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Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. Qualiter homo sit imago secundum considerationem absolutam.

Quaestio I. Utrum homo sit vere imago Dei.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod homo sit imago Dei vere.

1. Fundamenta. Genesis primo3: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem etc.; hoc non est nisi verbum Trinitatis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo4: Deus de terra creavit hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum; si igitur homo factus est secundum imaginem Dei, homo est imago Dei.

3. Item, quod est maxime natum uniri alteri maxime natum est ei configurari et conformari — amor enim, quia unit, transformare dicitur amantem in amatum, sicut dicit Hugo5 — sed creatura rationalis, ut homo, maxime nata est uniri Deo et in ipsum

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tendere per amorem: ergo maxime natus est ei configurari et assimilari. Si igitur imago dicit similitudinem expressam, patet etc.

4. Item, quod vere repraesentat aliquid secundum eius nobilem actum et secundum distinctionem et ordinem, vere est eius imago; sed homo vere repraesentat Deum secundum eius nobilissimum actum, qui est intelligere — non solum enim repraesentat Deum, in quantum est ens et vivens, sed etiam in quantum est intelligens — et iterum, repraesentat distinctionem et ordinem, qui est in personis, quantum ad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem6: ergo homo vere est Dei imago.

Contra:

1. Ad oppositum. Nihil est illud ad quod fit, quia nihil fit ad se ipsum; sed homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sicut dicitur Genesis primo7; ergo homo non est imago.

2. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est similitudo; ubicumque est similitudo, ibi est identitas aliqua; ubicumque autem est identitas, ibi est convenientia in aliquo tertio8: si igitur Deus et creatura in aliquo tertio non conveniunt, creatura non potest esse similitudo Dei, et ita nec imago.

3. Item, non quaecumque similitudo est imago, sed similitudo expressa; sed nulla est similitudo expressa alicuius, quae plus est disconveniens quam conveniens: cum ergo omnis creatura plus sit Deo dissimilis quam consimilis, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto9 de Trinitate, ergo nulla potest esse expressa Dei similitudo: ergo nulla potest esse imago.

4. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est configuratio, imago enim attenditur in figura10; sed divina essentia nullo modo est figurabilis: ergo nullo modo est per aliquam imaginem repraesentabilis: ergo nulla creatura est imago Dei.

5. Item, differt imago a vestigio, quia vestigium repraesentat secundum partem, imago autem secundum totum11; sed nullum finitum potest repraesentare infinitum secundum totum: cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, et quaelibet creatura finita, nulla creatura potest esse imago Dei.

6. Item, quaelibet creatura distat a Deo in infinitum; Deus enim quamlibet12 in infinitum excellit: ergo si infinita distantia non est maior, una creatura non distat magis quam alia; similiter nec una magis appropinquat quam alia: ergo vel omnis creatura est imago, vel nulla. Sed non omnis est imago: ergo nulla.

### Conclusio. Homo est vere imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod imago dicit expressam similitudinem. Necesse est autem, omnem creaturam quoquomodo13 assimilari Deo; necesse est etiam, aliquam ad complementum universi expresse assimilari Deo: et ideo omnis creatura habet rationem vestigii, sed aliqua habet rationem imaginis, illa videlicet, quae assimilatur expresse. Haec autem est rationalis creatura, ut homo; et ideo concedendum est, quod homo est imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.

Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod Quadruplex similitudo. quaedam est similitudo per convenientiam omnimodam in natura, et sic una persona in Trinitate est alteri similis; quaedam per participationem alicuius naturae universalis, sicut homo et asinus assimilantur in animali; quaedam vero secundum proportionalitatem14, sicut nauta et auriga conveniunt secundum comparationem ad illa quae regunt; quaedam est similitudo per convenientiam ordinis, sicut exemplatum assimilatur exemplari. — Applicatio ad Deum. Primis duobus modis nulla creatura potest Deo assimilari, secundis duobus modis omnis creatura assimilatur; sed illa quae assimilatur magis de longinquo, habet rationem vestigii; illa vero quae de proximo, habet rationem imaginis; talis autem est creatura rationalis, utpote homo.

