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Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia tam fortuita quam casualis actio est ex causis confluentibus, ob aliud inceptis; unde Boethius in quinto de Consolatione1: « Casus est inopinatus rei eventus ex causis concurrentibus, ob aliud inceptis ». Sed tam concursus causarum quam inchoatio propter aliud est a Deo: ergo si nihil plus requiritur ad hoc, quod aliquid sit fortuitum vel casuale; videtur, quod tam fortuita quam casualia, secundum quod huiusmodi, sint a Deo.

2. Item, sicut ens per se est a Deo, in quantum est per se, sic et accidens est a Deo, in quantum est accidens: ergo sicut operatio causae per se a Deo est, ita et operatio causae per accidens. Sed casuale et fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit operationem vel effectum causae per accidens, sed naturale et artificiale dicit effectum causae per se: ergo sicut omne naturale et artificiale est a Deo, in quantum huiusmodi, sic omne casuale et omne fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua diversa concurrunt ad unius effectus productionem, necesse est, quod per unum aliquid coniungantur; sed causae, a quibus oritur tam casuale quam fortuitum, et sunt diversae quantum ad rem et sunt diversae quantum ad intentionem: ergo si uniuntur, coniunguntur per aliquid, quod est supra eas. Sed nihil est supra agens naturale et agens a proposito2 nisi solus Deus: ergo talium causarum concursus a Deo est; et huiusmodi causarum concursus facit effectum casualem vel fortuitum: ergo etc.

4. Item, potentior est ad agendum causa per se quam causa per accidens; sed causa per se nullum effectum producere potest, quin adiuvetur a Deo: ergo nec causa per accidens. Sed causae per accidens sunt casus et fortuna, sicut vult Philosophus in secundo Physicorum3: ergo cum eorum effectus sint casuale et fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, videtur etc. Si tu dicas, quod casuale, secundum id quod est, a Deo est, non tamen secundum quod casuale, quia dicit privationem intentionis, non positionem; contra hoc est: quia, sicut natura operatur per intentionem, ita operatur etiam uniformiter et modo consueto; sed cum aliqua operatio fit praeter solitum cursum naturae, illa quidem operatio dicitur miraculum, et talis operatio ponitur a Deo, in quantum talis4. Si ergo operatio, quae fit praeter consuetudinem, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo, pari ratione et operatio, quae fit praeter intentionem, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo.

5. Item, fortuitum eo ipso dicitur fortuitum, quia est ab aliquo agente intendente aliud, sicut inventio thesauri est ab eo qui intendit arare terram; sed quod ille aliud intendat, hoc bonum est et a Deo est; similiter, quod thesaurum illum inveniat, hoc bonum est et a Deo est: ergo fortuitum, ut fortuitum est, a Deo videtur esse.

Fundamenta.

1. Sed contra hoc arguit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum5 sic: « Quidquid casu

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fit, temere fit: quidquid temere fit, non fit providentia »: si igitur omne quod fit a Deo, fit per providentiam, quia Deus nihil agit sine providentia; videtur, quod casuale et fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, non sit a Deo.

2. Item, casus et fortuna accidit per defectum praecognitionis; sed Deus nihil potest facere nisi praecognoscens et praesciens: ergo nihil casuale, in quantum huiusmodi, a Deo est6.

3. Item, sicut bonum repugnat malo, ita fortuna repugnat providentiae: sed a Deo, qui summe bonus est, non potest egredi aliqua operatio iniusta: ergo pari ratione, cum sit summe prudens7, non potest ab eo exire aliqua operatio fortuita.

4. Item, fortuitum, secundum quod fortuitum, ortum habet a causa per accidens: ergo si Deus esset causa fortuiti, secundum quod huiusmodi, Deus esset causa alicuius rei per accidens. Sed causa per accidens reduci habet ad causam nobiliorem8: ergo aliqua causa esset nobilior Deo: quod est absurdum.

