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Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam in affectiva.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam in motiva sive affectiva. Et quod principalius sit in cognitiva, videtur:

Fundamenta. 1. Per illud quod dicit Augustinus1: « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi »; sed hoc non est dictum, quod omnino sit in potentia cognoscendi: ergo dictum est, quia principalius est ibi.

2. Item, imago primo et principaliter convenit ipsi Verbo aeterno2: ergo ei principaliter magis convenit quod illi Verbo aeterno respondet; hoc autem est ipsa intelligentia, quae est in ipsa potentia cognitiva: ergo etc.

3. Item, imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate: sed duae istarum potentiarum, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, tenent se ex parte cognitivae: ergo et imago plus se tenet ex parte cognitivae quam affectivae.

4. Item, imago dicit quandam configurationem et distinctionem3; sed affectivae est unire, et cognitivae distinguere: ergo imago principalius residet penes cognitivam quam penes affectivam.

Ad oppositum. 1. Imago reformationis respondet imagini creationis; sed imago reformationis, quae quidem est gratia, principalius est in affectiva quam in cognitiva4: ergo et imago creationis.

2. Item, in eo principaliter consistit res, in quo consistit eius complementum; sed imago completur in voluntate, et voluntas se tenet ex parte affectivae: ergo etc.

3. Item, imago est nobilissimum in anima, ergo consistit penes id quod est in anima nobilissimum; sed liberum arbitrium sive voluntas est nobilissimum, quod sit in anima5: ergo principaliter consistit imago penes arbitrii libertatem sive voluntatem; hoc autem principaliter respicit affectivam: ergo etc.

4. Item, similitudo est in plus, quam sit imago; non enim quaelibet similitudo est imago, sed similitudo expressa in quadam configuratione et imitatione: ergo ubicumque est imago, est et similitudo: ergo ubi principaliter est imago, principaliter est et similitudo. Sed similitudo non est principaliter penes cognitionem, sed penes affectionem, cum similitudo sit in gratuitis, quae maxime respiciunt potentiam affectivam: ergo pari ratione imago.

Quaestio incidens 1. Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae sit differentia inter imaginem et similitudinem. Cum enim in plus sit similitudo quam imago, sicut ostendit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum6, et superius non debeat connumerari suo inferiori, videtur, quod male dicitur homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem.

Quaestio incidens 2. Item, cum duae sint potentiae ex parte affectionis, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis7, sicut duae ex parte cognitionis, scilicet memoria et intelligentia; quaestio est, quare in ratione imaginis potius accipiuntur duae potentiae ex parte cognitivae, et una ex parte affectivae. Videtur enim, quod potius deberet esse e converso, cum tres virtutes theologicae, quae reformant imaginem animae, sic in ea ponantur, ut duae sint ex parte affectivae, scilicet spes et caritas, quarum una est in irascibili et altera in concupiscibili, et una ex parte cognitivae, scilicet fides, quae communiter ponitur in rationali8.

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Conclusio.

Imago principalius respicit cognitivam quam affectivam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de prima nominis impositione differt imago et similitudo. Imago enim nominat conformitatem in quantitate, similitudo vero convenientiam in qualitate. Imago enim nominat quandam configurationem, et ita importat figuram, quae est quantitas in qualitate, vel qualitas in quantitate; similitudo vero dicitur rerum differentium eadem qualitas9.

Triplex modus distinguendi eas in specie.

Primus. Ex hac autem primaria differentia triplex consuevit assignari modus distinguendi inter imaginem et similitudinem, cum dicitur10: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem. — Primus est, quem dicit Hugo, quod « similitudo respicit naturam, et imago respicit figuram »; quia similitudo dicit convenientiam in qualitate naturali, imago vero convenientiam in distinctione figurali, ad modum cuiusdam trianguli, in quo sunt tres termini et tres lineae; quia tres sunt potentiae, quarum quaelibet habitudinem habet ad quamlibet, et similiter tres personae; et potentia vel persona tenet rationem termini; habitudo vero vel emanatio tenet rationem lineae.

Secundus. Secundus modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in naturalibus, et similitudo in gratuitis, qui similiter habet ortum ex illa prima differentia. Quia enim imago dicit configurationem; et illa attenditur ex parte naturalium potentiarum animae, scilicet memoriae, intelligentiae et voluntatis: hinc est, quod imago est in naturalibus. Quia vero similitudo dicit convenientiam, quae ortum habet a qualitate; et qualitas, in qua anima similatur Deo, haec est gratia: ideo similitudo dicitur in gratuitis esse.