Conclusio. Et hoc patet sic. Probatio: Primo de convenientia ordinis. Deus enim universa propter semetipsum operatus est15, ita quod, cum sit summa potestas et maiestas, fecit omnia ad sui laudem; cum sit summa lux, fecit omnia ad sui manifestationem; cum sit summa bonitas, fecit omnia ad sui communicationem. Non est autem perfecta laus, nisi adsit qui approbet; nec est perfecta manifestatio, nisi adsit qui intelligat; nec perfecta communicatio bonorum, nisi adsit qui eis uti valeat. Et quoniam laudem approbare, veritatem scire, dona in usum assumere non est nisi solummodo rationalis creaturae; ideo non habent ipsae creaturae irrationales immediate ad Deum ordinari, sed mediante creatura rationali. Ipsa autem creatura rationalis, quia de se nata est et laudare et nosse et res alias in facultatem voluntatis assumere, nata est ordinari in Deum immediate16.

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Et quoniam quanto aliquid immediatius ordinatur ad aliquid, tanto magis convenit cum eo convenientia ordinis; et anima rationalis et quaelibet rationalis creatura, eo quod « capax Dei est et particeps esse potest17 », immediate ordinatur in ipsum; maxime convenit cum eo convenientia ordinis. Et quia, quanto maior est convenientia, tanto expressior est similitudo; hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc genus similitudinis rationalis creatura est similitudo expressa, et ideo imago est. — Confirmatur. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Trinitate decimo quarto18, quod « eo est anima imago Dei, quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest ». Quia enim ei immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est, vel e converso; et quia capax est, nata est ei configurari; et propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini19. Et ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attenditur ad convenientiam ordinis, perfecte dicitur imago Dei, quia in hoc ei assimilatur expresse.

Probatio 2. Similiter in similitudine, quae attenditur in convenientia proportionalitatis vel proportionis, expresse assimilatur Deo creatura rationalis, et ideo secundum eam recte dicitur imago. Quod patet sic. Convenientia enim proportionis attenditur secundum similiter se habere. Distinctio. Similiter autem se habere, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel in comparatione ad extrinseca, vel in comparatione ad intrinseca. Tunc autem est similitudo expressa, quando non tantum est similis modus se habendi in comparatione ad extrinseca, sed in comparatione ad intrinseca. Contingit autem comparare divinam essentiam ad creaturam; contingit etiam comparare personam ad personam. Omnis autem creatura aliquam comparationem habet, secundum quam aliquo modo conformatur Deo, secundum quod est causa creaturae, sicut est comparatio illa, quae est ad effectum productum. Sicut enim Deus producit suum effectum, sic et agens creatum, licet non omnino. Creatura vero rationalis non solum sic convenit, sed etiam quantum ad intrinsecarum suarum potentiarum originem, ordinem et distinctionem, in quibus assimilatur illi distinctioni et ordini20, quae est in divinis personis intrinseca divinae naturae. — Confirmatur. Et in hoc ostendit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate21, hominem esse imaginem Dei; et hoc explanatum fuit in primo libro, ubi ostensum est, quod in anima rationali est unitas essentiae cum trinitate potentiarum ad invicem ordinatarum et quasi consimili modo se habentium, sicut se habent personae in divinis. Et ideo est ibi expressa similitudo proportionis; et propter hoc rationalis creatura, quae est homo, est imago Dei.

