Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26
Articulus unicus. De gratiae quidditate.
Quaestio V. Utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis. Et quod primo insit substantiae, videtur.
1. Nulla potentia animae est continue in suo actu; sed gratia est continue in suo actu, quia continue reddit hominem Deo acceptum et gratum: ergo gratia non est in potentiis animae.
2. Item, gratia est vita animae, sicut dicunt Sanctorum auctoritates et etiam doctores1; sed vivere, cum sit actus substantialis, non inest substantiae per potentias, sed potentiis per substantiam: ergo si primus actus gratiae est vivificare, videtur, quod prius respiciat substantiam quam potentias.
3. Item, accidens habet numerari per suum proprium subiectum2: ergo si gratia primo est in potentiis, cum potentiae sint multae, necesse est, gratiam in anima multiplicari. Si ergo in una anima una tantum est gratia, videtur, quod gratia primo sit in substantia quam in potentia.
4. Item, in gratia et virtutibus consistit imago reformationis3; sed imago reformationis respondet imagini creationis: cum igitur imago creationis consistat in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, et tres sint habitus virtutum, qui respiciunt tres potentias, videtur, quod sit aliquid unum, quod respiciat ipsam animae essentiam; sed non est nisi gratia: ergo etc.
5. Item, sicut operatio exit a potentia, sic potentia oritur a substantia: ergo sicut non placet nec acceptatur a Deo aliqua operatio, nisi prius acceptetur et gratificetur potentia, sic impossibile est acceptari potentiam, nisi prius acceptetur substantia: ergo cum per gratiam fiat acceptatio, per prius est gratia in substantia quam in potentia4.
6. Item, in parvulis baptizatis est Deus per inhabitantem gratiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum5: ergo cum in ipsis nulla sit potentia expedita, gratia non respicit primum expeditionem potentiae, sed potius vivificationem substantiae, et sic per prius est in substantia quam in potentia.
Sed contra: 1. Augustinus6 dicit, quod «gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum»: ergo residet in anima ratione liberi arbitrii; sed liberum arbitrium nominat potentiam: ergo etc.
2. Item, Magister in littera7 adducit auctoritatem Augustini, in qua dividit gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem, et utramque istarum definit per comparationem ad voluntatem: ergo videtur, quod primum et proprium subiectum gratiae est ipsa voluntas. Sed haec est potentia: ergo videtur, quod gratia per prius insit potentiae quam substantiae.
3. Item, sicut inter potentiam et actum cadit medius habitus, sic inter substantiam et habitum cadit media potentia. Cum igitur gratia sit in anima ut habitus et qualitas quaedam, videtur, quod ei insit mediante potentia: ergo per prius est in potentia quam in substantia.
4. Item, «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem8»; sed gratia ut gratia opponitur culpae in quantum culpa: si ergo culpa primo et proprie respicit arbitrii libertatem, pari ratione et gratia: ergo per prius erit in potentia quam in substantia.
5. Item, gratia, cum sit donum desursum descendens9, inest animae secundum suum supremum; sed supremum animae, sicut vult Augustinus, est ipsa mens; mens autem non est ipsa substantia animae, sed potius potentia suprema: ergo videtur, quod gratia per prius sit in potentia.
6. Item, gratia habet existere in anima secundum conversionem ipsius animae ad Deum, et amitti habet secundum aversionem. Si igitur illud, secundum quod anima primo avertitur et convertitur, hoc est potentia: videtur, quod gratia10 per prius sit in potentia quam in substantia.
7. Item, gratia non est in anima secundum se ipsam, sed secundum influentiam ab aliquo principio, quod est omnino ab ea diversum. Cum igitur anima suscipit gratiam, aut habet aliquam potentiam ad suscipiendam gratiam, aut non. Si non habet potentiam ad hoc11: ergo nunquam eam suscipiet. Si autem habet potentiam, mediante qua suscipit, aut illa erit ratio, aut voluntas, aut aliqua alia potentia ab his diversa; sed non est ponere potentiam aliam in anima praeter cognitivam et affectivam12: ergo videtur, quod mediantibus illis gratia suscipiatur ab anima.