Tertius. Tertius modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi: et iste modus similiter habet ortum ex differentia prima. Quia enim imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem; et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione: et haec origo et habitudo principaliter Conclusio 1. residet ex parte cognitivae: ideo imago principalius ponitur in cognitiva. Similitudo vero dicit convenientiam in qualitate; et quia qualitas, in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive Conclusio 2. in affectione: hinc est, quod similitudo ponitur principaliter in potentia affectiva.

Ad 2. quaestionem incidentem. Et inde est, quod in imagine creationis duae sunt potentiae ex parte cognitivae, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, et una ex parte affectivae, scilicet voluntas. Econtra vero in imagine recreationis, quae quidem consistit in gratia, duae virtutes sunt ex parte affectivae, scilicet spes et caritas, et una ex parte cognitivae, scilicet fides. Imago enim principaliter respicit originem et habitudinem; habitudo autem et origo attenditur inter memoriam et intelligentiam per modum parentis et prolis, et inter haec duo et voluntatem secundum modum derivationis sive processionis11. Inter irascibilem vero et concupiscibilem nec est talis ordo nec origo, cum motus irascibilis possit esse sine concupiscibili, et e converso; motus autem voluntatis non potest esse sine motu intelligentiae praevio, nec actus similiter intelligentiae sine actu memoriae, in his dico, quae sunt de ratione imaginis. Ideo in assignatione imaginis duo sumuntur membra ex parte cognitivae, et unum ex parte affectivae. Hoc enim exigit ordo et origo et distinctio, et propterea imago principalius est in cognitiva quam in affectiva. — Similitudo vero principalius consistit in unione animae ad Deum, quae quidem est per gratiam. Et quoniam unio et gratia principaliter respiciunt affectivam; hinc est, quod in imagine recreationis, quae quidem est in gratuitis, duae sunt virtutes, quae respiciunt affectivam, scilicet spes et caritas, penes duas vires, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem; una vero, quae respicit cognitivam, scilicet fides, quae respicit rationalem, quamvis et spes, reformans irascibilem, per consequens reformet memoriam, cum conveniant in actu, qui est tenere12.

Secundum hoc igitur planum est respondere ad quaestionem et ad obiecta. Concedendum enim est de plano, quod imago principaliter respicit cognitivam; concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc probant.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de imagine reformationis: dicendum, quod non valet, quia imago reformationis potius est similitudo quaedam, quam sit imago. Si enim proprie esset imago, esset capax Dei et esset immortalis13; nunc autem non est sic. Et ideo, quia imago recreationis potius est similitudo quam imago, magis principaliter respicit potentiam affectivam quam cognitivam, quamvis reformet tam cognitivam quam affectivam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod complementum imaginis14 est in voluntate; dicendum, quod etsi voluntas ultima sit in imagine, non tamen se habet

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per modum complementi in ratione imaginis. Imago enim dicit ordinem et originem in potentiis, sicut est in personis; et quemadmodum tertia persona non ponitur aliarum completiva nec alias complere, sed potius ab eis recipere; sic voluntas, prout est pars imaginis, potius consideratur in ratione egredientis quam in ratione complentis. Et quia prima ratio originis est per modum naturae, quae quidem consistit in ortu intelligentiae ex memoria; hinc est, quod imago principalius respicit cognitivam quam affectivam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago consistit penes nobilissimum in anima; dicendum, quod nobilius15 in anima dupliciter potest accipi: vel secundum distinctionem potentiarum, scilicet affectivae et cognitivae, vel secundum conditionem statuum, scilicet superioris portionis et inferioris. Cum ergo dicitur, quod imago consistat penes nobilissimum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad statum in superiori parte, non quantum ad potentias, quia imago complectitur tam affectivam quam cognitivam, cum utraque nata sit immediate ferri in Deum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est in plus quam imago; dicendum, quod similitudo, si accipiatur in sua generalitate, in plus est; Notandum. si vero accipiatur proprie, sicut accipitur in proposito, non est in plus, immo distinguitur ab imagine, ita quod, etsi utraque16 tam affectivam quam cognitivam respiciat, imago tamen principalius respicit cognitivam, et similitudo affectivam; et ratio iam dicta est. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa duo, quae quaerebantur.