5. Item, sicut iniustitia se habet ad suam causam, sic casuale et fortuitum ad suam; sed iniustitia non potest esse ab aliquo nisi operante iniuste: ergo casuale et fortuitum non potest esse, nisi ab eo qui operatur casualiter et fortuite. Sed Deus nullo modo operatur casualiter nec fortuite: ergo casualis sive fortuita operatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo.

CONCLUSIO.

Casuale et fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, a Deo non est, etsi a Deo est, secundum id quod est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod etsi casuale vel fortuitum, secundum id quod est, sit a Deo; in quantum tamen casuale vel fortuitum, a Deo non est. (Conclusio.) Et ratio huius est, quia fortuitum et casuale aliquid ponunt, utpote effectum, qui est ex concursu causarum ob aliud inceptarum; aliquid etiam privant; dicit enim casus et fortuna defectum intentionis et praecognitionis. (Ratio.) Et quoniam operatio causarum et concursus ad producendum tales effectus aliquid est, ideo a Deo est; quia vero privatio intentionis defectus est, ideo a Deo non est. Et quoniam casuale et fortuitum, ut sic nominantur, imposita sunt a tali defectu; hinc est, quod non sunt concedenda a Deo esse. Et hoc vult dicere Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum9, cum dicit: « Quod casu fit, temere fit »; et ideo, sicut non concedimus, quod temerarium, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo; sic non est concedendum, quod casuale vel fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. —

(Duplex casuale et fortuitum.) Et quia tam casuale quam fortuitum, ut sic est, est nomen impositum a privatione intentionis; secundum quod privatio intentionis dupliciter potest intelligi, secundum hoc casuale et fortuitum dicitur dupliciter. (Corollarium 1.) Uno enim modo potest intelligi privatio intentionis universaliter respectu cuiuscumque agentis, sive particularis sive universalis, sive operantis sive cooperantis, sive exsequentis sive gubernantis. Et hoc modo nihil est casuale, et casus et fortuna hoc modo nihil sunt. Et hoc modo posuerunt aliqui philosophi casum, et improbat Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum10 per hoc, quod providentia totus mundus administratur; et ita nihil fit, quod non pertineat ad opus providentiae. (Corollarium 2.) Alio modo potest intelligi privatio intentionis respectu agentis particularis, utpote particularis naturae et intellectus creati; et hoc modo aliquid est casuale, et casus aliquid est, secundum quod dicit Boethius in libro de Consolatione11 definiens casum et ostendens, qualiter quis potest operari casualiter, videlicet cum aliquid assequitur inopinate; et ideo dicit: « Casus est inopinatus rei eventus », ubi simul tangit privationem et positionem: positionem per hoc, quod dicit eventum; privationem in hoc, quod dicit inopinatum; et illa quidem privatio non est respectu Dei, quia Deus nihil potest facere inopinate sive improvise, nec etiam a Deo est, cum sit defectus, sed potius a defectibilitate creaturae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod nihil est a Deo casuale, et12 quod casuale, secundum quod casuale, non est a Deo.

(Solutio oppositorum.)

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod concursus causarum a Deo est; iam patet responsio. Arguit enim de casu, secundum quod dicit positionem, non secundum quod dicit defectum.

2. (Notandum.) Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod a Deo est causa per se et per accidens; dicendum, quod aliter dicitur accidens de ente, prout est differentia entis, aliter prout est differentia causae. Prout enim est differentia entis, dicit habitudinem ad subiectum, quae quidem est positio, non privatio. Prout autem est differentia causae, dicit privationem intentionis, per quam aliquid dicitur esse causa alicuius per se13.

