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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio I. Utrum ratio imaginis attendatur in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

Quod autem in omnibus simul sit, videtur.

1. Ad rationem enim imaginis requiritur expressa conformatio in distinctione1; sed distinctio in divinis attenditur quantum ad tres personas: ergo maxime in imagine creata attenditur quantum ad tres potentias.

2. Item, ratio imaginis consistit in perfecta capacitate, quia secundum Augustinum2 « eo est mens imago, quo potest esse capax et particeps Dei »; sed Deus non capitur ab anima plene nisi ametur, neque amatur nisi intelligatur, nec intelligitur nisi praesens ad animam habeatur; sed primum est per voluntatem, secundum per intelligentiam, tertium per memoriam: ergo etc.

3. Item, notitia sive intelligentia appropriatur Filio, voluntas Spiritui sancto: ergo aut truncata et diminuta erit assignatio imaginis, aut necesse3 est ponere potentiam respondentem Patri.

Sed contra:

1. Ad esse imaginis requiritur repraesentatio in distinctione originis et ordinis; sed in istis potentiis non est talis distinctio, quia simul sunt cum anima concreatae, nec una est4 ab alia nec una post aliam: ergo in istis non est reperire rationem imaginis.

2. Item, imago est repraesentatio secundum exteriorem dispositionem, ut patet5; sed istae tres potentiae sunt intimae ipsi animae: ergo in ipsis non est ratio imaginis.

3. Item, quod specialiter memoria non sit de ratione imaginis, videtur, quia imago cum sit animae essentialis et secundum potentiam rationalem sit in ipsa, memoria vero, ut dicit Philosophus6, est sensibilium, quia est in brutis; unde differt a reminiscentia, quia reminiscentia non est in brutis: ergo videtur quod memoria non pertineat ad imaginem. Praeterea, sive7 memoria sit sensibilium sive in-

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telligibilium, concernit differentiam temporis, quia est acceptio praesens de praeteritis; sed imago abstrahit a conditionibus sensibilibus et temporibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, imago attenditur in his quae sunt nata recipere imaginem reformationis sive similitudinis; sed imago illa consistit in tribus virtutibus theologicis, quarum nulla est in memoria: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod voluntas non sit de integritate imaginis, videtur, quia dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima8: « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo est in potentia diligendi »; sed voluntas non pertinet ad potentiam cognitivam: ergo etc.

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae est de imagine, debet aliis aequari, quia ad rationem imaginis requiritur aequalitas; sed voluntas non aequatur aliis, quia multa intelligimus, quae non volumus: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non attenditur aequalitas respectu obiectorum, sed respectu actuum, ut sit sensus: quaecumque9 intelligo, volo me intelligere, adhuc non est verum, quia multorum meminimus, quae nollemus.

Conclusio.

Ratio imaginis attenditur in his tribus potentiis, memoria, intellectu et voluntate, cum comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister recitat10, imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen11 in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quendam disponendi. Nam retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum, si quod intelligitur est bonum12.

1. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud13 quod obiicitur: in istis potentiis non est distinctio per originem: ergo etc.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago attenditur secundum exteriorem dispositionem; dicendum, quod est imago rei corporalis et sensibilis; et haec, quia offert se cognitioni per exteriora, habet imaginem repraesentantem secundum exteriorem dispositionem. Est iterum imago rei spiritualis, quae est intima cuilibet rei, et quae cognoscitur secundum quod virtus recolligitur ad intima; et haec14 habet imaginem repraesentantem quantum ad intimas dispositiones.

3. Ad illud15 quod obiicitur, quod memoria est sensibilium; dicendum, quod memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiectio currit de aliis primis duobus modis. Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondet Patri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria non reformatur; dicendum, quod immo memoria reformatur et quantum ad statum viae et quantum ad statum patriae: in primo per spem; et hoc patet per expositionem Augustini super illud verbum Matthaei vigesimo secundo16: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde, « id est, intellectu sine errore, ex tota anima, id est, voluntate sine contradictione, ex tota mente, id est, memoria sine oblivione ». In secundo statu reformatur quantum ad tentionem; unde Bernardus17 dicit, quod « Deus est futurus intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ». Nec est18 inconveniens, quod memoria, quamvis sit prima, reformetur per dotem ultimam; quia ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori, ordo autem informationis19 incipit a superiori: ideo a voluntate incipit reformatio et tendit usque in memoriam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi; dicendum, quod similitudo dicit quid gratuitum, et ideo dicitur esse per ap-

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propriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione. Imago vero non dicit gratuitum, et20 ideo dicitur esse in potentia cognoscendi.