8. Item, si gratia inesset animae secundum substantiam, cum possibile sit abstrahi13 per intellectum substantiam a potentiis, possibile esset intelligere, animam esse gratam, suis potentiis abstractis; sed omnis anima grata est disposita ad gloriam: ergo potest intelligi per consequens anima gloriosa, abstractis potentiis. Sed potentiis abstractis, anima nec videt nec amat Deum: ergo impossibile est animam gloriosam ponere, quae nec Deum videt nec Deum amat. Sed si hoc est impossibile: ergo et illud ex quo istud sequitur.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Gratia inest animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii, et dicitur respicere substantiam, quia habet esse in potentiis, ut continuantur ad unam essentiam.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod communis opinio tenet, gratiam primo respicere animae substantiam, et virtutes primo respicere potentias, ut sic per gratiam in virtutibus fiat reformatio imaginis creatae, quae consistit in trinitate potentiarum et unitate substantiae. Haec autem positio dupliciter potest intelligi.
Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod Deus prius influat gratiam in essentiam, et postmodum influentia illa in14 substantia redundet in potentias, ut sic sit conformitas gratiae ad animam, sive prout consideratur secundum rationem imaginis, sive prout consideratur ut perfectio corporis. Anima enim, ut est perfectio corporis, ratione suae substantiae vel essentiae respicit complexionis aequalitatem15; ratione vero potentiarum respicit organorum diversitatem. Et iterum, anima in se et vivere habet et agere; sed vivere per se ipsam et propriam formam, agere vero per potentiam. Per hunc modum, si gratia in perficiendo conformatur animae16, sub ratione gratiae prius debet respicere ipsam animae substantiam, et per virtutes debet esse perfectio potentiarum. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi, cum dicitur gratia respicere substantiam, et virtutes potentias, non tantum intelligitur esse dictum per appropriationem, verum etiam per proprietatem.
Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta positio per appropriationem quandam, non quia Deus prius influat gratiam in substantiam quam in potentiam, sed quia, cum anima suscipiat gratiam et virtutes mediante potentia, et17 tam gratia quam virtus insit animae per potentiam, aliter tamen inest haec et illa. Virtus enim dicit perfectionem respectu operis, gratia vero dicit perfectionem respectu Dei acceptantis. Et quoniam respectu operum potentiae distinguuntur, hinc est, quod virtutes potentias respiciunt ut distinctas, et tunc sunt in actu, quando potentiae sunt in actu. Potentiae autem, in quantum comparantur ad Deum acceptantem, unica acceptatione acceptantur cum ipsa substantia, cuius sunt18, et secundum unam naturam in eis repertam. Et hinc est, quod gratia est una, sicut et substantia, et est semper in actu continuo; et primo dicitur respicere substantiam, non quia sit in illa absque potentia, vel per prius quam in potentia, sed quia habet esse in potentiis, ut continuantur ad unam essentiam19. Virtus vero dicitur esse in potentiis, quia in eis est, ut referuntur ad operationes diversas.
Et hic modus intelligendi magis consonus est verbis Augustini, qui dicit, quod «gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum»; qui etiam gratiam cooperantem et operantem describit per comparationem ad voluntatem. — Magis etiam est consonus rationi. Si enim intelligimus gratiam tanquam habitum quendam et influentiam, quae inest animae ad Deum conversae; cum talis habilitatio et influentiae susceptio et conversio non possit intelligi nisi per potentiam, non videtur posse recte intelligi, quomodo gratia sit in anima, abstracta potentia. — Rursus, si gratia eo dicitur gratia, quia gratificat, et eo ipso quod gratificat, habet oppositionem ad culpam; cum «opposita secundum idem nata sint inesse», secundum idem ipsum anima nata est gratificari, secundum quod nata est et culpari. Culpatio autem et laus et vituperium inest animae primo secundum liberum arbitrium, ac per hoc et gratiae donum. Non enim quaecumque acceptatio gratificatio dicitur, sed illa sola, qua Deus sic acceptat animam, ut reputet eam remuneratione dignam, et talis respicit ipsam arbitrii libertatem. Et ideo gratia inest animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii; et huius signum est, quia ad eas solas potentias se extendit, ad quas se extendit arbitrii libertas. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod gratia inest animae secundum potentias. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum facile est respondere per iam dicta.
