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Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 11

Textus Latinus
p. 279

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum competens fuerit, Angelum deputari ad custodiam hominis conditi ante lapsum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum competens fuerit, Angelum deputari ad custodiam hominis conditi. Et quod non, videtur.

Ad oppositum. 1. Angelus deputatur ad custodiam hominis propter supplendos eius defectus; sed in homine secundum statum naturae institutae nulli erant defectus1: ergo ad eius custodiam non debebat deputari aliquis Angelus.

2. Item, homo secundum statum naturae institutae non erat magis pronus ad malum, quam unus Angelus in suis naturalibus constitutus: ergo si Angelus conditus nullius custodiae est commissus nisi soli divinae, videtur similiter, quod nec homo in statu innocentiae constitutus.

3. Item, custodia dicit quandam praesidentiam in custodiente respectu custoditi; sed anima humana solus Deus maior est, nisi depravetur per culpam2: ergo si homo in statu innocentiae nulla culpa erat depravatus, non debuit ei per officium custodiae praesidere aliquis Angelus.

4. Item, si ad custodiam hominis instituti deputatur angelicus spiritus: ergo cum virtus hominis sit modo per peccatum multipliciter deiecta, videtur, quod uni homini non sufficiat unius Angeli custodia: ergo si nunc uni homini lapso sufficit unus, videtur, quod tunc non indigebat custodia alicuius.

Contra: Fundamenta. 1. Super illud Matthaei decimo octavo3: Angeli eorum etc., Glossa Hieronymi: «Magna dignitas est animarum, ut unaquaeque ab ortu nativitatis suae habeat ad sui custodiam Angelum deputatum». Si ergo deputatio custodiae angelicae pertinet ad dignitatem animae, cum anima secundum statum naturae institutae dignior esset quam secundum statum naturae lapsae: videtur, quodsi nunc habet Angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum, quod multo magis tunc.

2. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum: ergo si homo in statu naturae institutae habuit angelum malum tentantem4, multo fortius divina misericordia debuit sibi dare Angelum custodientem.

3. Item, Angeli deputati sunt nobis custodes, ut per eorum operationem retrahamur a malo; sed homo in statu innocentiae indigebat a malo retrahi, cum posset peccare: ergo debebat ab Angelo custodiri.

4. Item, homo viator committitur angelicae custodiae, ut per sustentationem et auxilium angelicum et per subsidium eius operationis possit de bono in melius ascendere; sed homo in statu innocentiae proficere poterat: ergo videtur, quod ad ipsius custodiam Angelus deputari debebat5.

CONCLUSIO.

Homini non modo in statu naturae lapsae, sed etiam institutae dari angelicam custodiam, conveniens erat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod etsi Angelus deputatur ad custodiam hominis, ut in multis prosit ei et subveniat, specialiter tamen ad hoc deputatur, Finis principalis custodiae angelicae. ut ab invisibili adversario defendat. Quia enim homo non habet colluctationem adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus mundi rectores et adversus spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus6, qui sunt hostes invisibiles; debet per oppositum habere invisibiles adiutores ad sui ipsius defensionem. Et quia adversarius undique nos impugnat — nam rationem seducit per astutias, voluntatem allicit per blanditias, virtutes opprimit per violentiam — ideo bonus Angelus specialiter ad hoc nobis datur, ut hominem defendat ab oppressione contra violentiam, ut hominem erudiat et dirigat contra fallaciam, ut hominem exhortetur et incitet ad bonum contra blanditias. — Quia igitur adversarius noster diabolus etiam homine instituto erat fortior et astutior et in proposito malitiae pertinacior; ideo competebat, homini dari angelicam custodiam, quae comprimeret potestatem adversariam non solum secundum statum naturae lapsae, sed etiam institutae; licet magis nunc, quam tunc indigeret. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

