Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 19
Quaestio II. Utrum potestas clavium comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem.
Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum haec potestas comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia, sicut nunquam iteratur ordinis consecratio, sic nec iteratur verbum, in quo datur potestas clavium: ergo sicut ille ordo inseparabiliter possidetur propter characterem, videtur similiter, quod haec potestas.
2. Item, potestas ista in aliquo est; constat, quod non nisi in sacerdote, non secundum carnem, sed secundum animam; sed quae secundum animam habentur, cum anima sit incorruptibilis, non possunt auferri, ut patet in scientia et virtute: ergo talis potestas non potest auferri.
3. Item, si amittuntur, aut ergo propter ignorantiam, aut propter malitiam, aut propter subditi carentiam1. Non propter ignorantiam, hoc constat; non propter malitiam, istud constat, quia mali habent, ut visum est prius; non propter subditorum carentiam, quia, si talis faceret carere clave, tunc mutatio subditorum mutaret claves; quod est manifeste falsum: ergo etc.
4. Item, si aliquid necessario ponit aliud, non potest aliud auferri, quin ipsum auferatur, quod ponit; sed aliquo facto sacerdote secundum Ecclesiae formam, statim habet clavem: ergo remota clave, removetur ordo. Sed ordinis character non potest amoveri: ergo etc.
Contra:
Contra hoc obiicitur: 1. Primo de haereticis et schismaticis2, qui, secundum quod dicitur in littera et habetur in principio praecedentis distinctionis3, non possunt solvere et ligare, et tamen ordines habent, sicut infra patebit: ergo clavis non sequitur ordines inseparabiliter, quia, si non possunt, non habent potentiam.
2. Item, obiicitur de degradatis: constans est, quod ordines non possunt auferri, quia non potest auferri character: si ergo degradantur4, hoc erit solum quantum ad auctoritatem sive potestatem: ergo videtur, quod illa auferatur, maxime cum videantur magis elongari ab hoc actu ipsi degradati quam haeretici.
3. Item, obiicitur de anima separata, quae habet characterem ordinis et non habet potestatem clavium; in patria enim cessat omnis praelatio: ergo non videtur, quod inseparabiliter characterem comitetur.
Si tu dicas mihi ad haec omnia, quod omnes praedicti habent potestatem, sed non exsecutionem, hoc improbatur triplici ratione.
4. Prima est, quia illa potestas est spiritualis activa — potestas enim dicitur activa, non passiva5 — et iterum est in potentia libera, quae scilicet est liberum arbitrium, quod exit in actum, quando vult: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis habeat potestatem et non habeat exsecutionem, quando vult.
5. Item, frustra est potentia, quam non consequitur actus6: ergo si in talibus est potentia sine actu, frustra est; sed in operibus divinis nihil debet esse frustra: ergo etc.
6. Item, si talis potentia non est in actu, quaero, unde hoc sit. Si quia Papa prohibet, vel superior; sed contra: quantumcumque superior prohibeat, si quis conficit, confectum est de facto; si baptizat, baptizatum est: ergo pari ratione si absolvat vel liget, absolutum et ligatum est; quod est manifeste falsum: ergo redit primum, quod tales non habent potestatem; et habent characterem: ergo haec potestas non sequitur characterem inseparabiliter.
Conclusio. Clavis inseparabiliter sequitur ordinem sacerdotalem quoad essentiam, sed quoad exsecutionem sequitur statum viatoris et possessionem iurisdictionis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut de potentia visiva est loqui dupliciter: vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad usum; et quantum ad essentiam fundatur haec potentia radicaliter in anima nec animam deserit unquam; quantum ad usum vero exigit organum bene dispositum et medium illuminatum: sic in proposito est intelligendum, quod, si loquamur de potentia solvendi quantum ad essentiam, sic radicaliter est in ipsa anima, sicut et character, nec videtur ab illo differre nisi secundum relationem quandam; et hoc modo inseparabiliter se tenet cum sacerdotali ordine.