1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod gratia est continua20 in suo actu; non obviat ei quod nunc dictum est. Quamvis enim potentia in relatione ad opus non sit in suo actu continuo, et sic non habeat perfici gratia, sed virtute; in comparatione tamen ad substantiam, in qua est, est in suo actu continuo. Ita enim debetur quoddam vivere et quidam actus continuus ipsis potentiis, secundum quod continuantur ipsi substantiae, quemadmodum et ipsi substantiae; et ideo secundum hanc comparationem a gratia sunt perfectibiles. — Aliter etiam posset hic dici, quod duplex est actus ipsius formae: unus, qui est a forma per modum informantis; et alter, qui est a forma per modum efficientis, sicut albedo subiectum suum dealbat et oculum disgregat21. Quantum ad primum est omnis forma in actu continuo, quia ille est actus ut habitus; quantum vero ad secundum, non.
Sic et gratia, quamvis sit in suo actu continuo quantum ad illum actum, quem habet per modum informantis, non tamen est in actu continuo quantum ad illum, quem habet per modum praevenientis et subsequentis, sive cooperantis et operantis.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de actu vivificandi, dicendum, quod etsi vita, secundum quod dicit esse primum, primo respiciat ipsam essentiam quam potentiam; non tamen oportet de vita, secundum quod dicit esse secundum. Cum enim sit accidens superadditum non tantum essentiae, sed etiam potentiae; habet animae inesse, potentia mediante, sicut color dicitur esse in corpore, ita quod primo in superficie.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidens numeratur per subiectum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando ea quae subiiciuntur, diversa sunt et subiiciuntur ut diversa. Quando vero per eandem naturam subiiciuntur, non oportet, esse in accidente diversitatem; et sic gratia est in potentiis animae, in quantum continuantur ad unam substantiam, et in quantum communicant in libertate arbitrii, sicut prius dictum est. Unde, sicut una sanitas dicitur esse in omnibus membris hominis, quia est in ipsis, secundum quod ad unam originem reducuntur, et secundum quod in complexione conveniunt; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de conformitate imaginis creationis et reformationis, dicendum, quod cum deformatio imaginis non possit esse nisi per potentias, sic nec reformatio; et ideo imago reformationis in quantum huiusmodi sufficienter reformat ipsam animam, cum inest ei per suas potentias. Potentiis enim formatis22 et perfectis, per consequens perficitur et formatur ipsa substantia. Ideo ad perfectam reformationem animae non oportet aliquid poni, quod per prius sit in substantia quam in potentia, nisi hoc dicatur per appropriationem quandam.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non acceptat actum, nisi prius acceptando potentiam; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod potentia potest esse sine actu, et gratia in potentia absque merito operis. Substantia autem absque potentia esse non potest; et si possit intelligi, non tamen potest intelligi absque potentiis divina dona suscipere, in quibus donis decorari dicitur facies animae eo genere decoris, per quem23 Deus acceptat.
6. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur de parvulis, dicendum, quod etsi potentiae in parvulo non sint idoneae ad exeundum in usum gratiae et virtutum; nihilominus tamen idoneae sunt non solum per donum gratiae, sed etiam per habitus virtutum decorari et perfici. Et hoc melius declaratur in quarto24, cum agitur de effectu baptismatis, quem habet in parvulis.
I. Ut iam observavit S. Thom. (1. II. q. 110. a. 4.), solutio huius quaestionis dependet a solutione alterius quaestionis, scil. utrum habitus gratiae sanctificantis sit idem cum habitu caritatis, de quo agitur infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. Qui cum Magistro (hic c. 3.) et Scoto inter caritatem et gratiam istam non ponunt nisi distinctionem rationis, scilicet secundum diversa officia et relationes; hi asserere debent, subiectum immediatum gratiae esse voluntatem. Cum autem S. Thomas gratiam a caritate essentialiter distinctam esse velit, etiam docet, essentiam animae esse immediatum subiectum gratiae sanctificantis, virtutis autem subiectum esse potentiam. — S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. distinguit quidem realiter habitum gratiae ab habitu caritatis, sed paulo aliter ac S. Thomas (vide d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.); unde etiam hoc loco media quadam via incedit ac docet, utrumque habitum inesse animae per potentias, sed gratiam respicere suum subiectum, quatenus potentiae sunt unum in essentia animae; virtutem autem, quatenus potentiae respiciunt actus, qui sunt multiplices. — Cohaeret autem haec solutio aliquatenus cum sententia, quam S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem potentiarum animae ab eius essentia professus est, supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. — Observandum est, quod in verbis primo inesse, vel prius influere, pluries repetitis, non tam respicitur ordo generationis horum habituum, quam quid sit immediatum eorum subiectum. In ordine enim generationis, et loquendo de actu caritatis, hic saltem natura praecedere potest infusionem gratiae tanquam ultima dispositio ad eam, sicut quoad adultos multi discipuli S. Thomae docent.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 4. in solutione obiect. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. 1. II. q. 110. a. 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 4. — Richard. a Med., a. unicus q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Article unique. On the quiddity of grace.
