Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 19
Articulus III. In quos claves sacerdotales habeant effectum.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, in quos habeant sacerdotales claves usum vel effectum. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum sacerdos, qui potest absolvere subditum unum, possit et quemlibet alium.
Secundo, utrum subditus sacerdos possit absolvere praelatum suum.
Quaestio I. Utrum sacerdos, qui potest absolvere subditum unum, possit et quemlibet alium absolvere.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod sacerdos, qui in unum potest, eadem ratione potest et in omnem alium.
1. Levitici decimo tertio1 dicitur: Homo, in cuius cute apparuerit plaga leprae, adducetur ad Aaron sacerdotem, vel ad unum quemlibet filiorum eius; ex hoc patet, quod quilibet sacerdos in veteri lege poterat iudicare de omnibus fidelibus de populo Israel, de quacumque esset tribu; sed quod praecessit in figura debet sequi in veritate: ergo videtur, quod hic possit quilibet sacerdos de lepra cuiuslibet iudicare. Et multo fortius hic videtur, quia maior est unitas in Ecclesia et quantum ad ministrantes Sacramenta et quantum ad caritatem fidelium, quam tunc temporis erat; sed tunc quod poterat unus poterant omnes, et in quem poterat unus, et omnes: ergo et modo debet esse similiter.
2. Item, Dominus virtutem istam sive potestatem dedit primis sacerdotibus, et secundum conformitatem eorum descendit in posteros; sed Dominus dixit generaliter, Ioannis vigesimo2: Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis; et hoc ipsum dicitur sacerdoti: ergo videtur, quod detur potestas in omnes: ergo omnes potest absolvere.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quoniam ita videmus in corporalibus, quod ignis, qui comburit in una materia, comburit et in qualibet simili et eiusdem speciei; et lux, quae fugat tenebram de uno loco, similiter et de alio pellit sine instantia: ergo pari ratione videtur in proposito, quod si aliquis sacerdos potest absolvere unum peccatorem poenitentem, quod pari ratione possit et quemlibet consimilem.
4. Item, ita videmus in artificialibus, quod clavis, quae unam seram aperit, aperit et omnes per eum modum factas, et e converso, multae claves similes in quantitate et qualitate unam seram: si ergo debitum peccati3 est conforme in omnibus peccatoribus poenitentibus, et potestas aperiendi in omnibus clavibus sacerdotalibus; ergo qui potest in unum, et in quemlibet alium.
5. Item, ita videmus in supercaelestibus, quod Angelus ordinis inferioris potest purgari, illuminari et perfici a quolibet Angelo superioris ordinis4: ergo si haec hierarchia illam imitatur; cum ordo sacerdotalis sit supra laicos, videtur, quod quilibet laicus a quolibet sacerdote possit absolvi.
6. Item, si non potest absolvere omnes, cum possit unum; quaero, unde hoc sit. Aut enim est p. 808 potentiae laxatione et corruptione, aut ex ligatione, quia superior potestas non permittit. Primo modo non, illud patet. Secundo modo non debet, quia bonum est diffundendum et multiplicandum et colendum: ergo non est restringenda potestas; et ita videtur, quod qui in unum potest, quod possit in omnem.
Contra: 1. Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima5: «Nulli sacerdotum liceat parochianum alterius aut absolvere, aut ligare».
2. Item, Causa nona, quaestione secunda6: «Nullus alterius parochianum iudicare, ordinare, aut excommunicare praesumat, quia tale iudicium aut ordinatio vel excommunicatio nec rata erit nec vires ullas habebit».
3. Item, in Concilio generali, extra de Poenitentiis et remissionibus7: «Si quis aliquando ex causa voluerit alteri confiteri, licentiam petat et obtineat a proprio sacerdote, quia aliter ipsum non poterit absolvere vel ligare»; sed non quilibet sacerdos est proprius, quia proprium dicitur quod convenit uni soli: ergo non quilibet sacerdos potest quemlibet absolvere.