Scholion

I. In hac quaestione speciali praesupponitur distinctio inter imaginem creationis, quae pertinet ad ordinem naturae et proprie dicitur imago, et imaginem recreationis (reformationis), quae est ordinis supernaturalis et communiter vocatur similitudo in sensu proprio. Licet enim similitudo per se aliquid communius significet quam imago, atque in ipsa ratione imaginis includatur; tamen in sensu speciali et proprio adhibetur ad quandam altiorem imaginis perfectionem significandam, quae animae per gratiam sanctificantem tribuitur (hic ad 4, et cfr. S. Thom., locis citt.). — De triplici gradu expressionis per modum vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis S. Doctor egregie loquitur Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; de similitudine aequiparantiae et imitationis supra d. 3. a. I. q. 2; de similitudine secundum proprietatem generis et extra genus I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2; de similitudine proportionis et proportionalitatis IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. dub. 3.

II. Alii auctores hoc loco plerumque tantum quaerunt, quomodo differant imago et similitudo, praeter Alexandrum Hal. et Aegid. R., qui etiam de hac speciali quaestione tractant.

Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. a. 4. et § I. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 93. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. et q. I. a. 3. — Alios auctores vide in scholio ad a. 1. q. 1.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the motive or affective. And that it is more principally in the cognitive, it seems:

Foundations. 1. From what Augustine says1: "Image is in the power of knowing, and likeness in the power of loving"; but this is not said because it is wholly in the power of knowing: therefore it is said because it is more principally there.

2. Likewise, image befits primarily and principally the eternal Word itself2: therefore that which corresponds to that eternal Word befits it more principally; but this is the intelligence itself, which is in the cognitive power itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, image consists in memory, intelligence, and will: but two of these powers, namely memory and intelligence, are held on the side of the cognitive: therefore the image too is held more on the side of the cognitive than of the affective.

4. Likewise, image bespeaks a certain configuration and distinction3; but it belongs to the affective to unite, and to the cognitive to distinguish: therefore the image resides more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.

On the opposite side. 1. The image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation; but the image of reformation, which indeed is grace, is more principally in the affective than in the cognitive4: therefore the image of creation also.

2. Likewise, a thing principally consists in that wherein its completion consists; but the image is completed in the will, and the will is held on the side of the affective: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the image is the noblest thing in the soul, therefore it consists in that which is noblest in the soul; but free choice or will is the noblest thing that is in the soul5: therefore the image consists principally in the liberty of choice or the will; but this principally regards the affective: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, likeness is in more than image; for not every likeness is an image, but a likeness expressed in a certain configuration and imitation: therefore wherever there is image, there is also likeness: therefore where image is principally, likeness is also principally. But likeness is not principally on the side of cognition, but on the side of affection, since likeness is in gratuitous things, which most regard the affective power: therefore by equal reasoning the image as well.

Incidental question 1. Alongside this it is asked, what is the difference between image and likeness. For since likeness is in more than image, as Augustine shows in the book Of Eighty-three Questions6, and the higher ought not to be numbered together with its inferior, it seems that man is wrongly said to have been made to the image and likeness.

Incidental question 2. Likewise, since there are two powers on the side of affection, namely the irascible and the concupiscible7, just as there are two on the side of cognition, namely memory and intelligence; the question is, why in the account of the image two powers are taken on the side of the cognitive, and one on the side of the affective. For it seems that it ought rather to be the converse, since the three theological virtues, which reform the image of the soul, are so placed in it that two are on the side of the affective, namely hope and charity, of which one is in the irascible and the other in the concupiscible, and one is on the side of the cognitive, namely faith, which is commonly placed in the rational8.

Conclusion.

The image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.

I respond: It must be said that image and likeness differ from the very first imposition of the name. For image names a conformity in quantity, but likeness names an agreement in quality. For image names a certain configuration, and so it imports figure, which is quantity in quality, or quality in quantity; but likeness is called the same quality of different things9.

Threefold mode of distinguishing them in species.

First. From this primary difference a threefold mode of distinguishing has been customarily assigned between image and likeness, when it is said10: Let us make man to our image and likeness. — The first is the one Hugh says, that "likeness regards nature, and image regards figure"; because likeness bespeaks agreement in natural quality, but image agreement in figural distinction, after the manner of a certain triangle, in which there are three terms and three lines; for there are three powers, each of which has a relation to each, and likewise three persons; and the power or person holds the place of a term, but the relation or emanation holds the place of a line.