Question V. Whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies.
Fifth, it is asked whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies. And that it is present first in the substance, it seems.
1. No potency of the soul is continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in its act, because it continuously renders a man accepted and pleasing to God: therefore grace is not in the potencies of the soul.
2. Likewise, grace is the life of the soul, as the authorities of the Saints and also the doctors say1; but to live, since it is a substantial act, is not present to the substance through the potencies, but to the potencies through the substance: therefore if the first act of grace is to vivify, it seems that it regards the substance prior to the potencies.
3. Likewise, an accident is numbered by its own proper subject2: therefore if grace is first in the potencies, since the potencies are many, it is necessary that grace be multiplied in the soul. If therefore in one soul there is only one grace, it seems that grace is first in the substance rather than in a potency.
4. Likewise, in grace and the virtues consists the image of reformation3; but the image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation: since therefore the image of creation consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of potencies, and there are three habits of the virtues, which regard the three potencies, it seems that there is some one thing that regards the very essence of the soul; but this is nothing but grace: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, just as operation goes forth from a potency, so a potency arises from the substance: therefore just as no operation is pleasing nor accepted by God unless first the potency is accepted and made pleasing, so it is impossible for a potency to be accepted unless first the substance is accepted: therefore, since acceptance comes about through grace, grace is prior in the substance rather than in a potency4.
6. Likewise, in baptized infants God is present through indwelling grace, as Augustine says in the letter on the presence of God, to Dardanus5: therefore, since in them there is no potency ready [for use], grace does not regard first the readiness of a potency, but rather the vivification of the substance, and thus it is prior in the substance rather than in a potency.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine6 says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»: therefore it resides in the soul by reason of free choice; but free choice names a potency: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, the Master in the text7 adduces an authority of Augustine, in which he divides grace into prevenient and subsequent, and defines each of these by comparison to the will: therefore it seems that the first and proper subject of grace is the will itself. But this is a potency: therefore it seems that grace is present prior in a potency rather than in the substance.
3. Likewise, just as between potency and act there falls a mediating habit, so between substance and habit there falls a mediating potency. Since therefore grace is in the soul as a habit and a certain quality, it seems that it is present to it by the mediation of a potency: therefore it is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.
4. Likewise, «opposites are by nature brought to be about the same thing8»; but grace as grace is opposed to fault inasmuch as it is fault: if therefore fault first and properly regards the freedom of choice, by the same reasoning so too does grace: therefore it will be prior in a potency rather than in the substance.
5. Likewise, grace, since it is a gift descending from above9, is present to the soul according to its highest part; but the highest part of the soul, as Augustine holds, is the mind itself; but the mind is not the substance itself of the soul, but rather the highest potency: therefore it seems that grace is prior in a potency.
6. Likewise, grace has its existence in the soul according to the soul's conversion to God, and is lost according to its aversion. If therefore that according to which the soul is first turned away and turned [back] is a potency: it seems that grace10 is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.
7. Likewise, grace is not in the soul according to itself, but according to an influence from some principle that is altogether diverse from it. Since therefore the soul receives grace, either it has some potency for receiving grace, or it does not. If it does not have a potency for this11: therefore it will never receive it. But if it has a potency by the mediation of which it receives, either that will be reason, or will, or some other potency diverse from these; but there is no positing another potency in the soul besides the cognitive and the affective12: therefore it seems that grace is received by the soul by the mediation of these.
8. Likewise, if grace were present to the soul according to substance, since it is possible to abstract13 the substance from the potencies by the intellect, it would be possible to understand the soul to be pleasing, with its potencies abstracted; but every pleasing soul is disposed to glory: therefore consequently a glorious soul could be understood with the potencies abstracted. But with the potencies abstracted, the soul neither sees nor loves God: therefore it is impossible to posit a glorious soul that neither sees God nor loves God. But if this is impossible: therefore also that from which this follows.
Conclusio
Conclusion. Grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice, and is said to regard the substance because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the common opinion holds that grace first regards the substance of the soul, and the virtues first regard the potencies, so that thus through grace in the virtues there comes about the reformation of the created image, which consists in the trinity of potencies and the unity of substance. But this position can be understood in two ways.
