Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 11
ARTICULUS I.
Circa Angelorum custodiam.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum Angeli debuerint deputari ad custodiam hominis lapsi.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod Angeli non debuerunt deputari ad custodiam hominis.
1. Ad oppositum. Et primo ostenditur ratione sumta ex parte hominis sic. Cui nulla potest fieri violentia, nulla indiget custodia; sed liberum arbitrium humanum ad peccatum non potest violentari1: ergo non indiget ab Angelo custodiri: frustra ergo sunt Angeli ad eius custodiam deputati. Sed «Deus nihil facit frustra»: ergo etc.
2. Item, quanto aliquis paucioribus auxiliis extrinsecis triumphat de adversario, tanto gloriosior est victoria: ergo gloriosius esset homini vincere diabolum per se ipsum quam per angelicum suffragium: ergo carentia angelici praesidii auget gloriam. Igitur ab oppositis, custodia angelica minuit nostram gloriam; sed Deus nihil debet facere, quod sit nostrae gloriae detrimentum: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus sumtis a parte Angeli. Maior est qui recumbit, quam qui ministrat2: ergo si Angelus, qui custodit hominem, ei ministrat, homo viator est maior Angelo beato; quodsi hoc falsum est: ergo Angelus non ministrat homini: ergo Angelus non custodit hominem, aut in custodia pervertitur ordo.
4. Item, si Angelus custodit hominem, aut hoc habet a natura, aut a gratia. Si a natura; cum eadem sit natura in bonis et in malis, videtur, quod mali sint custodes hominum. Si a gratia; ergo cum una anima excedat aliam in gratia, videtur, quod una anima debeat ad custodiam alterius deputari.
5. Item, hoc ostenditur a parte ipsius Dei. Deus enim custos perfectus est, secundum quod legitur in Psalmo3: Ecce non dormitabit neque dormiet etc.: ergo si sufficiens est divina custodia, videtur, quod superfluat angelica; aut si angelica est necessaria, videtur divina custodia esse diminuta.
6. Item, custodia est ad conservandum in bonum4; sed non minus est conservare in bono quam liberare a malo; nam «Non minor est virtus quam quaerere, parta tueri.» Si ergo non decuit, hominem liberari nec erui de potestate diaboli nisi per Deum, videtur, quod non debeat custodiri; aut honor divinus transfertur in Angelum.
Sed contra: 1. Fundamenta. Isaiae sexagesimo secundo5: Super muros tuos Ierusalem etc., Glossa: «Muri sunt Apostoli, custodes sunt Angeli». — Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo6: In unamquamque gentem praeposuit rectorem, Glossa: «Id est Angelos». — Item, Matthaei decimo octavo7: Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris mei, Glossa: «Non sunt contemnendi, ad quorum custodiam mittuntur Angeli». — Ex his auctoritatibus colligitur, quod Angeli deputati sunt ad custodiam hominum.
2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Ordo universi hoc exigit, ut omne malum habeat bonum sibi oppositum; quod confirmatur per illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio8: Contra malum bonum. Si ergo tentamur per angelos malos, videtur, quod defendi debeamus per bonos.
3. Item, lex universitatis hoc exigit, ut media reducantur per prima, et postrema per media ad suum primum principium; et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia9: «Lex divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per prima media, et per media postrema reducere»: ergo si Angelus beatus superior est homine viatore, videtur, quod homo mediante auxilio Angeli ad beatitudinem debeat pervenire; auxilium autem illud maxime est in custodiendo: ergo etc.
4. Item, lex pietatis hoc exigit, ut sustentetur indigens a potente: si ergo homo viator fragilis est et indigens sustentante et custodiente, et Angelus beatus fortis est et potens, videtur, quod homo committi debeat angelicae custodiae.
CONCLUSIO.
Homini lapso deputari Angelum custodem, decet Dei potentiam, sapientiam et misericordiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod conveniens est, hominem lapsum deputari angelicae custodiae, et Angelum deputari ad custodiendum hominem, tum quia decet altitudinem divinae potentiae, tum quia decet ordinem sapientiae, tum etiam quia decet dulcedinem misericordiae.
