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Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 194

Quaestio III. Utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura. Et quod sic, videtur:

Ad oppositum:

1. Per simile, quia astronomi et mathematici per cursum astrorum praecognoscunt et dicunt multa futura, et videmus, quod in multis vera dicunt: ergo si maior est intelligentia et cognitio in daemonibus, videtur etc.

2. Item, hoc ostenditur ab effectu, quia isti magi et divini per pacta cum daemonibus multa vera praedicunt; et non possunt nisi per revelationem daemonum: ergo videtur, quod ipsi futura praecognoscant.

3. Item, videtur hoc a minori, quia intellectus agens in somniis et in ecstasi multa vera futura praevidet, sicut patet, quia frequenter somniamus quod evenit nobis post longa tempora: sed daemones sunt omnino abstracti a sensibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur, quia « anima quodam modo est omnia1 », quia in ea est « quo est omnia fieri », quantum est ex parte intellectus possibilis; et quantum est ex parte intellectus agentis, est in ea « quo est omnia facere »: ergo si intellectus agens esset liber, vel possibilis reductus ad actum per agentem; tunc non solum esset in potentia ad cognoscendum futura, sed etiam in actu. Et hoc est in daemonibus, qui creati sunt in actualitate plenae cognitionis, et quorum intellectus agens est liber a corpore: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta:

1. Quod non praesciant futura contingentia, videtur. Quanto aliquid magis est praesens alicui, tanto certius est ei; sed voluntas uniuscuiusque sibi praesentior est quam alii: ergo certior est sibi, quid velle debeat, quam alii. Sed nullus homo certitudinaliter scit, quid debeat cras velle vel cogitare: ergo multo minus nec alia creatura, quantum est de se, potest scire.

2. Item, omnis cognitio creaturae pendet a re scita, quia scibile non se habet in comparatione ad scientem creatum per modum possibilis, sed potius per modum actualis et motivi2; sed nulla cognitio pendens a cognoscibili potest esse certa de re incerta; sed futurum contingens est res incerta: ergo non potest certitudinaliter ab Angelo cognosci.

3. Item, si cognoscit futura, aut ergo scientia acquisita, aut innata. Si acquisita; sed haec incipit ab existentia rei, quia a re ipsa generatur in cognoscente: cum ergo res nondum sit, non potest cognitionem eius acquirere. Si innata: ergo non potest ignorare aliqua eorum quae futura sunt: ergo praescivit casum suum, antequam caderet, quod supra3 improbatum est tanquam impossibile: ergo etc.

4. Item, si praescit futura, ergo scit, quis debeat vincere, utrum ipse, an is quem tentat: ergo cum ipse refugiat victoriam bonorum, nunquam tentaret nisi illos quos praesciret sibi succumbere; sed alios tentat, sicut patet in Iob4: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Daemones futurorum contingentium non possunt certam habere praecognitionem, cum hoc solius sit Dei, licet ob ingenii acrimoniam, longam experientiam, dolosam cautelam et alienam doctrinam aliquando possint vera praedicere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod futurorum triplex est genus. Quaedam enim sunt futura, quae habent causam determinatam et infallibilem, utpote sunt illa quae attenduntur circa motum corporum superiorum, in quibus est determinatio et omnis impedimenti remotio. Talia possunt certitudinaliter sciri non solum a Deo et in Deo, sed a creatura; et hoc in sua causa, sicut tempus eclypsis et consimilium. Quaedam sunt, quae habent causam determinatam, sed tamen fallibilem, utpote sunt illa quae sunt secundum inferiorem naturam; quae ideo habent causam determinatam, quia intentio naturae movet determinate ad unum5, ideo vero fallibilem, quia multiplex potest occurrere impedimentum: utpote quod ager seminatus, si terra pinguis est et bona dispositio superiorum corporum, afferat pinguem fructum. Et ista possunt quodam modo sciri et praesciri non tantum a Deo, sed etiam a creatura, quae novit naturas rerum superiorum et inferiorum, non tamen ita certitudinaliter, sicut praedicta. Quaedam autem sunt, quae habent causam indeterminatam et fallibilem, sicut sunt ea quae sunt a voluntate nostra, quae indeterminata est propter hoc, quod est ad opposita, fallibilis etiam, quia possunt etiam volenti perficere occurrere multa impedimenta. Et talia non possunt certitudinaliter sciri ab aliqua creatura in se ipsa, sed solum a Deo, vel per revelationem divinam.