In one way, so that it be understood that God first infuses grace into the essence, and afterward that influence overflows in14 the substance into the potencies, so that thus there is a conformity of grace to the soul, whether it be considered according to the account of the image, or considered as the perfection of the body. For the soul, as it is the perfection of the body, by reason of its substance or essence regards the balance of the complexion15; but by reason of the potencies it regards the diversity of the organs. And again, the soul in itself both has to live and to act; but to live through itself and its own form, to act through a potency. In this way, if grace in perfecting is conformed to the soul16, under the account of grace it ought first to regard the very substance of the soul, and through the virtues there ought to be the perfection of the potencies. And according to this manner of speaking, when grace is said to regard the substance, and the virtues the potencies, this is understood to be said not only by appropriation, but even by propriety.
In another way the aforesaid position can be understood by a certain appropriation, not because God first infuses grace into the substance rather than into a potency, but because, since the soul receives grace and the virtues by the mediation of a potency, and17 both grace and virtue are present to the soul through a potency, yet the one and the other are present in different ways. For virtue expresses perfection with respect to a work, but grace expresses perfection with respect to God who accepts. And since with respect to works the potencies are distinguished, hence it is that the virtues regard the potencies as distinct, and are then in act when the potencies are in act. But the potencies, inasmuch as they are compared to God who accepts, are accepted by a single acceptance together with the very substance whose they are18, and according to one nature found in them. And hence it is that grace is one, just as the substance is, and is always in continuous act; and it is said first to regard the substance, not because it is in it apart from a potency, or prior to being in the potency, but because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence19. But virtue is said to be in the potencies because it is in them as they are referred to diverse operations.
And this manner of understanding is more consonant with the words of Augustine, who says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»; who also describes cooperating and operating grace by comparison to the will. — It is also more consonant with reason. For if we understand grace as a certain habit and influence, which is present to the soul turned to God; since such an enabling and the reception of the influence and the conversion cannot be understood except through a potency, it does not seem that it can rightly be understood how grace is in the soul with the potency abstracted. — Again, if grace is called grace because it makes pleasing, and by the very fact that it makes pleasing it has an opposition to fault; since «opposites are by nature present according to the same thing», according to the same very thing the soul is by nature made pleasing, according to which it is by nature also faulted. But faulting and praise and blame are present to the soul first according to free choice, and through this so too is the gift of grace. For not just any acceptance is called a making-pleasing, but only that by which God so accepts the soul that He reckons it worthy of reward, and such [acceptance] regards the very freedom of choice. And therefore grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice; and a sign of this is that it extends itself to those potencies alone to which the freedom of choice extends itself. — The reasons showing that grace is present to the soul according to the potencies are therefore to be granted. But to the reasons to the contrary it is easy to respond through what has already been said.
1. As for what is objected, that grace is continuous20 in its act; this does not stand against what has now been said. For although a potency in relation to a work is not in its continuous act, and thus is not perfected by grace but by virtue; nevertheless in comparison to the substance in which it is, it is in its continuous act. For thus a certain living and a certain continuous act is owed to the potencies themselves, insofar as they are continued to the substance itself, just as also to the substance itself; and therefore according to this comparison they are perfectible by grace. — It could also be said here in another way, that the act of the form itself is twofold: one, which is from the form by way of informing; and another, which is from the form by way of efficiency, as whiteness whitens its subject and dilates the eye21. As to the first, every form is in continuous act, because that is the act as a habit; but as to the second, not.
So too grace, although it is in its continuous act as to that act which it has by way of informing, is nevertheless not in continuous act as to that which it has by way of prevenient and subsequent, or cooperating and operating.
2. To what is objected concerning the act of vivifying, it must be said that although life, according as it expresses the first being, first regards the essence itself rather than a potency; nevertheless this need not hold of life according as it expresses the second being. For since it is an accident superadded not only to the essence but also to the potency, it is present to the soul by the mediation of a potency, as color is said to be in the body, in such a way that it is first in the surface.
3. To what is objected, that an accident is numbered by its subject; it must be said that this is true when those things that are subjected are diverse and are subjected as diverse. But when they are subjected through the same nature, there need be no diversity in the accident; and thus grace is in the potencies of the soul inasmuch as they are continued into one substance, and inasmuch as they share in the freedom of choice, as was said before. Hence, just as one health is said to be in all the members of a man because it is in them according as they are reduced to one origin, and according as they agree in complexion; so too it is to be understood in the matter at hand.
