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Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II.

### Quaestio II. Utrum Spiritus sanctus detur ab aliquo viro sancto.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Spiritus sanctus detur ab aliquo viro sancto. Et quod sic, probatur hoc modo:

Spiritum sanctum dari non est aliud quam gratiam gratum facientem dari; sed ostenditur, quod gratiam gratum facientem ab homine dari sive infundi est possibile et conveniens et verum.

Quod sit possibile:

1. Et quod sit possibile, videtur a minori: quia maioris virtutis est producere formam substantialem quam accidentalem; sed1 gratia est forma accidentalis: cum ergo creatura habeat virtutem producendi formam substantialem, multo fortius videtur de gratia, quae est forma accidentalis.2

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a simili: quia gratia est lumen spirituale; sed ita videmus in lumine corporali, quod aliquid est luminis dativum, aliquid receptivum, aliquid dativum et receptivum: ergo si lumen spirituale est aeque potens, pari ratione videtur de ipso. Sed dativum, cum sit Deus, non potest esse receptivum, quia nihil recipit ab aliquo: ergo hoc est reperiri in creatura, quod recipiat lumen spirituale, quod est gratia, et det ipsum; et sic etc.3

3. Item, duo sunt, quae faciunt creaturam habere posse producendi sibi simile, scilicet corruptibilitas, ob quam indiget conservari in alio, et perfectio in natura, ob quam potest in actum perfectum, qui est producere sibi similem.4 «Perfectum enim dicitur unumquodque, cum potest generare tale, quale ipsum est».5 Si ergo gratia est forma, quae citissime corrumpitur, et forma magnae perfectionis: ergo debet habere virtutem producendi sibi similem; sed non in subiecto in quo est: ergo in alio.

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4. Item, quod potest perfecte expellere contrarium potest perfecte aggenerare6 habitum contrarium, quia contrarium non expellitur perfecte nisi per contrarium; sed gratia potest perfecte expellere culpam: ergo gratia in homine potest ex se generare gratiam; sed non in habente, ergo in alio.

Quod sit congruum:

5. Ostenditur etiam,7 quod sit congruum, quod gratia procedat ab uno homine in alium. Et sic ostenditur: ratio superbiendi fuit ratio amittendi gratiam, ergo ab oppositis, humiliatio est ratio recuperandi;8 sed si gratia datur ab homine, plus humiliatur homo, quam si tantum a Deo; quia si datur ab homine, humiliatur homo sub Deo et sub homine, non autem, si a solo Deo datur, humiliatur sub utroque: ergo videtur, quod iste modus magis congruat.9

6. Item, si in actu iustitiae, qui est punitio, subiicitur anima peccatrix creaturae corporali, ut ordinetur in universo: ergo in actu misericordiae debet subiici alicui creaturae, ut reordinetur: ergo sicut ab aliqua creatura recipit poenam, ita videtur congruum, quod recipiat et gratiam.

7. Item, perfectum agens non tantum dat suscipienti formam, sed etiam dat potentiam consimilem;10 et hoc est in manifestationem suae potentiae: ergo si Deus est agens nobilissimum et qui maxime debet laudari in sua actione, congruum est, ut non tantum det formam gratiae, sed etiam potentiam dandi.

8. Item, sicut a Deo est esse, ita et bene esse; sed in nullo derogatur Deo, cum dat potentiam creaturae dandi esse: ergo in nullo derogatur, cum dat potentiam dandi bene esse, ergo et esse gratuitum.

Quod sit verum:

9. Ostenditur autem quod sit verum, quia Ioannis vigesimo11 dixit Dominus: Accipite Spiritum sanctum; quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis etc.

10. Item, in Actibus12 dicitur, quod per impositionem manuum Apostolorum dabatur Spiritus sanctus, non per impositionem manuum aliorum, ut dicit Glossa de Philippo discipulo, Actuum octavo: ergo aliqua virtus erat in Apostolis, quae non erat in aliis; sed per illam dabatur Spiritus sanctus: ergo ab homine dabatur Spiritus sanctus.

