Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 30
Articulus unicus. De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.
Quaestio I. Utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Super illud Psalmi1: Bonum mihi lex oris tui etc.; dicit Augustinus: « Plus diligit caritas Deum, quam cupiditas millia auri et argenti ». Hoc est verum de quantulacumque caritate; et si hoc, quantulacumque caritas excedit omnem cupiditatem sua virtute: si ergo magnitudo tentationis attenditur secundum magnitudinem cupiditatis, videtur, quod per quantulamcumque caritatem possumus maximae tentationi resistere.
2. Item, Gregorius2: « Debilis est hostis, qui non vincit nisi volentem »; sed quantulamcumque habet homo caritatem, habet quo potens est non velle vinci: ergo si per nolle vinci resistit omni tentationi et tentatori, videtur, quod per quantulamcumque caritatem possit homo superare omnem tentationem.
3. Item, potentior est caritas in bonum, quam sit culpa in malum3; sed peccatum mortale quantumcumque parvum sufficit ad expellendam magnam gratiam: ergo caritas, quantumcumque parva sit, sufficiens est resistere tentationi maximae.
4. Item, caritas, quantumcumque parva sit, hominem facit diligere Deum propter se et super omnia et facit hominem in Deum confidere plus quam in se; sed qui Deum propter se et super omnia amat et in Deum confidit habet Deum adiutorem, et qui habet Deum adiutorem omni tentationi potest resistere4: ergo homo ex quantulacumque caritate superare potest omnem tentationem.
5. Item, gratia, quantumcumque sit modica, potentior est et excellentior quam natura; sed homo in statu innocentiae, in puris naturalibus constitutus, poterat quantaecumque tentationi resistere5: ergo existens in gratia potest quantaecumque tentationi resistere, quantulamcumque habeat caritatem.
6. Item, esto quod aliquis habeat modicam caritatem et tentetur magna tentatione, aut potest illi resistere, aut non potest. Si potest, habeo propositum. Si non potest; et nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest6: ergo consentiendo tali tentationi non peccat. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo hoc sequitur: redit ergo idem quod prius.
Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo7: Fidelis Deus, qui non permittit vos tentari supra id quod potestis; constat, quod loquitur habentibus caritatem: ergo si Deus permitteret, diabolus tentaret hominem habentem caritatem supra posse: ergo non videtur, quod cum quantulacumque caritate possit homo resistere tentationi maximae.
2. Item, super illud Psalmi8: Proba me, Domine, et tenta me; dicit auctoritas: « Prius vires nostras inspice, et postea tentari permitte »; sed hoc non peteret, nisi posset tentari supra vires: ergo videtur, quod aliqua tentatio sit, cui non sufficit resistere virtus caritatis modicae et imperfectae.
3. Item, Ambrosius, in quodam sermone de Confessoribus9: « Diversa sunt genera inimicorum, qui secundum virium nostrarum quantitatem compensato nobiscum agone luctantur »; sed maiores vires habet caritas perfecta quam imperfecta: ergo si illa habet luctam suis viribus proportionabilem, videtur, quod aliqua lucta sit supra vires caritatis imperfectae.
4. Item, virtus caritatis maxime relucet in pugna10 et tentationis victoria: ergo si quantulacumque caritas potest resistere maximae tentationi, videtur, quod modica caritas sit maximae virtutis et perfectionis; quod si est manifeste falsum, restat, quod et illud, ex quo sequitur.
5. Item, magnitudo coronae attenditur secundum magnitudinem pugnae: ergo si modica caritas resistere posset tentationi maximae, videtur, quod maxima corona deberetur caritati minimae. Sed hoc est falsum manifeste: ergo etc.
6. Item, quaedam est pugna, ex cuius victoria purificatur anima ab omnibus venialibus et statim evolat in caelum, sicut est, quando pro iustitia mors homini intentatur: ergo si modica caritas posset resistere quantaecumque tentationi, modica caritas posset omnia venialia delere et statim in caelum facere evolare. Quodsi hoc absurdum est, restat idem quod prius.
Conclusio.
Concedi potest, quod quantulacumque caritas possit resistere quantaecumque tentationi, si comparatio fit tum ad dispositionem divinae providentiae tentationisque exordium, tum ad libertatem voluntatis; sed negandum est de caritate per comparationem ad consummationem victoriae et ad defectum pronitatis et difficultatis in voluntate.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum quantulacumque caritas possit resistere quantaecumque tentationi, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut loquendo de potestate caritatis per comparationem ad adiutorium divinae providentiae gubernantis, aut per comparationem ad vires liberi arbitrii cooperantis. Secundum utrumque istorum modorum fuit hic duplex modus dicendi.