Vel aliter de imagine: quia in Filio est propria21 imago, et Filio appropriatur intelligentia, quae est in potentia cognitiva; ideo dicitur imago esse in potentia cognoscendi.

6. Ad illud22: Voluntas non aequatur intelligentiae; dicendum, quod voluntas, prout communiter accipitur ad velle et nolle, quorum utrumque est actus voluntatis, bene aequatur, secundum quod dicitur uti esse commune ad utrumque, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera23 quod voluntas capit alia, dum utor etc. Quidquid enim recordamur vel intelligimus, in facultatem voluntatis accipimus ad eligendum vel ad respuendum; et istud est, secundum quod dicit actum communem voluntatis24; sed secundum actum specialem, qui est velle tantum, non aequatur; et de isto opponitur, quia25 sic velle non comprehendit totam voluntatem, sicut meminisse totam memoriam et intelligere totam intelligentiam.

Scholion

I. In responsione duplex est propositio. Prima est ipsa conclusio principalis, quae dicit, quod imago summae Trinitatis consistit in dictis tribus animae potentiis, quatenus includunt et unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum secundorum. Secunda propositio, quae illam explicat et probat, est haec: sicut in divinis personis est et distinctio et ordo et origo, ita etiam in actibus harum potentiarum haec tria inveniuntur. Nam actus earum realiter distinguuntur; porro memoriae actus sive retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum. Unde ex memoria quasi procedit actus intellectus, et ex memoria et intellectu amor.

Triplex illa distinctio memoriae (in solut. ad 3.) invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. et Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.

II. In solut. ad 4. dicitur cum sententia tunc communi, quod memoria reformatur in statu viae per spem, in statu gloriae per tentionem. Rationem, cur spes attribuatur memoriae, S. Doctor exhibet II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., scil. « quia habent conformitatem in actu, qui est tenere ». — Verba ibidem posita: « Ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori » hunc sensum habent: deformatio imaginis per culpam et reformatio per gratiam incipit a voluntate, quae in ordine potentiarum est ultima sive posterior, quia actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, et hic actum memoriae, si memoria sumitur in tertio sensu, immediate antea explicato. In hoc sensu memoria est prior et intimior et per consequens superior. Nam « in anima humana idem est intimum et supremum » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.). In ordine vero formationis sive informationis hae tres potentiae constituunt ipsam vitam spiritualem quasi per modum formae informantis; et sic memoria est prima potentia, et in hoc sensu informatio incipit ab ipsa. Pro explicatione cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. praesertim ad 4. — Ad obiect. 5. duplex datur responsio; de prima cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

III. Quoad rationem imaginis vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et Schol. Alia plura, quae in hac et seqq. qq. occurrunt, exponuntur et probantur ab ipso S. Doctore II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. et 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93. praesertim a. 5. 6. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. et 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. et Report. hic q. 7. — Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. Richard. a Med., hic p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16. — Durand., hic. p. II. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 10.

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English Translation

Question I. Whether the account of the image is found in memory, understanding, and will.

That, however, it is in all [three] together, seems [to be the case].

1. For to the account of the image is required an express conformation in distinction1; but distinction in the divine [persons] is found with regard to the three persons: therefore most of all in the created image it is found with regard to three powers.

2. Likewise, the account of the image consists in perfect capacity, because according to Augustine2: « the mind is the image in this, that it can be capable and partaker of God »; but God is not fully grasped by the soul unless he be loved, nor is he loved unless he be understood, nor is he understood unless he be held as present to the soul; but the first is through the will, the second through the understanding, the third through the memory: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, knowledge or understanding is appropriated to the Son, the will to the Holy Spirit: therefore either the assignment of the image will be truncated and diminished, or it is necessary3 to posit a power answering to the Father.

On the contrary:

1. To the being of the image is required representation in distinction of origin and order; but in these powers there is no such distinction, because they are con-created with the soul together, nor is one4 from another, nor one after another: therefore in these the account of the image is not to be found.

2. Likewise, the image is a representation according to exterior disposition, as is evident5; but these three powers are intimate to the soul itself: therefore in them is not the account of the image.