Fundamenta in oppositum:

E converso ostenditur, quod donum Spiritus sancti dari ab homine sit falsum, sit incongruum, sit etiam impossibile.

Quod sit falsum:

1. Quod sit falsum, videtur per Augustinum, decimo quinto de Trinitate13: «Non aliquis discipulorum dabat Spiritum sanctum, sed orabant, ut veniret in hominem».

2. Item, quicumque dat vel donat aliquid, habet posse14 activum super illud; sed super donum Spiritus sancti nullus homo habet posse: ergo etc.

Quod sit inconveniens:

3. Item, quod sit inconveniens, videtur, quia si anima ab alio quam a Deo gratificatur, alius quam Deus cadit medium inter animam et Deum. Sed quandocumque aliquid cadit medium15 inter animam et Deum, anima hominis est perversa: ergo secundum hoc, dum daretur animae gratia, perverteretur.

4. Item, gratia potest super liberum arbitrium, ergo si posset homo dare gratiam, homo haberet posse super alterius arbitrium; sed arbitrium, quod est alii subiectum, non est liberum: ergo talis donatio tolleret16 libertatem.

5. Item, maxima est gloria Deo17 de impii iustificatione; sed maxima gloria Dei non debet alii communicari: ergo si communicatur, divinae gloriae derogatur; sed si alius quam Deus dat gratiam, alius quam Deus iustificat: ergo talis donatio minuit Dei gloriam.

6. Item, iustum est in eo sperare, qui potest dare meritum salutis; sed si homo posset dare gratiam, posset dare meritum salutis: ergo iustum esset

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sperare in homine; sed homo est vanitas18: ergo donatio talis daret fiduciam vanitatis.

Ex his quatuor mediis patet, quod donatio Spiritus sancti ab homine tollit ordinem ipsius animae,19 tollit libertatem, minuit gloriam Dei et inducit in vanam confidentiam, quae omnia sunt inconvenientia.

Quod sit impossibile:

7. Ostenditur etiam, quod impossibile sit, dari talem potentiam creaturae: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus20, «maius est de impio facere pium quam creare caelum et terram». Sed potentia creandi non potuit a creatura recipi: ergo nec potentia dandi gratiam.

8. Item, productio gratiae per praesentiam agentis ab anima suscipitur; sed solus Deus potest animae illabi: ergo solus Deus potest gratiam infundere in animam.

9. Item, gratia est forma simplex et deiformis et spiritualis, non habens ortum a principiis subiecti: ergo cum anima rationalis ratione deiformitatis et spiritualitatis non possit21 esse nisi a Deo, patet quod nec gratia, quae aeque spiritualis, immo spiritualior est ipsa anima.

10. Item, gratia immediate unit Deo: ergo non potest esse a Deo nisi immediate, ergo nullo cooperante: ergo creatura non potest producere gratiam.

Conclusio. Spiritus sanctus non potest dari ab homine sicut a principio effectivo, potest tamen dari ab ipso sicut a praeparante vel impetrante.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut istae ultimae rationes ostendunt, gratiam sive Spiritum sanctum dari ab homine sicut a principio effectivo sive productivo, omnino est falsum et impossibile.

Tamen propter intelligentiam obiectorum in contrarium est notandum, quod gratiam dari ab aliquo est tripliciter: vel sicut a praeparante, sive administrante22 Sacramenta sive annuntiante salutaria documenta; vel sicut ab impetrante, sive per orationem sive per bona opera; vel sicut a producente. Primo modo datur gratia a bonis et a malis; secundo modo tantum a bonis; tertio modo tantum a Deo.

Et per hoc manifesta est responsio ad duo ultima,23 quae probant, Spiritum sanctum dari, quia ibi datio nihil aliud est quam praeparatio.

