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Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
p. 873

Articulus II.

Quaestio III. Utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, sit a Deo.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Quandocumque aliqua duo fundantur super idem secundum rem, si unum est a Deo, et reliquum1; sed falsitas alicuius propositionis et veritas suae oppositae fundantur super idem — hoc enim ipso, quod haec est vera: homo est animal, haec est falsa: homo non est animal — ergo cum omnis propositionis veritas sit a Deo, videtur, quod omnis propositionis falsitas sit a Deo.

2. Item, «veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus2 », et falsitas est inadaequatio rei et intellectus per oppositum; sed sicut se habet aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus, ita se habet aequalitas et inaequalitas in propositionibus; sed aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus sunt ab ipso Deo — sicut enim a Deo est, quod aliqua duo sint aequalia, sic a Deo est, quod aliqua duo sic se habeant, quod unum excedat reliquum; unde Augustinus3 dicit, quod «si essent aequalia, non essent omnia » — ergo pari ratione adaequatio et inadaequatio signi ad signatum est ab eodem Principio.

3. Item, ab eo est falsitas propositionis, qui solus potest facere, propositionem ipsam esse falsam; sed demonstrato aliquo peccatore, ista est vera: iste p. 874 non est iustus; et nullus potest facere, hanc esse falsam, nisi solus Deus, qui potest ei dare iustitiam: ergo etc.

4. Item, maioris dignitatis et potestatis est falsificare hanc propositionem: iste est peccator, quam verificare eam; qui enim peccat, hoc ipso quod peccat, verificat eam, et hoc indignitatis est: ergo si omnis propositionis veritas a Deo est, videtur multo fortius, quod talis propositionis falsitas sit a Deo.

Sed contra: 1. Omne quod Deus potest facere, habet exemplar in Deo; sed enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non habet exemplar in Deo, cum ipsa veritas sit ratio exemplandi: ergo enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non est a Deo4.

2. Item, sicut se habet bonitas ad malitiam, sic se habet veritas ad falsitatem; sed a summa bonitate nullo modo potest esse malitia: ergo a summa veritate nullo modo potest esse5 falsitas.

3. Item, «verum et ens convertuntur6 »; sed a Deo non potest aliquid esse, quod non sit aliquo modo ens — si enim pure nihil esset, a Deo non esset — ergo a Deo non potest esse nisi verum. Sed enuntiatio falsa, in quantum huiusmodi, dicit privationem veri: ergo videtur, quod a Deo non debeat causari, secundum quod huiusmodi.

4. Item, omne quod Deus potest facere, potest dicere; sed falsum non potest dicere: ergo non potest facere. Probatio minoris: si dicit falsum, aut ergo scienter, aut ignoranter. Ignoranter non; hoc constat. Si scienter; sed quicumque dicit falsum scienter, mentitur: ergo Deus mentiretur; quod profanum et impium est dicere.

Conclusio.

Enuntiatio falsa sub ratione falsitatis non est a Deo, facit tamen Deus aliquid, quo facto aliqua oratio est falsa necessario.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod falsitas nihil aliud est quam defectus veritatis in re, quae nata est verificari; sicut malitia dicit privationem bonitatis et rectitudinis circa actionem, quae nata est rectificari; et ideo, sicut actio mala, in quantum actio, est a Deo, in quantum vero mala et iniusta, a Deo non est7: sic et enuntiatio falsa, in quantum enuntiatio, a Deo est, in quantum vero falsa, non est a Deo. — Unde, quemadmodum in actione duplex consideratur bonitas: una naturae, et altera moris, et una est essentialis, et altera accidentalis; et ideo una privatur, altera relinquitur, et ratione illius bonitatis, quae relinquitur, actio illa est a Deo: sic in omni enuntiatione duplex est veritas: una essentialis, et haec est veritas, qua propositio repraesentat illud, ad quod repraesentandum instituta est; et haec nunquam privatur ab enuntiatione; omnis enim enuntiatio significat illud, ad quod instituta est, sive sit vera, sive falsa. Alia vero est veritas accidentalis, quae attenditur in propositione, in hoc quod repraesentat rem, secundum quod est — tunc enim dicitur adaequari signum signato; et veritas enuntiationis non est aliud quam quaedam adaequatio — et haec veritas privatur per falsitatem. Tunc enim est propositio vel enuntiatio falsa, quando signum non repraesentat rem, sicut est, vel res non est, sicut repraesentatur per signum. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus8: « Ab eo quod res est, vel non est, dicitur oratio vera, vel falsa »; hoc est dicere, ab eo quod res est, sicut repraesentatur, dicitur oratio vera; ab eo quod res non est, sicut repraesentatur, dicitur oratio falsa. Sicut igitur iniustitia est privatio rectitudinis, sic falsitas est defectus adaequationis; et ideo, sicut Deo ut auctori non attribuitur iniustitia actionis, sic non debet ei9 attribui falsitas orationis. Utroque enim modo defectus est, et nullus defectus Deo attribuendus est.

