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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio IV. Utrum trinitas personarum cum unitate essentiae naturaliter per creaturas cognosci possit.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturas. Et dicit Apostolus1, quod sempiterna virtus et divinitas. Et quaeritur, utrum per creaturas possit cognosci personarum pluralitas. Et videtur quod sic.

1. Quia philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per creaturas, et cognoverunt Trinitatem: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum de Civitate Dei2: « Philosophi tripartitam dicunt esse philosophiam », in qua est cognitio Trinitatis.

2. Item, magi defecerunt in tertio signo, Exodi octavo3; et exponitur, quod defecerunt in cognitione tertiae personae; aut ergo quantum ad propria aut quantum ad appropriata. Non quantum ad ap-

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propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura: ergo quantum ad propria: ergo saltem duas personas cognoverunt.

3. Item, hoc idem4 videtur per rationem: quia vestigium, cum dicat distinctionem, est ratio cognoscendi Deum distinctive sive in distinctione; sed non est in Deo nisi distinctio personarum: ergo per vestigium potuerunt cognoscere distinctionem personarum.

4. Item, per imaginem est cognitio Trinitatis quantum ad ordinem, distinctionem et aequalitatem; sed cognitio per imaginem est cognitio per creaturam: ergo per creaturam potuerunt cognoscere Trinitatem.

5. Item, difficilior est cognitio proprietatum occultarum creaturae quam cognitio pluralitatis personarum, quia illa non capitur nisi a magnis et subtilibus, haec autem capitur etiam5 a rudibus et insipientibus: ergo si potuerunt per proprietates creaturarum visibiles pervenire ad invisibiles, multo fortius ad cognoscendum, personas esse plures. Et hoc est quod dicitur Sapientiae decimo tertio6: Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent saeculum aestimare, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt?

Contra:

1. Cognitio Trinitatis est cognitio fidei; sed cognitio fidei est7 de his quae sunt supra rationem; et quae sunt supra rationem non possunt cognosci per creaturas: ergo etc.

2. Item, non est nisi duobus modis8 de Deo cognoscere per creaturam, aut affirmando quod est in creatura vel simile, aut removendo; sed Trinitas non cognoscitur per remotionem, sed per positionem; sed in nulla creatura invenitur pluralitas suppositorum cum unitate essentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, lex scripta est super9 legem naturae, sive liber sacrae Scripturae super librum mundanae creaturae; sed nullus fide carens per sacram Scripturam venit in cognitionem pluralitatis personarum: ergo multo minus per librum mundanae creaturae.

Conclusio.

Trinitas personarum non est cognoscibilis per creaturas, sed tantum trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitas, veritas, bonitas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum cum unitate essentiae est proprium divinae naturae solius, cuius simile nec reperitur in creatura nec potest reperiri nec rationabiliter cogitari: ideo nullo modo trinitas personarum est cognoscibilis per creaturam, rationabiliter ascendendo a creatura in10 Deum. Sed licet non habeat omnino simile, habet tamen aliquo modo quod creditur simile in creatura. Unde dico, quod philosophi nunquam per rationem cognoverunt personarum trinitatem nec etiam11 pluralitatem, nisi haberent aliquem habitum fidei, sicut habent aliqui haeretici; unde quae dixerunt, aut locuti sunt non intelligentes, aut fidei radio illustrati.

Est alia trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis12, et hanc cognoverunt, quia habet simile.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod per tripartitam philosophiam cognoverunt philosophi Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod per illud et per alia venerunt in13 cognitionem appropriatorum, credentes vero in cognitionem utriusque trinitatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio signo, dicitur et bene, quia sapientes ideo dicuntur defecisse in tertio signo, quia defecerunt in cognitione effectus potissimi14 bonitatis, scilicet redemptionis.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod vestigium dicit distinctionem proprietatum essentialium, et huic respondet trinitas appropriatorum, non propriorum sive personarum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imagine, dicendum, quod est cognoscere animam secundum id quod est; et cognitio ista est rationis; vel secundum15 quod imago; et cognitio ista est solius fidei.