Si enim loquamur per comparationem ad dispositionem divini regiminis, sic dixerunt aliqui, quod ex quantulacumque caritate potest quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi; alii vero, quod non. Et
utrique verum dicere potuerunt nec sibi contradicunt, si recte intelligantur.
Si enim loquamur quantum ad tentationis exordium, quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, quia Deus hominem habentem caritatem nunquam deserit, nisi ille voluntarie ab eo recedat; quin potius, secundum quod augetur tentationis bellum, operatur Deus caritatis augmentum. Unde quantumcumque sit modica caritas in homine, nunquam potest invitus ab adversario deici, quia, secundum quod crescit bellum, crescit adiutorium, si homo faciat quod in se est. — Si autem loquamur de tentatione quantum ad consummationem victoriae, sic non potest esse, quod homo ex modica caritate resistat tentationi maximae, quia non patitur ordo divinae iustitiae, quin ex victoria magni belli fiat amplificatio meriti. Unde sicut ista duo non contradicunt, sed simul vera sunt: possibile est, quod ex parva caritate in principio tentationis et magna in fine resistatur magnae tentationi; et iterum: possibile est, quod ex parva caritate in principio et in fine non resistatur magnae tentationi: sic non obviant sibi illae duae opiniones.
Similiter, si loquamur de potentia caritatis per comparationem ad vires liberi arbitrii cooperantis, duplex fuit opinio. Nam quidam dixerunt, quod ex quantulacumque caritate potest quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi; quidam, quod non. Et ratio huius est: quia de viribus liberi arbitrii adiuti a gratia est21 loqui dupliciter: vel quantum ad libertatem voluntatis, vel quantum ad vitium difficultatis ad bonum et pronitatis ad malum.
Si igitur loquamur de gratia per comparationem ad libertatem voluntatis, sic cum ipsa voluntas de se sit libera ad consentiendum, et per gratiam sit liberata a servitute peccati et cogi non possit24, potest quantaecumque tentationi resistere. — Si autem loquamur per comparationem ad vitium difficultatis et pronitatis, sic non potest resistere impulsui tentationis fortis, nisi caritas adeo fortis sit, quod suo vigore contra pronitatem refrenet a malo et contra difficultatem accendat ad bonum. Liberum enim arbitrium, ex una parte adiutum adiutorio gratiae, ex alia parte corruptum vitio concupiscentiae, quando excitatur in ipso per tentationem impetus concupiscentiae, secundum quod magis et magis fortiter excitatur, secundum hoc indiget maiori repressivo25. — Et sic diversis considerationibus concedi adhuc potest de caritate per comparationem ad liberum arbitrium, quod quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, et quod non potest: potest quidem, si comparetur ad dominium libertatis; non potest, si comparetur ad vitium pronitatis et difficultatis. Et hoc melius patet, si quis consideret et attendat et experimento cognoscat statum et conflictum hominum tentatorum.
Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam nihilominus responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae probant, quod quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, procedunt de ipsa caritate per comparationem ad Deum ipsam adiuvantem et promoventem, et per comparationem ad voluntatis libertatem, sicut intuenti apparet.
Verumtamen illa ratio, quam obiicit de peccato, non valet. Quod enim dicitur, quod quantumcumque parvum peccatum sufficit ad expellendam quantamcumque gratiam; hoc non est, quia peccatum agat in ipsam gratiam, sed quia facit liberum arbitrium deficere a gratiae complemento26. Ex hoc autem non potest inferri, quod propter hoc quantulacumque gratia sufficiat ad vincendum omnem tentationis impulsum, quia facilius est deficere quam bene facere27. Inferri tamen potest, quod quantulacumque gratia expellere potest omne peccatum.
Ad rationes vero, quae ad oppositum adducuntur, manifesta est similiter responsio; procedunt enim de ipsa caritate per comparationem ad defectum pronitatis et difficultatis; sicut patet de primis tribus rationibus; vel per comparationem ad terminum et consummationem victoriae, cui respondet28 perfectio meriti et magnitudo praemii quantum ad excellentiam victoriae et coronae; et hoc modo concessum est, quod non potest esse, quod modica caritas resistat tentationi magnae, quia non patitur hoc ordo divinae iustitiae, sicut praetactum est. — Et secundum hanc viam procedunt tres rationes ultimae; nec oportet amplius hic immorari, quia rationes illae per se satis manifestae sunt pertractanti29.