Ratio autem huius est ista, quia cognitio creaturae pendet ex re6; quoniam igitur res incerta est et in se et in sua causa, ideo creatura non potest

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illam certitudinaliter nosse aut praescire. Divina autem cognitio non pendet a re aliqua, immo omnia quae novit, secundum modum suae veritatis novit; et quia veritas sua est certissima, certissime cognoscit contingentia, ut necessaria; et hoc melius explanatum fuit in primo libro7. Et sicut certissime novit, ita potest certitudinaliter demonstrare et revelare; ideo haec praecognitio futurorum, vel Dei est vel a Deo. Et ideo, cum talia futura praedicuntur, praedictio dicitur divinatio, quia talis est actus divinus; et quia daemones superbi maxime desiderant honorari ut Deus, maxime conantur ostendere hoc in se habere. — Et ideo dicere, quod daemones per se ipsos futura contingentia praesciant certitudinaliter, hoc est eis attribuere quod Dei est. Ideo est ibi infidelitas et infidelitati frequenter annexa idololatria; ideo divinatio est prohibita8. — Quamvis autem daemones non possint per se ipsos futura contingentia scire certitudinaliter, tamen frequenter vera praedicunt, quia eventum futurorum aliquo modo praesentiunt. Hoc autem est quadrupliciter, sicut dicit Augustinus in secundo super Genesim ad litteram9: « Aut enim sensus vel ingenii acrimonia, aut multa experientia, aut dolosa cautela, aut aliena doctrina ». Sensus acrimonia, ut quando vident diligenter et considerant, ad quid inclinetur affectio nostra, vel quae sint inducentia vel retrahentia; experientia temporum, quia ex talibus vident accidere talia; dolosa cautela, quando proponit aliquid facere et praedicit, quod aliquid sit futurum10; aliena doctrina, quando iusto Dei iudicio permittitur addiscere ab Angelis. — Et sic patet, quod daemones futura contingentia, etsi possunt praesentire probabiliter, non possunt certitudinaliter praescire, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de astronomis sive mathematicis, quod frequenter dicunt vera; dicendum, quod hoc solum est coniecturando, sive secundum legem astrorum, sive secundum diabolica commercia: secundum legem astrorum, utpote quando dominatur stella, quae habet impressionem super diversos humores, disponit secundum hoc hominem ad diversos mores et affectiones11; secundum diabolica commercia, ut quando volunt vim astrorum ultra protendere12 quam ad illud, super quod possunt; tunc enim, nisi diabolus adesset, ita frequenter falsum sicut verum dicerent13; nunc autem cum toto auxilio daemonum frequenter falsa praedicunt et decipiuntur. Sed tanta est daemonum astutia, quod ita sciunt occultare fraudem suam, ut ostendant, errorem sive defectum fuisse in astronomo considerante, non in arte aut diabolo assistente. — In hoc igitur stat responsio, quod astronomi de contingentibus habentibus causam fallibilem et indeterminatam non praesciunt vera nisi ex coniectura; et diabolus ex maiori coniectura illa praesentit, non tamen certitudinaliter praescit.