His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta. Concedendum est enim, quod homo vere est imago Dei, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Solutio oppositorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo est ad imaginem: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, cum dicitur factus ad imaginem, imago accipitur abstractive; cum dicitur imago Dei, imago accipitur concretive, quia est imagine Dei insignitus; sicut tabula, in qua depicta est imago, et imago potest dici et ad imaginem22. Sic et in proposito.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est aliqua identitas Dei ad creaturam, ergo nec similitudo; dicendum, quod similitudo, quae est in imagine, non Notandum. attenditur per identitatem, aut eiusdem naturae participationem, sed per convenientiam in ordine et proportione23; quae similitudo non exigit communicantiam in tertio, quia in convenientia ordinis unum est similitudo alterius; in convenientia proportionis non est similitudo in uno, sed in duabus comparationibus.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est similitudo expressa; iam patet responsio, quia, si magna sit24 dissimilitudo in proprietatibus absolutis, multum tamen magna est similitudo in immediatione ordinis et comparatione proportionis, ex quibus et in quibus duobus expressio similitudinis consistit, quae imaginem facit.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de configuratione; dicendum, quod imago corporalis exigit configurationem corporalem, imago vero spiritualis configuratione et effigie spirituali contenta est. Haec autem consistit non in quantitate molis, sed in quantitate virtutis, scilicet in potentiis, ita quod, sicut figura triangularis habet tres terminos et tres lineas, sic etiam in imagine spirituali potentiae sint ad modum terminorum, et egressio unius ab altera quantum ad actum se habeat ad modum lineae coniungentis.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago repraesentat secundum totum; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa imagine, quae habet omnimodam perfectionem; et sic solus Filius Dei est imago Patris25. De alia non est verum, quod repraesentet secundum totum simpliciter, repraesentat autem quantum ad aliquam totalitatem. Quia enim « rationalis creatura et intellectus quodam modo est omnia26 », et

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omnia sunt nata ibi scribi, et imprimi omnium similitudines et depingi; ideo, sicut totum universum repraesentat Deum in quadam totalitate sensibili, sic creatura rationalis eum repraesentat in quadam totalitate spirituali; quaelibet autem alia creatura irrationalis repraesentat eum solum in parte, quia secundum se tantum, cum non sit nata alia in se spiritualiter continere, ita quod nihil sit, quod non sit nata cognoscere. Notandum. Hoc dico propter animam sensibilem, quae, si cognoscat aliqua, non tamen nata est cognoscere omnia.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaelibet creatura distat in infinitum; dicendum, quod verum est de illa distantia, quae opponitur participationi et Notandum. adaequationi. Cum enim Deus sit infinitus, nihil potest ei adaequari; cum sit simplex, non potest aliquam naturam tertiam cum aliqua creatura participare. Et penes has similitudines nullo modo attenditur ratio imaginis in homine, sed penes aliam duplicem, scilicet ordinis et consimilis habitudinis, secundum quam rationalis creatura non distat in infinitum a Creatore, sed valde appropinquat ei, sicut ostensum est supra.

Scholion.