Second. The second mode of distinguishing is that image is in natural things, and likeness in gratuitous things, which likewise has its origin from that first difference. For since image bespeaks configuration, and that is attended to on the side of the soul's natural powers, namely of memory, intelligence, and will: hence it is that image is in natural things. But since likeness bespeaks agreement, which takes its origin from quality, and the quality in which the soul is likened to God is grace: therefore likeness is said to be in gratuitous things.

Third. The third mode of distinguishing is that image is in the power of knowing, and likeness in the power of loving: and this mode likewise takes its origin from the first difference. For since image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is attended to in origin, relation, and the distinction of powers: and this origin and relation principally Conclusion 1. resides on the side of the cognitive: therefore image is more principally placed in the cognitive. But likeness bespeaks agreement in quality; and since the quality in which the soul is principally likened to God is in the will or Conclusion 2. in affection: hence it is that likeness is placed principally in the affective power.

To the 2nd incidental question. And hence it is that in the image of creation two powers are on the side of the cognitive, namely memory and intelligence, and one on the side of the affective, namely the will. But, on the contrary, in the image of recreation, which indeed consists in grace, two virtues are on the side of the affective, namely hope and charity, and one on the side of the cognitive, namely faith. For the image principally regards origin and relation; but relation and origin are attended to between memory and intelligence after the manner of parent and offspring, and between these two and the will according to the mode of derivation or procession11. But between the irascible and the concupiscible there is neither such order nor origin, since the motion of the irascible can be without the concupiscible, and conversely; but the motion of the will cannot be without a preceding motion of intelligence, nor likewise an act of intelligence without an act of memory, in those things, I say, which pertain to the account of the image. Therefore in the assigning of the image two members are taken on the side of the cognitive, and one on the side of the affective. For order and origin and distinction demand this, and on that account the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective. — But likeness principally consists in the union of the soul to God, which is through grace. And since union and grace principally regard the affective; hence it is that in the image of recreation, which indeed is in gratuitous things, there are two virtues that regard the affective, namely hope and charity, in the two powers, namely the irascible and the concupiscible; but one which regards the cognitive, namely faith, which regards the rational, although hope also, reforming the irascible, consequently reforms the memory, since they agree in the act, which is to hold fast12.

According to this, then, it is plain how to respond both to the question and to the objections. For it must be conceded outright that the image principally regards the cognitive; the reasonings that prove this must also be conceded.

Solution of the opposites. 1. As to what is objected concerning the image of reformation: it must be said that it is not valid, because the image of reformation is rather a certain likeness than an image. For if it were properly an image, it would be capable of God and would be immortal13; but it is not so now. And therefore, since the image of recreation is rather likeness than image, it regards the affective power more principally than the cognitive, although it reforms both the cognitive and the affective.

2. As to what is objected, that the completion of the image14 is in the will; it must be said that although the will is last in the image, nevertheless it does not stand

after the manner of completion in the account of the image. For the image bespeaks order and origin in the powers, as it is in the persons; and just as the third person is not placed as completing the others nor as completing the others, but rather as receiving from them; so the will, insofar as it is part of the image, is rather considered in the account of one going forth than in the account of one completing. And since the first account of origin is by the mode of nature, which indeed consists in the rising of intelligence from memory; hence it is that the image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.

3. As to what is objected, that the image consists in the noblest thing in the soul; it must be said that the nobler15 in the soul can be taken in two ways: either according to the distinction of powers, namely affective and cognitive, or according to the condition of states, namely of the superior portion and the inferior. When therefore it is said that the image consists in the noblest thing, this is understood with regard to the state in the superior part, not with regard to the powers, since the image embraces both the affective and the cognitive, since each is born immediately to be borne to God.

4. As to what is objected, that likeness is in more than image; it must be said that likeness, if it be taken in its generality, is in more; Note. but if it be taken properly, as it is taken in the present case, it is not in more, but rather is distinguished from image, so that, although each16 regards both the affective and the cognitive, image nevertheless more principally regards the cognitive, and likeness the affective; and the reason has already been stated. — And by this is made plain the response to those two things that were asked.