Notandum est tamen, quod etsi nullus defectus sit a Deo, magis tamen aliquis defectus elongatur a causalitate Dei quam alius, secundum quod sunt diversi modi deficiendi. Est enim quidam defectus, qui dicit privationem alicuius positionis et ordinis, sicut est defectus culpabilis; et iste est defectus vituperabilis et vituperabilem reddit actorem10; et talem defectum Deus non facit, nec etiam facit aliquid, quo facto creatura tali defectu deficiat necessario. Unde Deus nec facit peccatum, nec facit aliquem peccare, nec facit aliquid, quo facto necessario sequatur peccatum ratione illius quod Deus facit. Hoc dico propter animae infusionem, in qua necessario contrahitur culpa originalis; sed hoc non est ex actu Dei, sed ex praevaricatione primi parentis11. — Est et alius defectus, qui est privatio alicuius positionis, non tamen est privatio ordinis; contingit enim, aliquos defectus ordinari. Et talis defectus, licet non possit Deo attribui secundum quod defectus, potest tamen ei attribui secundum quod ordinatus; et de tali defectu licet non possit dici, quod Deus eum faciat, quia defectum facere p. 875 est deficere; potest tamen dici, quod facit aliquid, quo facto necessario consequitur ille defectus; et talis defectus est falsitas et ignorantia et caecitas et consimiles. Unde quamvis non possit concedi, quod Deus faciat falsitatem orationis sive orationem falsam, secundum quod falsa est; potest tamen concedi, quod Deus faciat aliquid, quo facto aliqua oratio est falsa necessario; sicut, cum iustificat impium, facit aliquid, quo facto haec enuntiatio est falsa: iste est impius. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non sit a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod veritas et falsitas fundantur super idem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen aliter et aliter, quia veritas fundatur per modum positionis, et falsitas per modum privationis; et ideo non sequitur, quod sint ab eodem. Cum autem dicitur, quod quae super idem fundantur ab eodem sunt, hoc intelligitur, quando super illud idem fundantur et eodem modo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus sunt ab eodem principio; respondendum est, quod non est simile: quia in rebus uno modo inaequalitas dicit privationem aequalitatis, ubi debet esse; et tunc non est a Deo, cum sit defectus. Alio modo inaequalitas dicit gradum et ordinem, qui debet esse inter res; et hoc modo, etsi videatur dicere privationem, quia tamen dicit positionem, a Deo est. Sed inadaequatio signi ad signatum semper dicit defectum, pro eo quod signum institutum est, ut repraesentet signatum, secundum quod est12; et ideo inadaequatio signi ad signatum est falsitas; inadaequatio vero in rebus non est falsitas. Et propterea non sequitur, quodsi inadaequatio rei ad rem est a Deo, quod inadaequatio signi ad signatum sit a Deo. — Posset tamen dici, quod inadaequatio, in quantum huiusmodi, cum dicat defectum aequalitatis, a Deo non est, quamvis illud quod subest, a Deo est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest falsificare enuntiationem; dicendum, quod haec est vera et propria: Deus facit aliquid13, quo facto aliqua propositio est falsa; haec autem minus propria: Deus facit aliquam propositionem falsam; sed haec est simpliciter impropria: Deus facit falsitatem in propositione; et hoc, quia falsitas nominat ipsum defectum praecise. Et ideo in illa ratione est sophisma secundum accidens14, qua sic arguit: facit aliquid, quo facto propositio est falsa: ergo facit propositionem falsam sive falsitatem in propositione.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris dignitatis est falsificare aliquam propositionem quam verificare; dicendum, quod veritatem ad falsitatem contingit comparari dupliciter: aut loquendo formaliter, aut causaliter sive ratione eius quod subest. Si loquendo formaliter; sic cum veritas dicat adaequationem, et falsitas inadaequationem, et ita falsitas privationem, veritas positionem; dignius est omnino aliquid verificare quam falsificare, quidquid illud sit, cum dignior sit veritas quam falsitas; si tamen contingat dicere dignius respectu eius, in quo nulla est dignitas. Si autem comparamus veritatem ad falsitatem ratione eius quod respondet ex parte rei; sic dico de plano, quod aliquando dignius est illud quod ex parte rei reddit illam propositionem falsam, quam illud quod reddit propositionem veram, sicut patet; dignius est enim, quod reddit istam propositionem falsam: iste non est bonus; quam quod reddit eam veram. — Et ratio huius est ista, quia, quamvis veritas de se dicat positionem, quia dicit adaequationem, illa adaequatio ex parte alterius extremi ita bene potest respicere privationem sicut positionem, et defectum sicut effectum. Sicut enim defectus est ordinabilis15, et tamen defectus est, sic est cognoscibilis, et sic est significabilis. Ideo cum quaeritur, super quid fundetur veritas enuntiationis; non oportet, quod ex parte rei respondeat aliqua veritas. Sicut enim verum ens contingit vere significari ipsum esse, sic etiam de illo quod nullo modo est, contingit vere significare quod ipsum non est16. Sicut enim significatio dicit relationem, quae non requirit significatum esse in actu; sic etiam veritas signi, quae quidem dicit conditionem illius relationis, non exigit fundari super aliquam rem actualiter existentem. Nihilominus tamen, cum omnis relatio et ordo a Deo sit, talis significatio et talis veritas a Deo est; nec sequitur ad hoc, quod significatum sit a Deo, immo est ibi sophisma secundum accidens, sicut si argueretur: ordinatio culpae et poenae est a Deo, ergo culpa est a Deo. Sic non sequitur in proposito: vera significatio furti est a Deo, ergo furtum est a Deo17. — Et sic patet, quod etsi veritati non semper correspondeat ex parte significati aliquid excellentius quam falsitati, tamen veritas nobilior est quam falsitas; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi verificatio propositionis sit a Deo, quod ab eodem sit propositionis falsificatio sive falsa enuntiatio, secundum quod falsa. — Et sic patent p. 876 quaesita18.