4. Item, videtur ratione: quia nos videmus in ordinatione praedicamentorum in rationalibus8 et in ordine causarum in naturalibus, quod reductio fit usque ad supremum per unum immediatum, ita quod non sunt plura immediata respectu unius. Et hoc patet, quia una est species specialissima individui unius, similiter est in causis: ergo si ordo est in Ecclesia secundum gradus descendendo et ascendendo a Summo Pontifice usque ad parochianum; videtur tunc, quod per unum sacerdotem, per unum archidiaconum, per unum episcopum, per unum hierarcham9 reducatur ad Summum Pontificem: ergo non poterunt secundum rectum ordinem plures sacerdotes in unum: non ergo quilibet quemlibet potest absolvere vel ligare.
5. Item, ita videmus in exercitibus, quod sunt ordines distincti, ut tribunus super centuriones, et centurio super quinquagenarios, et quinquagenarius super decuriones, et decurio super decem10; et qui sunt sub uno non sunt sub alio decurione, nec potest decurio compescere nisi suos decem, et sic de aliis ascendendo; secundum hoc pari ratione videtur, quod nec sacerdos alterius parochianum, nec episcopus alienum subditum.
6. Item, si duo haberent posse super unum, qui possent discordare, possent contraria iubere; sed nemo potest duobus dominis contraria iubentibus obtemperare rationabiliter11: ergo posset in isto subdito perplexitas generari: ergo secundum rectum ordinem non debet duobus sacerdotibus super eundem subditum aequalis potestas dari: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Non quilibet sacerdos potest quemlibet absolvere nisi in articulo necessitatis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius12, «lex divinitatis est media per prima, et ultima per media perducere ad purgationem, illuminationem et perfectionem». Ideo, sicut videmus in omnibus, sive in rationalibus, sive in naturalibus, sive in caelestibus, quod ad hoc, quod sit concordia et decor, oportet, quod sit ordo; sic intelligendum est et in spiritualibus potestatibus in ipsa Ecclesia; unde Cantici sexto13 legitur, quod terribilis est ut castrorum acies ordinata.
Quoniam igitur ordo attenditur secundum praelationem et subiectionem; et praelatio attenditur secundum ascensum et descensum, non secundum aequalitatem; et in ascendendo ad superius est status et reductio ad unum, econtra in descendendo est multiplicatio14: ideo secundum rectum ordinem Ecclesiae oportuit, unum esse praelatum primum et supremum, in quo esset status omnis praelationis ecclesiasticae. Et quia in illo status est tanquam in primo et simplicissimo in illo genere; ideo virtus in eo unita est, et solus est inter praelatos, qui habet plenitudinem potestatis15. — Item, quoniam per recessum ab uno fit multiplicatio, et per hoc virtutis diminutio; ideo, quanto praelati alii inferiores sunt, tanto plures sunt et tanto minorem habent potestatem, ita quod status est in sacerdo- p. 809 tibus parochialibus, qui immediate gerunt populi curam; et istorum iurisdictio arctata est ad portiunculam determinatam, et cuilibet commissa est sua portio secundum rectam ordinationem, et illa iudicatur esse messis sua16. Et quoniam non licet alii sacerdoti mittere manum vel falcem in alienam messem; ideo alius non habet potestatem eius subditum absolvere, nisi superior, vel vicem habeat superioris, ut poenitentiarii domini Papae et poenitentiarii episcopi, legati et privilegiati, qui faciunt hoc auctoritate superioris, sicut nuntius a principe procedens potest in omnes subditos aliis inferioribus. Haec autem intelligenda sunt secundum legem communem, quia in articulo necessitatis indulget rectitudo iuris cuilibet sacerdoti quemlibet absolvere, si sit in Ecclesiae unitate.