Altitudinem namque decet divinae potentiae, Ratio prima a parte potentiae. duplici ex causa. Una est, quia Deus non solummodo vult honorari in se, sed etiam in suis servis. Unde non sufficit altitudini divinae potentiae, quod Angeli ministrent sibi, sed etiam ad ostensionem excellentis suae potentiae hoc ab eis exigit, ut ministrent etiam creaturae suae10. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia cum Deus habeat diabolum et eius daemones adversarios, magis decens est, quod ipse eos vincat per suos ministros, ut per hoc ostendatur potentia manus Dei, qua non solum potens est in se, sed etiam in servis suis, et ut non indebite possit Dominus exercituum appellari11.
Ordinem vero sapientiae similiter decet. Ratio secunda a parte sapientiae. Nam hic est ordo, quem divina lex in suis operibus exsequitur et conservat, ut postrema per media deducat ad summa12. Quoniam igitur Angelus tum ratione immortalis naturae, tum etiam ratione gratiae consummatae medium tenet inter Deum et hominem lapsum; decens fuit, ut Deus hominem adiuvaret et custodiret per Angelum.
Dulcedinem etiam decet divinae misericordiae, Ratio a parte misericordiae. quae aperuit sinum ad hominem lapsum nec in aliquo ei deficit, quod spectet ad salutis suae promotionem. Et ideo, cum homo lapsus esset venumdatus, ut faceret malum13, ei ministravit pretium sanguinis Filii sui, per quod est redemptus, ut faciat bonum14.
Et quia habet adversarium impugnantem, dedit ei ministrum custodientem vel custodem auxiliantem, ut sic ex nulla parte miseria remaneret humana sine divinae misericordiae subsidio et beneficio.
Competebat igitur, homini lapso dari ex hac triplici ratione angelicam custodiam. Sunt et aliae rationes, quae in obiiciendo tactae sunt. Rationes igitur ad hanc partem inductae concedendae sunt.
1. Solutio oppositorum. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod homini non potest fieri violentia; dicendum, quod etsi non possit fieri violentia, quantum est ex parte liberi arbitrii, posset tamen fieri, quantum est ex parte sui corporis15. Et iterum, quamvis angelus non possit sufficienter liberum arbitrium violentare, tamen nisi haberet contrariam potestatem arcentem, adeo posset inducere et circumvenire, quod valde pauci essent, quos non deiiceret; et ideo pernecessaria est custodia angelica, quae comprimat potestatem diabolicam.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carentia angelici praesidii auget gloriam et triumphum; dicendum, quod verum esset, si ita bene triumpharet homo absque Angelo, sicut cum adiutorio angelico. Nunc autem non est ita. Si enim ei deesset angelicum subsidium, multo frequentius vinceretur, quam vinceret; et multo melius est cum angelico praesidio vincere, quam sine praesidio perdere. Et iterum, praesidium Angeli non excludit libertatem arbitrii nec minuit dignitatem gratiae Dei, et ideo nihil minuit16 de substantia meriti vel praemii vel de nobilitate triumphi, quantum ad id quod est substantiale.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non convenit ex parte Angeli, quia maior est qui recumbit, quam qui ministrat; dicendum, quod verum est, quando minister recumbenti ministrat propter se ipsum, sicut servus regis ministrat regi propter eius dignitatem et imperium; sed non habet veritatem, quando aliquis ministrat alicui, habendo respectum ad alium, sicut aliquando aliquis magnus miles deservit non tantum regi, sed etiam toti familiae, nec aliquem abiicit nec despicit, ut ei non ministret propter vilitatem personae17; non enim considerat, quis est, sed cuius servus est. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere. Angelus enim homini non propter se ministrat, sed propter Deum, cuius gerit imaginem. — Alia solutio. Vel aliter dici potest, quod verbum illud intelligitur de ministerio subiectionis, non praesidentiae; custodire autem hominem, etsi ministerium dicat, magis tamen importat, Angelum praesidere homini quam esse subiectum.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum habeat a gratia, vel a natura; dicendum, quod ab utroque habet. Quia enim de natura sua fortior est homine et potentior, et similiter in gratia est excellentior et stabilior, adeo ut plus excedat hominem, quam excedat paedagogus parvulum; ideo convenit Angelo et ex natura et gratia, ut homo committatur eius custodiae et tutelae18.