3. Likewise, that especially memory is not of the account of the image, is seen [from this], because, since the image is essential to the soul and is in it according to the rational power, but memory, as the Philosopher says6, is of sensibles, because it is in brutes; whence it differs from reminiscence, because reminiscence is not in brutes: therefore it seems that memory does not pertain to the image. Further, whether7 memory be of sensibles or of in-

telligibles, it concerns the difference of time, because it is a present apprehension of past things; but the image abstracts from sensible conditions and times: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the image is found in those things which are apt to receive the image of reformation or likeness; but that image consists in the three theological virtues, of which none is in memory: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that the will is not of the integrity of the image, is seen [from this], because it is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul8: « The image is in the power of knowing, the likeness is in the power of loving »; but the will does not pertain to the cognitive power: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every power which belongs to the image ought to be equal to the others, because to the account of the image is required equality; but the will is not equal to the others, because we understand many things which we do not will: therefore etc. If you should say that equality is not regarded with respect to objects, but with respect to acts, so that the sense is: whatever9 I understand, I will to understand myself, still it is not true, because we remember many things which we would not [will].

Conclusion.

The account of the image is found in these three powers, memory, intellect, and will, with comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says and the Master recites10, the image is found in these three powers, yet11 in comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts, in which there is distinction and order and origin of one from another through a certain mode of disposing. For the retention of the species disposes to understanding, and understanding to loving, if that which is understood is good12.

1. And by this is clear the solution to that13 which is objected: in these powers there is no distinction through origin: therefore etc.

2. To that which is objected, that the image is found according to exterior disposition; it must be said that there is an image of a corporeal and sensible thing; and this, because it offers itself to cognition through external things, has an image representing according to exterior disposition. There is again an image of a spiritual thing, which is intimate to every thing, and which is known insofar as the power is gathered back to inner things; and this14 has an image representing with regard to interior dispositions.

3. To that15 which is objected, that memory is of sensibles; it must be said that memory is taken in three ways: in one way as it is receptive and retentive of sensibles and of past things; in another way as it is retentive of past things, whether sensible or intelligible; and in the third way as it is retentive of species, abstracting from every difference of time, as of innate species. And in this third way it is part of the image; but the objection runs concerning the other first two modes. In the first mode memory follows sense, in the second mode it follows understanding itself and will, in the third mode it precedes and answers to the Father.

4. To that which is objected, that memory is not reformed; it must be said that, on the contrary, memory is reformed both with regard to the state of the way and with regard to the state of the fatherland: in the first through hope; and this is evident from Augustine's exposition on that word of Matthew twenty-two16: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, « that is, with the understanding without error, with all thy soul, that is, with the will without contradiction, with all thy mind, that is, with the memory without forgetfulness ». In the second state it is reformed with regard to retention; whence Bernard17 says that « God shall be to the understanding the fullness of light, to the will the multitude of peace, to the memory the continuation of eternity ». Nor is it18 unfitting that memory, although it be first, should be reformed through the last endowment; because the order of reformation and deformation begins from the posterior, but the order of information19 begins from the superior: therefore from the will reformation begins and tends as far as memory.

5. To that which is objected, that the image is in the power of knowing; it must be said that the likeness expresses something gratuitous, and therefore it is said to be by appropriation in the will or in love. The image, however, does not express something gratuitous, and20 therefore it is said to be in the power of knowing.

Or otherwise concerning the image: because in the Son is the proper21 image, and to the Son is appropriated the understanding, which is in the cognitive power; therefore the image is said to be in the power of knowing.

6. To that22: The will is not equal to the understanding; it must be said that the will, as it is commonly taken for to-will and to-not-will, of which each is an act of the will, is well equated, according to which it is said to use to be common to both, as Augustine says, and it is held in the letter [of the Master]23 that the will takes other things, while I make use of them, etc. For whatever we remember or understand, we receive into the faculty of the will for choosing or rejecting; and this is, according to which it expresses the common act of the will24; but according to the special act, which is to-will alone, it is not equal; and concerning this the objection is raised, because25 thus to-will does not comprise the whole will, as to-remember [comprises] the whole memory, and to-understand the whole understanding.

Scholion

I. In the response there are two propositions. The first is the principal conclusion itself, which says that the image of the supreme Trinity consists in the said three powers of the soul, insofar as they include both the unity of essence and the plurality of second acts. The second proposition, which explains and proves the first, is this: as in the divine persons there is both distinction and order and origin, so also in the acts of these powers these three are found. For their acts are really distinguished; further, the act of memory or the retention of the species disposes to understanding, and understanding to loving. Whence from memory there proceeds, as it were, the act of the intellect, and from memory and intellect love.