Ad opposita:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod agens creatum possit in formam substantialem; dico, quod non potest in omnem substantialem, ut puta in eam quae est deiformis, sicut est anima rationalis. Et quia gratia est deiformis,24 ideo non potest ab agente tali produci. Si autem de aliis formis naturalibus arguat, non est locus a minori.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lumine corporali, dicendum, quod non est simile. Lumen enim corporale diffunditur per medium deferens, et per idem medium potest iterum aggenerari25 quod defertur; gratia autem non est per delationem, sed per illapsum agentis et omnimodam indistantiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura corruptibilis debet habere potentiam generandi; dicendum, quod verum est de illa quae corruptibilis est de se; sed gratia de se nunquam corrumpitur vel senescit.

Vel dic, quod illa non est tota causa, maxime in his quae non dicunt substantiam completam, sed magis dispositionem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia potest expellere culpam; dicendum, quod expellere culpam est dupliciter: vel effective, vel formaliter. Quod potest expellere effective, potest efficere gratiam; sed non oportet, quod illud quod formaliter, quia illud se ipso expellit. Quoniam igitur gratia expellit formaliter, non oportet eam in homine generare aliam gratiam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in iustificatione debet peccator humiliari; dicendum, quod verum est, quia humiliari debet et sub homine et etiam sub visibilibus signis: tamen aliter quam sub Deo, quia alius honor debetur Deo quam homini; et ideo, quia sub Deo humiliatur ut sub principio salutis et a quo salvatur, non26 debet sub creatura humiliari, ut a qua salus detur ei, sed ut a qua salus administratur.

6. Et sic patet etiam sequens de humiliatione in poena. Non enim est simile de humiliatione illa, quia ibi anima perversa, manens in sua perversitate, ratione illius subiicitur inferiori per naturam, vel quia habet reliquias perversitatis; sed in gratiae donatione anima perversa a perversitate mutatur et ad Deum immediate ordinatur.

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7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens perfectum dat potentiam agendi simile; dicendum, quod verum est, si patiens congruenter27 posset suscipere; sed, sicut ostensum est, ex parte hominis non est possibile, ut talis potentia ab eo recipiatur, propter talis formae nobilitatem, quae non potest esse nisi a nobilissimo agente.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dare potentiam ad esse non derogat Deo; dicendum, quod ordo [est in nobilitate creaturarum,][?] quia aliquae creaturae sunt ita nobiles, quod non decet eas nisi a nobilissimo agente produci, ut sunt illae quae sunt ad imaginem.28 Quoniam igitur gratia est de nobilissimis, patet, quod non potest produci ab homine, sicut nec esse animae.

9. 10. Quae ultimo obiiciuntur soluta sunt supra per distinctionem dationis secundum differentiam29 trimembrem.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio non parum luminis affert ad solvendas difficultates, quae contra doctrinam catholicam de sacerdotio visibili ab adversariis Ecclesiae proferuntur. — Vocabulum deiformis (in solut. ad 1.) duplici sensu sumitur, scil. improprie de ea similitudine, quae naturaliter inest imagini Dei, et proprie de supernaturali similitudine, quae est per gratiam quae nos immediate Deo coniungit. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 2.[?] ad ult.; et II. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. a. 1.[?]

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. q. 72. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 16.[?] — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. unic. ad ult.; et II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 4.[?] — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. quaestiunc. 1.

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English Translation

Article II.

### Question II. Whether the Holy Spirit is given by any holy man.

Secondly, the question is asked whether the Holy Spirit is given by any holy man. And that He is, is proved in this way:

For the Holy Spirit to be given is nothing other than for grace-making-pleasing (gratia gratum faciens) to be given; but it is shown that for grace-making-pleasing to be given or infused by a man is possible and fitting and true.

That it is possible:

1. That it is possible is seen from the lesser: since it is of greater power to produce a substantial form than an accidental one; but1 grace is an accidental form: since therefore a creature has the power of producing a substantial form, much more does it seem so concerning grace, which is an accidental form.2

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so from a similitude: since grace is a spiritual light; but we so see in corporeal light that something is a giver of light, something a receiver, something both giver and receiver: therefore if spiritual light is equally powerful, by parity of reasoning the same seems true of it. But the giver, since it is God, cannot be a receiver, because He receives nothing from anything: therefore this is to be found in a creature, that it both receives spiritual light, which is grace, and gives it; and so on.3

3. Likewise, two things make a creature have the power of producing something like itself, namely corruptibility, on account of which it needs to be preserved in another, and perfection in nature, on account of which it can attain to a perfect act, which is to produce something like itself.4 «For each thing is called perfect when it can generate one like itself».5 If therefore grace is a form that very quickly corrupts, and a form of great perfection: therefore it ought to have the power of producing something like itself; but not in the subject in which it is: therefore in another.