Scholion

I. In this special question is presupposed the distinction between the image of creation, which pertains to the order of nature and is properly called image, and the image of recreation (reformation), which is of the supernatural order and is commonly called likeness in the proper sense. For although likeness of itself signifies something more general than image, and is included in the very account of image; nevertheless in a special and proper sense it is applied to signify a certain higher perfection of the image, which is bestowed on the soul through sanctifying grace (here ad 4, and cf. S. Thomas, in the places cited). — Concerning the threefold grade of expression by way of vestige, image, and likeness the Holy Doctor speaks excellently Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; concerning the likeness of equality and imitation above d. 3. a. I. q. 2; concerning likeness according to the property of genus and outside genus I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2; concerning the likeness of proportion and proportionality IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. dub. 3.

II. Other authors at this place mostly ask only how image and likeness differ, except Alexander of Hales and Aegidius Romanus, who also treat of this special question.

Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. a. 4. et § I. 2. — S. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 93. a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 3. and q. I. a. 3. — See other authors in the scholion at a. 1. q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 10. Cfr. ibid. c. 39. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine), c. 10. Cf. ibid. c. 39, and here in the text of the Master, c. 3.
  2. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. q. 2. — De seqq. cfr. ibid. d. 27. p. II. q. 3.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 31. p. II. q. 2. — On the following, cf. ibid. d. 27. p. II. q. 3.
  3. Vide infra pag. 405, nota 2.
    See below, p. 405, note 2.
  4. Cfr. infra d. 26. q. 5. seq.
    Cf. below, d. 26. q. 5 and following.
  5. Vide supra pag. 115, nota 6, et infra d. 25. p. I. q. 6, ubi etiam ostenditur, quod liberum arbitrium principalius respicit affectivam potentiam.
    See above, p. 115, note 6, and below d. 25. p. I. q. 6, where it is also shown that free choice more principally regards the affective power.
  6. Quaest. 74, ubi dicit: « Imago et aequalitas et similitudo distinguenda sunt », et deinde hanc explicat propositionem: Quia ubi imago, continuo similitudo, non continuo aequalitas; ubi aequalitas, continuo similitudo, non continuo imago; ubi similitudo, non continuo imago, non continuo aequalitas.
    Question 74, where he says: "Image and equality and likeness are to be distinguished," and then he explains this proposition: Because where there is image, there immediately is likeness, but not immediately equality; where there is equality, there immediately is likeness, but not immediately image; where there is likeness, not immediately image, not immediately equality.
  7. Vide tom. I. pag. 197, nota 6. et infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. circa finem corp. quaest.; d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.
    See vol. I, p. 197, note 6, and below d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1, near the end of the body of the question; d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.
  8. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 3.
    Cf. III Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 3.
  9. Nam ut dicit Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate: Proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici. Cfr. etiam V. Metaph. text. 16. et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 13.).
    For as Aristotle says, Categories, chapter On Quality: "It is proper to quality that according to it [things] are called like or unlike." Cf. also V Metaph. text 16 and 20 (IV, cc. 9 and 13).
  10. Gen. 1, 26. — Verba Hugonis habentur I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 2: Imago pertinet ad figuram, similitudo ad naturam.
    Gen. 1:26. — The words of Hugh are found in I On the Sacraments, p. VI. c. 2: "Image pertains to figure, likeness to nature."
  11. Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. seq. — Plures codd. cum Vat. donationis pro derivationis.
    Cf. Augustine, IX On the Trinity c. 12. n. 17 and following. — Several codices with the Vatican edition read donationis for derivationis.
  12. Ut iam dictum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et plenius dicetur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.
    As has already been said in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, and will be said more fully in III Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.
  13. Duplex haec proprietas requiritur, ut aliquid sit imago Dei, sicut ostendit August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 informet pro reformet.
    This twofold property is required for something to be the image of God, as Augustine shows, XIV On the Trinity c. 3. n. 6 and c. 8. n. 11. — A little below, codex cc and ed. 1 read informet for reformet.
  14. Vat. magis.
    The Vatican edition reads magis.
  15. Vat. cum ed. 1 et uno alteroque cod. nobilissimum. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius cognitionem, cod. W considerationem pro conditionem, de quo cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2.
    The Vatican edition with ed. 1 and one other codex read nobilissimum. The same Vatican edition a little below reads cognitionem, codex W considerationem for conditionem; on which cf. below d. 24. p. I. a. 2.
  16. Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 utramque, non recte.
    Several codices with editions 1, 2, 3, 4 read utramque, not correctly. ---
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