I. In tota hac distinctione, quae est magni momenti, disputatur de imagine creata, de qua iam plura dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4; sed de differentia inter vestigium et imaginem ibid. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. De imagine increata actum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4. 5, ubi in scholio ad q. 1. de ipsa ratione imaginis nonnulla notata sunt. — De ratione imaginis et similitudinis etiam cfr. infra a. 2. q. 3. in initio corp. De imagine in specie S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) dicit: « Imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum », sive (hic in corp.): « Imago dicit expressam similitudinem »; et infra (a. 2. q. 3.): « Imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem, et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione ». Ut haec definitio intelligatur, notandum est, quod hoc termino expressa duplex insinuatur relatio, quam imago habet ad prototypum. Prima relatio est, quod imago sit ex alio expressa per aliquem modum productionis, saltem secundum rationem causae exemplaris. Unde dicit S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.): « Sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum activi — unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid — sic e contrario imago per modum passivi; et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et imitatur ». Unde ob defectum huius conditionis ovum non dicitur imago ovi, licet ei sit simillimum (S. Thom. S. I. q. 93. a. 1.). Secunda relatio est relatio ipsius similitudinis inter imaginem et prototypum, et non similitudinis cuiuslibet, sed expressae i. e. « quae sit similitudo expressa in quadam configuratione et imitatione » (infra a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos.), sive per convenientiam in aliqua proprietate distinctiva et insigni. Diximus: distinctiva; « si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur, aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius » (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 2.). Multo magis hoc valet de proprietatibus transcendentibus unitatis, bonitatis, veritatis, in quibus conditionibus generalibus omnis creatura similis est Deo secundum rationem vestigii. Diximus: in proprietate insigni, quia, ut bene observat Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica, a. 2.), similitudo in pede non dicitur proprio imago, sed in facie. — Cum autem illa convenientia in aliqua proprietate pluribus modis esse possit, plures etiam species imaginis distinguuntur. « Imago accipitur dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est expressio, scilicet vel in naturae unitate, vel in naturae diversitate: in naturae communitate sive unitate, sicut filius imperatoris dicitur imago patris; in naturae diversitate, sicut imago imperatoris est in nummo ». (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). Unitas autem naturae accipi potest vel ut unitas numerica (identitas), qualis est inter divinas personas, vel ut unitas specifica, qualis est inter patrem humanum eiusque filium. — His suppositis, facile intelligitur distinctio in seq. quaest. inter imaginem connaturalem, naturalem et artificialem. Aliter enim filius est imago naturalis sui patris, nempe in unitate specifica naturae, aliter imago naturalis Dei, nempe « in diversitate naturae » (loc. cit.); tamen est Dei imago per suam formam naturalem, quae convenientiam habet cum suo exemplari divino tum in intellectualitate naturae, tum in origine, habitudine et distinctione suarum potentiarum, quibus adumbratur personarum divinarum trinitas. Haec autem secunda convenientia praecipue a Seraphico urgetur hic et infra a. 2. q. 1. — De imagine corporali et spirituali cfr. hic ad 4. et I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

II. Alii commentatores plerumque de hac materia diffuse, sed sub aliis titulis, disputant I. Sent. d. 3, imprimis Dionys. Carth., ubi plura in seqq. quaestionibus tractata inveniuntur. — Alex. Hal., de hac et pluribus seqq. qq. inquirit S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. et etiam q. 55. m. 4. — Item Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica et I. Sent. d. 3. q. 9.

Hanc et seq. quaestionem alii (exceptis Petr. a Tar. et Ægid. R.) una quaestione absolvunt; S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1: (de hac et seqq. qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica n. 1. 7. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. hic q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

III. De 3. huius articuli quaestione sub aliis titulis tractant: S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. — Ægid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. In what way man is the image [of God] considered absolutely.

Question I. Whether man is truly the image of God.

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus and it is shown that man is truly the image of God.

1. Fundamenta. Genesis 13: Let us make man to our image etc.; this is none other than the word of the Trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 174: God created man of the earth, and made him after his own image; if therefore man was made according to the image of God, man is the image of God.

3. Likewise, that which is in the highest degree apt to be united to another is in the highest degree apt to be configured and conformed to it — for love, since it unites, is said to transform the lover into the beloved, as Hugh says5 — but the rational creature, such as man, is in the highest degree apt to be united to God and to tend toward him

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through love: therefore he is in the highest degree apt to be configured and assimilated to him. If therefore "image" denotes an expressed likeness, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that which truly represents something according to its noble act and according to distinction and order, is truly its image; but man truly represents God according to his most noble act, which is to understand — for he represents God not only inasmuch as he is being and living, but also inasmuch as he is intelligent — and again, he represents the distinction and order which is in the [divine] persons, with respect to memory, intelligence, and will6: therefore man is truly the image of God.

On the contrary:

1. To the opposite. That to which something is made is not the thing itself, since nothing is made unto itself; but man was made unto the image of God, as is said in Genesis 17; therefore man is not the image [of God].

2. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is likeness; wherever there is likeness, there is some identity; and wherever there is identity, there is agreement in some third thing8: if therefore God and the creature do not agree in any third thing, the creature cannot be the likeness of God, and so neither the image.