Pro regula igitur habendum est, quod solus sacerdos proprius habet potestatis exsecutionem in suos, exceptis quinque casibus. Primus est, si ovis aliena in parochia sua deliquit. — Secundus, si mutavit ibi domicilium, sicut est in scholaribus, qui student Parisius. — Tertius est, si sit vagabundus. — Quartus est, si sacerdos proprius sit inscius, vel malitiosus, et petita licentia, vult adire peritiorem. — Ultimus est in articulo necessitatis, et hoc in casu non oportet sacerdotem esse licentiatum17. In aliis autem oportet, non a sacerdote poenitentis solum — quia ille non potest nisi subditum licentiare — sed oportet esse licentiatum ab ordinario, scilicet ipso episcopo. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod non quilibet potest in quemlibet.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de filiis Aaron, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia populus Israel populus unus erat et unum templum habebat, nec erant ibi regna terrarum sollicitudini sacerdotum commissa, sicut nunc sunt; et ideo oportet modo esse plures episcopos18 et plures ecclesias, quarum quaelibet habet suam potestatem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc quod dicit Dominus: Quorum remiseritis etc.; dicendum, quod clavis sacerdotalis, quamvis, quantum est de se, indifferens sit ad omnes; tamen vis motiva huius clavis, quae est iurisdictio, ut prius19 visum est, non se habet ad omnes nisi in uno solo; et ideo unus solus potest omnes absolvere. Quando ergo Dominus dedit clavem et hanc potestatem, ipse praesupposuit eius exsecutionem secundum regulam potestatis collatae Petro et eius successoribus.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignis agit in quodlibet combustibile; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia prima est actio naturalis, quae est secundum necessitatem, haec autem actio est spiritualis et rationalis, quae quidem attenditur secundum ordinem.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de clave et sera, dicendum, quod istud verum est, quando adest virtus motiva, quae clavem moveat; sed in aliquibus vis ista arctata est, ut in sacerdotibus inferioribus; in aliquibus ligata, ut in haereticis et excommunicatis; in aliquibus est amputata, ut in degradatis20. Unde sicut hi non possunt absolvere aliquem, quorum manus est ligata simpliciter, ita in aliis non potest clavis claudere, ubi se manus iurisdictionis non valeat extendere.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelis superioris ordinis, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in hierarchia angelica non potest cadere zelus nec controversia, pro eo quod concordia in sublimibus est facta21; non sic est in Ecclesia, immo quilibet vult sibi ius alterius vindicare: ideo oportuit potestates distinguere et limitare.
6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod potestas non est arctanda; dicendum, quod arctatio potestatis potest venire dupliciter: aut propter defectum amoris, aut propter conservationem ordinis. Prima est invidiae et repugnat bonitati, secunda vero est sapientiae et concordat paci et communi utilitati; et talis arctatio facta est in minoribus sacerdotibus, regulante iure divino, immo ipso Spiritu sancto22, per Patres et Apostolos, qui Ecclesiam fundaverunt et ordinaverunt. Et sic patet totum.
I. De I. huius articuli quaestione vide auctores in praecedente scholio citatos et Alex. Hal. S. p. IV. q. 21. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — Praeclara autem est doctrina Seraphici, qua ex ipsa Ecclesiae ratione ordinem hierarchicum comprobat et centro Ecclesiae sive Sedi apostolicae plenitudinem potestatis vindicat.
In 2. quaestione recte docet S. Bonav. contra quosdam posteriores, quod licet superior se possit subiicere inferiori eique dare iurisdictionem in se pro foro interno, tamen «qui subiiciuntur uni non possunt dare alteri auctoritatem in se». De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 20. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Article III. On whom the priestly keys take effect.
Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked on whom the priestly keys have their use or effect. And concerning this two things are asked.
First it is asked whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.
Second, whether a subject priest can absolve his own prelate.
Question I. Whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.
Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is shown that a priest who can act upon one can, by the same reasoning, act upon every other.