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5. Ad illud quod ultimo16 obiicitur, quod difficilius est cognoscere mundum; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur, supposito divino adminiculo; simpliciter autem loquendo falsum est. Citius enim disponeretur homo ad fidem, quam acquireret17 cognitionem philosophiae. Intellectus tamen noster plus potest in cognitionem rerum mundanarum quam Trinitatis; quia illa est supra rationem, et contrarium eius videt in sensu; et ideo indiget nova elevatione, utpote cognitione per infusionem.

Scholion

I. Quoad propositionem in corp., quae attribuit haereticis aliquem habitum fidei, sciendum, quod duplex distinguitur habitus fidei, scil. infusus et acquisitus, et hic est ordinis naturalis. Acquisitum habitum vel ipsi haeretici formales habere possunt.

Recte dicitur in solut. ad 4, quod cognitio imaginis sit solius fidei. Imago enim, in quantum imago, dicit respectum ad id cuius est imago. Nullus autem respectus potest cognosci nisi cognito utroque extremo. Licet igitur cognoscatur fundamentum relationis in anima, i. e. imago materialiter intellecta, tamen non cognoscitur formaliter ut imago, quamdiu alter terminus relationis non cognoscitur, nempe tres personae divinae.

II. S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. I. c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Quodlib. q. 14. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 32. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 43. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether the trinity of persons together with the unity of essence can be known naturally through creatures.

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, what of God is knowable through creatures. And the Apostle says1 that his eternal power also and divinity [are knowable]. And it is asked whether through creatures the plurality of the persons can be known. And it seems that yes.

1. Because the philosophers had no knowledge of God except through creatures, and they knew the Trinity: therefore etc. The minor is clear through Augustine, On the City of God2: "The philosophers say that philosophy is threefold," in which there is knowledge of the Trinity.

2. Likewise, the magicians failed at the third sign, Exodus eight3; and it is expounded that they failed in the knowledge of the third person; either therefore as regards what is proper [to each person] or as regards what is appropriated. Not as regards what is appropriated, because goodness shines forth in creatures most of all for us: therefore as regards what is proper: therefore they knew at least two persons.

3. Likewise, this same point4 seems to follow by reason: because a vestige, since it bespeaks distinction, is a ground for knowing God distinctively or in distinction; but there is no distinction in God except the distinction of persons: therefore through the vestige they were able to know the distinction of the persons.

4. Likewise, through the image there is knowledge of the Trinity as regards order, distinction, and equality; but knowledge through the image is knowledge through a creature: therefore through a creature they were able to know the Trinity.

5. Likewise, more difficult is the knowledge of the hidden properties of a creature than the knowledge of the plurality of the persons, because that [hidden-property knowledge] is grasped only by the great and subtle, but this [plurality of persons] is grasped even5 by the rude and the unwise: therefore if [the philosophers] were able through the visible properties of creatures to arrive at the invisible properties, much more strongly [were they able to arrive] at knowing that the persons are several. And this is what is said in Wisdom thirteen6: For if they were able to know so much that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?

On the contrary:

1. Knowledge of the Trinity is knowledge of faith; but the knowledge of faith is7 of those things which are above reason; and those things which are above reason cannot be known through creatures: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there are only two ways8 of knowing of God through a creature, either by affirming what is in the creature or [what is] similar, or by removing; but the Trinity is not known by removal, but by position; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits with unity of essence: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the written law is above9 the law of nature, or the book of sacred Scripture above the book of mundane creation; but no one lacking faith comes through sacred Scripture into knowledge of the plurality of the persons: therefore much less through the book of mundane creation.

Conclusion.

The trinity of persons is not knowable through creatures, but only the trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely unity, truth, goodness.

