Bonaventure

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de ratione, quam reddit Magister, cum ait: In eo quod dicit: Faciamus, una operatio trium personarum ostenditur. Cum enim indivisa sint opera Trinitatis¹, et tres personae ita operatae sint simul omnia alia, sicut fecerunt hominem; quemadmodum in productione hominis dicitur: Faciamus, ita deberet dici in productione aliorum. — Item, quaeritur, quare in productione hominis utitur legislator verbo primae personae, scilicet faciamus, in productione aliorum verbo tertiae personae, scilicet dixit et fecit? — Iuxta hoc etiam est quaestio, quare distinguit inter productionem hominis et bestiarum, cum eodem die² producta sint ad ornatum eiusdem elementi?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in productione hominis non tantum erat manifestatio Trinitatis in vestigio, sed etiam secundum imaginem; ideo tribus personis pluraliter attribuitur productio hominis ut ostendatur, quod in homine Trinitas repraesentatur expresse, in aliis vero insinuatur Trinitas quoquo modo, licet non ita explicite. — Et quia ratio imaginis non convenit nisi personae, quae potest loqui per se³; ideo in productione eius utitur verbo primae personae. — Et iterum, quia haec creatura praecellit alias in gradu et dignitate, ideo productionem hominis distinguit a productione bestiarum, licet propter convenientiam in ornando terram in opus unius diei conveniant⁴. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dei et Angelorum non est una et eadem imago. Contra hoc est: quia, cum Angelus sit imago Dei, quod conformatur Angelo, per consequens conformatur Deo: ergo quod est imago Angeli est imago Dei. — Item, unum opus potest esse Dei et Angeli⁵: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod eadem imago.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia imago dicit ordinem ad illud cuius est imago, tanquam in finem et ordinem immediatum; cum impossibile sit, Deum et Angelum eiusdem rei esse finem immediatum et ultimum: impossibile est, eandem imaginem esse Angeli et Dei. — Quia vero Deus cooperatur Angelo, et omne quod est ab Angelo est a Deo; ideo possibile est, unum opus simul esse et Angeli et Dei. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod si aliquis repraesentat Angelum, per consequens repraesentat Deum. Quamvis enim inferri valeat, quod creatura, quae repraesentat Angelum, repraesentat Deum mediate, non tamen potest inferri, quod repraesentet immediate⁶.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Fuerunt nonnulli, qui ita distinxerunt, ut in hoc loco imaginem intelligerent Filium, quos etiam consequenter reprehendit. Videtur enim, quod convenienter dixerint, per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos octavo⁷: Quos praedestinavit, conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui. — Item, quod ita oporteat intelligi, videtur. Aut enim imago stat ibi pro re creata, aut pro re increata. Si pro creata: ergo idem est dicere: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem⁸, quod: faciamus hominem ad se ipsum. Si pro increata; sed illa non est nisi Filius: ergo videtur, quod expositio illa sit recta. — Propter hoc Quaestio incidens. quaeritur, quae istarum expositionum, quas Magister assignat in littera⁹, sit tenenda.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est modus Duplex expositio. exponendi istam auctoritatem: Faciamus hominem etc.: unus intelligendo de imagine increata, alter vero intelligendo de imagine creata. — Prima fit Primus modus triplicatur. Unus est, ut imago et similitudo iter triplex. referantur ad idem, scilicet ad essentiam in tribus personis. Secundus modus est, ut imago et similitudo referantur ad idem, scilicet ad personam Filii. Tertius modus exponendi est, ut imago referatur ad Filium, et similitudo ad Spiritum sanctum. Ita hos omnes modos ponit Magister, quos tamen non approbat, licet sustineri possint. Primum enim arguit de improprietate, quia divina essentia non est proprie imago. Secundum de falsitate, quia Filius non est imago nostra; et de hoc etiam, quod dicit, quod homo non est imago, sed ad imaginem. Tertium arguit de incertitudine, quia auctoritatem ex Scriptura non habet.