1. In Leviticus thirteen1 it is said: The man in whose skin the plague of leprosy shall appear shall be brought to Aaron the priest, or to any one of his sons; from this it is clear that any priest in the old law could judge concerning all the faithful of the people of Israel, of whatever tribe they were; but what went before in figure ought to follow in truth: therefore it seems that here any priest can judge concerning the leprosy of anyone. And this seems much more strongly to be so here, because there is greater unity in the Church, both as regards those ministering the Sacraments and as regards the charity of the faithful, than there was at that time; but then what one could do all could do, and toward whomever one could act, so could all: therefore now too it ought to be similar.
2. Likewise, the Lord gave this power or authority to the first priests, and according to their conformity it descended to those who came after; but the Lord said in general, John twenty2: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and this very thing is said to the priest: therefore it seems that power is given over all: therefore he can absolve all.
3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for we see thus in bodily things, that fire which burns in one matter burns also in any like matter of the same species; and light which drives darkness from one place likewise drives it from another without resistance: therefore by parity of reason it seems so in the case at hand, that if some priest can absolve one penitent sinner, by parity of reason he can also absolve any like one.
4. Likewise, we see thus in things of craft, that a key which opens one lock opens also all locks made in the same manner, and conversely, many keys alike in quantity and quality open one lock: if therefore the debt of sin3 is conformable in all penitent sinners, and the power of opening is conformable in all priestly keys; therefore he who can act upon one can act upon any other.
5. Likewise, we see thus in supercelestial things, that an Angel of a lower order can be purified, illumined, and perfected by any Angel of a higher order4: therefore if this hierarchy imitates that one, since the priestly order is above the laity, it seems that any layman can be absolved by any priest.
6. Likewise, if he cannot absolve all, since he can absolve one; I ask whence this is. For either it is p. 808 from a slackening and corruption of the power, or from a binding, because a higher power does not permit it. That it is not in the first way is clear. In the second way it ought not to be, because the good is to be diffused and multiplied and cultivated: therefore the power is not to be restricted; and so it seems that he who can act upon one can act upon every one.
On the contrary: 1. Cause sixteen, question one5: «Let it be lawful for no priest to absolve or to bind another's parishioner».
2. Likewise, Cause nine, question two6: «Let no one presume to judge, ordain, or excommunicate another's parishioner, because such judgment or ordination or excommunication will be neither valid nor have any force».
3. Likewise, in the General Council, extra, On Penance and Remissions7: «If anyone at some time should for cause wish to confess to another, let him ask and obtain license from his own priest, because otherwise that one cannot absolve or bind him»; but not every priest is the proper one, because that is called proper which belongs to one alone: therefore not every priest can absolve everyone.
4. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for we see in the ordering of the predicaments in rational matters8 and in the order of causes in natural things, that reduction is made up to the supreme through one immediate thing, such that there are not several immediate things with respect to one. And this is clear, because there is one most special species of one individual, and likewise it is in causes: therefore if there is order in the Church according to degrees, descending and ascending from the Supreme Pontiff down to the parishioner; it seems then that through one priest, through one archdeacon, through one bishop, through one hierarch9 it is reduced to the Supreme Pontiff: therefore there cannot, according to right order, be several priests over one: therefore not anyone can absolve or bind anyone.
5. Likewise, we see thus in armies, that there are distinct orders, as the tribune over the centurions, and the centurion over the captains of fifty, and the captain of fifty over the captains of ten, and the captain of ten over the ten10; and those who are under one are not under another captain of ten, nor can the captain of ten restrain any but his own ten, and so on ascending; according to this, by parity of reason it seems that neither can a priest restrain another's parishioner, nor a bishop another's subject.
6. Likewise, if two had power over one, who might disagree, they could command contrary things; but no one can reasonably obey two masters commanding contrary things11: therefore perplexity could be generated in that subject: therefore according to right order equal power ought not be given to two priests over the same subject: therefore etc.