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English Translation

Article II.

Question III. Whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is from God.

Thirdly it is asked whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, is from God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Whenever any two things are founded upon the same thing in reality, if the one is from God, so also is the other1; but the falsity of some proposition and the truth of its opposite are founded upon the same thing — for by this very fact, that "a man is an animal" is true, "a man is not an animal" is false — therefore, since the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems that the falsity of every proposition is from God.

2. Likewise, "truth is the adequation of thing and intellect2," and falsity, by the opposite, is the inadequation of thing and intellect; but as equality and inequality stand in things, so do equality and inequality stand in propositions; but equality and inequality in things are from God himself — for just as it is from God that two things are equal, so it is from God that two things stand thus, that one exceeds the other; whence Augustine3 says that "if they were equal, they would not be all things" — therefore by parity of reasoning the adequation and inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from the same Principle.

3. Likewise, the falsity of a proposition is from him who alone can make the proposition itself to be false; but, a certain sinner having been pointed out, this is true: "he is not just"; and no one can make this false except God alone, who can give him justice: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it is of greater dignity and power to falsify this proposition: "he is a sinner," than to verify it; for whoever sins, by the very fact that he sins, verifies it, and this belongs to indignity: therefore, if the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems much more strongly that the falsity of such a proposition is from God.