Alius modus exponendi est de imagine creata, Secunda et iste triplex est. — Unus, qui sic exponit, ut imago item triplex. praecedat similitudinem; et dicit, quod imago est in naturalibus, et similitudo in gratuitis. Secundus, qui sic exponit, ut similitudo concomitetur imaginem; et iste est, quod imago sit in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo in potentia diligendi. Tertius modus, qui sic exponit, ut imago sequatur similitudinem secundum rem; et iste dicit, quod similitudo est in natura, et imago in forma¹⁰.

Omnes hos modos approbat Magister et susti- Ad quaest. net; et satis videtur probabile, quod Scriptura de incidentem. imagine creata intelligat, quamvis etiam possit intelligi de increata. Verum est enim, quod homo praedestinatus est, ut conformetur imagini Filii Dei; nec ideo Magister illam positionem redarguit, quod hoc non sit verum, sed quia illa imago non potest proprie dici nostra; vel etiam, quia non solummodo Filius est imago, sed etiam homo, cuius contrarium dicebatur in illo modo exponendi.

Ad illud vero, quod obiicitur, quod imago non potest stare pro creata imagine; dicendum, quod immo, quia imago accipitur in abstractione; et sic Notandum. potest dici homo fieri ad imaginem, sicut tabula dicitur fieri ad imaginem, quando sibi imprimitur imago Herculis. Hinc est, quod homo non tantum est imago, sed etiam ad imaginem, quia non secundum omne quod est¹¹, est imago, immo differt ab imagine; Filius vero secundum omne quod est, est imago Patris, et ideo solum est imago, non ad imaginem.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non omnino aequalis fiebat illa imago, tanquam non ab illo nata, sed ab eo creata. Quod enim creatur non est per naturam, sed per artem; sed quod est per artem non univocatur cum eo, quod est per naturam, immo aequivocatur¹²: ergo aequivoce dicitur imago de Filio Dei et de homine.

Respondeo: Dicendum est, quod imago de Filio Dei et homine nec dicitur aequivoce, nec dicitur Notandum. univoce, sed analogice secundum prius et posterius. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod illud, quod creatur, est ab arte; dicendum quod quaedam est ars, cuius operatio consequitur naturam; et opus istius artis sic est artificiale, quod non est naturale; et

ideo opus istius artis cum opere naturae in eodem nomine faciunt aequivocationem, sicut homo pictus et homo verus. Quaedam est ars, quae est fundamentum naturae, et opus istius artis bene est naturale, quia fabricat ipsam naturam, et talis est ars, cuius opus est creare¹³; et ideo non oportebit esse aequivocationem. — Alia solutio. Vel dicendum, quod ideo est aequivocatio, quando dicitur homo pictus et homo verus, quia hoc nomen homo primo et principaliter imponitur homini vero; et ideo, cum dicitur de homine picto, alia est acceptio et alia significatio. Non sic imago primo et principaliter imponitur Dei Filio, sed omni ei, quod expresse repraesentat alterum¹⁴.

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts concerning the letter, and the first inquiry is about the reason which the Master gives, when he says: In that he says, Let us make, one operation of the three persons is shown. For since the works of the Trinity are undivided¹, and the three persons have worked together all other things, just as they made man; in the way that in the production of man it is said, Let us make, so it should also be said in the production of other things. — Likewise, it is asked why in the production of man the lawgiver uses the verb of the first person, namely let us make, but in the production of other things uses the verb of the third person, namely he said and he made. — In line with this, there is also the question, why he distinguishes between the production of man and of the beasts, since on the same day² they were produced for the adornment of the same element?

I respond: It must be said that in the production of man there was not only a manifestation of the Trinity in vestige, but also according to image; and therefore the production of man is attributed in the plural to the three persons in order to show that in man the Trinity is represented expressly, whereas in other things the Trinity is intimated in some way, although not so explicitly. — And because the account of image does not befit anything except a person, who can speak by himself³; therefore in his production he uses the verb of the first person. — And again, because this creature surpasses the others in rank and dignity, therefore he distinguishes the production of man from the production of beasts, although they agree in adorning the earth in the work of one day⁴. And thus the response to the queries is clear.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: The image of God and of the Angels is not one and the same. Against this is: that, since the Angel is the image of God, what is conformed to the Angel is consequently conformed to God: therefore what is the image of the Angel is the image of God. — Likewise, one work can be of God and of an Angel⁵: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the same is the image.