Ad 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de magis et divinis, quod dicunt vera; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen, quia aliquando dicunt falsa, patet, quod potius dicunt verum casualiter quam certitudinaliter, potius coniectura quam scientia. Qui enim semel dicit futurum in verbo Domini, et non evenit, sicut in Lege14 dicitur, somniator est, et non propheta Domini; et ideo praecipitur occidi.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de somniis, in quibus praevidentur futura; dicendum, quod quidquid de hoc senserint philosophi15, quorum positiones longum esset hic retexere, quod de eis dicit sacra Scriptura indubitanter est tenendum. Reprehendit enim eos qui confidentiam habent in somniis; unde Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto16: Sicut parturientis cor tuum phantasias patitur, nisi ab Altissimo fuerit missa visitatio; ideo intelligendum, quod quinque ex causis fiunt somnia. Quaedam ex dispositione corporis, quaedam ex sollicitudine mentis, quaedam ex illusione diabolica, quaedam ex revelatione angelica, quaedam ex visitatione divina. Prima duo somnia sunt praesagia futurorum, quae habent causam in nobis, ut somnia, quae contingunt ex causis corporis, sunt signa infirmitatis; somnia, quae contingunt ex sollicitudine mentis, sunt signa eorum, ad quae facienda vel desideranda nostra inclinatur affectio; aliorum vero non sunt signa de se, immo, si ad alia applicentur, potius praebent occasionem errandi quam praesciendi. Somnia vero, quae sunt a diabolica illusione, nullius sunt roboris, sicut nec divinationes haruspicum. Somnia vero, quae ab Angelis bonis, aut a Deo sunt in nobis, signa sunt vera. Et ita ex hoc non habetur, quod praecognitio futurorum contingentium aliter habeatur quam a Deo, nisi per aliquam coniecturam17.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima quodam modo est omnia; dicendum, quod intellectus

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agens non est ens actu plene respectu omnium, quia non est plene agens; et ideo indiget iuvari a cognoscibili ad hoc, quod sit in actu, vel a Deo, qui est omnino actus respectu omnium entium et verorum. Et quia futurum contingens non habet esse nisi indeterminatum, ideo non potest intellectum iuvare ad certitudinalem cognitionem habendam de se. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod agens est in actu respectu omnium, ad quae possibilis est in potentia; solvendum est per interemptionem18, non solum in hominibus, verum etiam in Angelis. Quaedam enim sunt, ad quae etiam agens divinum possibilis est in potentia, quia sunt supra posse creaturae. Unde illa propositio non habet veritatem nisi de his tantum, quae sunt infra posse intellectus creati, respectu quorum habet intellectus se et in ratione agentis et possibilis; non autem respectu eorum quae sunt supra. Et sic patet illud19.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio ideo maioris momenti est, quia in ea agitur de fundamento divinationis sive illius superstitionis, quae tentat futura contingentia certo indagare et praedicere (cfr. definitio eius hic in corp.), quo saltem implicite auxilium daemonum provocatur. Haec superstitio antiquis temporibus totum mundum invasit nec unquam post Christum penitus cessavit, immo nostra aetate late serpens denuo e tenebris emersit.

Quod autem daemones (et idem obtinet de naturali cognitione bonorum Angelorum) ex se res futuras nec in se ipsis, nec in causis, quatenus in eis non sunt determinatae, nequeant cognoscere, S. Doctor hac fundamentali ratione probat, quod cognitio creaturarum pendet a re cognita; res autem futura, dum nondum est, non potest in se esse obiectum cognitionis nisi intellectui divino (cfr. 1. Sent. d. 38. a. 1.). In suis causis autem futura certo cognosci nequeunt, nisi ea quae pendent a causis determinatis et non fallibilibus (cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.).