3. Likewise, not every likeness is an image, but [only] an expressed likeness; but no expressed likeness of anything can have more that is dissimilar than what agrees: since therefore every creature is more unlike than like to God, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 159, therefore no [creature] can be an expressed likeness of God: therefore none can be an image.

4. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is configuration, for an image is considered with respect to figure10; but the divine essence is in no way capable of being figured: therefore in no way can it be represented by any image: therefore no creature is the image of God.

5. Likewise, the image differs from the vestige, since the vestige represents according to a part, but the image according to the whole11; but nothing finite can represent the infinite according to the whole: since therefore God is infinite, and every creature finite, no creature can be the image of God.

6. Likewise, every creature is distant from God infinitely; for God excels every [creature]12 infinitely: therefore if an infinite distance cannot be greater, one creature is not more distant than another; likewise, neither does one approach more nearly than another: therefore either every creature is an image, or none. But not every one is an image: therefore none.

### Conclusion. Man is truly the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that "image" signifies an expressed likeness. Now it is necessary that every creature in some way13 be assimilated to God; it is also necessary that some [creature], for the completion of the universe, be assimilated to God expressly: and therefore every creature has the character of a vestige, but some [creature] has the character of an image — namely, that which is assimilated expressly. And this is the rational creature, namely man; and therefore it must be conceded that man is the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that — A fourfold likeness. — there is a certain likeness through agreement entirely in nature, and in this way one person in the Trinity is like the other; and another through participation in some universal nature, as a man and an ass are assimilated in [the genus] animal; and another according to proportionality14, as a sailor and a charioteer agree according to the comparison with the things which they govern; and another is a likeness through agreement in order, as the thing exemplified is assimilated to the exemplar. — Application to God. In the first two modes no creature can be assimilated to God; in the second two modes every creature is assimilated; but that which is assimilated more from afar has the character of a vestige, while that which is assimilated more closely has the character of an image; and such is the rational creature, namely man.

Conclusion. And this is shown thus. Proof: First, from the agreement of order. For God wrought all things on account of Himself15, so that, since He is highest power and majesty, He made all things for His own praise; since He is highest light, He made all things for His own manifestation; since He is highest goodness, He made all things for His own communication. But there is no perfect praise unless there be one who approves; nor perfect manifestation unless there be one who understands; nor perfect communication of goods unless there be one who is able to use them. And since to approve praise, to know truth, [and] to receive gifts into use belongs only to the rational creature; therefore the irrational creatures themselves are not ordered to God immediately, but through the mediation of the rational creature. But the rational creature itself, since it is naturally able both to praise and to know and to receive other things into the power of the will, is naturally ordered to God immediately16.

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And since the more immediately something is ordered to something, the more it agrees with it in agreement of order; and the rational soul and every rational creature, in that "it is capable of God and able to be partaker of Him17," is immediately ordered to Him; it agrees with Him in the highest degree in agreement of order. And since, the greater the agreement, the more expressed is the likeness; hence it is that, with respect to this kind of likeness, the rational creature is an expressed likeness, and therefore is an image. — It is confirmed. And this is what Augustine says in On the Trinity 1418, that "the soul is the image of God in this, that it is capable of Him and able to be partaker [of Him]." For since it is immediately ordered to Him, therefore it is capable of Him, or conversely; and because it is capable, it is naturally apt to be configured to Him; and on account of this it bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance19. And therefore, as regards the likeness which is considered with respect to agreement of order, [the rational creature] is perfectly called the image of God, because in this it is assimilated to Him expressly.

