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Dist. 15, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 15

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De ordine, quo animalia sunt producta.

Consequenter quaeritur, quo ordine animalia sint producta. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de ordine productionis ex parte finis. Secundo vero ex parte temporis. Tertio vero de ordine1 productionis et quietis.

Quaestio I. Utrum omnia sensibilia facta sint propter hominem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnia sensibilia facta sint propter hominem. Et quod sic, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Primo per Scripturam, Genesis primo2: Dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli etc. Et post, Genesis nono3: Omnes pisces maris manui vestrae traditi sunt, et omne quod movetur et vivit: ergo omnia ad utilitatem hominis facta sunt.

2. Item, Apostolus primae ad Corinthios tertio4: Omnia vestra sunt, hoc dicit viris iustis: ergo propter viros iustos omnia quaecumque facta sunt, sunt producta: ergo et animalia sensibilia.

3. Item, Philosophus5: «Homo est finis quodam modo omnium eorum quae sunt»: ergo et sensibilium.

4. Item, omnia bonum exoptant, non quodcumque, sed summum, sicut vult Dionysius6 et Philosophus; sed inter creaturas inferiores solus homo natus est immediate ad Deum pertingere: ergo aliae creaturae ordinantur in finem mediante homine. Sed quod in finem ordinatur mediante alio, est propter illud: ergo omnia sensibilia facta sunt propter hominem.

Ad oppositum.

Sed contra: 1. Tantae dignitatis est esse rerum finem, sicut esse principium; sed sensibilium animalium solus Deus fuit principium, ita quod non homo: ergo eorundem finis est non homo, sed Deus.

2. Item, quaedam sunt animalia, quae non valent homini nisi ad esum, quaedam, quae non valent nisi ad vestimentum; sed homo, si stetisset, his non indiguisset: ergo huiusmodi animalia aut facta essent frustra, aut non sunt facta propter hominem. Si tu dicas, quod Deus ea fecit, quia praevidit, hominem esse lapsurum7; tunc videtur, quod in voluntate hominis et peccato consisteret, utrum illa animalia frustra facta essent; quod falsum est.

3. Item, si animalia facta sunt propter hominem, ergo nulla debent esse facta contra hominem; sed bestiae sunt nocivae: ergo non debuerunt fieri in primaria rerum conditione, aut certe frustra factae sunt. Si tu dicas, quod bestiae non possent nocere, si homo non peccasset; tunc videtur, quod post peccatum hominis sit nova potentia eis tradita.

4. Item, si animalia facta sunt propter habitationem hominis decorandam, cum in statu innocentiae non deberet habitatio foedari, videtur, quod non debuerunt corruptibilia animalia fieri, quae suis corruptionibus et exhalationibus inficerent aerem. Si tu dicas, quod non corrumperentur; hoc est contra Augustinum super Genesim ad litteram libro tertio8, qui dicit, tunc facta esse animalia viventia de rapina. Ait enim sic: «Quaedam refectionem corporis sui ex aliorum corporibus quaerunt», ubi loquitur de bestiis.

5. Item, quidquid sit de hoc, sive moriantur sive non moriantur, videtur, quod animalia, quae alia devorant, hominis habitationem dehonestent, cum ea destruant, quae ad ipsius faciunt decorem et ornatum.

Conclusio.

Omnia sensibilia facta sunt propter hominem, aliter tamen in statu innocentiae, aliter in statu naturae lapsae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod finis, ad quem res ordinantur, Duplex finis. duplex est. Quidam enim est finis principalis et ultimus, quidam vero est finis sub fine. Si primo modo loquamur de fine, sic omnium creaturarum tam rationalium quam irrationalium finis est Deus, Conclusio 1. quia omnia propter semetipsum creavit Altissimus9; omnia enim fecit ad laudem suae bonitatis.

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Si autem loquamur de fine non principali, qui est finis quodam modo et finis sub fine; Conclusio 2. sic omnia sensibilia animalia facta sunt propter hominem.

Et hoc insinuat Philosophus, cum dicit: Rationes. «Sumus finis nos quodam modo omnium eorum quae sunt». Insinuat etiam Scriptura multo excellentius, cum dicit10: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris etc. Quia enim homo rationis capax est, ideo habet libertatem arbitrii et natus est piscibus dominari; quia vero per similitudinem natus est in Deum immediate tendere, ideo omnes creaturae irrationales ad ipsum ordinantur, ut mediante ipso in finem ultimum perducantur. — Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, animalia propter hominem facta esse.