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Et ideo non sequitur, quod si modus essendi per accidens, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo, quod et modus operandi per accidens, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversae causae indigent aliquo superiori coniungente ad hoc, quod possint unum effectum producere; dicendum, quod illud dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo vere, alio modo false. (Dupliciter intelligitur.) Si enim ita intelligatur, quod ad hoc, quod aliquae duae causae concurrant, necessaria sit nova influentia causae superioris plus, quam si non concurrerent, et quaelibet operaretur per se; sic non habet veritatem. Hoc enim ipso, quod aliquis abscondit in terra thesaurum, et aliquis fodit in eadem terra, sine nova influentia illae duae operationes causant thesauri inventionem. Si autem ita intelligatur, quod omnes causae, quae concurrunt ad unum effectum, reducuntur ad aliquod unum principium; sic veritatem habet, pro eo quod illa quae non possunt reduci ad unum principium, omnino sunt diversa; et ideo nunquam possunt ad unum effectum concurrere. Si enim in uno principio non convenirent, iam omnino non haberent aliquid commune; et ideo necesse est ponere, quod tam causae concurrentes quam earum concursus sint ab uno principio primo. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod casuale, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo, quamvis sit a Deo, secundum id quod est; quia casus non tantum dicit eventum, sed etiam eventum inopinatum14.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa per accidens indiget adiutorio, sicut causa per se; dicendum, quod verum est respectu eius quod efficit, sed non indiget adiutorium respectu eius, in quo deficit; per se enim potest deficere, sed non per se potest efficere. Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod casuale sit a Deo, nisi secundum id, secundum quod aliquid ponit, non secundum quod dicit privationem intentionis. (Notandum.) Et si obiiciat, quod miraculum, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo, et tamen dicit privationem consuetudinis, quia fit praeter solitum cursum; dicendum, quod aliter miraculum fit praeter solitum cursum, et aliter fortuitum praeter intentionem. Miraculum enim fit sic15 praeter solitum cursum, ita quod supra cursum naturae, unde plus dicit positionis quam privationis; casuale vero non ita fit praeter intentionem, quod fiat supra intentionem, sed deficit ab intentione.

5. (Notandum.) Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest16, quod aliquod agens unum assequatur et aliud intendat, ita quod utrumque sit a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed assequi unum et intendere aliud hoc non facit casus vel fortuna, in quantum quis aliud intendit ab eo quod assequitur, sed in quantum non praevidet nec intendit illud quod assequitur. Si enim illud et aliud17 intenderet, iam non operaretur casualiter sive fortuite. Licet autem intendere ad aliud sit a Deo, non tamen a Deo est non intendere illud quod assequitur, quia primum dicit positionem, et secundum privationem; et casuale sive fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, non denominatur a primo, sed a secundo: et propterea, in quantum tale, non est a Deo, sed a defectu reperto in agente creato.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.

Secondly it is asked, whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because both a fortuitous and a chance action is from causes converging, undertaken for the sake of something else; whence Boethius in the fifth [book] On Consolation1: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing from causes concurring, undertaken for the sake of something else ». But both the concurrence of causes and the inception for the sake of another are from God: therefore if nothing more is required for something to be fortuitous or by chance; it seems that both fortuitous and chance things, insofar as they are such, are from God.

2. Likewise, just as being per se is from God insofar as it is per se, so also accident is from God insofar as it is an accident: therefore just as the operation of a cause per se is from God, so also the operation of a cause per accidens. But the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, denote the operation or effect of a cause per accidens, whereas the natural and the artificial denote the effect of a cause per se: therefore just as every natural and artificial thing is from God, insofar as it is such, so every chance thing and every fortuitous thing, insofar as it is such, is from God.