5. Notandum. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte Dei, quod Dominus est custos perfectus; dicendum, quod perfectio divinae custodiae non excludit utilitatem angelicae. Sicut enim Deus operatur in omnibus rebus, et tamen eius operatio operationes creaturarum non excludit, sed conservat et adiuvat; nec tamen eius operatio est imperfecta, nec operatio creaturae superflua19: sic intelligendum est de custodia. Sicut enim Deus propter suae bonitatis manifestationem et ordinis sapientiae ostensionem creaturis communicavit posse operari et in alias creaturas effectum suum imprimere, ipso tamen non deserente, sed cooperante; sic dedit Angelis posse hominem custodire, cum tamen a servorum suorum custodia ipse nunquam desistat, quia tale posse competebat angelicae naturae et gratiae. Et una istarum custodiarum alteri non praeiudicat, immo divina facit ad angelicae custodiae perfectionem, angelica vero ad perfectionis divinae custodiae manifestationem.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus per se ipsum debuit redimere, ergo per se ipsum debuit custodire; dicendum, quod non est simile. Redimere enim aeque magnum est sicut condere; et ideo sicut nullus debuit esse conditor nisi solus Deus, sic nullus alius debuit esse redemptor; custodire autem dicit aliquem effectum beneficentiae, qui magis est exterius quam interius, et ideo non est tantus. — Nec valet illud quod obiicitur20, quod non minor est virtus tueri bona quam acquirere; dicendum enim, quod illud tunc verum est, quando conservatio et acquisitio est in potestate eiusdem virtutis.
SCHOLION
I. Ex s. Scriptura (praesertim Hebr. 1, 14. et Matth. 18, 10.) et ex manifesto magisterio Ecclesiae constat, Angelos deputari in custodiam hominum. Haec autem custodia plura comprehendit quam tres actus hierarchicos, de quibus supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. 2. actum est (cfr. hic q. 2.). Quare Deus hanc custodiam Angelorum ordinaverit, optimis rationibus congruentiae hic explicatur. — Quando incipiat haec custodia, exponitur hic dub. 1, scil. a nativitate in utero sive ab instante infusionis animae. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 4. a. 3.), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.) et S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3.), qui tamen in Summa (I. q. 113. a. 5. ad 3.) docet, probabiliter dici posse, Angelum matris custodire prolem in matris utero existentem.
II. De seq. huius articuli quaestione explicite agunt solummodo Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 41. m. 4. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 9. q. 36. m. 4.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1., et Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Quae ibi dicuntur de fine et effectibus angelicae custodiae magis determinantur infra a. 2. q. 1, ubi duodecim effectus ex s. Scriptura recensentur, quae ibid. q. 3. ad quatuor principales effectus reducuntur. — In solut. ad 2. docetur, talem custodiam non esse admittendam respectu unius Angeli ad alium, de quo explicite agit Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3.
III. De 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 1. 2. — Scol., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et 3; S. I. q. 113. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2; Sum. loc. cit. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
---
ARTICLE I.
Concerning the guardianship of the Angels.
QUESTION I.
Whether the Angels ought to have been deputed to the guardianship of fallen man.
Concerning the first, the procedure runs thus, and it is shown that the Angels ought not to have been deputed to the guardianship of man.
1. Ad oppositum. And first it is shown by an argument taken from the side of man, thus. To whom no violence can be done, no one needs guardianship; but the free choice of the human will cannot be violently coerced1 into sin: therefore it does not need to be guarded by an Angel: in vain therefore are the Angels deputed to its guardianship. But «God does nothing in vain»: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the fewer the extrinsic helps by which one triumphs over an adversary, the more glorious the victory: therefore it would be more glorious for man to vanquish the devil by himself than by angelic support: therefore the absence of angelic guardianship augments glory. Therefore conversely, angelic guardianship diminishes our glory; but God ought to do nothing that is to the detriment of our glory: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the same is shown by reasons taken from the side of the Angel. He is greater who reclines than he who serves2: therefore if the Angel who guards a man serves him, the wayfaring man is greater than the blessed Angel; and if this is false, then either the Angel does not serve man, and so does not guard him, or the order is inverted in the guardianship.
4. Likewise, if an Angel guards man, he has this either from nature or from grace. If from nature: since the nature is the same in the good and the evil [Angels], it seems that the evil [Angels] would be guardians of men. If from grace: then since one soul exceeds another in grace, it seems that one soul ought to be deputed to the guardianship of another.
5. Likewise, this is shown from the side of God himself. For God is a perfect guardian, according to what is read in the Psalm3: Behold, he shall not slumber nor sleep etc.: therefore if the divine guardianship is sufficient, it seems that the angelic is superfluous; or if the angelic is necessary, the divine guardianship seems to be diminished.