Ad dissolutionem autem rationum, quae inducuntur in contrarium, notandum est, quod Conclusio 3. aliter ordinantur animalia ad hominem secundum statum innocentiae, aliter secundum statum naturae lapsae. — Secundum statum innocentiae ordinantur ad hominem secundum rationem quadruplicem. In statu innocentiae quadrupliciter. Prima ratio est ad manifestandum eius imperium, quod manifestarent, dum ei per omnia obedirent. Secundo, ad decorandum hominis habitaculum; perpulcrum enim erat, habitationem hominis animalium multiplicatione, non solum arborum decorari. Tertio, ad excitandum11 hominis sensum, ut in ipsorum animalium naturis diversis videret homo multiformitatem sapientiae Conditoris. Quarto, ad movendum eius affectum, ut, dum homo videret, animalia secundum rectitudinem suae naturae currere et amare illud ad quod naturaliter facta sunt, ex hoc excitaretur ad amandum Deum. — Corollarium. Et propter has rationes non solummodo fecit Deus iumenta, sed etiam bestias et pecora; omnia enim faciunt ad hominis utilitatem secundum rationes praedictas.

Secundum statum naturae lapsae ordinantur ista animalia ad utilitatem hominis; sed Item in statu naturae lapsae cum distinctione. aliter bestiae, et aliter iumenta et pecora. Iumenta enim et pecora ordinantur ad relevandam hominis indigentiam quantum ad cibum et quantum ad vestimentum12 et quantum ad obsequium, sicut sunt equi et asini etc., et quantum ad solatium, sicut sunt quaedam aves et catuli et similia: et sic facta sunt propter hominem ratione quadruplici. — Similiter De bestiis. bestiae sive animalia noxia ordinantur ad hominem secundum quadruplicem rationem et utilitatem, quam ponit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro tertio13. Dicit enim, quod «aut poenaliter laedunt, aut salubriter exercent, aut utiliter probant, aut ignoranter docent».

Et sic patet, quod tam bestiae quam reptilia et Epilogus. iumenta facta sunt propter hominem, sive in statu innocentiae, sive in statu naturae lapsae. Planum est etiam per hoc illud quod obiicitur in contrarium.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod esse finem est magnae dignitatis; dicendum, quod verum est de fine principali, qui est finis carens fine; non autem est verum de fine, qui est finis quodam modo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de animalibus non valentibus nisi14 ad esum et vestimentum, responderi potest, quod illa fecit Deus, quia praevidit hominem lapsurum; esto tamen, quod non laberetur, non tamen essent frustra; haberent enim praeter relevationem indigentiae quadruplicem utilitatem, sicut determinatum est supra.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bestiis, quae sunt contra hominem; dicendum, quod homine stante, Notandum. nulla animalia ipsum offenderent, sed omnia sibi mansueta essent, sicut aliquando divino imperio ferae crudelissimae Sanctis Dei mansuetae factae sunt, ut leones Danieli15. Quod autem noceant vel offendant, hoc est propter peccatum hominis, non propter novam potentiam eis datam, sed propter dignitatis praesidentiam ab homine amissam. Unde sicut oculus sanus a sole non laeditur, sed cum efficitur lippus, statim offenditur, non propter mutationem factam in sole, sed in oculo; sic in proposito intelligi potest.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homine stante, non debuerunt fieri animalia mortalia; dicendum, quod sicut animalia sua vita habitationem hominis decorant et ornant, sic etiam morte sua ex successione faciunt ad universi decorationem. Et sicut animalia se invicem iuvantia sunt ratio sapientiae excogitandae16, sic etiam animalia sese offendentia et de carnibus aliorum animalium nutrimentum sumentia; quia illa corruptio aerem hominis non inficeret, qui eius odoratum offenderet, sed potius quadam successione et ordine, dum animalia sibi succederent, universum decorarent, tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, in quo syllaba succedit syllabae17. — Similiter, dum bestia aliud animal comedendo occideret, in hominis habitatione discordiam non faceret, sed potius occasionem eruditionis homini praeberet. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus tertio18 super Genesim ad litteram: «Nimirum aliae

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bestiae cibi sunt aliarum; nec recte possumus dicere, quod non essent aliae, quibus aliae vescerentur; habent enim omnia, quamdiu sunt, mensuras, numeros et ordines suos, quae cuncta merito considerata laudantur, nec sine occulta pro suo genere moderatione pulcritudinis temporalis, ex alio in aliud transeundo, mutantur; et certe omnibus talibus inferioris creaturae motibus praebentur homini salubres admonitiones». Deinde planius exemplificat. — Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta.