Second proof. Likewise, with respect to the likeness which is considered in the agreement of proportionality or proportion, the rational creature is expressly assimilated to God, and therefore according to it is rightly called an image. This is shown thus. For the agreement of proportion is considered according to being-disposed-similarly. Distinction. Now being-disposed-similarly can be twofold: either in comparison to extrinsic things, or in comparison to intrinsic things. And the likeness is expressed when there is a similar mode of being disposed not only in comparison to extrinsic, but in comparison to intrinsic things. Now one can compare the divine essence to the creature; one can also compare person to person. But every creature has a certain comparison, according to which it is in some way conformed to God, inasmuch as He is the cause of the creature, as is the comparison which [the creature] has to the effect produced. For as God produces His effect, so does the created agent, although not in every respect. But the rational creature agrees [with God] not only in this way, but also as regards the origin, order, and distinction of its intrinsic powers, in which it is assimilated to that distinction and order20 which is in the divine persons intrinsic to the divine nature. — It is confirmed. And in this Augustine in the book On the Trinity21 shows man to be the image of God; and this was explained in the first book, where it was shown that in the rational soul there is unity of essence with a trinity of powers ordered to one another and disposed in an almost consimilar way, as the persons in the divine [nature] are disposed. And therefore there is there an expressed likeness of proportion; and on account of this the rational creature, which is man, is the image of God.

These things being seen, the answer to the proposed question and also to the objections is clear. For it must be conceded that man is truly the image of God, as the reasons adduced for this show.

To the arguments on the opposite side:

Solution of the opposites.

To 1. To that which is objected, that man is unto the image: therefore etc.; it must be said that it does not follow, because, when one says made unto the image, "image" is taken abstractly; when one says the image of God, "image" is taken concretely, because [man] is marked with the image of God; just as a tablet on which an image is painted, both can be called "image" and "unto the image"22. So also in the matter at hand.

To 2. To that which is objected, that there is no identity of God to the creature, therefore neither likeness; it must be said that the likeness which is in the image is Note. not considered through identity, or through participation of the same nature, but through agreement in order and proportion23; and this likeness does not require communication in a third thing, because in agreement of order one [thing] is the likeness of the other; in agreement of proportion the likeness is not in one [thing], but in two comparisons.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the image is an expressed likeness; the answer is already clear, because, although there is24 great dissimilitude in the absolute properties, yet very great is the likeness in the immediacy of order and the comparison of proportion, from which and in which two [things] consists the expression of likeness which constitutes the image.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning configuration; it must be said that a bodily image requires bodily configuration, but a spiritual image is content with spiritual configuration and effigy. And this consists not in quantity of mass, but in quantity of power, namely in the [soul's] potencies, so that, just as a triangular figure has three terminals and three lines, so also in the spiritual image the potencies are in the manner of terminals, and the procession of one from another as regards its act has the manner of a line joining [them].

To 5. To that which is objected, that the image represents according to the whole; it must be said that that is true of that image which has every-mode perfection; and in this way the Son of God alone is the image of the Father25. Of the other [image] it is not true that it represents according to the whole simply, but it represents according to a certain totality. For since "the rational creature and the intellect is in some way all things26," and

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all things are naturally apt to be inscribed there, and likenesses of all things to be imprinted and depicted [there]; therefore, just as the whole universe represents God in a certain sensible totality, so the rational creature represents Him in a certain spiritual totality; but every other irrational creature represents Him only in part, because [it represents Him] only according to itself, since it is not naturally apt to contain others in itself spiritually, in such a way that there be nothing which it is not apt to know. Note. I say this on account of the sensible soul, which, even if it knows some things, is nevertheless not naturally apt to know all things.

To 6. To that which is objected, that every creature is distant infinitely; it must be said that this is true of that distance which is opposed to participation and Note. adequation. For since God is infinite, nothing can be adequated to Him; since He is simple, He cannot share any third nature with any creature. And it is not according to these [kinds of] likenesses in any way that the character of image in man is considered, but according to another twofold [likeness], namely of order and of similar habitude, according to which the rational creature is not distant infinitely from the Creator, but very nearly approaches Him, as has been shown above.

Scholion.