6. Likewise, guardianship is for preserving in the good4; but it is no less to preserve in the good than to deliver from evil; for «No less is the virtue to keep what is won, than to seek it.» If therefore it was not fitting that man should be delivered, nor be drawn out of the power of the devil, except by God, it seems that he ought not to be guarded; otherwise divine honour is transferred to an Angel.
On the contrary: 1. Fundamenta. Isaiah sixty-two5: Upon thy walls, O Jerusalem etc., the Gloss: «The walls are the Apostles, the guardians are the Angels». — Likewise, Ecclesiasticus seventeen6: Over every nation he set a ruler, the Gloss: «That is, the Angels». — Likewise, Matthew eighteen7: Their Angels always see the face of my Father, the Gloss: «They are not to be despised, to whose guardianship Angels are sent». — From these authorities it is gathered that the Angels have been deputed to the guardianship of men.
2. Likewise, the same is shown by reason. The order of the universe requires that every evil have a good opposed to it; which is confirmed by what is said in Ecclesiasticus thirty-three8: Against evil, good. If therefore we are tempted by evil angels, it seems that we ought to be defended by good [angels].
3. Likewise, the law of the universe requires that the middle things be brought back through the first, and the last through the middle to their first principle; and this is confirmed by what Dionysius says in the book on the Angelic Hierarchy9: «The law of divinity is to neglect order in nothing, but to bring back the middle through the first, and the last through the middle»: therefore if a blessed Angel is superior to the wayfaring man, it seems that man ought to arrive at beatitude with the mediating help of an Angel; and that help is greatest in [the work of] guarding: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the law of piety requires that the needy be supported by the powerful: if therefore wayfaring man is fragile and needs one to sustain and guard him, and the blessed Angel is strong and powerful, it seems that man ought to be committed to angelic guardianship.
CONCLUSION.
That a guardian Angel be deputed to fallen man befits God's power, wisdom, and mercy.
I respond: It must be said that it is fitting that fallen man be deputed to angelic guardianship, and that an Angel be deputed to guard man — first because it befits the loftiness of the divine power; secondly because it befits the order of wisdom; thirdly also because it befits the sweetness of mercy.
For it befits the loftiness of the divine power, first reason from the side of power, for a twofold cause. The one is that God wills to be honoured not only in himself but also in his servants. Hence it does not suffice to the loftiness of the divine power that Angels minister to him, but he requires of them also, for the manifestation of his surpassing power, that they minister also to his creature10. — The other reason is that, since God has the devil and his demons as adversaries, it is more fitting that he conquer them through his ministers, so that through this the power of the hand of God may be shown — by which he is mighty not only in himself but also in his servants — and so that he may not undeservedly be called Lord of hosts11.
It befits the order of wisdom likewise. Second reason from the side of wisdom. For this is the order which the divine law in its works pursues and preserves, that it lead the lowest through the middle to the highest12. Since therefore the Angel — both by reason of his immortal nature and by reason of consummate grace — holds the middle between God and fallen man, it was fitting that God should help and guard man through an Angel.
It also befits the sweetness of the divine mercy, Reason from the side of mercy, which has opened her bosom to fallen man and fails him in nothing that pertains to the advancement of his salvation. And therefore, since fallen man had been sold to do evil13, she ministered to him the price of the blood of her Son, by which he is redeemed, that he might do good14.
And because he has an adversary attacking him, she has given him a minister to guard him — or a guardian to help him — so that in no part should human misery remain without the assistance and benefit of divine mercy.
It was fitting therefore that angelic guardianship be given to fallen man from this threefold reason. There are also other reasons, which have been touched on in the objections. The reasons therefore brought forward on this side are to be granted.
1. Solution of the objections. To what is objected first, that no violence can be done to man; it must be said that, even though no violence can be done as regards free choice, it could still be done as regards his body15. And again, although an angel cannot sufficiently coerce free choice, yet unless he had a contrary power to restrain [the devil], he could so induce and circumvent that very few would there be whom he would not cast down; and therefore angelic guardianship — which represses the diabolical power — is utterly necessary.
2. To what is objected, that the absence of angelic support augments glory and triumph; it must be said that this would be true if man triumphed as well without an Angel as with angelic help. But now it is not so. For if angelic assistance were lacking to him, he would be conquered far more often than he conquered; and it is much better to conquer with angelic guardianship than to perish without guardianship. And again, the guardianship of the Angel does not exclude the freedom of choice nor diminish the dignity of the grace of God, and therefore it diminishes nothing16 of the substance of merit or of reward or of the nobility of triumph, as regards what is substantial.