I. Praenotandum est, quod antiqui Scholastici, sicut et Ss. Patres, non ita distinguunt et separant gratiam habitualem et actualem, ut theologi recentiores passim faciunt. Ipsi enim habituali attribuunt non tantum effectum elevandi animam ad statum gratiae, quo quis efficitur Deo acceptus, sed etiam virtutem moventem, illuminantem et roborantem, ut iam observatum est II. Sent. d. 26. q. I. et 6. in scholiis (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 109. passim). Hinc etiam fit, ut S. Thom. (S. III. q. 62. a. 6. ad 3, q. 70. a. 4. in corp.) eundem effectum attribuat gratiae habituali, quem hic tribuit caritati i. e. habitui caritatis, qui inseparabiliter est connexus cum gratia habituali, vel, ut Scotistae volunt, non nisi ratione ab eo distinctus. Docet enim, quod « minima gratia potest resistere cuilibet concupiscentiae et vitare omne peccatum mortale ».
II. Pro more suo S. Bonav., duplici usus distinctione, aliqualiter conciliat duas sibi oppositas opiniones dicitque, utramque aliquid veritatis continere. Prima distinctione utitur etiam S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 31. q. I. a. 3.) et resolvit ad mentem nostri auctoris, quod virtute minimae gratiae possit quis resistere tentationi qualicumque, ut non vincatur, sive ut a bono proposito, oriente tentatione, non cadat, sed non ita, ut tentationem vincat « ex magnitudine virtutis »; cum caritas, quae in principio tentationis sit parva, in fine eiusdem fiat magna. « Si tamen ponatur, quod semper parva maneret, non posset per modum dictum tentationi resistere ». Similiter respondent Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 31. q. I. a. 4, et Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 31. a. I. q. 3. De opinione Guliel. Antissiod. vide pag. 658, nota 9.
III. Solutio seq. (2.) quaestionis non habet difficultatem nec eadem ab aliis commentatoribus Magistri tractatur. Tangitur autem ipsa a S. Thoma (III. Sent. d. 29. a. 8. quaestiunc. 2.) in quaestione: utrum omnes teneantur ad caritatem perfectam, praesertim in solutione ad 3. Similiter in eadem quaestione 13. Albert., III. Sent. d. 29. a. 8, et Petr. a Tar., de III. Sent. d. 29. a. 9. ad 3. breviter idem dicunt.
IV. Tertiam quaestionem sic proponit B. Albert. (loc. cit. a. 9.): An plus secundum actum tenetur diligere perfectus quam imperfectus; et resolvit, quod « perfectus tenetur secundum actum plus diligere ex commisso, non ex praecepto (cfr. Bonav., ibi ad 2.). Praeter hunc tractat eandem quaestionem solus S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 8. quaestiunc. 3. — De quinque perfectionis generibus vide pag. 662, nota 4. Videsis etiam praeclaram doctrinam de vera ratione perfectionis, quam S. Bonav. exhibet in opusculo Apologia pauperum, resp. I. c. 2. 3.
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Article unique. On charity as regards the perfection of merit.
Question I. Whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation.
Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation. And that he can, seems [to be the case].
1. On that [verse] of the Psalm1: The law of thy mouth is good to me etc.; Augustine says: "Charity loves God more than cupidity [loves] thousands of gold and silver." This is true of however little charity; and if this is so, however little charity exceeds all cupidity by its power: if therefore the magnitude of a temptation is reckoned according to the magnitude of cupidity, it seems that by however little charity we can resist the greatest temptation.
2. Likewise, Gregory2: "Weak is the enemy who conquers none but the willing"; but however little charity a man has, he has that whereby he is able not to will to be conquered: therefore if by not-willing to be conquered he resists every temptation and tempter, it seems that by however little charity a man can overcome every temptation.
3. Likewise, charity is more powerful for good than fault is for evil3; but a mortal sin, however small, suffices to expel a great grace: therefore charity, however small it be, suffices to resist the greatest temptation.
4. Likewise, charity, however small it be, makes a man love God for His own sake and above all things, and makes a man trust in God more than in himself; but he who loves God for His own sake and above all things and trusts in God has God for a helper, and he who has God for a helper can resist every temptation4: therefore a man can by however little charity overcome every temptation.
5. Likewise, grace, however slight it be, is more powerful and more excellent than nature; but a man in the state of innocence, constituted in his pure natural [powers], was able to resist however great a temptation5: therefore one existing in grace can resist however great a temptation, however little charity he have.