I respond: It must be said that, because image signifies an ordering to that of which it is the image, as to an end and an immediate ordering; since it is impossible for God and an Angel to be the immediate and ultimate end of the same thing: it is impossible for the same image to be of an Angel and of God. — But because God cooperates with the Angel, and everything which is from the Angel is from God; therefore it is possible for one work simultaneously to be of an Angel and of God. — Nor does the objection avail, which urges that if someone represents an Angel, he consequently represents God. For although it may be inferred that a creature which represents an Angel represents God mediately, yet it cannot be inferred that it represents him immediately⁶.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: There were some, who so distinguished, that in this place they understood by image the Son, whom he consequently rebukes. For it seems that they had spoken fittingly, on account of what is said in Romans 8⁷: Whom he predestined, to be conformed to the image of his Son. — Likewise, that it must be so understood seems clear. For either image there stands for the created thing, or for the uncreated thing. If for the created: then it is the same to say, Let us make man to the image⁸, as: let us make man to himself. If for the uncreated; but that is none other than the Son: therefore it seems that this exposition is correct. — On account of this, an incidental question: it is asked, which of these expositions, which the Master assigns in the letter⁹, is to be held.

I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold Twofold exposition. manner of expounding this authority: Let us make man etc.: one understanding it of the uncreated image, the other understanding it of the created image. — The first mode is threefold. One way is that image and similitude be referred to the same thing, namely to the essence in three persons. The second mode is that image and similitude be referred to the same thing, namely to the person of the Son. The third mode of exposition is that image be referred to the Son, and similitude to the Holy Spirit. So all these modes the Master sets forth, which however he does not approve, although they can be sustained. For the first he refutes on the ground of impropriety, because the divine essence is not properly an image. The second on the ground of falsity, because the Son is not our image; and also concerning what he says, that man is not image, but to the image. The third he refutes on the ground of uncertainty, because he has no authority for it from Scripture.

Another mode of exposition is of the created The second mode image, and this is threefold. — One, who so expounds likewise threefold. that image precedes similitude; and says that image is in natural things, and similitude in gratuitous things. A second, who so expounds that similitude accompanies image; and this one holds that image is in the power of knowing, similitude in the power of loving. A third mode, who so expounds that image follows similitude according to the thing; and this one says that similitude is in nature, and image in form¹⁰.

All these modes the Master approves and To the incidental sustains; and it seems probable enough that Scripture question. understands [the text] of the created image, although it can also be understood of the uncreated. For it is true that man is predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son of God; nor does the Master refute that position on the ground that this is not true, but because that image cannot properly be called ours; or also, because not only the Son is image, but also man, the contrary of which was being said in that mode of exposition.

To that, however, which is objected, that image cannot stand for the created image; it must be said that, on the contrary, image is taken in abstraction; and so Note. it can be said that man comes to be to the image, just as a tablet is said to come to be to the image, when the image of Hercules is impressed upon it. Hence it is that man is not only image, but also to the image, because not according to everything which he is¹¹ is he image, indeed he differs from the image; whereas the Son according to everything which he is, is the image of the Father, and therefore he alone is image, not to the image.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: That image was not made altogether equal, as not born from him, but created by him. For what is created is not by nature, but by art; but what is by art is not univocated with what is by nature, indeed it is equivocated¹²: therefore image is said equivocally of the Son of God and of man.

I respond: It must be said that image, concerning the Son of God and concerning man, is neither said equivocally, nor said Note. univocally, but analogically according to prior and posterior. — To what therefore is objected, that that which is created is from art; it must be said that there is a certain art whose operation follows nature; and the work of that art is artificial in such a way that it is not natural; and therefore the work of that art together with the work of nature in the same name produce an equivocation, as a painted man and a true man. There is a certain art which is the foundation of nature, and the work of that art is indeed natural, because it fabricates nature itself, and such is the art whose work is to create¹³; and therefore there will not need to be an equivocation. — Another solution. Or it must be said that the reason there is an equivocation, when it is said painted man and true man, is because this name man is primarily and principally imposed upon the true man; and therefore, when it is said of the painted man, the acceptation is different and the signification is different. Not so is image primarily and principally imposed upon the Son of God, but upon everything which expressly represents another¹⁴.

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