On the contrary: 1. Everything that God can make has its exemplar in God; but a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, does not have an exemplar in God, since truth itself is the ground of exemplifying: therefore a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God4.

2. Likewise, as goodness stands to malice, so truth stands to falsity; but from the highest goodness malice can in no way arise: therefore from the highest truth falsity can in no way arise5.

3. Likewise, "the true and being are convertible6"; but from God nothing can be which is not in some way being — for if it were pure nothing, it would not be from God — therefore from God there can be nothing but the true. But a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, asserts a privation of the true: therefore it seems that it ought not to be caused by God, insofar as it is such.

4. Likewise, everything that God can make, he can say; but he cannot say what is false: therefore he cannot make it. Proof of the minor: if he says what is false, then either knowingly or unknowingly. Not unknowingly; this is clear. If knowingly — but whoever says what is false knowingly, lies: therefore God would lie; which it is profane and impious to say.

Conclusion.

A false enunciation under the aspect of falsity is not from God; yet God does make something by which some discourse is necessarily false.

I respond: It must be said that falsity is nothing other than a defect of truth in a thing which is apt to be made true; just as malice asserts a privation of goodness and rectitude concerning an action which is apt to be made right; and therefore, just as an evil action, insofar as it is action, is from God, but insofar as it is evil and unjust, is not from God7: so too a false enunciation, insofar as it is enunciation, is from God, but insofar as it is false, is not from God. — Whence, just as in an action a twofold goodness is considered: one of nature, and the other of morals, and the one is essential, and the other accidental; and therefore the one is taken away, the other remains, and by reason of that goodness which remains, that action is from God: so in every enunciation there is a twofold truth: one essential, and this is the truth by which a proposition represents that for the representing of which it was instituted; and this is never taken away from the enunciation; for every enunciation signifies that for which it was instituted, whether it be true or false. But the other is accidental truth, which is regarded in a proposition in this, that it represents a thing according as it is — for then the sign is said to be made adequate to the thing-signified; and the truth of an enunciation is nothing other than a certain adequation — and this truth is taken away by falsity. For a proposition or enunciation is then false, when the sign does not represent the thing as it is, or the thing is not as it is represented by the sign. And this is what the Philosopher8 says: "From the fact that a thing is, or is not, a statement is called true, or false"; that is to say, from the fact that the thing is, as it is represented, the statement is called true; from the fact that the thing is not, as it is represented, the statement is called false. Therefore, just as injustice is a privation of rectitude, so falsity is a defect of adequation; and therefore, just as injustice of action is not attributed to God as its author, so falsity of discourse ought not to be attributed to him9. For in both ways it is a defect, and no defect is to be attributed to God.

It must be noted, however, that although no defect is from God, yet one defect is more removed from the causality of God than another, according as there are diverse modes of failing. For there is a certain defect which asserts a privation of some position and order, such as is a culpable defect; and this is a blameworthy defect and renders the agent blameworthy10; and such a defect God does not make, nor even does he make anything by which a creature necessarily fails through such a defect. Whence God neither makes sin, nor makes anyone sin, nor makes anything by which sin necessarily follows by reason of that which God makes. I say this on account of the infusion of the soul, in which original guilt is necessarily contracted; but this is not from the act of God, but from the prevarication of the first parent11. — And there is another defect, which is a privation of some position, yet is not a privation of order; for it happens that some defects are ordered. And such a defect, although it cannot be attributed to God insofar as it is a defect, can nevertheless be attributed to him insofar as it is ordered; and of such a defect, although it cannot be said that God makes it, because to make a defect is to fail; nevertheless it can be said that he makes something by which that defect necessarily follows; and such a defect is falsity and ignorance and blindness and the like. Whence, although it cannot be conceded that God makes the falsity of a discourse or a false discourse, insofar as it is false; it can nevertheless be conceded that God makes something by which some discourse is necessarily false; just as, when he justifies the impious, he makes something by which this enunciation becomes false: "he is impious." — The arguments showing that a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that truth and falsity are founded upon the same thing; it must be said that this is true; but yet in one way and another, because truth is founded by mode of position, and falsity by mode of privation; and therefore it does not follow that they are from the same. But when it is said that those things which are founded upon the same thing are from the same, this is understood when they are founded upon that same thing and in the same way.