3. Likewise, whenever diverse things concur toward the production of one effect, it is necessary that they be joined through some one thing; but the causes from which both the chance and the fortuitous arise are diverse as to the thing and are diverse as to the intention: therefore if they are united, they are joined through something which is above them. But nothing is above a natural agent and an agent acting from purpose2 except God alone: therefore the concurrence of such causes is from God; and the concurrence of such causes makes a chance or fortuitous effect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a cause per se is more powerful in acting than a cause per accidens; but a cause per se can produce no effect unless it be helped by God: therefore neither [can] a cause per accidens. But chance and fortune are causes per accidens, as the Philosopher holds in the second [book] of the Physics3: therefore since their effects are the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, it seems etc. If you say that the chance thing, according to that which it is, is from God, yet not insofar as it is chance, because it denotes a privation of intention, not a position; on the contrary there is this: because, just as nature operates through intention, so it also operates uniformly and in the accustomed manner; but when some operation comes to be beyond the usual course of nature, that operation indeed is called a miracle, and such an operation is ascribed to God, insofar as it is such4. If therefore an operation which comes to be beyond custom, insofar as it is such, is from God, by parity of reasoning an operation also which comes to be beyond intention, insofar as it is such, is from God.

5. Likewise, the fortuitous is by this very fact called fortuitous, because it is from some agent intending something else, just as the finding of a treasure is from one who intends to plow the earth; but that he intend something else, this is good and is from God; similarly, that he find that treasure, this is good and is from God: therefore the fortuitous, as it is fortuitous, seems to be from God.

Fundamenta.

1. But against this Augustine argues in the book On the Eighty-three Questions5 thus: « Whatever happens by chance, happens at random:

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whatever happens at random, does not happen by providence »: if therefore everything that comes to be from God comes to be through providence, since God does nothing without providence; it seems that the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God.

2. Likewise, chance and fortune happen through a defect of foreknowledge; but God can make nothing except foreknowing and foreseeing: therefore nothing chance, insofar as it is such, is from God6.

3. Likewise, just as the good is repugnant to the evil, so fortune is repugnant to providence: but from God, who is supremely good, no unjust operation can proceed: therefore by parity of reasoning, since he is supremely prudent7, no fortuitous operation can come forth from him.

4. Likewise, the fortuitous, insofar as it is fortuitous, has its origin from a cause per accidens: therefore if God were the cause of the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, God would be the cause of some thing per accidens. But a cause per accidens has to be reduced to a nobler cause8: therefore some cause would be nobler than God: which is absurd.

5. Likewise, just as injustice stands to its cause, so the chance and the fortuitous to theirs; but injustice cannot be from anyone except one acting unjustly: therefore the chance and the fortuitous cannot be, except from one who operates by chance and fortuitously. But God in no way operates by chance nor fortuitously: therefore a chance or fortuitous operation, insofar as it is such, is not from God.

CONCLUSION.

The chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God, even though it is from God according to that which it is.

I respond: It must be said that although the chance or the fortuitous, according to that which it is, is from God; yet insofar as it is chance or fortuitous, it is not from God. (Conclusion.) And the reason of this is that the fortuitous and the chance posit something, namely an effect, which is from the concurrence of causes undertaken for the sake of something else; they also privatively take something away; for chance and fortune denote a defect of intention and of foreknowledge. (Reason.) And since the operation of the causes and their concurrence toward producing such effects is something, therefore it is from God; but since the privation of intention is a defect, therefore it is not from God. And since the chance and the fortuitous, as they are so named, are imposed from such a defect; hence it is that they are not to be granted to be from God. And this is what Augustine means to say in the book On the Eighty-three Questions9, when he says: « What happens by chance, happens at random »; and therefore, just as we do not grant that the random, insofar as it is such, is from God; so it is not to be granted that the chance or the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is from God. —