p. 280

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod Angelus datur homini ad custodiam propter supplendos defectus; dicendum, quod illa non est tota causa, nisi large vocetur suppletio defectus, sive quantum ad defectum, qui inest, sive etiam quantum ad defectum, qui potest inesse, ut non insit. Et licet in primo homine non esset defectus actualis, erat tamen in eo defectibilitas; et si ex se non haberet defectum, in defectum tamen praecipitari poterat per suum adversarium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angelus non deputatur ad custodiam alterius Angeli; dicendum, Notandum. quod etsi Angelus possit alteri Angelo praesidere, tamen proprie non dicitur ipsum custodire. Nam ille solus indiget custodia, qui potest impugnari et per custodiam superare vel absque custodia perdere7; et ille solus debet custodire, qui nec potest expugnari nec perdere. Et hinc est, quod Angelus potest deputari ad custodiam hominis instituti, et non alterius Angeli: nam Angeli simul conditi sunt, et simul etiam, qui beatificantur beatificati sunt, et simul etiam, qui peccaverunt, irrecuperabiliter lapsi sunt. Et ideo Angelus non potest deputari ad custodiam alterius Angeli, quia bonus post confirmationem non indiget, malo post obstinationem nec prodest; ante vero confirmationem et obstinationem nec erat qui posset defendere, nec erat qui posset impugnare, cum omnes essent aequaliter vertibiles. In homine vero viatore secus est. Nam homine existente in statu vertibilitatis et pugnae, in qua poterat amittere vel lucrari, Angelus in statu beatitudinis erat, a quo non poterat commoveri8.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod menti humanae, quae non est per peccatum corrupta, solus Deus debet praefici; dicendum, quod verum est de ea praelatione, quae habet oppositam servitutem; Quo praelatio soli Deo conveniat. sic enim homo conditus soli Deo dicebatur esse subiectus, et solius Dei erat servus, non alterius. De praelatione vero, quae attenditur secundum excellentiam status et secundum praesidentiam respectu alicuius actus, non habet veritatem; sic enim Angelus praeest Angelo, in quibus nunquam fuit peccatum9.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi homo10 habuit Angelum ad custodiam deputatum, quod nunc unus homo debet habere multos; dicendum, quod illud argumentum non cogit; quia effectus angelicae custodiae dupliciter potest crescere: Distinctio. vel propter multiplicationem custodientium, vel propter maiorem succursum custodientis. Et ideo licet homo lapsus maiori indigeat officio custodiae quam institutus, tamen, quia idem Angelus secundum diversas opportunitates potest magis et magis succurrere et indigentias relevare; ideo non oportet pro augmentatione indigentiae in custodito numerum custodum multiplicare11.

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English Translation

Question II.

Whether it was fitting that an Angel be assigned to the custody of man as created before the fall.

Second, it is asked whether it was fitting that an Angel be assigned to the custody of man as created. And that it was not, seems [the case].

To the contrary [arguments]. 1. An Angel is assigned to the custody of man on account of supplying his defects; but in man according to the state of nature as instituted there were no defects1: therefore no Angel ought to have been assigned to his custody.

2. Likewise, man according to the state of nature as instituted was not more prone to evil than a single Angel constituted in his natural powers: therefore if a created Angel was committed to no custody save the divine alone, it seems likewise that neither was man constituted in the state of innocence.

3. Likewise, custody implies a certain presidency in the custodian with respect to the one guarded; but only God is greater than the human soul, unless it be depraved by fault2: therefore if man in the state of innocence was depraved by no fault, no Angel ought to have presided over him through the office of custody.

4. Likewise, if an angelic spirit is assigned to the custody of man as instituted: therefore since the strength of man is now in many ways cast down through sin, it seems that the custody of one Angel does not suffice for one man: therefore if now one Angel suffices for one fallen man, it seems that then he did not need anyone's custody.

On the contrary: Foundations. 1. On that text of Matthew chapter eighteen3: Their Angels etc., the Gloss of Jerome: «It is a great dignity of souls, that each one from the rising of her nativity should have an Angel assigned to her custody». If, therefore, the assignment of angelic custody pertains to the dignity of the soul, since the soul according to the state of nature as instituted was more worthy than according to the state of nature as fallen: it seems that if she now has an Angel assigned to her custody, much more so then.

2. Likewise, God is more prone to having mercy than to condemning: therefore if man in the state of nature as instituted had an evil angel tempting [him]4, much more strongly ought the divine mercy to have given him a guarding Angel.

3. Likewise, the Angels have been assigned to us as guardians, so that through their operation we might be drawn back from evil; but man in the state of innocence needed to be drawn back from evil, since he was able to sin: therefore he ought to have been guarded by an Angel.

4. Likewise, man as wayfarer is committed to angelic custody, so that through angelic sustenance and aid and through the support of [the Angel's] operation he might be able to ascend from good to better; but man in the state of innocence was able to make progress: therefore it seems that an Angel ought to have been assigned to his custody5.

Conclusion.

Not only in the state of fallen nature, but even in the instituted [state], it was fitting that angelic custody be given to man.

I respond: It must be said that although an Angel is assigned to the custody of man in order to profit him and come to his aid in many ways, yet he is assigned especially for this, The principal end of angelic custody. that he might defend [man] from the invisible adversary. For since man does not have a wrestling against flesh and blood, but against the rulers of the world and against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places6, who are invisible enemies; he ought, conversely, to have invisible helpers for his own defense. And because the adversary attacks us on every side — for he seduces reason by cunning, allures the will by flatteries, oppresses the virtues by violence — therefore the good Angel is especially given to us for this: that he may defend man from oppression against violence, that he may instruct and direct man against deception, that he may exhort and incite man to good against flatteries. — Since therefore our adversary the devil was, even in instituted man['s case], stronger and more cunning and more obstinate in his purpose of malice; therefore it was fitting that angelic custody be given to man, which would suppress the adversary's power not only according to the state of fallen nature, but even of the instituted; though he has greater need now than then. Whence the reasons adduced for this [position] are to be granted.