I. In this whole distinction, which is of great moment, the created image is discussed, of which many things have already been said in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4; and concerning the difference between vestige and image, ibid. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. The uncreated image was treated in I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4. 5, where in the scholion to q. 1. several things were noted concerning the very character of the image. — On the character of image and likeness see also below a. 2. q. 3. at the beginning of the body. On the image in particular the Holy Doctor (I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) says: "The image is considered according to expressed conformity to that which is imaged"; or (here in the body): "The image signifies an expressed likeness"; and below (a. 2. q. 3.): "The image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is considered in origin, habitude, and distinction of powers." That this definition may be understood, it must be noted that by the term expressed a twofold relation which the image has to its prototype is insinuated. The first relation is that the image be expressed from another by some mode of production, at least according to the character of exemplary cause. Whence the Holy Doctor says (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.): "Just as exemplar according to the propriety of the word signifies expression through the manner of the active — whence the exemplar is said to be that to whose imitation something is made — so on the contrary the image [signifies expression] through the manner of the passive; and image is said of that which expresses and imitates another." Whence on account of the defect of this condition the egg is not called an image of [another] egg, although it be most like it (S. Thomas, S. I q. 93. a. 1.). The second relation is the relation of the likeness itself between image and prototype, and not of any likeness whatsoever, but of an expressed one, i.e. "which is an expressed likeness in a certain configuration and imitation" (below a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos.), or through agreement in some distinctive and notable property. We said distinctive; "for if the likeness be only according to genus, or according to some common accident, on this account it is not said that something is unto the image of another" (S. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 2.). Much more does this hold of the transcendental properties of unity, goodness, and truth, in which general conditions every creature is like to God according to the character of the vestige. We said in a notable property, because, as Petrus a Tarantasia well observes (here q. unica, a. 2.), the likeness in the foot is not properly called an image, but [the likeness] in the face. — Now since that agreement in some property can be in many modes, several species of image are also distinguished. "Image is taken in two ways, according as expression is twofold, namely either in unity of nature, or in diversity of nature: in community or unity of nature, as the son of the emperor is called the image of his father; in diversity of nature, as the image of the emperor is on a coin" (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). And unity of nature can be taken either as numerical unity (identity), such as is between the divine persons, or as specific unity, such as is between a human father and his son. — These things being supposed, the distinction in the next question between the connatural, natural, and artificial image is easily understood. For in one way the son is the natural image of his father, namely in specific unity of nature; in another way [man is] the natural image of God, namely "in diversity of nature" (loc. cit.); yet he is the image of God through his natural form, which has agreement with its divine exemplar both in the intellectuality of the nature, and in the origin, habitude, and distinction of his powers, by which the trinity of the divine persons is adumbrated. And this second agreement is especially urged by the Seraphic [Doctor] here and below a. 2. q. 1. — On the bodily and spiritual image see here ad 4. and I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

II. The other commentators most often treat of this matter diffusely, but under other titles, in I Sent. d. 3, especially Dionysius Carthusianus, where many things are found treated in the following questions. — Alexander of Hales inquires into this and many of the following questions in S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. and also q. 55. m. 4. — Likewise Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. unica and I Sent. d. 3. q. 9.

This and the following question others (except Petrus a Tarantasia and Aegidius Romanus) settle in one question; S. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1: (on this and the following qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica n. 1. 7. — Richardus a Mediavilla, II. Sent. here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Durandus, I Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