(The chance and the fortuitous are twofold.) And since both the chance and the fortuitous, as it is so, is a name imposed from the privation of intention; according as the privation of intention can be understood in two ways, accordingly the chance and the fortuitous is said in two ways. (Corollary 1.) For in one way the privation of intention can be understood universally with respect to any agent whatsoever, whether particular or universal, whether operating or cooperating, whether executing or governing. And in this way nothing is chance, and chance and fortune in this way are nothing. And in this way certain philosophers posited chance, and Augustine disproves it in the book On the Eighty-three Questions10 by this, that the whole world is administered by providence; and so nothing comes to be which does not pertain to the work of providence. (Corollary 2.) In another way the privation of intention can be understood with respect to a particular agent, namely of a particular created nature and intellect; and in this way something is chance, and chance is something, according as Boethius says in the book On Consolation11 defining chance and showing in what way one can operate by chance, namely when one attains something unlooked-for; and therefore he says: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing », where at once he touches the privation and the position: the position by this, that he says outcome; the privation in this, that he says unlooked-for; and that privation indeed is not with respect to God, because God can make nothing unlooked-for or unforeseen, nor is it from God, since it is a defect, but rather from the defectibility of the creature. — There are therefore to be granted the reasons showing that nothing chance is from God, and12 that the chance, insofar as it is chance, is not from God.

(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the concurrence of causes is from God; the response is already plain. For it argues of chance according as it denotes a position, not according as it denotes a defect.

2. (To be noted.) To that which is objected, that the cause per se and per accidens is from God; it must be said that accident is said in one way of being, insofar as it is a difference of being, in another way insofar as it is a difference of cause. For insofar as it is a difference of being, it denotes a relation to a subject, which indeed is a position, not a privation. But insofar as it is a difference of cause, it denotes a privation of intention, by which something is said to be a cause of something per se13.

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And therefore it does not follow that, if the mode of being per accidens, insofar as it is such, is from God, then the mode of operating per accidens, insofar as it is such, is also from God.

3. To that which is objected, that diverse causes need some superior thing joining them in order that they may produce one effect; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way truly, in another way falsely. (It is understood in two ways.) For if it be understood thus, that in order that any two causes concur, a new influence of a superior cause is necessary, more than if they did not concur and each operated per se; thus it does not hold true. For by this very fact that someone hides a treasure in the earth, and someone digs in the same earth, without a new influence those two operations cause the finding of the treasure. But if it be understood thus, that all the causes which concur toward one effect are reduced to some one principle; thus it holds true, for the reason that those things which cannot be reduced to one principle are wholly diverse; and therefore they can never concur toward one effect. For if they did not agree in one principle, they would now have nothing in common at all; and therefore it is necessary to posit that both the concurring causes and their concurrence are from one first principle. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that the chance, insofar as it is such, is from God, although it is from God according to that which it is; because chance denotes not only the outcome, but also the unlooked-for outcome14.

4. To that which is objected, that a cause per accidens needs help, just as a cause per se; it must be said that this is true with respect to that which it effects, but it does not need help with respect to that in which it fails; for of itself it can fail, but it cannot of itself effect. And therefore it does not follow from this that the chance is from God, except according to that, according to which something posits, not according as it denotes a privation of intention. (To be noted.) And if it be objected that a miracle, insofar as it is such, is from God, and yet denotes a privation of custom, since it comes to be beyond the usual course; it must be said that a miracle comes to be beyond the usual course in one way, and the fortuitous beyond intention in another way. For a miracle comes to be thus15 beyond the usual course, in such a way that it is above the course of nature, whence it denotes more of position than of privation; but the chance does not so come to be beyond intention that it should come to be above intention, but it falls short of intention.