Alio modo possumus loqui quantum ad usum, et hoc modo necessario requiritur status viatoris et auctoritas iurisdictionis. — Quod status viatoris requiratur, patet, quia, sicut ratio merendi non competit caritati extra statum viae, sic nec potestas reconciliandi et Sacramenta exhibendi sive administrandi nisi in statu Ecclesiae militantis; et sic per mortem dicitur potestas usum amittere in anima separata. — Quod iterum requiratur iurisdictio, patet sic. Sacerdos enim est mediator, et in quantum mediator inferior est Deo et superior poenitente et arbiter et iudex homini constitutus loco Dei ad parcendum7 sive solvendum et ad puniendum; talis autem iudicatio non est sine aliqua iurisdictione in eum qui iudicatur, quia nemo potest aliquem iudicare, nisi qui iudex eius constituitur ab eo qui potestatem habet. Et ideo iurisdictio est tanquam vis motiva ipsius clavis, sive manus; hac autem deficiente, quae clavem moveat, etsi adsit clavis, nunquam aperiet; et si amittitur haec iurisdictio, cessat clavis exsecutio. — Haec autem amittitur dupliciter: vel per ablationem subditorum quantum ad rem8, et sic est in schismaticis, haereticis, praecisis, fornicariis notoriis, excommunicatis et huiusmodi; vel quantum ad ablationem secundum rem et secundum spem, et hoc est in degradatis, quibus sine spe recuperandi aufertur. Unde et haeretici et excommunicati dicuntur habere manum ligatam, sed degradati amputatam. — Ideo dico, quod etsi clavis quantum ad esse ordinem consequatur, tamen quantum ad exsecutionem sequitur statum et iurisdictionem.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1, 2, 3. Et sic patet responsio ad tria prima obiecta de haereticis, de degradatis et aliquibus separatis; qui dicuntur non posse, quia non sunt ibi quae necessaria sunt ad usum; et tamen habent potentiam, sicut in anima caeci est potentia visiva, et tamen videre non potest.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est potestas activa et libera; dicendum, quod quamvis sit activa et in substantia libere agente, tamen est ad alterum et indiget debito suscipiente; unde, quemadmodum matrimonium est ex consensu libero, tamen, quia mater non est idonea ad contrahendum cum filio, quantumcumque consentiant, non est matrimonium. Sic intelligendum est in proposito.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustra est potentia, quam non consequitur actus; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de actu debito pro loco et tempore et opportunitate, potest habere locum; si autem in aliis intelligatur, multas habet instantias. Et quia tales personae carent opportunitate ad actum, etsi nunquam exeant, non propter hoc habent potentiam frustra. Praeterea, illud verbum intelligitur de actu generaliter, non de hoc, vel de illo, quia non oportet, quod potentia exeat in omnes, sufficit tamen, quod aliquid faciat, ita quod non sit otiosum in natura. Et sic est in proposito, quia, etsi nihil per illam potentiam fiat exterius, tamen illa potest esse in animae ornatum quantum ad bonos, vel in confusionem quantum ad malos.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quis aufert illi potentiae exsecutionem? dicendum, quod potestas contraria sive superior potest ei auferre. Et si tu obiicias, quod non potest auferre actum conficiendi; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa. Prima est, quia non potest tali auferre materiam, et si posset panem de tritico auferre, tunc auferret potentiam; sed haec aufert materiam, scilicet subditos — superior enim potestas potest subditos eximere a potestate inferioris — et hanc auferendo aufert iurisdictionem. — Praeterea, in potestate conficiendi omnes pares sunt, quia haec immediate datur per impressionem characteris; sed in iurisdictione sive praelatione non est aequalitas: et ideo in huiusmodi possunt arceri, non sic in aliis. — Et haec est ratio, quare boni et sancti religiosi inclusi, etiam si sint sacerdotes, non habent exsecutionem clavis in absolvendo et ligando, quia non habent iurisdictionem in aliquos; et ideo ab hoc actu prohibentur. Unde Eugenius Papa: «Placuit, ut nulli monachorum temerario ausu liceat poenitentiam dare» etc.