6. Likewise, suppose that someone has slight charity and is tempted by a great temptation, either he can resist it, or he cannot. If he can, I have my point. If he cannot; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid6: therefore by consenting to such a temptation he does not sin. But this is false: therefore so too is that from which it follows: thus the same conclusion as before returns.
On the contrary: 1. In the First [Letter] to the Corinthians, the tenth [chapter]7: God is faithful, who does not permit you to be tempted above that which you are able [to bear]; it is settled that he is speaking to those having charity: therefore if God were to permit, the devil would tempt a man having charity beyond his power: therefore it does not seem that by however little charity a man can resist the greatest temptation.
2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm8: Prove me, O Lord, and try me; an authority says: "First inspect our powers, and afterward permit [us] to be tried"; but he would not ask this unless he could be tried above his powers: therefore it seems that there is some temptation which the power of slight and imperfect charity does not suffice to resist.
3. Likewise, Ambrose, in a certain sermon on the Confessors9: "There are diverse kinds of enemies, who struggle with us in a contest measured to the quantity of our powers"; but perfect charity has greater powers than imperfect: therefore if the former has a struggle proportioned to its powers, it seems that there is some struggle above the powers of imperfect charity.
4. Likewise, the power of charity shines forth most in the fight10 and in the victory of temptation: therefore if however little charity can resist the greatest temptation, it seems that slight charity is of the greatest power and perfection; and since this is manifestly false, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.
5. Likewise, the magnitude of the crown is reckoned according to the magnitude of the fight: therefore if slight charity could resist the greatest temptation, it seems that the greatest crown would be owed to the least charity. But this is manifestly false: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, there is a certain fight from whose victory the soul is purified of all venial [sins] and at once flies up into heaven, as is the case when death is threatened upon a man for justice' sake: therefore if slight charity could resist however great a temptation, slight charity could blot out all venial [sins] and make [one] at once fly up into heaven. But if this is absurd, the same conclusion as before remains.
Conclusion.
It can be granted that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, if the comparison is made both to the disposition of divine providence and to the temptation's beginning, and to the freedom of the will; but it must be denied of charity by comparison to the consummation of the victory and to the defect of proneness [to evil] and of difficulty in the will.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether however little charity can resist however great a temptation, this can be understood in two ways: either by speaking of the power of charity by comparison to the help of governing divine providence, or by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice. According to each of these ways there was here a twofold manner of speaking.
For if we speak by comparison to the disposition of the divine governance, then some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; others, however, that one cannot. And
both could speak truly and do not contradict one another, if they are rightly understood.
For if we speak as regards the temptation's beginning, however little charity can resist however great a temptation, because God never deserts a man having charity unless he voluntarily withdraws from Him; rather, according as the war of temptation is increased, God works an increase of charity. Hence however slight the charity in a man be, he can never be cast down unwillingly by the adversary, because, according as the war grows, the help grows, if a man does what is in him. — But if we speak of the temptation as regards the consummation of the victory, then it cannot be that a man by slight charity resist the greatest temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow that an amplification of merit not arise from the victory of a great war. Hence, just as these two [statements] do not contradict but are at once true: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning of a temptation and great at the end a great temptation be resisted; and again: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning and at the end a great temptation be not resisted: thus those two opinions do not stand in each other's way.
Similarly, if we speak of the power of charity by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice, there was a twofold opinion. For some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; some, that one cannot. And the reason of this is: that of the powers of the free choice helped by grace21 one may speak in two ways: either as regards the freedom of the will, or as regards the vice of difficulty toward the good and proneness toward evil.
If therefore we speak of grace by comparison to the freedom of the will, then, since the will is of itself free to consent, and through grace is freed from the servitude of sin and cannot be compelled24, it can resist however great a temptation. — But if we speak by comparison to the vice of difficulty and proneness, then it cannot resist the impulse of a strong temptation, unless the charity be so strong that by its vigor it restrains from evil against proneness and kindles toward good against difficulty. For free choice, on the one part helped by the help of grace, on the other part corrupted by the vice of concupiscence, when in it through temptation the impulse of concupiscence is aroused, according as it is aroused more and more strongly, according to this it needs a greater restraint25. — And thus by diverse considerations it can still be granted of charity, by comparison to free choice, that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, and that it cannot: it can indeed, if it be compared to the lordship of freedom; it cannot, if it be compared to the vice of proneness and difficulty. And this is better seen if one considers and attends and learns by experience the state and conflict of tempted men.