Conclusion. Not every priest can absolve everyone except in a case of necessity.
I respond: It must be said that, as Dionysius says12, «it is the law of the Godhead to lead through the first to the middle, and through the middle to the last, unto purification, illumination, and perfection». Therefore, as we see in all things, whether in rational, or natural, or celestial things, that for there to be concord and beauty it is required that there be order; so it must be understood also in the spiritual powers within the Church itself; whence in Canticles six13 it is read that she is terrible as an army set in array.
Since therefore order is regarded according to prelacy and subjection; and prelacy is regarded according to ascent and descent, not according to equality; and in ascending to what is higher there is a coming-to-rest and a reduction to one, while on the contrary in descending there is multiplication14: therefore according to the right order of the Church it was required that there be one prelate, first and supreme, in whom should be the coming-to-rest of all ecclesiastical prelacy. And because in him the coming-to-rest is as in the first and most simple thing in that genus; therefore power is united in him, and he alone among prelates is the one who has the fullness of power15. — Likewise, since by withdrawal from the one there comes multiplication, and through this a diminution of power; therefore, the more the other prelates are inferior, the more numerous they are and the less power they have, so that the coming-to-rest is in the par- p. 809 ish priests, who immediately bear the care of the people; and the jurisdiction of these is restricted to a determined portion, and to each is committed his portion according to right ordering, and that is judged to be his harvest16. And since it is not lawful for another priest to put his hand or sickle into another's harvest; therefore another does not have the power to absolve his subject, unless a superior, or one who holds the place of a superior, as the penitentiaries of the lord Pope and the penitentiaries of the bishop, legates and the privileged, who do this by the authority of a superior, as a messenger proceeding from a prince can act upon all subjects below others. But these things are to be understood according to the common law, because in a case of necessity the rectitude of the law grants to any priest to absolve anyone, if he be in the unity of the Church.
As a rule, therefore, it is to be held that only the proper priest has the exercise of power over his own, except in five cases. The first is, if a stray sheep has offended in his parish. — The second, if it has changed its domicile there, as is the case with students who study at Paris. — The third is, if it be a vagabond. — The fourth is, if the proper priest be ignorant or malicious, and, license having been sought, [the penitent] wishes to go to a more skilled one. — The last is in a case of necessity, and in this case the priest need not be licensed17. In the others, however, it is required — not from the priest of the penitent alone, because he can only license a subject — but it is required to be licensed by the ordinary, namely the bishop himself. — The reasons proving that not anyone can act upon anyone are therefore to be granted.
To the arguments:
1. To that which is objected concerning the sons of Aaron, it must be said that it is not similar: because the people of Israel was one people and had one temple, nor were the kingdoms of the lands committed there to the care of the priests, as they now are; and therefore it is now required that there be several bishops18 and several churches, each of which has its own power.
2. To that which is objected concerning what the Lord says: Whose sins you shall forgive etc.; it must be said that the priestly key, although of itself it is indifferent to all, nevertheless the moving force of this key, which is jurisdiction, as was seen before19, does not bear upon all but only upon one alone; and therefore one alone can absolve all. When therefore the Lord gave the key and this power, he himself presupposed its exercise according to the rule of the power conferred on Peter and his successors.
3. To that which is objected, that fire acts upon any combustible thing; it must be said that it is not similar: because the first is a natural action, which is according to necessity, but this action is spiritual and rational, which indeed is regarded according to order.
4. To that which is objected concerning the key and the lock, it must be said that that is true when there is present the moving force which moves the key; but in some it is restricted, as in inferior priests; in some bound, as in heretics and the excommunicate; in some it is cut off, as in the degraded20. Whence just as those whose hand is bound absolutely cannot absolve anyone, so in others the key cannot close where the hand of jurisdiction is unable to extend itself.
5. To that which is objected concerning the Angels of a higher order, it must be said that it is not similar: because in the angelic hierarchy zeal or controversy cannot fall, since concord is made among the sublime ones21; it is not so in the Church, but rather everyone wishes to claim for himself the right of another: therefore it was required to distinguish and limit the powers.