— Ratio autem huius prohibitionis assignatur Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima, et in pluribus decretis sanctorum Patrum. Habent tamen, sicut ibidem ostenditur, idoneitatem ex ordine et ex vitae merito, cui adiuncta iurisdictione quae dicitur, ordo sacerdotalis exit in actum. Unde Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima, Leo Papa: «Monachi etsi in dedicatione sui presbyteratus, sicut et ceteri sacerdotes, praedicandi, baptizandi, poenitentiam dandi, peccata dimittendi, beneficiis ecclesiasticis perfruendi rite potestatem accipiant, tamen exsecutionem suae potestatis non habent, nisi a populo fuerint electi et ab episcopo ex consensu abbatis ordinati».
Ex his patet, quando haec potestas datur, quod nunquam quantum ad substantiam auferatur, sed solum quantum ad usum.
Question II. Whether the power of the keys inseparably accompanies the priestly order.
Secondly, it is asked concerning this whether this power inseparably accompanies the priestly order. And that it does, seems to be the case:
1. Because, just as the consecration of an order is never repeated, so neither is the word repeated in which the power of the keys is given: therefore, just as that order is inseparably possessed on account of the character, it seems likewise that this power is too.
2. Likewise, this power is in something; it is established that it is in nothing but the priest, not according to the flesh, but according to the soul; but the things that are had according to the soul, since the soul is incorruptible, cannot be taken away, as is clear in the case of knowledge and virtue: therefore such a power cannot be taken away.
3. Likewise, if they are lost, then it is either on account of ignorance, or on account of malice, or on account of the absence of a subject1. Not on account of ignorance, this is established; not on account of malice, this is established, because the wicked have it, as was seen before; not on account of the absence of subjects, because, if such a one were to be made to lack the key, then a change of subjects would change the keys; which is manifestly false: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, if something necessarily posits another thing, the other cannot be taken away without that which it posits being taken away; but once someone has been made a priest according to the form of the Church, he immediately has the key: therefore, the key being removed, the order is removed. But the character of the order cannot be removed: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
On the contrary, it is objected: 1. First, concerning heretics and schismatics2, who, according to what is said in the text and is found at the beginning of the preceding distinction3, cannot loose and bind, and yet have orders, as will be clear below: therefore the key does not follow orders inseparably, because, if they cannot, they do not have the power.
2. Likewise, it is objected concerning the degraded: it is established that orders cannot be taken away, because the character cannot be taken away: if therefore they are degraded4, this will be only as to authority or power: therefore it seems that this is taken away, especially since the degraded themselves seem to be farther removed from this act than heretics.
3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the separated soul, which has the character of the order and does not have the power of the keys; for in the fatherland all prelacy ceases: therefore it does not seem that it inseparably accompanies the character.
If you say to me, against all these things, that all the aforesaid have the power but not the execution, this is disproved by a threefold reason.
4. The first is, because that power is a spiritual active power — for power is called active, not passive5 — and again it is in a free potency, namely free choice, which goes forth into act when it wills: therefore it is impossible that anyone should have the power and not have the execution when he wills.
5. Likewise, a potency that is not followed by act is in vain6: therefore if in such persons there is potency without act, it is in vain; but in the divine works nothing ought to be in vain: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, if such a potency is not in act, I ask whence this comes. If because the Pope or a superior forbids it; but on the contrary: however much a superior may forbid it, if someone consecrates, it is consecrated in fact; if he baptizes, it is baptized: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he absolves or binds, it is absolved and bound; which is manifestly false: therefore the first returns, that such persons do not have the power; and they have the character: therefore this power does not follow the character inseparably.
Conclusion. The key inseparably follows the priestly order as to its essence, but as to its execution it follows the state of the wayfarer and the possession of jurisdiction.