From these things the response to the proposed question is plain, and likewise plain is the response to the objections. For the reasons which prove that however little charity can resist however great a temptation proceed of charity itself by comparison to God Himself helping and promoting it, and by comparison to the freedom of the will, as appears to one who looks.
Nevertheless that reason which is objected concerning sin is not valid. For what is said, that however small a sin suffices to expel however great a grace; this is not because the sin acts upon the grace itself, but because it makes free choice fail from the completion of grace26. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that on this account however little grace suffices to conquer every impulse of temptation, because it is easier to fail than to do well27. Yet it can be inferred that however little grace can expel every sin.
To the reasons, however, which are adduced to the opposite, the response is likewise manifest; for they proceed of charity itself by comparison to the defect of proneness and difficulty, as is plain of the first three reasons; or by comparison to the term and consummation of the victory, to which corresponds28 the perfection of merit and the magnitude of the reward as regards the excellence of the victory and the crown; and in this way it was granted that it cannot be that slight charity resist a great temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow this, as was touched on before. — And along this way the last three reasons proceed; nor is it necessary to linger here further, since those reasons are of themselves plain enough to one who works them through29.
I. It must be noted beforehand that the ancient Scholastics, like the holy Fathers too, do not so distinguish and separate habitual and actual grace as the more recent theologians commonly do. For they attribute to habitual [grace] not only the effect of elevating the soul to the state of grace, by which one is made acceptable to God, but also a moving, illuminating, and strengthening power, as has already been observed at II Sent. d. 26, q. I and 6, in the scholia (cf. St. Thomas, S. I-II q. 109, throughout). Hence it also comes about that St. Thomas (S. III q. 62, a. 6, ad 3; q. 70, a. 4, in the body) attributes to habitual grace the same effect which here [Bonaventure] attributes to charity, i.e., to the habit of charity, which is inseparably connected with habitual grace, or, as the Scotists hold, distinct from it only by reason. For he teaches that "the least grace can resist any concupiscence and avoid every mortal sin."
II. After his manner St. Bonaventure, using a twofold distinction, somewhat reconciles two mutually opposed opinions and says that each contains something of truth. The first distinction St. Thomas also uses (III Sent. d. 31, q. I, a. 3) and resolves [it] to the mind of our author, namely, that by the power of the least grace one can resist any temptation whatever, so as not to be conquered, or so as not to fall from a good purpose when temptation arises, but not so as to conquer the temptation "by the magnitude of virtue"; since charity, which is small at the beginning of a temptation, becomes great at its end. "If, however, it be supposed that it always remained small, it could not in the said manner resist the temptation." Similarly answer Peter of Tarentaise, III Sent. d. 31, q. I, a. 4, and Richard of Mediavilla, III Sent. d. 31, a. I, q. 3. On the opinion of William of Auxerre see p. 658, note 9.
III. The solution of the following (2nd) question presents no difficulty, nor is it treated by the other commentators on the Master. It is, however, touched on by St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 29, a. 8, sub-question 2) in the question: whether all are bound to perfect charity, especially in the solution to [objection] 3. Similarly in the same question 13, Albert, III Sent. d. 29, a. 8, and Peter of Tarentaise, on III Sent. d. 29, a. 9, ad 3, briefly say the same.
IV. The third question Blessed Albert (loc. cit., a. 9) poses thus: Whether the perfect is bound to love more according to act than the imperfect; and he resolves that "the perfect is bound according to act to love more from what he has committed himself to, not from precept" (cf. Bonaventure, there, ad 2). Besides him, only St. Thomas treats the same question, loc. cit., a. 8, sub-question 3. — On the five kinds of perfection see p. 662, note 4. See also the splendid doctrine on the true account of perfection which St. Bonaventure sets forth in the opusculum Apologia pauperum, response I, c. 2, 3.
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- Psalm. 118, 72. — Verba August. habentur in eius Enarrat. super hunc Ps., serm 17. n. 10.Psalm 118:72. — Augustine's words are found in his Enarratio on this Psalm, sermon 17, n. 10.
- Libr. V. Moral. c. 22. n. 63. De verbis ipsis vide tom. II. pag. 170, nota 2. Similis sententia invenitur in quodam sermone attributo Augustino, nunc in append. operum eius serm. 37. (alias 197. de temp.) n. 6; et in Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. 68. n. 4.[Gregory,] Moralia, Book V, c. 22, n. 63. On the words themselves see vol. II, p. 170, note 2. A similar sentence is found in a certain sermon attributed to Augustine, now in the appendix of his works, sermon 37 (otherwise 197, de tempore), n. 6; and in Bernard, Sermon on the Canticle 68, n. 4.