That threefold distinction of memory (in solut. ad 3.) is also found in Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. and Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 1.

II. In solut. ad 4. it is said, with the then-common opinion, that memory is reformed in the state of the way through hope, in the state of glory through retention. The reason why hope is attributed to memory the holy Doctor exhibits in II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., namely « because they have a conformity in act, which is to hold ». — The words placed there: « The order of reformation and deformation begins from the posterior » have this sense: the deformation of the image through fault and the reformation through grace begins from the will, which in the order of the powers is the last or posterior, because the act of the will presupposes the act of the intellect, and this the act of memory, if memory is taken in the third sense just explained. In this sense memory is prior and more interior and consequently superior. For « in the human soul the inmost is the same as the supreme » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.). But in the order of formation or information these three powers constitute the spiritual life itself as it were through the mode of an informing form; and thus memory is the first power, and in this sense information begins from it. For explanation cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. especially ad 4. — To objection 5. a twofold response is given; concerning the first cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

III. As to the account of the image, see below d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. and Schol. Many other matters that occur in this and the following questions are expounded and proved by the holy Doctor himself in II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. and 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93. especially a. 5. 6. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. and 7. — Scotus, here q. 9. and Report. here q. 7. — Albert, here a. 19; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 1. Richard of Mediavilla, here p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16. — Durandus, here. p. II. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 10.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De veritate plura vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I.
    Concerning truth see further below d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I.
  2. Vat. omittit: cuius divisio posita est supra, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. I; et paulo infra post tribus ponit scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.
    The Vatican edition omits: cuius divisio posita est supra ("whose division is set forth above"), which however is extant in the manuscripts and ed. 1; and a little below, after tribus, it adds scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate ("namely memory, understanding, and will").
  3. Vat., obnitentibus mss., necessario. — De variis imaginis definitionibus, in quibus hoc argumentum et plura sequentia fundantur, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. I. et 2., ac ibid. dub. 2. et 3.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, [reads] necessario. — On the various definitions of the image, on which this argument and many following are founded, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. I. and 2., and ibid. dub. 2. and 3.
  4. Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Vide supra d. III. in lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa initium. — Paulo infra post praesens ope mss. posuimus ad loco apud.
    Book XIV On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 11. See above d. III. in the letter of the Master, c. 2, near the beginning. — A little below, after praesens, with the help of the manuscripts we have placed ad in place of apud.
  5. Plures codd. ut ABIPQTX etc. hic repetunt est.
    Several codices such as ABIPQTX etc. here repeat est.
  6. Codd. IXY « in imagine hominis picti patet ». Immediate post cod. I igitur si loco sed.
    Codices IXY [read] « in imagine hominis picti patet » ("it is evident in the image of a painted man"). Immediately after, codex I [reads] igitur si in place of sed.
  7. Libr. de Memoria et Reminisc. c. 1. et 2. (in aliis edd. c. 2. et 4.). — Paulo infra post brutis Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit unde differt usque ad brutis, ac mox habet pertinet loco pertineat. Paulo ante codd. N Z connaturalis pro essentialis.
    Book On Memory and Reminiscence c. 1 and 2 (in other editions c. 2 and 4). — A little below, after brutis, the Vatican edition, without any authority of manuscripts and ed. 1, omits unde differt down to brutis, and shortly has pertinet in place of pertineat. A little before, codices N Z [read] connaturalis for essentialis.
  8. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 cum loco sive et in fine argumenti temporalibus pro temporibus.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] cum in place of sive, and at the end of the argument temporalibus for temporibus.
  9. Cap. 39: Anima rationalis et intellectus facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat. Ex imagine namque Dei habet rationem et ex similitudine caritatem.
    Chapter 39: "The rational soul and intellect was made to the image and likeness of God, that it might know its Maker through the image and love him through the likeness. For from the image of God it has reason, and from the likeness, charity."
  10. Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut ACFGHIKT etc. et ed. 1 quidquid.