4. Likewise, what can perfectly expel the contrary can perfectly engender6 the contrary habit, since the contrary is not perfectly expelled except by its contrary; but grace can perfectly expel guilt: therefore grace in a man can of itself generate grace; but not in the one in whom it inheres, therefore in another.

That it is fitting:

5. It is shown also7 that it is fitting that grace should proceed from one man to another. And it is shown thus: the ground of pride was the ground of losing grace; therefore from opposites, humbling is the ground of recovering it;8 but if grace is given by a man, the man is more humbled than if [it were given] only by God; for if it is given by a man, the man is humbled under God and under man, whereas if it is given by God alone, he is not humbled under both: therefore it appears that this mode is more fitting.9

6. Likewise, if in the act of justice, which is punishment, the sinful soul is subjected to a corporeal creature, in order that it may be ordered in the universe: therefore in the act of mercy it ought to be subjected to some creature, in order that it may be re-ordered: therefore just as it receives punishment from some creature, so it seems fitting that it should also receive grace.

7. Likewise, a perfect agent not only gives the recipient the form, but also gives a like power;10 and this is for the manifestation of its power: therefore if God is the most noble agent and one who most ought to be praised in His action, it is fitting that He give not only the form of grace, but also the power of giving [it].

8. Likewise, just as being is from God, so also is well-being; but God is in no way derogated when He gives a creature the power of giving being: therefore He is in no way derogated when He gives the power of giving well-being, and therefore also of giving gratuitous being.

That it is true:

9. That it is true is shown because in the twentieth [chapter] of John11 the Lord said: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, etc.

10. Likewise, in the Acts12 it is said that by the imposition of the hands of the Apostles the Holy Spirit was given, not by the imposition of the hands of others, as the Gloss says concerning the disciple Philip, in Acts 8: therefore some power was in the Apostles which was not in others; but by it the Holy Spirit was given: therefore the Holy Spirit was given by a man.

Foundations to the contrary:

Conversely it is shown that the gift of the Holy Spirit being given by a man is false, is unfitting, and is also impossible.

That it is false:

1. That it is false is seen through Augustine, in book fifteen On the Trinity13: «No one of the disciples gave the Holy Spirit, but they prayed that He might come into a man».

2. Likewise, whoever gives or bestows anything has active power14 over it; but no man has power over the gift of the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

That it is unfitting:

3. Likewise, that it is unfitting is seen because if the soul is graced by another than God, another than God falls as middle between the soul and God. But whenever something falls as middle15 between the soul and God, the soul of the man is perverse: therefore on this account, while grace would be given to the soul, it would be perverted.

4. Likewise, grace has power over free choice, therefore if a man could give grace, the man would have power over another's choice; but a choice that is subjected to another is not free: therefore such a giving would take away16 freedom.

5. Likewise, the greatest glory accrues to God17 from the justifying of the impious; but the greatest glory of God ought not to be communicated to another: therefore if it is communicated, divine glory is derogated; but if another than God gives grace, another than God justifies: therefore such a giving diminishes God's glory.

6. Likewise, it is just to hope in him who can give the merit of salvation; but if a man could give grace, he could give the merit of salvation: therefore it would be just

to hope in a man; but man is vanity18: therefore such a giving would give confidence to vanity.

From these four middle terms it is plain that the giving of the Holy Spirit by a man takes away the order of the soul itself,19 takes away freedom, diminishes the glory of God, and induces vain confidence — all of which are unfitting.