- Vide sententiam Anselmi, tom. II. pag. 920, nota 4. allatam.See the sentence of Anselm cited at vol. II, p. 920, note 4.
- Psalm. 117, 7: Dominus mihi adiutor, et ego despiciam inimicos meos.Psalm 117:7: The Lord is my helper, and I will despise my enemies.
- Cfr. II. Sent. III. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. I, et Comment. ibid. p. I. dub. I. — Verbis maioris respondent illa verba Ambrosii, I. de offic. ministror. c. 7. n. 24: Non enim vehementior est natura ad diligendum quam gratia.Cf. the Master's III [Book of] Sentences, d. XXIV, c. I, and the Commentary there, p. I, dub. I. — To the words of the major [premise] correspond those words of Ambrose, de officiis ministrorum I, c. 7, n. 24: For nature is not more vehement toward loving than grace [is].
- August., l. Retract. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest?Augustine, Retractations I, c. 9, n. 5, and On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 50: For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided?
- Vers. 13, ubi Vulgata patietur pro permittit.Verse 13, where the Vulgate reads patietur ("will suffer") for permittit ("permits").
- Psalm. 25, 2. — Auctoritatem hic intellige Glossam ordinariam (apud Strabum et Lyranum).Psalm 25:2. — Understand the "authority" here as the Glossa ordinaria (in Strabo and Lyra).
- Pro de Confessoribus Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat 72. a. I. de Confessione, sed neque sub hoc neque sub illo titulo sermo reperitur in edd. operum Ambrosii, quas prae manu habemus, neque in aliis locis illa verba invenire potuimus.For "on the Confessors" the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales [reads] collation 72, a. I, "on Confession"; but neither under this nor under that title is the sermon found in the editions of Ambrose's works which we have at hand, nor were we able to find those words in other places.
- Cod. K lucta.Codex K reads lucta ("struggle").
- Codd. H I K N U contingit. Proxime ante pro adiuti a gratia edd. et adiuti gratia, codd. C D adiuti et de gratia.Codices H I K N U read contingit ("it happens"). Just before, for adiuti a gratia ("helped by grace") the editions [read] et adiuti gratia, codices C D adiuti et de gratia.
- Vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq.See II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and following.
- Cod. W praesidio, edd. repressione, quae etiam mox omittunt adhuc. Deinde pro per comparationem cod. H in comparatione.Codex W reads praesidio ("by a defense"), the editions repressione ("by a repression"), which also presently omit adhuc ("still"). Then for per comparationem codex H reads in comparatione.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 4. ad 5. — Cod. ¥ sed quia facit, ut liberum arbitrium deficiat etc.Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 4, ad 5. — Codex Y reads but because it makes free choice fail etc.
- Vide supra pag. 499, nota 2.See above, p. 499, note 2.
- Cod. A respondent. Inferius pro magnae cod. Z maximae, et circa finem solut. pro hic immorari cod. U in hoc immorari.Codex A reads respondent ("they correspond"). Lower down, for magnae ("great") codex Z [reads] maximae ("greatest"), and near the end of the solution, for hic immorari codex U [reads] in hoc immorari.
- Aliter solvit Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 4: Haec est igitur differentia inter primam opinionem et secundam, quia prima dicit, quod ex minima caritate, manente minima, potest aliquis resistere quantaelibet tentationi, sed non de facili. Secunda dicit, quod nullo modo. Sed prima magis placet nobis, quoniam dicitur in Cantico Deuter.: Dei perfecta sunt opera; ergo quaecumque Deus armat, perfecte armat. Virtutes autem non dantur tantum ad informandam animam, quantulaecumque sint, sed etiam ad armandum contra omnes tentationes: ergo quantulaecumque sint, sufficiunt ad resistendum quantaecumque tentationi.William of Auxerre solves [it] otherwise, Summa p. III, tr. 6, c. 4: This, then, is the difference between the first opinion and the second, because the first says that by the least charity, while it remains least, anyone can resist any temptation whatever, but not easily. The second says that [he can] in no way. But the first pleases us more, because it is said in the Canticle of Deuteronomy: God's works are perfect; therefore whatever God arms, He arms perfectly. But the virtues are given not only to inform the soul, however slight they be, but also to arm [it] against all temptations: therefore however slight they be, they suffice to resist however great a temptation.