    The Vatican edition, against most codices such as ACFGHIKT etc. and ed. 1, [reads] quidquid.
  11. Hic c. 2. — Paulo post Vat. cum loco tamen in, sed minus signanter et contra mss. et ed. 1.
    Here c. 2. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition [reads] cum in place of tamen in, but less pointedly and against the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  12. Corruptam lectionem Vat. amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum emendavimus ope mss. et ed. I.
    The corrupt reading of the Vatican edition amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  13. Plures codd. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 aliud loco illud.
    Several codices such as A T etc. and ed. 1 [read] aliud in place of illud.
  14. Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 haec. Paulo ante post virtus in cod. A additur intelligibiliter.
    We restore from the manuscripts and ed. 1 haec. A little before, after virtus, in codex A is added intelligibiliter.
  15. Ope antiquorum mss. et ed. I expunximus a Vat. additum ergo. Paulo infra post sensibilium cod. O omittit et, moxque cod. M loco retentiva ponit receptiva.
    With the aid of the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1 we have expunged ergo added by the Vatican edition. A little below, after sensibilium, codex O omits et, and shortly codex M puts receptiva in place of retentiva.
  16. Vers. 37. Expositionem huius loci, non solum a S. Bonaventura, sed etiam a S. Thoma (III. Sent. d. 27. expos. textus) Augustino adscriptam, non potuimus invenire in ipsius operibus. S. Thomas in Catena aurea (Matth. 22, 37.) eam attribuit Glossae interlineari, in qua sic legitur: Ex toto corde, id est intellectu, ut nullam in confessione divinitatis relinquas errori locum; in tota anima, id est voluntate, ut nihil ei contrarium velis, in tota mente, nihil reminiscens quo minus de eo sentias. — Tam in libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 35, quam in libr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2, qui inter opera S. Augustini recensebantur, simpliciter dicitur: Id est ex toto intellectu tuo et ex tota voluntate tua et ex tota memoria tua.
    Verse 37. The exposition of this passage, ascribed to Augustine not only by St. Bonaventure but also by St. Thomas (III. Sent. d. 27. expos. textus), we have been unable to find in his [Augustine's] works. St. Thomas in the Catena aurea (Matth. 22, 37) attributes it to the interlinear Gloss, in which is read thus: With all thy heart, that is, with the intellect, that you leave no place for error in confessing the divinity; with all thy soul, that is, with the will, that you wish nothing contrary to it; with all thy mind, remembering nothing whereby you might think less of him. — Both in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 35, and in the book On Loving God, c. 2, which used to be counted among the works of St. Augustine, it is simply said: That is, with all your intellect and with all your will and with all your memory.
  17. In Cant. Cant. Serm. II. n. 5. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. I quia loco quod.
    On the Song of Songs, Sermon II, n. 5. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] quia in place of quod.
  18. Ope mss. et ed. 1 delevimus etiam. Paulo post cod. T prior loco prima.
    With the aid of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have deleted etiam. Shortly after, codex T [reads] prior in place of prima.
  19. Vat. formationis, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. I, qui etiam paulo post omittunt reformatio, quod tamen claritatis gratia non expunximus. Vide plura infra in Scholio ad hanc quaestionem.
    The Vatican edition [reads] formationis, but the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against it, which also shortly after omit reformatio, which however for the sake of clarity we have not expunged. See more below in the Scholion on this question.
  20. Fide mss. restituimus particulam et.
    On the testimony of the manuscripts we have restored the particle et.
  21. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 prima. Cod. R quia enim in Filio proprie est imago. Mox codd. P Q cognitiva loco cognoscendi.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] prima. Codex R [reads] quia enim in Filio proprie est imago ("because indeed in the Son there is properly the image"). Shortly after, codices P Q [read] cognitiva in place of cognoscendi.
  22. Plures codd. ut X V hic addunt quod, alii ut B I aa bb quod obiicitur quod.
    Several codices such as X V here add quod, others such as B I aa bb [read] quod obiicitur quod.
  23. Hic c. 2, circa medium, iuxta quem textum et ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus hoc loco illam in alia, scilicet intelligentiam et memoriam. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt particulam enim.
    Here c. 2, near the middle, according to which text and with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have changed in this place illam to alia, namely intelligentiam et memoriam. — Shortly after, many codices together with ed. 1 omit the particle enim.
  24. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cfr. above d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
  25. Ita mss. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco quia minus bene habeant quod, sed Vat: De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic.
    Thus the manuscripts together with ed. 1, although some in place of quia less correctly have quod, but the Vatican edition: De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic ("Concerning this there is an opposition, how thus").
← Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2→