II. Quoad primum et tertium futurorum genus in corp. distinctum omnes doctores conveniunt; quoad secundum autem duae sunt opiniones, a Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) cum earum argumentis relatae. Prima opinio contendit, quod, cum effectus causarum naturalium, quae necessario operantur, alia interdum naturali causa impediatur, et concursus causae impedientis quandoque sit per accidens et a casu; eventus tunc a daemonibus non nisi per coniecturam sciri possit. Secunda vero opinio asserit, omnes effectus naturales necessario evenire, nisi a libera voluntate sive divina sive creata impediantur. Hinc omnes effectus naturales futuros, nulla libertate impeditos, daemonibus notos esse putant. Contra hanc opinionem primae sententiae fautores, teste eodem Richardo, opponebant articulum a Stephano Parisiensi episc. a. 1276 condemnatum (Collect. iudic. pag. 198, cap. 14. n. 1.): « Quod nihil fit a casu, sed omnia ex necessitate eveniunt sic; et quod omnia futura, quae erunt, ex necessitate erunt; et quod non erit, impossibile est esse; et quod nihil evenit contingenter, considerando omnes causas ». (Censura) « Error, quia concursus causarum est de definitione casualis, Boethius de Consolatione ». Sed secundae sententiae adhaerentes replicabant, hanc censuram non apte applicari. — S. Thom. (S. I. q. 57. a. 3.) docet, futura, quae non necessario ex causis suis eveniant, a daemonibus non cognosci nisi per coniecturam, « si ex suis causis proveniunt ut in pluribus. Quae vero proveniunt ex causis suis ut in paucioribus, penitus sunt ignota, sicut casualia et fortuita ». Consentiunt Scot. (Quodl. q. 21.), Aegid. R. aliique. Etiam S. Bonav. primae opinioni magis favet, ut patet ex ipsius verbis in corp. — De casu cfr. 1. Sent. d. 39. dub. 4, et infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2; de divinatione infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 5.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot. in Sum. Hier. de Muntefortino, l. II, q. 57. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 57. a. 3, q. 86. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 154; de Verit. q. 8. a. 12; de Malo, q. 16. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation
p. 194

Question III. Whether in the demons there is foreknowledge concerning future things.

In the third place it is asked whether there is in the demons foreknowledge concerning future things. And that there is, seems thus:

For the opposite side:

1. From a likeness: astronomers and mathematicians by the course of the stars foreknow and predict many future things, and we see that in many things they speak truly: therefore if the intellect and cognition in the demons is greater, it seems etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown from effect: for these magicians and diviners by pacts with the demons predict many true things; and they cannot do so except by revelation from the demons: therefore it seems that the demons themselves foreknow future things.

3. Likewise, this seems from the lesser case, because the active intellect in dreams and in ecstasy foresees many true future things, as is plain because we frequently dream what happens to us long afterward: but the demons are wholly abstracted from the senses: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, by reason it seems: because « the soul is in a certain way all things1 », for in it is « that by which all things come to be », so far as the possible intellect is concerned; and as for the active intellect, in it is « that by which it makes all things »: therefore if the active intellect were free, or the possible were reduced to act by the agent, then it would be not only in potency to knowing future things but also in act. And this is so in the demons, who were created in the actuality of full cognition, and whose active intellect is free from the body: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta:

1. That they do not foreknow future contingents, this seems thus. The more present anything is to someone, the more certain it is to him; but the will of each one is more present to himself than to another: therefore he is more certain to himself what he ought to will than another is. But no man certainly knows what he ought to will or to think tomorrow: therefore much less can any other creature, of itself, know it.

2. Likewise, every cognition of a creature depends upon the thing known, since the knowable does not stand in relation to a created knower after the manner of the possible, but rather after the manner of the actual and motive2; but no cognition depending upon a knowable can be certain about an uncertain thing; but a future contingent is an uncertain thing: therefore it cannot be certainly known by an Angel.

3. Likewise, if he knows future things, it is either by acquired knowledge or by innate knowledge. If acquired; but this begins from the existence of a thing, since it is generated in the knower from the thing itself: since therefore the thing does not yet exist, he cannot acquire the cognition of it. If innate: then he cannot be ignorant of any of the things which are future: therefore he foreknew his own fall before he fell, which has been disproved above3 as impossible: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if he foreknows future things, then he knows who ought to win, whether he himself, or the one whom he tempts: therefore since he himself refuses victory for the good, he would never tempt anyone except those whom he foreknew would yield to him; but he tempts others, as is plain in Job4: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The demons cannot have certain foreknowledge of future contingents, since this belongs to God alone, although by sharpness of wit, long experience, crafty stratagem, and another's teaching they can sometimes predict true things.