That it is impossible:

7. It is shown also that it is impossible for such a power to be given to a creature: because, as Augustine20 says, «it is greater to make a pious man out of an impious one than to create heaven and earth». But the power of creating could not be received by a creature: therefore neither the power of giving grace.

8. Likewise, the production of grace by the presence of the agent is received by the soul; but God alone can flow into the soul: therefore God alone can infuse grace into the soul.

9. Likewise, grace is a form simple and deiform and spiritual, not having its origin from the principles of the subject: therefore since the rational soul, by reason of its deiformity and spirituality, cannot21 be except from God, it is plain that neither can grace, which is equally spiritual — nay rather, more spiritual than the soul itself.

10. Likewise, grace immediately unites to God: therefore it cannot be from God except immediately, therefore with no co-operator: therefore a creature cannot produce grace.

Conclusion. The Holy Spirit cannot be given by a man as by an effective principle; He can however be given by him as by one preparing or impetrating.

I respond: It must be said that, just as those last reasonings show, that grace or the Holy Spirit is given by a man as by an effective or productive principle is altogether false and impossible.

Yet for the understanding of the objections to the contrary it must be noted that grace is given by someone in three ways: either as by one preparing, whether by administering22 the Sacraments or by announcing salvific teachings; or as by one impetrating, whether through prayer or through good works; or as by one producing. In the first mode grace is given by good and bad alike; in the second mode only by the good; in the third mode only by God.

And from this the response to the last two arguments,23 which prove that the Holy Spirit is given, is plain — for there the giving is nothing other than preparation.

To the objections:

1. To that which is objected first, that a created agent can attain to a substantial form; I say that it cannot attain to every substantial form — for instance, to that which is deiform, as is the rational soul. And because grace is deiform,24 therefore it cannot be produced by such an agent. But if it argues from other natural forms, there is no place for an argument from the lesser.

2. To that which is objected concerning corporeal light, it must be said that it is not similar. For corporeal light is diffused through a conveying medium, and through the same medium that which is conveyed can be engendered again25; but grace is not by conveyance, but by the inflowing of the agent and total absence of distance.

3. To that which is objected, that a corruptible creature ought to have a power of generating; it must be said that it is true of that which is corruptible of itself; but grace of itself is never corrupted nor grows old.

Or say: that this is not the whole cause, especially in those things which do not signify a complete substance, but rather a disposition.

4. To that which is objected, that grace can expel guilt; it must be said that to expel guilt is in two ways: either effectively or formally. What can expel effectively can effect grace; but it is not necessary that what [expels] formally [should do so], because that thing expels by itself. Since therefore grace expels formally, it is not necessary for it to generate another grace in the man.

5. To that which is objected, that in justification the sinner ought to be humbled; it must be said that it is true, because he ought to be humbled both under man and also under visible signs: yet otherwise than under God, since a different honor is due to God than to man; and therefore, because under God he is humbled as under the principle of salvation and the one by whom he is saved, he ought not26 to be humbled under a creature as one by which salvation is given to him, but as one by which salvation is administered.

6. And so the next [reply], concerning humbling in punishment, is also plain. For there is not a like case with that humbling, because there the perverse soul, remaining in its perversity, by reason of that is subjected to what is inferior by nature, or because it has the remnants of perversity; but in the giving of grace the perverse soul is changed from perversity and is ordered immediately to God.

7. To that which is objected, that a perfect agent gives the power of producing something like [itself]; it must be said that it is true, if the patient could fittingly27 receive [it]; but, as has been shown, on man's part it is not possible that such a power be received by him, on account of the nobility of such a form, which cannot be except from a most noble agent.

8. To that which is objected, that to give the power [unto] being does not derogate God; it must be said that the order [is in the nobility of creatures,][?] because some creatures are so noble that it does not befit them to be produced except by a most noble agent — as are those which are to the image [of God].28 Since therefore grace is among the most noble things, it is plain that it cannot be produced by a man, just as neither can the being of the soul.

9. 10. Those which were objected last are resolved above by the threefold29 distinction of giving.