6. To that which is last objected, that power is not to be restricted; it must be said that the restriction of power can come in two ways: either on account of a defect of love, or on account of the conservation of order. The first is of envy and is repugnant to goodness, but the second is of wisdom and accords with peace and the common good; and such restriction was made in the lesser priests, the divine law regulating it, indeed the Holy Spirit himself22, through the Fathers and Apostles, who founded and ordered the Church. And thus the whole is clear.
I. Concerning the first question of this article, see the authors cited in the preceding scholion and Alex. of Hales, S[umma] p. IV, q. 21, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — But excellent is the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, by which from the very nature of the Church he proves the hierarchical order and vindicates to the center of the Church, that is, to the Apostolic See, the fullness of power.
In the second question S. Bonaventure rightly teaches, against certain later writers, that although a superior can subject himself to an inferior and give him jurisdiction over himself for the internal forum, nevertheless «those who are subject to one cannot give another authority over themselves». On this second question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, subquestion 3; Suppl. q. 20, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Petr. of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
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- 1Vers. 2: Homo, in cuius cute et carne ortus fuerit diversus color sive pustula, aut quasi lucens quidpiam, id est plaga leprae etc. — Circa finem arg. post tunc temporis cod. A omittit erat, pro quo alii codd. esset.Verse 2: The man in whose skin and flesh there shall arise a different color, or a pustule, or as it were something shining, that is, the plague of leprosy etc. — Toward the end of the argument, after tunc temporis codex A omits erat, for which other codices [read] esset.
- 2Vers. 23.Verse 23.
- 3Codd. A aa bb peccatorum, plures alii codd. vel peccatori vel peccatoris.Codices A, aa, bb [read] peccatorum; several other codices either peccatori or peccatoris.
- 4Secundum Dionys., de Caelesti Hierarch. c. 3. § 2. seq. et c. 8. § 2.According to Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 3, § 2 ff. and c. 8, § 2.
- 5Gratian. super C. Adiicimus illud etiam (19.). Cfr. Gratian. super C. Sacerdos ante omnia (2.), de Poenitentia d. 6. infra in lit. Magistri, d. XXI. in fine allegatus.Gratian on the canon Adiicimus illud etiam (19). Cf. Gratian on the canon Sacerdos ante omnia (2), On Penance, d. 6, cited below in the Master's text, d. XXI, at the end.
- 6Can. Nullus alterius terminos usurpet nec ullerius parochianum... quia talis iudicatio vel ordinatio aut excommunicatio vel damnatio nec rata etc. (1.).The canon Let no one usurp another's bounds nor [judge] another's parishioner... because such judgment or ordination or excommunication or condemnation [shall] not [be] valid etc. (1).
- 7Libr. V. tit. 38. C. Omnis utriusque sexus (12.). Cfr. supra pag. 452, nota 3. — Inferius respicitur Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4: Proprium... soli autem inest et conversim praedicatur de re... Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.Book V, tit. 38, the canon Omnis utriusque sexus (12). Cf. above p. 452, note 3. — Below reference is made to Aristotle, Topics I, c. 4: A property... belongs to one alone and is predicated convertibly of the thing... For no one calls that a property which can belong to another. Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Property.
- 8Supple: disciplinis sive scientiis. Disciplina rationalis est logica (cfr. tom. III. pag. 568, nota 3.), in qua agitur de praedicamentis (cfr. tom. II. pag. 48, nota 1.). — De specie specialissima vide supra pag. 411, nota 16. — Vat. cum multis codd. rationabilibus. Idem recurrit infra in corp.Supply: disciplines or sciences. The rational discipline is logic (cf. vol. III, p. 568, note 3), in which the predicaments are treated (cf. vol. II, p. 48, note 1). — On the most special species see above p. 411, note 16. — The Vatican [edition] with many codices [reads] rationabilibus. The same recurs below in the body.