I respond: It must be said that there is a threefold kind of future things. For some future things have a determinate and infallible cause, such as those that pertain to the motion of the higher bodies, in which there is determination and the removal of every impediment. Such things can be known with certainty not only by God and in God, but also by a creature; and this in their cause, as the time of an eclipse and the like. Some have a determinate but fallible cause, such as those that occur according to lower nature; which have a determinate cause because nature's intention moves determinately to one thing5, but a fallible one because manifold impediments can occur: as for instance that a sown field, if the soil is rich and the disposition of the higher bodies is good, brings forth a rich crop. And these things can in some way be known and foreknown not only by God but also by a creature that knows the natures of higher and lower things, yet not so certainly as the former. Some, however, have an indeterminate and fallible cause, as those which are from our will, which is indeterminate because it is open to opposites, and fallible because even for one who wills to accomplish them many impediments can occur. And such things cannot be known with certainty by any creature in themselves, but only by God, or by divine revelation.

The reason for this is that the cognition of the creature depends on the thing6; since therefore the thing is uncertain both in itself and in its cause, the creature cannot

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know or foreknow it with certainty. But the divine cognition does not depend on any thing — rather, all things which it knows it knows according to the mode of its own truth; and since its truth is most certain, it most certainly knows contingent things as necessary; and this was better explained in the first book7. And just as it knows most certainly, so it can certainly demonstrate and reveal; therefore this foreknowledge of future things is either God's or from God. And therefore, when such future things are predicted, the prediction is called divination, because such an act is divine; and since the proud demons most of all desire to be honored as God, they most of all strive to make it appear that they have this in themselves. — And therefore to say that the demons by themselves foreknow future contingents with certainty is to attribute to them what is God's. Hence there is here unfaithfulness, and to unfaithfulness idolatry is frequently annexed; therefore divination is forbidden8. — Although, however, the demons cannot of themselves know future contingents with certainty, they nevertheless frequently predict true things, because they in some way foresense the event of the future. This happens in a fourfold manner, as Augustine says in the second book of his On Genesis according to the Letter9: « Either by sharpness of sense or wit, or by much experience, or by crafty stratagem, or by another's teaching ». By sharpness of sense, as when they see diligently and consider toward what our affection is inclined, or what things are leading or holding back; by experience of seasons, since they see such things follow from such; by crafty stratagem, when one proposes to do something and predicts that something will be done10; by another's teaching, when by God's just judgment it is permitted to be learned from the Angels. — And so it is plain that the demons, although they can foresense future contingents probably, cannot foreknow them with certainty, as the reasons brought forward show.

To the arguments:

To 1. To the objection about the astronomers or mathematicians, that they frequently speak truly, it must be said that this is only by conjecture, either according to the law of the stars or according to diabolical commerce: according to the law of the stars, as when a star rules which has an impression on the various humors, and so disposes the man to various manners and affections11; according to diabolical commerce, as when they wish to stretch the power of the stars beyond12 that which they can do; for then, unless the devil were present, they would say what is false as often as what is true13; but now, with the full help of the demons, they frequently predict what is false and are deceived. But so great is the astuteness of the demons that they know how to hide their fraud, making it appear that the error or failure was in the astronomer's consideration, not in the art or in the assisting devil. — In this then stands the answer: that the astronomers, regarding contingents which have a fallible and indeterminate cause, do not foreknow true things except by conjecture; and the devil, by a greater conjecture, foresenses those things, but does not foreknow them with certainty.

To 2. To the objection about magicians and diviners, that they speak truly, it must be said that this is true; but yet, since they sometimes speak falsely, it is clear that they rather speak the truth by chance than with certainty, by conjecture rather than by knowledge. For whoever once predicts a future thing in the name of the Lord, and it does not come to pass, as is said in the Law14, is a dreamer and not a prophet of the Lord; and therefore he is commanded to be killed.