3. To what is objected, that it does not befit the side of the Angel, since he is greater who reclines than he who serves; it must be said that this is true when the minister serves the one reclining on the latter's own account — as a servant of the king serves the king for the sake of the king's own dignity and rule; but it does not hold when someone serves another with respect to a third, as when sometimes a great soldier renders service not only to the king but also to the whole household, nor does he reject or despise anyone, refusing to serve him on account of the lowliness of the person17; for he considers not who the person is, but whose servant he is. So is it to be understood in the matter at hand. For the Angel does not serve man on man's own account, but on God's account, whose image man bears. — Another solution. Or it may be put otherwise: that the word is to be understood of the ministry of subjection, not of presidency; and to guard a man, although it is spoken of as a ministry, more truly implies that the Angel presides over the man than that he is subject to him.
4. To what is asked, whether he has it from grace or from nature; it must be said that he has it from both. For since from his nature he is stronger than man and more powerful, and likewise in grace he is more excellent and more stable — to such a degree that he exceeds man more than a tutor exceeds a small child — therefore it belongs to the Angel both from nature and from grace that man be committed to his guardianship and tutelage18.
5. Note. To what is objected from the side of God, that the Lord is a perfect guardian; it must be said that the perfection of the divine guardianship does not exclude the usefulness of the angelic. For just as God works in all things, and yet his operation does not exclude the operations of creatures but preserves and aids them — yet neither is his operation imperfect, nor is the creature's operation superfluous19 — so is it to be understood of guardianship. For just as God, for the manifestation of his goodness and for the showing forth of the order of wisdom, communicated to creatures the power to operate and to imprint their own effect upon other creatures (yet he himself not abandoning [them] but cooperating with [them]), so he has given to the Angels the power to guard man — although he himself never desists from the guardianship of his servants — because such power belonged to the angelic nature and grace. And the one of these guardianships does not prejudice the other, but rather the divine [guardianship] contributes to the perfection of the angelic, and the angelic to the manifestation of the perfection of the divine guardianship.
6. To what is objected, that God ought to have redeemed by himself, therefore he ought to guard by himself; it must be said that the cases are not alike. For to redeem is as great a thing as to create; and therefore, just as none ought to have been creator save God alone, so no other ought to have been redeemer; but to guard speaks of some effect of beneficence, which is more outward than inward, and therefore is not so great. — Nor does the objection avail20 that no less is the virtue to safeguard goods than to acquire them; for it must be said that this is true only when preservation and acquisition are in the power of the same virtue.
SCHOLION
I. From Sacred Scripture (especially Heb. 1:14 and Matt. 18:10) and from the manifest magisterium of the Church, it is clear that Angels are deputed to the guardianship of men. This guardianship comprehends more than the three hierarchical acts treated above at d. 10, a. 2, qq. 1–2 (cf. here, q. 2). Why God has ordained this guardianship of the Angels is here explained with optimal reasons of fittingness. — When this guardianship begins is set forth here in dub. 1: namely, from birth in the womb, or from the very instant of the infusion of the soul. So consent Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., m. 4, a. 3), Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2), and St. Thomas (here, q. 1, a. 3) — who however in the Summa (I, q. 113, a. 5, ad 3) teaches that it can probably be said that the mother's Angel guards the offspring existing in the mother's womb.
II. Concerning the following question of this article, explicitly only the following treat: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 41, m. 4, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; S. p. II, tr. 9, q. 36, m. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1; and Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. — What is said there about the end and effects of angelic guardianship is more fully determined below at a. 2, q. 1, where twelve effects from Sacred Scripture are recounted, which there at q. 3 are reduced to four principal effects. — In the solution ad 2 it is taught that such guardianship is not to be admitted with respect to one Angel toward another — on which Alexander of Hales explicitly treats, loc. cit., m. 3.
III. On the first question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., m. 1–2. — Scotus, here q. unica; Reportatio here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, aa. 1 and 3; Summa I, q. 113, aa. 1–2. — Bl. Albert, here aa. 1–2; Summa loc. cit., m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, aa. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, aa. 1–2. — Durand, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.