III. On the third question of this article they treat under other titles: S. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 26.
    Verse 26.
  2. Vers. 1.
    Verse 1.
  3. De Arrha animae: Qui per affectum coniungeris, in ipsius similitudinem ipsa quodammodo dilectionis societate transformaris.
    [Hugh of St. Victor], De Arrha animae: "You who are joined [to another] by affection are, by that very fellowship of love, in some way transformed into his likeness."
  4. Sicut explanatum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. per totam. — Vat. et originem, quae pro et ordinem, qui.
    As was explained in I Sent. d. 3 p. II throughout. — The Vatican [edition reads] and origin, which for and order, which.
  5. Vers. 26.
    Verse 26.
  6. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2. ait: « Imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est ». Et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. 9.) similitudo definitur rerum diversarum qualitas eadem; identitas autem unitas quaedam plurium in essentia.
    Aristotle, Topics VI c. 2, says: "An image is that whose generation is by imitation." And Metaphysics V text. 16 (IV. 9.) likeness is defined as the same quality of diverse things; while identity [is] a certain unity of many in essence.
  7. Cap. 11. n. 20. seqq., ubi et similitudo et dissimilitudo, quae est inter Verbum increatum et verbum creatum, inter imaginem increatam et creatam ostenditur. Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 3. — De maiori cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 74.
    Cap. 11 n. 20 ff., where both the likeness and the unlikeness between the uncreated Word and the created word, between the uncreated and created image, is shown. Compare the text of the Master, I Sent. d. III c. 3. — On the major [premise] compare Augustine, 83 Questions q. 74.
  8. Hugo a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 2: Imago pertinet ad figuram. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem. — Minorem exhibet Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. etiam eiusdem Orationes de imaginibus, ubi et haec sententia, sicut et plura alia huc spectantia occurrunt.
    Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I p. VI c. 2: Image pertains to figure. Compare here the text of the Master, c. 3 near the end. — The minor [premise] is supplied by [John] Damascene, De Fide orthodoxa IV c. 16. See also his Orations on Images, where this sentence is found, as also many other things bearing on this point.
  9. De quo vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.
    On which see I Sent. d. 3 p. I q. 2 ad 4.
  10. Aliqui codd. hic repetunt creaturam. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. Deus enim quodlibet finitum excellit in infinitum.
    Some codices here repeat creaturam. The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads]: For God excels every finite thing infinitely.
  11. Codd. IQ quodam modo; bene. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 2 autem pro etiam; incongrue.
    Codices IQ [read] quodam modo ("in a certain mode"); well. Then many codices with ed. 2 [read] autem for etiam; incongruously.
  12. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 proportionem.
    Several codices with ed. 1 [read] proportionem ("proportion").
  13. Prov. 16, 4.
    Proverbs 16, 4.
  14. Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 44. n. 82.
    Compare Augustine, De Vera Religione c. 44 n. 82.
  15. August., XIV de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.
    Augustine, De Trinitate XIV c. 8 n. 11.
  16. Cap. 8. n. 11. — Paulo superius post similitudo expressa non pauci codd. addunt et imago.
    Cap. 8 n. 11. — A little above, after similitudo expressa, not a few codices add et imago.
  17. Alluditur ad illud Ps. 4, 7: Signatum est super nos etc.
    Allusion to Ps. 4, 7: It is signed upon us etc.
  18. Cod. T (a manu suppari) bene addit et origini.
    Codex T (by a contemporary hand) well adds et origini ("and to the origin").
  19. Praesertim libr. IX. X. XIV. et XV. Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 2. et ibid. Comment. p. II. per totam.
    Especially books IX, X, XIV, and XV. Compare the text of the Master, I Sent. d. III c. 2, and ibid. Commentary p. II throughout.
  20. Cfr. August., XV. de Trin. c. 22. n. 43. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine et Comment. infra dub. 3.
    Compare Augustine, De Trinitate XV c. 22 n. 43, and here the text of the Master, c. 3 at the end, and the Commentary below dub. 3.
  21. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. proportionem.
    The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] proportionem.
  22. Vat. etsi magna est.
    The Vatican [edition reads] etsi magna est ("although it is great").
  23. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 4.
    Compare I Sent. d. 31 p. II a. 1 q. 1 seq. and dub. 4.
  24. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.): « Anima entia quodam modo est omnia ». Ibid. text. 14. (c. 4.): Potentia quodam modo est intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nullum antequam intelligat. Oportet autem sic, ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu etc.
    Aristotle, De Anima III text. 37 (c. 8): "The soul in some way is all things." Ibid. text. 14 (c. 4): The intellect is in potency in some way the intelligibles, but actually none [of them] before it understands. It must be so, as in a tablet on which nothing is actually written etc.
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