I respond: It must be said that the plurality of persons with unity of essence is proper to the divine nature alone, whose like neither is found in any creature nor can be found nor can be rationally thought: therefore in no way is the trinity of persons knowable through a creature, by ascending rationally from creature to10 God. But although [the divine nature] has no full likeness, nevertheless it has in some way what is believed to be a likeness in a creature. Hence I say that the philosophers never by reason knew the trinity of persons nor even11 the plurality, unless they had some habit of faith, just as certain heretics have; whence those things which they said, either they spoke not understanding, or [they spoke] illumined by a ray of faith.

There is another trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely of unity, truth, and goodness12, and this they knew, because it has a likeness.

To the arguments:

1. To that therefore which is objected, that through threefold philosophy the philosophers knew the Trinity; it must be said that it is true that through that and through other things they came into13 knowledge of the appropriated [attributes], but believers [came] into knowledge of both trinities.

2. To that which is objected concerning the third sign, it is said, and well, that the wise are said to have failed at the third sign because they failed in the knowledge of the chief14 effect of goodness, namely redemption.

3. To the other [it must be said] that the vestige bespeaks the distinction of essential properties, and to this corresponds the trinity of appropriated [attributes], not of properties proper [to the persons] or of the persons themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the image, it must be said that it is one thing to know the soul according to that which it is; and this knowledge is of reason; or according to15 [the soul's character] as image; and this knowledge is of faith alone.

5. To that which is objected last16, that it is more difficult to know the world; it must be said that this is understood on the supposition of divine assistance; but speaking simply, it is false. For a man would be sooner disposed to faith than he would acquire17 the knowledge of philosophy. Yet our intellect can do more toward the knowledge of mundane things than toward [the knowledge] of the Trinity; because the latter is above reason, and its contrary one sees in sense; and therefore it requires a new elevation, namely [a knowledge] by infusion.

Scholion

I. With respect to the proposition in the body [of the article] which attributes to heretics some habit of faith, it is to be known that a twofold habit of faith is distinguished, namely infused and acquired, and this [latter] is of the natural order. The acquired habit the formal heretics themselves can have.

It is rightly said in the solution to the fourth [argument] that the knowledge of the image is of faith alone. For the image, insofar as image, bespeaks a relation to that of which it is the image. But no relation can be known unless both extremes are known. Although therefore the foundation of the relation in the soul, i.e. the image materially understood, is known, nevertheless it is not known formally as image, so long as the other term of the relation is not known, namely the three divine persons.

II. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium p. I. c. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scotus, Quodlibet q. 14. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 4; Summa I. q. 32. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 18; Summa p. I. tr. 3. q. 43. m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Rom. 1, 20.
    Romans 1:20.
  2. Libr. XI. c. 25: Hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt. — Ex cod. U adiungimus glossema dicta Augustini exponens: cui haec sunt adscribenda, nisi creatori omnium creaturarum, datori intelligentiae, amorum inspiratori (ex August. loc. cit.)? Unde vult dicere, quod naturalis philosophia est de his quae pertinent ad conditionem naturae; rationalis de his quae pertinent ad rationem et intelligentiam; moralis de his quae pertinent ad amorem. Ideo naturalis adscribitur auctori Patri, rationalis sapientiae Filio, moralis amori seu bonitati Spiritus sancti.
    Book XI, c. 25: "Hence the philosophers wished the discipline of wisdom to be threefold." — From codex U we add a gloss expounding what Augustine says: "to whom are these to be ascribed, if not to the creator of all creatures, the giver of intelligence, the inspirer of loves" (from Augustine, loc. cit.)? Whence he means to say that natural philosophy is concerned with what pertains to the condition of nature; rational [philosophy] with what pertains to reason and intelligence; moral [philosophy] with what pertains to love. Therefore natural philosophy is ascribed to the Father as author, rational [philosophy] to the Son as wisdom, moral [philosophy] to the love or goodness of the Holy Spirit.
  3. Vers. 18. Expositionem huius loci vide apud Lyranum et Magistrum, hic in fine c. 2.
    Verse 18. For the exposition of this passage see Lyra and the Master [Lombard], here at the end of c. 2.
  4. Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit idem, pro quo cod. Z habet ipsum.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits idem, for which codex Z has ipsum.
  5. Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus etiam, quod Vat. minus bene omittit. Mox cod. R post si adiungit philosophi, ac plurimi codd. ut A F G H I K S T Y etc. post creaturarum addunt rerum, in qua lectione creaturarum falso positum est loco creatarum.
    With the support of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added etiam, which the Vatican edition less well omits. Soon after, codex R after si adds philosophi, and many codices such as A F G H I K S T Y etc. after creaturarum add rerum, in which reading creaturarum is falsely placed in place of creatarum.
  6. Vers. 9, ubi Vat. post scire ponit quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo.
    Verse 9, where the Vatican edition after scire puts quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo.
  7. Ed. 1 hic repetit cognitio. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 1. §. 2.
    Ed. 1 here repeats cognitio. — On this argument cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 1, §2.
  8. Cod. K satis bene adiungit aliquid, cod. X Verum ponit loco de Deo. Mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H I L O S T U X etc. vel simile vel removendo, pro quo Vat. aut simile aut removendo; sequimur codd. quoad primam partem ponendo vel simile, et Vat. quoad secundam retinendo aut removendo, quia in hac lectione membra divisionis et subdivisionis clarius exhibentur. Cod. Y omittit vel et ed. 1 loco vel ponit ut ante simile. — De hoc argumento vide Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 2.
    Codex K rather well adds aliquid, codex X puts Verum in place of de Deo. Soon after, many codices such as A C F G H I L O S T U X etc. [read] vel simile vel removendo, for which the Vatican edition has aut simile aut removendo; we follow the codices as to the first part by putting vel simile, and the Vatican edition as to the second by retaining aut removendo, because in this reading the members of the division and subdivision are more clearly exhibited. Codex Y omits vel and ed. 1 puts ut before simile in place of vel. — On this argument see Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 2.
  9. Plures codd. ut B S bb et ed. 1 hic et paulo post supra.
    Several codices such as B S bb and ed. 1, here and a little later, [read] supra.
  10. Ed. 1 ad. Cod. R paulo post loco quod habet et ac cod. T cernitur pro creditur.
    Ed. 1 [reads] ad. Codex R a little later in place of quod has et, and codex T [has] cernitur in place of creditur.
  11. Desideratur in Vat. etiam, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo post Vat. unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 in eo conveniunt, quod omittant hanc Trinitatem, dissentiunt tamen inter se, quod alii cum Vat. habeant qui dixerunt, cod. I qui hoc dixerunt, alii ut O T etc. quae dixerunt, quos sequimur; ed. 1 tandem legit qui aliquid inde dixerunt.
    In the Vatican edition etiam is missing, which however is found in the manuscripts and ed. 1. A little later the Vatican edition has unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut; all the codices with ed. 1 agree in this, that they omit hanc Trinitatem, but disagree among themselves, in that some with the Vatican edition have qui dixerunt, codex I qui hoc dixerunt, others such as O T etc. quae dixerunt, whom we follow; ed. 1 finally reads qui aliquid inde dixerunt.
  12. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte veritas, unitas et bonitas et paulo post habent.
    The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, less aptly [reads] veritas, unitas et bonitas, and a little later habent.
  13. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ad.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] ad.
  14. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene potissimae. Mox cod. O ante redemptionis praemittit incarnationis et.
    The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 opposing, less well [reads] potissimae [agreeing with bonitatis rather than potissimi with effectus]. Soon after, codex O before redemptionis prefixes incarnationis et.
  15. Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene addit id.
    The Vatican edition, against many codices, less well adds id.
  16. Ope mss. substituimus ultimo pro ulterius et immediate post adiunximus quod.
    With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted ultimo for ulterius and immediately after we have added quod.
  17. Cod. Y quam ad acquirendam; lectio haud spernenda.
    Codex Y [reads] quam ad acquirendam; a reading by no means to be despised.
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