4. To what is objected concerning the conformity of the image of creation and of reformation, it must be said that since the deformation of the image cannot be except through the potencies, so neither can the reformation; and therefore the image of reformation as such sufficiently reforms the soul itself when it is present to it through its potencies. For when the potencies are formed22 and perfected, consequently the substance itself is also perfected and formed. Therefore for the perfect reformation of the soul there is no need to posit something that is prior in the substance rather than in a potency, unless this be said by a certain appropriation.
5. To what is objected, that God does not accept an act unless first accepting the potency; it must be said that it is not similar, because a potency can be without act, and grace [can be] in a potency without the merit of a work. But the substance cannot be without a potency; and even if it could be understood [so], yet it cannot be understood to receive the divine gifts apart from the potencies, in which gifts the face of the soul is said to be adorned by that kind of adornment by which23 God accepts.
6. To the last [objection] which is raised concerning infants, it must be said that although the potencies in an infant are not fit for going forth into the use of grace and the virtues; nevertheless they are fit to be adorned and perfected not only by the gift of grace, but also by the habits of the virtues. And this is better explained in the fourth [book]24, where the effect of baptism, which it has in infants, is treated.
I. As St. Thomas has already observed (1a-2ae, q. 110, a. 4), the solution of this question depends on the solution of another question, namely whether the habit of sanctifying grace is the same as the habit of charity, which is treated below at d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. Those who with the Master (here c. 3) and with Scotus posit between charity and that grace nothing but a distinction of reason, namely according to diverse offices and relations, must assert that the immediate subject of grace is the will. But since St. Thomas wishes grace to be essentially distinct from charity, he also teaches that the essence of the soul is the immediate subject of sanctifying grace, but the subject of virtue is a potency. — St. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales does indeed really distinguish the habit of grace from the habit of charity, but somewhat otherwise than St. Thomas (see d. 27, a. 1, q. 2); whence here too he proceeds by a certain middle way and teaches that each habit is present to the soul through the potencies, but that grace regards its subject inasmuch as the potencies are one in the essence of the soul; but virtue, inasmuch as the potencies regard acts, which are manifold. — This solution coheres somewhat with the view that St. Bonaventure professed regarding the distinction of the soul's potencies from its essence, above at d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1. — It must be observed that in the words to be present first, or to influence prior, repeated several times, what is regarded is not so much the order of generation of these habits, as what is the immediate subject of them. For in the order of generation, and speaking of the act of charity, this at least can by nature precede the infusion of grace as an ultimate disposition to it, as many disciples of St. Thomas teach regarding adults.
II. Alexander of Hales, S., p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4, in the solution of the objection. — Scotus, in both Scripta, here, the single question. — St. Thomas, here, the single question, a. 3; S. 1a-2ae, q. 110, a. 4; On Truth q. 27, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 3; S., p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, the single question, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, the single article, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, here, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.
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- August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 47. n. 8; XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2; de Natura et gratia, c. 23. n. 2-5. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 633, nota 5, ubi ii notati sunt loci, in quibus per oppositionem ad peccatum Deus dicitur vita animae; nec non Hugo de S. Vict., de Arrha animae. — De minori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. et 37. (c. 2. et 4.).Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 47, n. 8; City of God XIII, c. 2; On Nature and Grace, c. 23, nn. 2–5. Cf. also above p. 633, note 5, where the passages are noted in which, by opposition to sin, God is called the life of the soul; and also Hugh of St. Victor, On the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul. — On the minor premise cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, texts 24 and 37 (c. 2 and 4).
- Vide supra pag. 119, nota 8. — In fine arg. pro in potentia Vat. in potentiis.See above p. 119, note 8. — At the end of the argument, for in potentia the Vatican edition reads in potentiis.
- Sicut dictum est supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.As was said above at d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
- Vat. potentiis.The Vatican edition reads potentiis.
- Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 6. n. 21. — Paulo inferius pro primum codd. F K T V et alii cum primis edd. primum, Vat. primo.Letter 187 (alias 57), c. 6, n. 21. — A little below, for primum codices F K T V and others, with the first editions, read primum, the Vatican edition primo.
- Vide supra pag. 600, nota 6.See above p. 600, note 6.