- 9Edd. praefigunt patriarcham vel. Sicut patriarcha significat patrum principem (cfr. C. Cleros et clericos 1. d. 21.), ita hierarcha principem sacrorum (ἱερά et ἀρχός). Cfr. S. Bonav. in Hexaem. serm. 3.The editions prefix patriarcham vel. Just as «patriarch» signifies prince of the fathers (cf. the canon Cleros et clericos 1, d. 21), so «hierarch» [signifies] prince of the holy things (hiera and archos). Cf. S. Bonaventure, Hexaemeron, sermon 3.
- 10Vide Isidor., IX. Etymolog. c. 3. n. 29. seq. — Codd. R S prosequuntur et decem, qui sunt etc.See Isidore, Etymologies IX, c. 3, n. 29 ff. — Codices R, S continue and ten, who are etc.
- 11Respicitur Matth. 6, 24: Nemo potest duobus dominis servire. — Superius pro qui possent cod. K (1 a secunda manu) quia possent.Reference is to Matthew 6:24: No one can serve two masters. — Above, for qui possent codex K (1, by a second hand) [reads] quia possent.
- 12De Caelesti Hierarch. c. 8. § 2. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 277 nota 7.On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 8, § 2. Cf. vol. II, p. 277, note 7.
- 13Vers. 3.Verse 3.
- 14Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie.Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species.
- 15Ut dicit Bernard., Epist. 131. n. 2. et II. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 16. Lib. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. Cfr. Gratian., d. 21. et 22.As Bernard says, Epistle 131, n. 2, and On Consideration II, c. 8, n. 16. The Book of Causes, prop. 17: Every power, when united, is more infinite than a power that is multiplied. Cf. Gratian, d. 21 and 22.
- 16Respicitur Matth. 9, 37. seq. et Luc. 10, 2. Deut. 23, 25: Falcem non immittes in segetem proximi tui (secundum Septuaginta). Cfr. C. Ecclesias singulas (1.), C. 13. q. 1.Reference is to Matthew 9:37 ff. and Luke 10:2. Deuteronomy 23:25: You shall not put a sickle into your neighbor's standing grain (according to the Septuagint). Cf. the canon Ecclesias singulas (1), C. 13, q. 1.
- 17De duobus ultimis casibus cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XX. c. 6. et d. XXI. c. 9. — Licentiatum esse saepe idem est ac facultatem audiendi confessiones sive iurisdictionem habere. — Post sacerdotem edd. addunt alienum.On the last two cases cf. below in the Master's text, d. XX, c. 6, and d. XXI, c. 9. — To be licensed is often the same as to have the faculty of hearing confessions, that is, jurisdiction. — After sacerdotem the editions add alienum.
- 18In codd. P R S additur aequales.In codices P, R, S is added aequales.
- 19Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.
- 20Hic in corp. et a. 2. q. 2. — Mox post uno solo in cod. P secunda manus addidit scilicet in Summo Pontifice. Subinde pro praesupponit ex codd. A G H substituimus praesupposuit.Here in the body and a. 2, q. 2. — Soon after uno solo in codex P a second hand added namely, in the Supreme Pontiff. Thereafter, for praesupponit, from codices A, G, H we have substituted praesupposuit.
- 21Cfr. a. 2. q. 2. — In fine solut. pro ubi... non valeat edd. nisi... valeat.Cf. a. 2, q. 2. — At the end of the solution, for ubi... non valeat the editions [read] nisi... valeat.
- 22Respicitur Iob 25, 2: Potestas et terror apud eum est, qui facit concordiam in sublimibus suis. Cfr. Act. 20, 28. — Mox edd. cum plurimis codd. omittunt per.Reference is to Job 25:2: Power and terror are with him, who makes concord in his high places. Cf. Acts 20:28. — Soon after, the editions with most codices omit per.