5. (To be noted.) To that which is objected, that God is able16 to bring it about that some agent attain one thing and intend another, in such a way that both be from God; it must be said that this is true; but to attain one thing and intend another — this chance or fortune does not do, insofar as one intends something else than that which he attains, but insofar as he does not foresee nor intend that which he attains. For if he intended both it and the other17, he would no longer operate by chance or fortuitously. But although to intend toward another be from God, yet it is not from God not to intend that which he attains, because the first denotes a position, and the second a privation; and the chance or fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is denominated not from the first, but from the second: and therefore, insofar as it is such, it is not from God, but from a defect found in the created agent.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Prosa 1, ubi proprie habentur haec: Licet igitur definire, casum esse inopinatum ex confluentibus causis, in his quae ob aliquid geruntur, eventum. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.), ubi de casu et fortuna, oppositis naturae et arti, fusius agitur atque exponitur, quid sint, quomodo ab invicem differant, quomodo sint causae per accidens etc., quae omnia in hac quaestione tanguntur.
    Prose 1, where these words are properly found: It is permitted therefore to define chance as the unlooked-for outcome, from converging causes, in those things which are done for the sake of something. Cfr. Aristotle, II. Physics text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.), where chance and fortune, as opposed to nature and art, are treated more fully and it is explained what they are, how they differ from one another, how they are causes per accidens etc., all of which are touched upon in this question.
  2. Vide tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.
    See tom. I. p. 714, note 3.
  3. Text. 48. seqq., praecipue text. 57. (c. 4. seqq.).
    Text 48. seqq., especially text 57. (c. 4. seqq.).
  4. Vide supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Immediate supra post ponitur a Deo cod. N addit esse, et aliquanto superius pro contra hoc est: quia cod. cc. et ed. 1 habent contra hoc est: quod.
    See above d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Immediately above, after ponitur a Deo, cod. N adds esse, and somewhat earlier for contra hoc est: quia cod. cc. and ed. 1 have contra hoc est: quod.
  5. Quaest. 24. — De minori vide I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3.
    Question 24. — On the minor [premise] see I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3.
  6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4.
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4.
  7. Codd. N bb providens.
    Codd. N bb [read] providens.
  8. Vide supra pag. 810, nota 3.
    See above p. 810, note 3.
  9. Quaest. 24. Verba Augustini improbantia habentur supra d. XXXV. lit. Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 43. seqq. (c. 4.) et de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.). Philosophi, qui casualismum profitebantur, fuerunt Leucippus et Democritus. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Part. animal. c. 1.
    Question 24. The words of Augustine disproving [it] are had above at d. XXXV. in the text of the Master, c. 3. Cfr. Aristotle, II. Physics text. 43. seqq. (c. 4.) and On the World, c. 7. (c. 6.). The philosophers who professed chance-doctrine were Leucippus and Democritus. Cfr. Aristotle, I. On the Parts of Animals c. 1.
  10. Libr. V. prosa 1, ubi de Aristotele iudicat, quod iste casum vel fortuitum « in Physicis (II. text. 48. seqq.) et brevi et veri propinqua ratione definivit ».
    Book V. prose 1, where he judges of Aristotle that he defined chance or the fortuitous « in the Physics (II. text. 48. seqq.) both briefly and by a reasoning near to the truth ».
  11. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ita.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] ita.
  12. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 50. (c. 5.); V. Metaph. text. 3-5. et VII. text. 3. (IV. c. 30. et VI. c. 1.). — In principio solut. cod. V tam per se quam per accidens pro per se et per accidens.
    Cfr. Aristotle, II. Physics text. 50. (c. 5.); V. Metaphysics text. 3–5. and VII. text. 3. (IV. c. 30. and VI. c. 1.). — At the beginning of the solution cod. V [reads] tam per se quam per accidens for per se et per accidens.
  13. Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro dicit ed. 3 intendit, Vat. intendit et dicit, quae et deinde post sed etiam interiicit ut.
    See above d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — A little before, for dicit ed. 3 [reads] intendit, the Vatican [edition] intendit et dicit, which also thereupon, after sed etiam, interposes ut.
  14. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest sic.
    In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 sic is lacking.
  15. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest sic.
    In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 sic is lacking.
  16. Cod. cc et ed. 1 bene supplent facere.
    Cod. cc and ed. 1 rightly supply facere.
  17. Vat. omittit et aliud. Mox pro intendere ad aliud ed. 1 intendere aliud.
    The Vatican [edition] omits et aliud. Soon, for intendere ad aliud ed. 1 [reads] intendere aliud.
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