Scholion

I. De fine eiusque distinctionibus vide supra d. I. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. Principia hoc loco explicata communiter approbantur et magni momenti sunt pro ethica christiana (cfr. infra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1.).

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 17. m. 3. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 22. 97. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. II. q. 63. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic II. Sent. d. 1. a. 5. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 8. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.

III. De seq. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 85. m. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. q. 71. 72. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. II. q. 63. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article II. On the order in which the animals were produced.

Consequently it is asked, in what order the animals were produced. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First, the question is asked about the order of production from the side of the end. Second, from the side of time. Third, about the order1 of production and of rest.

Question I. Whether all sensible things were made for the sake of man.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked, whether all sensible things were made for the sake of man. And that they were, seems so:

Foundations.

1. First, through Scripture, Genesis 12: Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the heavens, etc. And after, Genesis 93: All the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand, and everything that moves and lives: therefore all things have been made for the use of man.

2. Likewise, the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 34: All things are yours; this he says to just men: therefore for the sake of just men all things whatsoever were made, were produced: therefore also the sensible animals.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher5: «Man is in a certain way the end of all things which are»: therefore also of sensible things.

4. Likewise, all things desire the good — not any good whatever, but the highest — as Dionysius6 and the Philosopher hold; but among inferior creatures man alone is born to reach immediately to God: therefore the other creatures are ordered to the end through man as mediator. But that which is ordered to an end through another, is on account of that other: therefore all sensible things were made for the sake of man.

To the opposite.

On the contrary: 1. It is of as great dignity to be the end of things as to be the beginning; but of the sensible animals God alone was the beginning, in such a way that man was not: therefore the end of the same is not man, but God.

2. Likewise, there are certain animals which serve man only for food, certain that serve only for clothing; but man, if he had stood [in innocence], would not have needed these: therefore animals of this kind either would have been made in vain, or were not made for the sake of man. If you say that God made them because he foresaw that man would fall7; then it seems that it would lie in the will of man and in his sin, whether those animals would have been made in vain — which is false.

3. Likewise, if the animals were made for the sake of man, then none ought to have been made against man; but the beasts are harmful: therefore they ought not to have come to be in the original constitution of things, or else they were made in vain. If you say that the beasts could not harm if man had not sinned, then it seems that after man's sin a new power was given to them.

4. Likewise, if the animals were made to adorn the dwelling of man, since in the state of innocence his dwelling ought not to have been defiled, it seems that corruptible animals ought not to have been made, which by their corruptions and exhalations would infect the air. If you say that they would not have been corrupted, this is against Augustine on Genesis according to the letter, book III8, who says that even then the living animals were made for prey. For he says thus: «Some seek the refreshment of their own body from the bodies of others», where he speaks of beasts.

5. Likewise, whatever is the case about this — whether they die or do not die — it seems that animals which devour others dishonor man's dwelling, since they destroy those things which serve for his beauty and adornment.

Conclusion.

All sensible things were made for the sake of man, yet differently in the state of innocence and differently in the state of fallen nature.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the end to which things are ordered is twofold (The end is twofold.). For one is the principal and ultimate end, another is the end under an end. If we speak of the end in the first way, thus the end of all creatures, both rational and irrational, is God (Conclusion 1.), because the Most High created all things for himself9; for he made all things for the praise of his goodness.

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But if we speak of the non-principal end, which is end in a certain way and end-under-an-end (Conclusion 2.), then all sensible animals were made for the sake of man.

And this the Philosopher suggests when he says (Reasons.): «We are in some way the end of all things which are». Scripture suggests it also much more excellently, when it says10: Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him be set over the fishes of the sea, etc. For because man is capable of reason, therefore he has freedom of choice and is born to rule the fishes; and because by his likeness he is born to tend immediately to God, therefore all irrational creatures are ordered to him, so that through him as mediator they may be led to the ultimate end. — And so the reasons showing that the animals were made for the sake of man are to be conceded.