- Hic c. 2. seqq.Here, c. 2 ff.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Paulo inferius pro arbitrii libertatem Vat. arbitrium liberum.Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7). — A little below, for arbitrii libertatem the Vatican edition reads arbitrium liberum.
- Iac. 1, 17. — Sententia Augustini habetur VI. de Trin. c. 9. n. 10, ubi S. Doctor sic loquitur: Si enim mentem recte dicimus principale hominis, id est tanquam caput humanae substantiae etc. Cfr. etiam ibid. XIV. c. 8. n. 11, ubi mens praedicatur illud «quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius»; et supra pag. 45, nota 3. — In fine arg. cod. aa subiungit quam in substantia.James 1:17. — The opinion of Augustine is found in On the Trinity VI, c. 9, n. 10, where the holy Doctor speaks thus: For if we rightly call the mind the principal part of man, that is, as it were the head of the human substance, etc. Cf. also ibid. XIV, c. 8, n. 11, where the mind is predicated to be that «than which our nature has nothing better»; and above p. 45, note 3. — At the end of the argument codex aa adds quam in substantia ("than in the substance").
- Edd. cum multis codd. perperam anima; ed. nostra sequitur codd. H K O (T a secunda manu) Y aa. Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pluribus codd., inter quos F aa, omittit hoc.The editions, with many codices, wrongly read anima ("the soul"); our edition follows codices H K O (T by a second hand) Y aa. A little before, the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4 and several codices, among which F aa, omits hoc ("this").
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 ad suscipiendum. Paulo superius pro ab ea plurimi codd. cum primis edd. ab eo; non recte.Codex cc and edition 1 read ad suscipiendum. A little above, for ab ea very many codices, with the first editions, read ab eo; not rightly.
- Cfr. supra d. 23. p. I. q. 2. in corp.Cf. above d. 23, p. I, q. 2, in the body.
- Cod. cc cum ed. 1 abstrahere.Codex cc, with edition 1, reads abstrahere.
- Ed. 1 cum cod. cc ex.Edition 1, with codex cc, reads ex.
- Vide supra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3. De secunda ratione cfr. ibid. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 6.See above d. 17, a. 2, q. 3. On the second reason cf. ibid. a. 1, q. 2, fundamentum 6.
- Cod. X hic bene subiicit tunc gratia.Codex X here fittingly subjoins tunc gratia ("then grace").
- Ed. 1 omittit et, quod accipias pro etiam.Edition 1 omits et, which you may take for etiam ("also").
- Cod. aa hic addit sit una, qua lectione admissa, vocula cum paulo superius sumenda est ut coniunctio.Codex aa here adds sit una ("be one"), on which reading, once admitted, the little word cum a little above is to be taken as a conjunction.
- Cod. B. unam potentiam et essentiam, cod. F unam ipsam essentiam, cod. aa unum esse.Codex B reads unam potentiam et essentiam, codex F unam ipsam essentiam, codex aa unum esse.
- Vat. supplet gratia.The Vatican edition supplies gratia.
- Cod. bb continuo, Vat. continue. — Aristot. in diversis locis, ut I. Topic. c. 13; III. c. 1. (c. 5.); VII. c. 2; X. Metaph. text. 23. (IX. c. 7.), definiens colorem album, propter hunc effectum dicit, quod sit «disgregativus visum», et definiens colorem nigrum ait, quod sit «congregativus visum». — Paulo superius pro Aliter etiam cod. H Aliter tamen, cod. aa Aliter autem, et subinde pro posset hic cod. T posset hoc.Codex bb reads continuo, the Vatican edition continue. — Aristotle in diverse places, as Topics I, c. 13; III, c. 1 (c. 5); VII, c. 2; Metaphysics X, text 23 (IX, c. 7), in defining the color white, on account of this effect says that it is «that which dilates the sight», and in defining the color black says that it is «that which contracts the sight». — A little above, for Aliter etiam codex H reads Aliter tamen, codex aa Aliter autem, and thereupon for posset hic codex T reads posset hoc.
- Vat. reformatis. Paulo inferius post prius sit in cod. F addit sua.The Vatican edition reads reformatis. A little below, after prius sit in, codex F adds sua.
- Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 quod.Codices aa, cc and edition 1 read quod.
- Dist. 4. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — Cod. aa verbis non solum praemittit ut, et dein post decorari addit possit.[Book IV,] Distinction 4, part II, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — Codex aa prefixes ut to the words non solum, and then after decorari adds possit. ---