Solution of the opposed [arguments]. 1. To that which is objected first, that an Angel is given to man for custody on account of supplying defects; it must be said that this is not the whole cause, unless supplying of defect be taken broadly, whether with respect to a defect that is present, or also with respect to a defect that can be present, so that it may not be present. And although in the first man there was no actual defect, yet there was in him defectibility; and although of himself he had no defect, nevertheless he could be cast down into defect by his adversary.

2. To that which is objected, that an Angel is not assigned to the custody of another Angel; it must be said, To be noted. that although an Angel can preside over another Angel, nevertheless he is not properly said to guard him. For only he needs custody who can be attacked and through custody overcome [his attacker] or without custody be lost7; and only he ought to guard who can neither be vanquished nor lost. And hence it is that an Angel can be assigned to the custody of man as instituted, and not of another Angel: for the Angels were created at the same time, and likewise those who are beatified were beatified at the same time, and likewise those who sinned fell irrecoverably at the same time. And therefore an Angel cannot be assigned to the custody of another Angel, because the good [Angel] after confirmation does not need [custody], to the evil [Angel] after obstinacy [custody] is of no avail; and before confirmation and obstinacy there was neither one who could defend, nor one who could attack, since all were equally changeable. But it is otherwise with man as wayfarer. For while man exists in the state of changeability and combat, in which he was able to lose or to gain, the Angel was in the state of beatitude, from which he could not be moved8.

3. To that which is objected, that to the human mind, which is not corrupted by sin, God alone ought to be set in command; it must be said that this is true of that pre-eminence which has opposed servitude [as its correlate]; In what way pre-eminence belongs to God alone. for thus man as created was said to be subject to God alone, and to be servant of God alone, of no other. But of that pre-eminence which is regarded according to excellence of status and according to presidency with respect to some act, it does not hold; for thus Angel presides over Angel, in whom sin never was9.

4. To that which is objected, that if man10 had an Angel assigned to his custody, then now one man ought to have many; it must be said that the argument does not compel; for the effect of angelic custody can grow in two ways: Distinction. either by the multiplication of custodians, or by the greater succor of the custodian. And therefore although fallen man needs a greater office of custody than [man] as instituted, nevertheless, because the same Angel according to diverse opportunities can succor more and more and relieve the [man's] needs; therefore it is not necessary, in proportion to the increase of need in the one guarded, to multiply the number of guardians11.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide infra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 2. et XXV. c. 6.
    See below d. XXIV, Littera Magistri, c. 2, and XXV, c. 6.
  2. Cfr. supra pag. 45, nota 5. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 per peccatum.
    Cf. above p. 45, note 5. — Codex cc and edition 1 read per peccatum [by sin].
  3. Vers. 10. — Verba Hieronymi sunt etiam in lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Verse 10. — The words of Jerome are also in the Littera Magistri, c. 1.
  4. Gen. 3, 1. seqq.
    Genesis 3, 1ff.
  5. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 debeat.
    Most codices, with editions 1 and 2, read debeat [ought].
  6. Eph. 6, 12, ubi Vulgata post sed adversus prosequitur principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia etc.
    Ephesians 6, 12, where the Vulgate, after sed adversus, continues principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia etc. [the principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts] etc.
  7. Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hic et paulo inferius perdi, et substituit «In testimonium meruerunt» pro qui beatificantur.
    Codex cc with edition 1 reads perdi [to be lost, pass.] here and a little below, and substitutes «In testimonium meruerunt» for qui beatificantur.
  8. Consentit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 41. m. 3, ubi etiam quaestionem de custodia respectu animae separatae eodem modo resolvit. — Paulo superius Vat. legit Nam homo erat in statu vertibilitatis et pugnae, in quo poterat etc. Cod. T pugna pro et pugnae.
    Alexander of Hales agrees, Summa p. II, q. 41, m. 3, where he also resolves in the same way the question concerning the custody [of an Angel] with respect to the separated soul. — A little above the Vatican [edition] reads Nam homo erat in statu vertibilitatis et pugnae, in quo poterat etc. Codex T [reads] pugna for et pugnae.
  9. Cfr. supra d. 9. q. 2. et 6.
    Cf. above d. 9, q. 2, and 6.
  10. Cod. Q primus homo; Vat. homo tunc, quae etiam paulo inferius substituit multitudinem pro multiplicatione. Cfr. de hac solutione littera Magistri, c. 1.
    Codex Q reads primus homo [the first man]; the Vatican [edition reads] homo tunc [man then], which also a little below substitutes multitudinem [multitude] for multiplicatione [multiplication]. Cf. on this solution the Littera Magistri, c. 1.
  11. Vide scholion ad quaest. praecedentem.
    See the scholion on the preceding question. ---
Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 3