2. To that which is objected, that equality and inequality in things are from the same principle; it must be answered that it is not similar: because in things in one way inequality asserts a privation of equality, where it ought to be; and then it is not from God, since it is a defect. In another way inequality asserts a grade and order which ought to be among things; and in this way, even though it may seem to assert a privation, yet because it asserts a position, it is from God. But the inadequation of sign to thing-signified always asserts a defect, for the reason that the sign was instituted to represent the thing-signified, according as it is12; and therefore the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is falsity; but inadequation in things is not falsity. And for this reason it does not follow that, if the inadequation of thing to thing is from God, the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from God. — Yet it could be said that inadequation, insofar as it is such, since it asserts a defect of equality, is not from God, although that which underlies it is from God.

3. To that which is objected, that God can falsify an enunciation; it must be said that this is true and proper: God makes something13 by which some proposition is false; but this is less proper: God makes some proposition false; but this is simply improper: God makes falsity in a proposition; and this, because falsity names precisely the defect itself. And therefore in that argument there is a fallacy of accident14, by which it argues thus: he makes something by which the proposition is false: therefore he makes the proposition false or makes falsity in the proposition.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater dignity to falsify some proposition than to verify it; it must be said that truth can be compared to falsity in two ways: either by speaking formally, or causally, that is, by reason of that which underlies. If by speaking formally; then since truth asserts adequation, and falsity inadequation, and so falsity privation, truth position; it is altogether more worthy to verify something than to falsify it, whatever that be, since truth is more worthy than falsity; if indeed it can be said to be more worthy with respect to that in which there is no dignity. But if we compare truth to falsity by reason of that which corresponds on the part of the thing; then I say plainly that sometimes that which on the part of the thing renders that proposition false is more worthy than that which renders the proposition true, as is evident; for it is more worthy that which renders this proposition false: "he is not good"; than that which renders it true. — And the reason for this is this, that, although truth of itself asserts position, because it asserts adequation, that adequation on the part of the other extreme can just as well regard a privation as a position, and a defect as an effect. For just as a defect is orderable15, and yet is a defect, so it is knowable, and so it is signifiable. Therefore when it is asked upon what the truth of an enunciation is founded; it is not necessary that on the part of the thing some truth correspond. For just as it happens that a true being is truly signified to be, so also of that which in no way is, it happens that it is truly signified that it is not16. For just as signification asserts a relation which does not require the thing-signified to be in act; so also the truth of a sign, which indeed asserts the condition of that relation, does not require to be founded upon some actually existing thing. Nevertheless, since every relation and order is from God, such signification and such truth is from God; nor does it follow from this that the thing-signified is from God, but rather there is here a fallacy of accident, just as if one were to argue: the ordering of guilt and punishment is from God, therefore guilt is from God. So it does not follow in the matter at hand: the true signification of theft is from God, therefore theft is from God17. — And so it is evident that, although there does not always correspond to truth, on the part of the thing-signified, something more excellent than to falsity, yet truth is nobler than falsity; and therefore it does not follow that, if the verification of a proposition is from God, from the same is the falsification of the proposition or the false enunciation, insofar as it is false. — And so the things sought are evident18.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. (p. 873, nota 1, pertinet ad quaest. praec.)
    Cf. above d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1. (The marginal gloss reads de oppositum.)
  2. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (p. 873, nota 5.)
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
  3. Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 4. ad 3. — Omnis propositionis veritatem a Deo esse, docetur ibid. d. 46. dub. 8, d. 35. q. 1, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. (p. 873, nota 6.)
