note. it is not said to go forth naturally from him, but voluntarily; from this, however, it does not follow that it represents voluntarily, indeed the [voluntary mode] is there [as an] accident12. For although God voluntarily produced man, yet man has natural operations, because the divine will fabricated and made nature itself; it is not so, however, with the will of a created artisan, who cannot produce a natural form.
5. Note. To that which is objected, that image says likeness in nature; it must be said that this determination naturally, added to some term which neither says a relationship as that from which nor as that to which, renders the locution ambiguous, because it can say a relationship either in the manner of cause or in the manner of form13. Whence this [statement] is twofold: this is naturally assimilated to that: either as understood causally, because it is assimilated in that which it has from nature; or as understood formally, because it is assimilated in the very nature. Taken in the first mode, this is true: man is naturally assimilated to God; in the second mode, false; and in the first mode there follows on this: man is naturally the image of God: but not in the other mode14.
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- Intellige etsi, quod etiam Vat. ponit.Understand "etsi" ["even though"], which the Vatican edition also supplies.
- Hic in corp. quaest.See here in the body of the question.
- Vat. ergo inest ei naturaliter.The Vatican edition reads: therefore it belongs to him naturally.
- Secundum Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. seq., naturale est idem apud omnes. Cfr. eius Problem. sect. 15. n. 3.According to Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 1 sqq., the natural is what is the same with all. Cf. his Problems sect. 15, n. 3.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 4.
- Num. 13: Imago itaque est rei ad rem coaequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitudo.N. 13: Image, therefore, is the imaged and undivided likeness of a thing to a thing to be made equal to it.
- Serm. IX. c. 8. n. 9. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 540, nota 3.Sermon IX, c. 8, n. 9. See the words in vol. I, p. 540, note 3.
- Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.As was shown in I Sent. d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
- Vide tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6. et pag. 127, nota 2.See vol. I, p. 56, note 6, and p. 127, note 2.
- Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16., adductis his Basilii verbis: «imaginis honor ad exemplar transfertur», dicit: Exemplar porro est id cuius effigies exprimitur, ex quo forma derivatur (πρωτότυπον δέ ἐστι τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ τὸ παράγωγον γίνεται). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 82, nota 10, ubi similia ex eiusdem Orationibus de imaginibus allata sunt.On the Orthodox Faith IV, c. 16, having adduced these words of Basil: «the honor of the image is transferred to the exemplar», says: Furthermore the exemplar is that of which the effigy is expressed, from which the form is derived (πρωτότυπον δέ ἐστι τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ τὸ παράγωγον γίνεται). Cf. vol. I, p. 82, note 10, where similar passages are adduced from his Orations on the Images.
- In cod. F (Q a secunda manu) additur naturalem.In codex F (Q by a second hand) the word naturalem is added.
- De fallacia accidentis cfr. tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5.On the fallacy of accident cf. vol. I, p. 58, note 5.
- Codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 finis, quod explicari potest finis vel est extrinsecus, vel intrinsecus; posterior coniungitur cum ipsa rei forma. — Paulo superius Vat. sed ut ad quem pro nec ut ad quem. Subinde in multis codd. et ed. 1 deest saliter et in paucis codd. etiam formaliter.The codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, read finis, which can be explained as: the end either is extrinsic or intrinsic; the latter is conjoined with the very form of the thing. — A little higher up the Vatican edition reads sed ut ad quem for nec ut ad quem. Then in many codices and ed. 1 the word [cau]saliter is missing, and in a few codices also formaliter.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---