---
- Cfr. infra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq. — Quod Deus nihil facit frustra, dicit Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 32. (c. 4.).Cf. below d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and following. — That God does nothing in vain, Aristotle says, On the Heavens and the World I, text 32 (c. 4).
- Luc. 22, 27.Luke 22:27.
- Psalm. 120, 4.Psalm 120:4 (Vulgate).
- Ita codd. et edd. Post versum in cod. T bene additur Ovidius, qui dicit; versum habet II. Artis amatoriae, v. 13. — Paulo inferius post custodiri in codd. A (Q a secunda manu) additur nisi per Deum, in Vat. per Angelum.Thus the codices and editions. After the [Latin] verse codex T rightly adds Ovidius, qui dicit ("Ovid, who says"); the verse is found in Ars amatoria II, v. 13. — A little below, after custodiri, codices A (and Q by a second hand) add nisi per Deum ("save by God"); the Vatican edition has per Angelum ("by an Angel").
- Vers. 6. — Glossa est secundum Hieronymum in hunc locum, quam vide apud Lyranum.Verse 6. — The Gloss is according to Jerome on this passage; see it in Lyra.
- Vers. 14. — Glossam refert Rabanus et Lyranus in hunc locum, quoad sensum.Verse 14. — Rabanus and Lyra report the Gloss on this passage, as to the sense.
- Vers. 10. — Glossa est secundum Hilarium super hunc locum.Verse 10. — The Gloss is according to Hilary on this passage.
- Vers. 15.Verse 15.
- Cap. 4. § 3: Docet autem et hoc sapienter theologia, per Angelos eam [legislationem] in nos provenire, tanquam divino legali ordine illud legaliter ponente, hoc est, per prima secunda in divinum reduci. Cfr. ibid. c. 8. § 2. — In principio arg. Vat. Item lex divinitatis hoc.Cap. 4, § 3: «Theology wisely teaches also this, that this [legislation] comes to us through the Angels, as the divine legal order legally so ordaining — that is to say, that through the first, the second things are brought back to the divine.» Cf. ibid. c. 8, § 2. — At the beginning of the argument, the Vatican edition reads Item lex divinitatis hoc.
- Cfr. August., V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 37. seqq.Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis V, c. 19, n. 37ff.
- Libr. I. Reg. 1, 3. et 11; Isai. 1, 24; Ier. 2, 19.I Reg. (= I Samuel) 1:3 and 1:11; Isaiah 1:24; Jeremiah 2:19.
- In cod. 1 additur ut dicit Dionysius.In codex 1 there is added ut dicit Dionysius ("as Dionysius says").
- Ita de Achab dicitur III. Reg. 21, 25.Thus it is said of Ahab, III Reg. (= I Kings) 21:25.
- Cod. A subiungit: Primae Petri primo (v. 18.): Non corruptibilibus auro vel argento redempti estis de vana etc. In fine arg. plures codd. et beneficentia pro et beneficio, et dein cod. cc cum ed. 1 habere pro dari.Codex A subjoins: «I Peter, chapter 1 (v. 18): Not with corruptible things, as gold or silver, are you redeemed from your vain etc.» At the end of the argument, several codices read et beneficentia for et beneficio, and then codex cc with edition 1 reads habere for dari.
- Ita codd. E K; in aliis omittitur corporis. Nostra lectio confirmatur infra q. 3. Paulo inferius post violentare in codd. et edd., excepta Vat., incongrue deest tamen.Thus codices E and K; in others corporis is omitted. Our reading is confirmed below at q. 3. A little below, after violentare, tamen is incongruously absent in the codices and editions, except the Vatican.
- Vat. omittit dignitatem gratiae Dei, et ideo nihil minuit.The Vatican edition omits dignitatem gratiae Dei, et ideo nihil minuit («the dignity of the grace of God, and therefore diminishes nothing»).
- Ita codd. F I cc ee et ed. 1; alii cum Vat. utilitatem personae.Thus codices F, I, cc, ee and edition 1; others, with the Vatican, read utilitatem personae («the usefulness of the person») [for vilitatem personae].
- Eodem modo hanc incidentem quaestionem resolvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 41. m. 2.Alexander of Hales resolves this incidental question in the same way, S. p. II, q. 41, m. 2.
- Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2.Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, and I Sent. d. 45, a. 2, q. 2.
- Non pauci codd. ostendit, cod. ee ostenditur.Quite a few codices read ostendit («it is shown»); codex ee reads ostenditur («it is being shown»). ---