Scholion

I. This question brings no little light to resolving the difficulties which are urged against the Catholic doctrine of the visible priesthood by adversaries of the Church. — The word deiform (in the solution to objection 1) is taken in two senses, namely improperly of that likeness which is naturally present in the image of God, and properly of the supernatural likeness, which is by the grace that immediately joins us to God. Cf. above d. 3. p. 1. q. 2.[?] ad ult.; and II. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. a. 1.[?]

II. Alex. of Hales, S. p. q. 72. m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16.[?] — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here 3. princ. q. unic. ad ult.; and II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 4.[?] — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2. quaestiunc. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit est.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, omits est.
  2. Hoc enim eruitur ex propositione prima obiectionis.
    For this is drawn from the first proposition of the objection.
  3. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 donatione loco datione, et paulo infra contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit duo, deinde post habens absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit et habet et. Codd. TW habens dicitur haberi, plures codd. ut ACGLRSUY corrupte habens dicitur, alii tamen codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 exhibent lectionem nostram.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, has donatione in place of datione, and a little below, against the older codices and the first edition, omits duo; then after habens, without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, it adds et habet et. Codices TW have habens dicitur haberi; many codices such as ACGLRSUY corruptly habens dicitur; yet other codices with editions 1, 2, 3 exhibit our reading.
  4. Fide mss. et ed. 1 hic et circa finem argumenti loco simile substituimus similem, quod et plures codd. cum ed. 1 circa principium argumenti exhibent. — De duplici ratione, ob quam creaturis convenit potentia producendi sibi simile, vide supra d. 7. q. 2. in corp.
    On the trust of the manuscripts and the first edition, here and toward the end of the argument we substitute similem in place of simile, which several codices with the first edition also exhibit toward the beginning of the argument. — On the twofold ground on which the power of producing something like itself befits creatures, see above d. 7, q. 2, in the body.
  5. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.) et IV. Meteor. text. 19. (c. 3.). Cfr. supra d. 9. q. I. — In quo textu, postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, posuimus cum loco quod. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, minus bene autem pro ergo. Paulo infra cod. O maximae loco magnae.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4) and Meteorology IV, text 19 (c. 3). Cf. above d. 9, q. 1. — In which text, at the demand of the older manuscripts and the first edition, we have placed cum in place of quod. Next, the Vatican edition with codex cc, against other codices and the first edition, less well [reads] autem for ergo. A little below, codex O has maximae in place of magnae.
  6. Sequimur codd. ACHIRSTU etc. cum ed. 1 ponendo aggenerare loco generare, quod Vat. habet.
    We follow codices ACHIRSTU etc. with the first edition in placing aggenerare in place of generare, which the Vatican edition has.
  7. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 autem.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition, [adds] autem.
  8. Unus alterque codex ut I V repetit hic gratiam. Mox plures codd. ut A I S T W Y etc. incongrue ergo pro sed.
    One or two codices such as I and V here repeat gratiam. Next, several codices such as A I S T W Y etc. incongruously [have] ergo for sed.
  9. Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus iste loco ille, et congruat pro conveniat.
    On the trust of very many manuscripts and the first edition, we substitute iste in place of ille, and congruat for conveniat.
  10. Averroes, Comment. in VIII. Phys. text. 32: Generans enim est illud quod dat corpori simplici generato formam suam et omnia accidentia contingentia formae. — In fine argumenti cod. B addit gratiam.
    Averroes, Commentary on Physics VIII, text 32: For the generator is that which gives to the simple generated body its form and all the accidents pertaining to the form. — At the end of the argument codex B adds gratiam.
  11. Vers. 22, 23.
    Verses 22, 23.
  12. Cap. 8, 17. — Verba glossae ordinariae mox citatae sunt: Philippus, qui Samariae evangelizabat, unus de septem (diaconis) fuit. Si enim Apostolus esset, manus imponere posset, ut Spiritum acciperent, quod solis episcopis licet.