Respondeo: It must be said that, just as the power of sight may be spoken of in two ways — either as to essence, or as to use; and as to essence this power is rooted radically in the soul and never deserts the soul; but as to use it requires a well-disposed organ and an illuminated medium — so in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, if we speak of the power of loosing as to essence, then it is radically in the soul itself, like the character, and does not seem to differ from it except according to a certain relation; and in this way it holds inseparably with the priestly order.
In another way we can speak of it as to use, and in this way the state of the wayfarer and the authority of jurisdiction are necessarily required. — That the state of the wayfarer is required is clear, because, just as the ground of meriting does not belong to charity outside the state of the way, so neither does the power of reconciling and of presenting or administering the Sacraments belong except in the state of the Church militant; and thus through death the power is said to lose its use in the separated soul. — That jurisdiction too is required is shown thus. For the priest is a mediator, and insofar as mediator he is inferior to God and superior to the penitent, and is appointed as arbiter and judge over man in the place of God, for sparing7 or loosing and for punishing; but such a judgment is not without some jurisdiction over him who is judged, because no one can judge anyone except him who is appointed his judge by him who holds the power. And therefore jurisdiction is, as it were, the moving force of the key itself, or of the hand; but this failing — that which should move the key — even if the key be present, it will never open; and if this jurisdiction is lost, the execution of the key ceases. — Now this is lost in two ways: either through the removal of subjects as to the thing8, and so it is in schismatics, heretics, the cut-off, notorious fornicators, the excommunicate, and the like; or as to removal both according to the thing and according to hope, and this is in the degraded, from whom it is taken away without hope of recovery. Hence both heretics and the excommunicate are said to have a bound hand, but the degraded an amputated one. — Therefore I say that although the key follows as to being an order, yet as to execution it follows the state and jurisdiction.
Replies to the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1, 2, 3. And thus the response to the first three objections is clear — concerning heretics, the degraded, and some separated souls; who are said not to be able, because the things necessary for use are not present there; and yet they have the potency, just as in the soul of a blind man there is the power of sight, and yet he cannot see.
To 4. To that which is objected, that it is an active and free power; it must be said that although it is active and is in a freely-acting substance, nevertheless it is directed to another and needs a fitting recipient; hence, just as matrimony is from free consent, yet, because a mother is not fit to contract with her son, however much they consent, there is no matrimony. So it is to be understood in the matter at hand.
To 5. To that which is objected, that a potency which is not followed by act is in vain; it must be said that if it is understood of the due act for place and time and opportunity, it can hold; but if it is understood of other cases, it has many instances. And because such persons lack opportunity for the act, even if they never go forth into it, they do not on this account have the potency in vain. Moreover, that saying is understood of act in general, not of this or that one, because it is not necessary that the potency go forth into all, yet it suffices that it do something, so that it not be idle in nature. And so it is in the matter at hand, because, even though nothing be done externally through that potency, nevertheless it can be for the adornment of the soul as regards the good, or for the confusion as regards the wicked.
To 6. To that which is objected: who takes away the execution from that potency? it must be said that a contrary or superior power can take it away from it. And if you object that it cannot take away the act of consecrating; it must be said that the cases are not alike, for two reasons. The first is that it cannot take away the matter from such a one, and if it could take away bread made of wheat, then it would take away the potency; but this takes away the matter, namely the subjects — for a superior power can withdraw subjects from the power of an inferior — and by taking this away it takes away jurisdiction. — Moreover, in the power of consecrating all are equal, because this is given immediately through the impression of the character; but in jurisdiction or prelacy there is no equality: and therefore in matters of this kind they can be restrained, but not so in others. — And this is the reason why good and holy enclosed religious, even if they be priests, do not have the execution of the key in absolving and binding, because they do not have jurisdiction over any persons; and therefore they are forbidden this act. Hence Pope Eugenius: «It has been resolved that it be permitted to no monks by rash daring to give penance» etc.