But for the resolution of the reasons brought to the contrary, it must be noted (Conclusion 3.) that animals are ordered to man one way in the state of innocence, another way in the state of fallen nature. — In the state of innocence they are ordered to man according to a fourfold reason (In the state of innocence in a fourfold way.). The first reason is for manifesting his rule, which they would manifest by obeying him in all things. Second, for adorning man's dwelling; for it was most beautiful that the dwelling of man be adorned by a multitude of animals, not only of trees. Third, for arousing11 man's sense, so that in the diverse natures of the animals themselves man might see the multiform wisdom of the Creator. Fourth, for moving his affection, so that, while man saw the animals run according to the rectitude of their nature and love that to which they were naturally made, he might from this be stirred up to love God. — Corollary. And on account of these reasons God made not only the beasts of burden, but also the wild beasts and the cattle; for all serve man's use according to the said reasons.

In the state of fallen nature these animals are ordered to the use of man; but (Likewise in the state of fallen nature, with distinction.) wild beasts in one way, beasts of burden and cattle in another. For the beasts of burden and the cattle are ordered to relieve man's need with respect to food and with respect to clothing12 and with respect to service, such as horses and asses etc., and with respect to solace, such as certain birds and puppies and the like: and thus they were made for the sake of man under a fourfold reason. — Similarly (Concerning the beasts.) the wild or harmful beasts are ordered to man according to a fourfold reason and use, which Augustine sets out in On Genesis according to the letter, book III13. For he says that «either they harm by way of penalty, or they exercise wholesomely, or they prove usefully, or they teach unwittingly».

And thus it is plain that both beasts and reptiles and beasts of burden (Epilogue.) were made for the sake of man, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of fallen nature. And by this also is made plain that which is objected to the contrary.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. To that which is objected, that to be an end is of great dignity, it must be said that this is true of the principal end, which is the end lacking a [further] end; it is not however true of the end which is end in a certain way.

2. To that which is objected concerning animals not serving except14 for food and clothing, it can be answered that God made them because he foresaw man would fall; suppose, however, that he had not fallen, they would not on that account have been made in vain; for they would have, beyond the relief of need, a fourfold utility, as has been determined above.

3. To that which is objected concerning the beasts which are against man; it must be said that, man standing [in innocence] (Note.), no animals would have offended him, but all would have been tame to him, just as sometimes by divine command the most cruel beasts have been made tame to the Saints of God, as the lions to Daniel15. But that they harm or offend, this is on account of man's sin — not on account of a new power given to them, but on account of the dignity of pre-eminence which man has lost. Whence, just as a healthy eye is not injured by the sun, but when it becomes bleary, it is at once offended — not on account of a change made in the sun, but in the eye — so it can be understood in the matter at hand.

4. 5. To that which is objected, that with man standing, mortal animals ought not to have been made, it must be said that, just as animals by their life adorn and embellish man's dwelling, so also by their death, through succession, they make for the adornment of the universe. And just as animals helping one another (iuvantia) are a reason for thinking on wisdom16, so also animals offending one another and taking nourishment from the flesh of other animals; because that corruption would not have infected man's air so as to offend his smell, but rather by a certain succession and order, while the animals succeeded one another, they would have adorned the universe as a most beautiful song, in which one syllable succeeds another17. — Likewise, when a beast killed another animal by eating it, it would not have made discord in man's dwelling, but rather would have furnished man with an occasion of instruction. And this is what Augustine says in [book] three18 on Genesis according to the letter: «Surely some

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beasts are food for others; nor can we rightly say that there would not have been others on which others might feed; for all things, so long as they exist, have their own measures, numbers, and orders, which when duly considered are all praised, nor without a hidden moderation suitable to its own kind of temporal beauty are they changed, passing from one into another; and certainly by all such motions of the inferior creature wholesome admonitions are offered to man». Then he sets it out more plainly by example. — From these things the response to the objections is plain.

Scholion

I. Concerning the end and its distinctions, see above d. I, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. The principles here explained are commonly approved and are of great moment for Christian ethics (cf. below d. 16, a. 2, q. 1).

II. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 17, m. 3. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 1, q. 2, a. 3; Summa contra Gent. III, c. 22, 97. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. II, q. 63, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here II Sent. d. 1, a. 5, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, II Sent. d. 1, p. II, q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 1, q. 8. — Biel, here in the sole question at the end.

III. Concerning the following question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 85, m. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; Summa q. 71, 72. — Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. II, q. 63, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. ex parte pro de ordine.
    The Vatican edition reads ex parte in place of de ordine.
  2. Vers. 28. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2. seq.
    Verse 28. — The following text is from the same place, v. 2 ff.
  3. Vers. 22.
    Verse 22.
  4. I Cor. 3, 22.
    1 Corinthians 3:22.
  5. Libr. II. Phys. text. 24. (c. 2.).
    [Aristotle,] Physics II, text 24 (c. 2).
  6. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 10. — Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. Cfr. etiam Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. et 10. seq.
    [Pseudo-Dionysius,] On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 10. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, c. 1. Cf. also Boethius, Consolation III, prose 2 and 10 ff.
  7. Sicut dicit Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 10. — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum Vat. et potestate pro et peccato.
    As Damascene says, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 10. — A little below, several codices with the Vatican edition read et potestate (and power) in place of et peccato (and sin).
  8. Secundum August., III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 24. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Cod. aa potuissent pro possent. Aliquanto superius Vat. sed multae bestiae homini pro sed bestiae.
    According to Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter III, c. 15, n. 24. Cf. here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 3. — Codex aa reads potuissent (would have been able) in place of possent (could). Somewhat earlier the Vatican edition reads sed multae bestiae homini (but many beasts to man) in place of sed bestiae (but the beasts).
  9. Prov. 16, 4: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. 1. c. 4. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius Vat. sensibilia alia pro sensibilia animalia.
    Proverbs 16:4: The Lord has made all things for himself. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. 1, c. 4, and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below the Vatican edition reads sensibilia alia (other sensible things) in place of sensibilia animalia (sensible animals).
  10. Gen. 1, 26. — Cfr. August., 83. Qq. q. 13. et 30; et Serm. 43. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, 27.). c. 2. n. 3. seq.
    Genesis 1:26. — Cf. Augustine, Eighty-three Questions q. 13 and 30; and Sermon 43 (otherwise On the Words of the Apostle, 27), c. 2, n. 3 ff.
  11. Cod. C excolendum, cod. T exercendum. Paulo inferius cod. 1 excitandum, Vat. moderandum pro movendum.
    Codex C reads excolendum (cultivating), codex T exercendum (exercising). A little below codex 1 reads excitandum (arousing); the Vatican edition reads moderandum (moderating) in place of movendum (moving).
  12. Aliqui codd. vestitum. — Cfr. de his Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 10.
    Some codices read vestitum (clothing, another form). — Cf. on these things Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 10.
  13. Cap. 17. n. 26.
    Chapter 17, n. 26.
  14. Fide codd. Q U et exigente ipsa obiectione supplevimus nisi. Vat. vestitum pro vestimentum.
    On the authority of codices Q and U, and as the objection itself requires, we have supplied nisi (except). The Vatican edition reads vestitum in place of vestimentum.
  15. Dan. 6, 22.
    Daniel 6:22.
  16. Respicere videtur ad Eccli. 16, 5.
    It seems to refer to Ecclesiasticus 16:5.
  17. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 786, nota 7. et pag. 832, nota 4, ubi opera Augustini allegantur, in quibus haec habetur sententia. — Paulo superius Vat. quod eius pro qui eius.
    Cf. tom. I, p. 786, note 7, and p. 832, note 4, where the works of Augustine are cited in which this sentiment is found. — A little above the Vatican edition reads quod eius in place of qui eius.
  18. Cap. 16. n. 25, in quibus verbis textus originalis post mutantur subiungit: Quod etsi stultos latet, sublucet proficientibus clarumque perfectis est. Cfr. I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 16. n. 25. seq.
    Chapter 16, n. 25, in which words the original text after mutantur adds: Which, even if it lies hidden from the foolish, dimly shines for those making progress and is clear to the perfect. Cf. On Genesis against the Manicheans I, c. 16, n. 25 ff. ---
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