    Chapter 8, verse 17. — The words of the Glossa ordinaria just cited are: Philip, who was evangelizing in Samaria, was one of the seven (deacons). For if he had been an Apostle, he could have laid on hands so that they might receive the Spirit, which is permitted to bishops alone.
  13. Cap. 26. n. 46. Vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Chapter 26, no. 46. See in the Littera of the Master, c. 3.
  14. Auctoritate plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic minus apte additum aliquod; mox bis substituimus super loco supra.
    On the authority of very many manuscripts and the first edition we have expunged here the less aptly added aliquod; next, twice we substitute super in place of supra.
  15. In Vat. et cod. cc perperam deest medium, quod in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo infra unus alterque codex ut T ee cum pro dum.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc the word medium is wrongly missing, which is found in the other manuscripts and the first edition. A little below, one or two codices such as T and ee [have] cum for dum.
  16. Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 tollit, deinde contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 addit arbitrii.
    The Vatican edition, against the older codices and the first edition, [has] tollit; then against all codices and the first edition it adds arbitrii.
  17. Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. Dei, quod edd. 2, 3 omittunt.
    So the older codices with the first edition, while the Vatican edition has Dei, which editions 2 and 3 omit.
  18. Psalm. 38, 6: Verumtamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens. — Mox cod. aa cum ed. 1 datio pro donatio.
    Psalm 38:6: Yet truly every living man is altogether vanity. — Next, codex aa with the first edition [has] datio for donatio.
  19. Vat., omisso ipsius, hic addit ad Deum et post tollit adiungit arbitrii, sed obstant codd. cum ed. 1. — In principio huius propositionis post his cod. M et ed. 1 satis bene addunt igitur.
    The Vatican edition, omitting ipsius, here adds ad Deum and after tollit adjoins arbitrii, but the codices with the first edition stand against this. — At the beginning of this proposition, after his, codex M and the first edition not badly add igitur.
  20. Expositio in Evang. Ioan. tract. 72. n. 3.
    Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract 72, no. 3.
  21. Multi codd. cum tribus primis edd. potest.
    Many codices with the first three editions [have] potest.
  22. Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus administrante pro ministrante, et post Sacramenta particulam sive pro ambiguo seu sicut ab; deinde post impetrante adiecimus non bene omissum sive. Mox codd. aa bb post producente addunt et infundente.
    From very many manuscripts and the first edition we substitute administrante for ministrante, and after Sacramenta the particle sive for the ambiguous seu sicut ab; then after impetrante we have inserted the not-well-omitted sive. Next, codices aa and bb after producente add et infundente.
  23. Vat. praeter fidem vetustiorum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit obiecta.
    The Vatican edition, beyond the trust of the older manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds obiecta.
  24. Vat. cum paucis codd. hic superflue repetit sicut est anima rationalis. Mox ex codd. cum sex primis edd. posuimus arguat loco arguatur.
    The Vatican edition with a few codices here superfluously repeats sicut est anima rationalis. Next, from the codices with the first six editions we have placed arguat in place of arguatur.
  25. Ex plurimis codd. substituimus aggenerari pro generari, loco cuius codd. L O habent aliud generari et ed. 1 aggregari. Omnes codd. cum ed. 1 post aggenerari omittunt per, quod Vat. falso adiungit.
    From very many codices we substitute aggenerari for generari, in place of which codices L and O have aliud generari and the first edition aggregari. All codices with the first edition after aggenerari omit per, which the Vatican edition falsely adjoins.
  26. Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus sic, quod Vat. particulae non praefigit.
    On the trust of the manuscripts and the first edition we have expunged sic, which the Vatican edition prefixes to the particle non.
  27. Anchor on congruenter — Vat. variant not flagged in OCR; entry continues on next page (see [?] in tier2-ambiguities).
    Anchor on fittingly — Vatican variant not separately flagged in the surviving OCR; placeholder pending PDF spot-check.
  28. Cf. supra d. 3. p. 1. (Bonav. on creatures ad imaginem.)
    Cf. above d. 3, p. 1 (Bonaventure on creatures to the image).
  29. Sc. praeparans, impetrans, producens; vide supra in corp.
    Namely the one preparing, the one impetrating, the one producing; see above in the body.
← Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 1Dist. 14, Dubia→