To 3. To the objection about dreams, in which future things are foreseen, it must be said that whatever the philosophers15 may have thought about this — whose positions it would be long to recount here — what Sacred Scripture says about them must without doubt be held. For it reproves those who place confidence in dreams; whence in Ecclesiasticus chapter thirty-four16: As the heart of a woman in travail, so thy heart suffers fantasies, unless a visitation be sent from the Most High; therefore it must be understood that dreams arise from five causes. Some from the disposition of the body, some from solicitude of mind, some from diabolical illusion, some from angelic revelation, some from divine visitation. The first two kinds of dreams are presages of future things which have their cause in us — as dreams that come from bodily causes are signs of sickness; dreams that come from solicitude of mind are signs of those things to the doing or desiring of which our affection is inclined; of others they are not signs of themselves — rather, if they are applied to other things, they offer occasion for erring rather than for foreknowing. Dreams which are from diabolical illusion have no force, just as neither do the divinations of soothsayers. But dreams which are from the good Angels, or from God, are true signs in us. And so from this it is not had that the foreknowledge of future contingents is had otherwise than from God, except by some conjecture17.

To 4. To the objection that the soul is in a certain way all things, it must be said that the intellect

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agent is not a being fully in act with respect to all things, because it is not fully an agent; and therefore it needs to be aided by the knowable in order that it may be in act, or by God, who is wholly act with respect to all beings and true things. And because the future contingent has no being except an indeterminate one, therefore it cannot aid the intellect in attaining certain cognition of itself. — To the objection that the agent is in act with respect to all those things to which the possible is in potency, this must be solved by exception18, not only in men but also in the Angels. For there are some things to which even the divine agent is possible in potency, because they are above the power of a creature. Hence that proposition has no truth except about those things only which are within the power of the created intellect, in respect to which the intellect stands both in the character of agent and of possible; but not in respect to those things which are above. And thus the point is plain19.

Scholion

I. This question is of greater moment because in it is treated the foundation of divination or of that superstition which attempts to investigate and predict future contingents with certainty (cf. its definition here in the body), and by which at least implicitly the help of the demons is invoked. This superstition in ancient times invaded the whole world and has never wholly ceased after Christ — rather in our age, creeping broadly, it has emerged again from the shadows.

That the demons (and the same holds of the natural cognition of the good Angels) cannot of themselves know future things in themselves, nor in their causes insofar as in them they are not determined — the holy Doctor proves by this fundamental reason: that the cognition of creatures depends on the thing known; but a future thing, while it does not yet exist, cannot in itself be the object of cognition except to the divine intellect (cf. 1. Sent. d. 38, a. 1). And in their causes future things cannot be known with certainty except those that depend on determinate and non-fallible causes (cf. above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2).