    See I Sent. d. 46, q. 4, ad 3. — That the truth of every proposition is from God is taught ibid. d. 46, dub. 8, d. 35, q. 1, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1.
  4. Principio, in quibus fundatur hoc arg., habentur I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. seqq. et d. 36. per totam. (p. 874, nota 1.)
    The principles on which this argument is founded are had in I Sent. d. 35, q. 1 ff. and d. 36 throughout.
  5. Pro potest esse codd. H I K T Y et alii cum ed. 1 est. (p. 874, nota 2.)
    For potest esse codices H I K T Y and others, with ed. 1, read est.
  6. Haec propositio innititur verbis Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (l. brev. c. 1.): Quare ut secundum esse unumquodque se habet, ita etiam secundum veritatem. — Paulo inferius pro Sed enuntiatio falsa plures codd., ut V X Y bb (K Q T a secunda manu), Si igitur falsum. (p. 874, nota 3.)
    This proposition rests on the words of Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 4 (brief recension c. 1): "Wherefore, as each thing stands with respect to being, so also with respect to truth." — A little below, for Sed enuntiatio falsa several codices, such as V X Y bb (K Q T by a second hand), read Si igitur falsum.
  7. Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. (p. 874, nota 4.)
    As was shown above a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1.
  8. Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. ad 3, et Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2. seqq., ubi de veritate significationis, de veritatibus enuntiationis etc. agit. (p. 874, nota 5.)
    Book of the Categories, chapter On Substance. Cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 1, ad 3, and Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 2 ff., where he treats of the truth of signification, of the truths of enunciation, etc.
  9. In multis codd., ut F H K T W bb, et ed. 1 deest ei. (p. 874, nota 6.)
    In many codices, such as F H K T W bb, and in ed. 1, ei is lacking.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 803, nota 1, et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 14. n. 40. seqq. (p. 874, nota 7.)
    Cf. above p. 803, note 1, and Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 1, n. 1 ff. and c. 14, n. 40 ff.
  11. De quo vide supra d. 32. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius post potest tamen plurimi codd. et ed. 1, perinde ac supra, omittunt ei. (p. 874, nota 8.)
    On which see above d. 32, a. 3, q. 1 f. — A little below, after potest tamen, most codices and ed. 1, just as above, omit ei.
  12. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5. (p. 873, nota 7.)
    Cf. tom. I, p. 707, note 5.
  13. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt aliquid sed tum supra tum infra ordinarie hoc vocabulum habent. Paulo inferius post haec autem cod. H supplet dicitur, Vat. est. (p. 875, nota 2.)
    Most codices with edd. 2, 3, 4 omit aliquid, but both above and below they ordinarily have this word. A little below, after haec autem, codex H supplies dicitur, the Vatican edition est.
  14. Vide supra pag. 870, nota 8. — Cod. F sophisticatio pro sophisma. Mox pro qua sic Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit quae sic. (p. 875, nota 3.)
    See above p. 870, note 8. — Codex F reads sophisticatio for sophisma. Shortly, for qua sic the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 substitutes quae sic.
  15. Cfr. August., de Magistro, c. 2. n. 3. seqq., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 2. n. 2. et II. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. — Subinde pro et ideo inadaequatio Vat. et ideo in inadaequatione. (p. 875, nota 1.)
    Cf. Augustine, On the Teacher, c. 2, n. 3 ff.; On Christian Doctrine I, c. 2, n. 2 and II, c. 1, n. 1 ff. — Subsequently, for et ideo inadaequatio the Vatican edition reads et ideo in inadaequatione.
  16. Cod. T hanc proposit. sic exhibet: Sicut... vere significari esse, sic etiam de illa re, quae nullo modo est, contingit significare ipsam non esse. In initio proposit. post contingit vere significari Vat. addit de ipso. (p. 875, nota 5.)
    Codex T presents this proposition thus: "Just as... it is truly signified to be, so also of that thing which in no way is, it happens that it is signified not to be itself." At the beginning of the proposition, after contingit vere significari, the Vatican edition adds de ipso.
  17. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 5. — Aliquanto superius inter verba illa adaequatio codd. F W interiiciunt tamen. (p. 875, nota 4.)
    Cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 5. — Somewhat above, between the words of that adaequatio, codices F W insert tamen.
  18. Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 4. ad 1. — Subinde (cfr. p. 875, nota 7): Vide scholion ad primam huius art. quaest. (p. 875, notae 6 et 7.)
    See I Sent. d. 46, q. 4, ad 1. — And further: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---
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