— But the reason for this prohibition is assigned at Cause sixteen, question one, and in many decrees of the holy Fathers. They have nevertheless, as is shown in the same place, a fitness from the order and from the merit of life, to which jurisdiction being joined — that which is so called — the priestly order goes forth into act. Hence at Cause sixteen, question one, Pope Leo: «Monks, although in the dedication of their priesthood, like other priests, may duly receive the power of preaching, baptizing, giving penance, remitting sins, and enjoying ecclesiastical benefices, yet they do not have the execution of their power unless they have been elected by the people and ordained by the bishop with the consent of the abbot».
From these things it is clear that, when this power is given, it is never taken away as to substance, but only as to use.
- 1Inferius pro mutatio multi codd. et ed. I perperam vitio, Vat. mutatione, quae etiam subinde cum ed. I amitterentur pro mutaret (codd. R S T U bb immutaret).Below, for mutatio (change) many codices and the first edition wrongly read vitio (fault); the Vatican edition reads mutatione, which also subsequently, with the first edition, [reads] amitterentur for mutaret (codices R S T U bb, immutaret).
- 2Cap. 2. — Quod haeretici retineant ordines, ostenditur infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. — In principio huius et seq. arg. pro obiicitur ed. I cum pluribus codd. ostenditur.Chapter 2. — That heretics retain orders is shown below at d. 25, a. 1, q. 2. — At the beginning of this and the following argument, for obiicitur (it is objected) the first edition with several codices [reads] ostenditur (it is shown).
- 3Ita cod. E, in aliis et edd. degradatur.So codex E; in the others and in the editions, degradatur (he is degraded).
- 4Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XLVII. c. 5.Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XLVII, c. 5.
- 5Vide B. Albert., in V. Metaph. tr. 2. c. 12: Potestas est potentia stans sub complemento actualis habitus, et ideo activa est potestas; potentia autem est interminata adhuc et incompleta; et ideo proprie materialis potentia potentia vocatur.See Blessed Albert, On the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics, tr. 2, c. 12: "Power is a potency standing under the completion of an actual habit, and therefore power is active; but potency is still indeterminate and incomplete; and therefore properly material potency is called potency."
- 6Secundum Aristot.; cfr. tom. I. pag. 771, nota 1. Minor, in qua post divinis codd. A V W addunt et Domini, et cod. H potest pro debet, insinuatur ab Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo text. 32. (c. 4.).According to Aristotle; cf. tom. I, p. 771, note 1. The minor [premise], in which after divinis (divine) codices A V W add et Domini (and of the Lord), and codex H [reads] potest (can) for debet (ought), is suggested by Aristotle, On the Heavens, Book I, text 32 (c. 4).
- 7Edd., hic posito aperiendum, subinde verbo puniendum praemittunt parcendum sive.The editions, having put aperiendum (opening) here, subsequently prefix to the word puniendum (punishing) [the words] parcendum sive (sparing or).
- 8Multi codd. notis. Mox post ablationem cod. aa addit ipsius iurisdictionis. — Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Pro Et quia edd. cum uno alteroque cod. Et iam quia. — Solae edd. quaeritur. — Codd. vel hoc, vel haec, fortasse legendum hos; in nostra lectione hanc referendum est ad materiam. — In Can. Placuit communi (S. C. 16. q. 1.), ut nullus monachorum pro lucro terreno de monasterio exire nefandissimo ausu praesumat, neque poenitentiam dare... sit claustro suo contentus, quia, sicut piscis sine aqua caret [vita]...Many codices [read] notis. Soon after ablationem codex aa adds ipsius iurisdictionis (of the jurisdiction itself). — Cf. III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — For Et quia the editions with one or another codex [read] Et iam quia. — The editions alone [read] quaeritur. — The codices [read] vel hoc, vel haec; perhaps hos should be read; in our reading hanc is to be referred to materiam (matter). — In the canon Placuit of the common [decretal] (Causa 16, q. 1.), that no monk presume by most nefarious daring to go out of the monastery for earthly gain, nor to give penance... let him be content with his cloister, because, as a fish without water is wanting [in life]...