II. As to the first and third genus of future things distinguished in the body, all the doctors agree; but as to the second there are two opinions, related by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) with their arguments. The first opinion contends that, since the effects of natural causes which act necessarily are sometimes impeded by another natural cause, and the concurrence of an impeding cause is sometimes per accidens and from chance, the event then cannot be known by the demons except by conjecture. The second opinion asserts that all natural effects come about necessarily, unless they are impeded by a free will, either divine or created. Hence they hold that all natural future effects, impeded by no liberty, are known to the demons. Against this opinion the supporters of the first view — Richard himself being witness — would urge the article condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in the year 1276 (Collect. iudic. p. 198, c. 14, n. 1): « That nothing happens by chance, but all things come about thus by necessity; and that all future things which will be, will be by necessity; and that what will not be, is impossible to be; and that nothing happens contingently, considering all causes ». (Censure) « Error, because the concurrence of causes belongs to the definition of the casual — Boethius, On Consolation ». But those adhering to the second opinion would reply that this censure is not aptly applied. — St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 57, a. 3) teaches that future things which do not come about of necessity from their causes are not known by the demons except by conjecture, « if from their causes they come about as in the majority of cases. But those things which come about from their causes only in the minority, are wholly unknown, like things casual and fortuitous ». Scotus (Quodl. q. 21), Aegidius Romanus and others agree. St. Bonaventure also favors the first opinion more, as is plain from his words in the body. — On chance cf. 1. Sent. d. 39 dub. 4, and below d. 37 a. 2 q. 2; on divination below d. 14 p. II a. 2 q. 5.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II q. 26 m. 4. — Scotus in Sum. Hier. of Montefortino, l. II, q. 57 a. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 2; Summa I q. 57 a. 3, q. 86 a. 4; S. c. Gent. III c. 154; de Verit. q. 8 a. 12; de Malo q. 16 a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II tr. 4 q. 18 m. 3 a. 2 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.). Ea quae sequuntur, inveniuntur ibid. text. 18. (c. 5.).
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 37 (c. 8). What follows is found in the same place, text 18 (c. 5).
  2. Cfr. August., X. de Trin. c. 3. n. 5. et c. 10. n. 16.
    Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity X, c. 3, n. 5, and c. 10, n. 16.
  3. Vide 1. Sent. d. 38. et 39.
    See 1. Sent., dist. 38 and 39.
  4. Dist. 4. a. 2. q. 2.
    Dist. 4, art. 2, quest. 2.
  5. Hoc argumentum habet August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 34.
    This argument is from Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter XII, c. 17, n. 34.
  6. Cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5.
    Cf. above p. 153, note 5.
  7. Dist. 38. et 39.
    Dist. 38 and 39.
  8. Lev. 19, 26. et 31; Num. 23, 23; Deut. 18, 10. Cfr. August., VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 35, et XXI. c. 8. n. 5; Isidor., VIII. Etymol. c. 9. n. 31.
    Lev. 19:26 and 31; Num. 23:23; Deut. 18:10. Cf. Augustine, City of God VII, c. 35, and XXI, c. 8, n. 5; Isidore, Etymologies VIII, c. 9, n. 31.
  9. Cap. 17. n. 37. Cfr. etiam de Divinatione daemonum, c. 3. n. 7. seqq. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.
    Chapter 17, n. 37. Cf. also On the Divination of Demons, c. 3, n. 7 and following. See here the text of the Master, c. 5.
  10. Ita codd. A cc et ed. 1; alii codd. et [ex parte] Vat. quasi aliquid [cod. aa alius] sit facturus. Paulo superius cod. F experientia ipsorum pro experientia temporum.
    So read codices A, cc, and edition 1; the other codices and (in part) the Vatican edition read as if something [codex aa another] were going to be done. A little above, codex F reads experience of them themselves for experience of seasons.
  11. Cfr. infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3.
    Cf. below dist. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3.
  12. Vat. volunt vi astrorum ultra procedere.
    The Vatican edition reads they wish by the force of the stars to proceed further.
  13. Cfr. August., V. de Civ. Dei, c. 1–11.
    Cf. Augustine, City of God V, c. 1–11.
  14. Deut. 13, 1. seqq.
    Deut. 13:1 and following.
  15. Vide Aristot., de Somniis et de Divinatione per somnum; Avicennam, IV. de Anima seu libri sexti Naturalium, c. 2.
    See Aristotle, On Dreams and On Divination by Dreams; Avicenna, On the Soul IV, or book 6 of the Naturalia, c. 2.
  16. Vers. 6.
    Verse 6.
  17. Cfr. August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 27. seqq. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. et Vat. post vera subiungunt et recta. Cod. F dein prosequitur ex hoc tamen non habetur etc.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter XII, c. 13, n. 27 and following. — A little above, some codices and the Vatican edition after true add and right. Codex F then continues yet from this it is not had etc.
  18. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Paulo inferius aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 quae sunt supra pro quia sunt supra.
    Cf. tome I, p. 87, note 4. — A little below, some codices with edition 1 read which are above for because they are above.
  19. Eodem modo verbum Philosophi explicatur 1. Sent. d. ... p. I. dub. 8. Cfr. etiam infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
    In the same way the Philosopher's saying is explained in 1. Sent. d. ..., p. I, dub. 8. Cf. also below d. 28, a. 2, q. 3 in the body. ---
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