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Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 192

Quaestio II. Utrum in daemonibus cadat oblivio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus cadat oblivio circa praeterita. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum:

1. Nullus de sapiente fit stultus, nisi aliquid obliviscatur; daemones autem de sapientibus facti sunt stulti, maxime lucifer, de quo Ezechielis vigesimo octavo1: Tu plenus sapientia etc., et de quo Ecclesiastis quarto: Melior est puer sapiens rege sene et stulto; Glossa exponit de lucifero sive diabolo: ergo etc.

2. Item, gratia reparat et reformat totam imaginem, ergo et peccatum deformat; sed deformatio memoriae et corruptio est per oblivionem: ergo videtur, quod peccatum in vim memorativam inducat in Angelis oblivionem.

3. Item, intelligere et memorari ipsorum daemonum est cum variatione, ergo est in tempore; sed omne quod mensuratur a tempore, senescit et tendit ad corruptionem, quia « tempus facit distare quod est », ut dicit Philosophus2, unde est principium corruptionis per se: ergo cum corruptio circa vim memorativam sit tantum per oblivionem, patet etc.

4. Item, sicut se habet intelligentia ad errorem, ita memoria ad oblivionem; sed in intelligentia Angeli cadit deceptio et in voluntate obliquatio3: ergo in memoria cadit oblivio.

5. Item, « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem4 »; sed memoria Angeli potest proficere addiscendo: ergo pari ratione deficere obliviscendo, cum status ille sit magis aptus ad defectum quam ad profectum.

6. Item, « mente humana solus Deus superior est », sicut vult Augustinus5; sed contingit in mentem nostram cadere oblivionem: ergo si par est angelicae, multo fortius in mentem daemonum. Quod autem in mentem nostram cadat oblivio quantum ad superiorem partem, patet, quia Augustinus dicit, quod cognitio eorum quae spectant ad divinitatem, est superioris partis; sed frequenter talium obliviscimur: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta:

1. Quod est naturale est indelebile; sed species existentes in angelica memoria sunt ei innatae et concreatae: ergo sunt indelebiles. Si ergo oblivio venit per deletionem specierum, patet etc.

2. Item, « omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum6 recipientis »: ergo species, quae est in angelica memoria, est ibi per modum recipientis; sed memoria angelica est incorruptibilis nec dependet a corruptibili, nec quantum ad substantiam nec quantum ad operationem, nec per se nec per accidens: ergo species, quae ibi recipitur, est simpliciter incorruptibilis.

3. Item, hoc videtur a minori. Vertibilior est voluntas quam aliqua interiorum potentiarum; sed culpa, quae adhaeret voluntati, adhaeret invertibiliter: ergo multo fortius species, quae est in memoria, est in ea indelebiliter: si ergo oblivio est propter deletionem speciei, patet etc.

4. Item, « omne quod corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur, quia habet contrarium, aut quia est ex contrariis, aut quia est in aliquo, quod habet contrarium, vel est ex contrariis » — haec scripta est a Philosopho in libro de Morte et vita7 — sed

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species existens in memoria daemonis nullo praedictorum modorum est corruptibilis: ergo etc.

5. Item, Philosophus dicit, quod virtus sensitiva non senescit, quantum est de se, sed solum ratione organi. Unde in primo de Anima8 dicit: « Si senex acciperet oculum pueri, videret utique, sicut videt puer »: ergo cum virtus memorativa ipsius daemonis non pendeat ex organo, non senescit nec lassatur in operando: ergo nec in recipiendo species, et ita, ut videtur, nihil obliviscitur.

Conclusio

Quatenus memoria dicit habitum, nulla in daemonibus est oblivio; quatenus autem dicit actum memorandi, et quidem respectu beneficiorum Dei et salutis, potest esse oblivio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod actum memoriae contingit accipere9 per modum habitus; et iste est retinere speciem, et esse dicitur per modum habitus, quia continue tenet et dicit magis statum sive conservationem quam actionem. Est alius actus memoriae10, qui est meminisse sive recordari. Primus quidem actus naturalis est et non subest voluntati, nec penes illum attenditur meritum vel demeritum. Secundus vero actus potest ordinari ad bonum et eius oppositum, scilicet ad malum. — Secundum hunc duplicem modum distinguendum est in oblivione.

Nam si dicatur oblivio per oppositionem ad retentionem speciei, sic11 est deletio speciei de memoria; si autem dicatur per oppositionem ad recordationem, sic dicit dehabilitationem quantum ad istum actum, qui est meminisse. Et hoc potest esse bonum, scilicet cum obliviscimur malorum illatorum nobis, et malum, cum obliviscimur beneficiorum nobis a Deo collatorum, vel obliviscimur eorum quae nobis essent expedientia ad salutem; contra quod dicitur Deuteronomii quarto12: Cave, ne unquam obliviscaris Domini Dei tui etc.

Si igitur loquamur de oblivione primo modo, sic dico, quod non cadit in daemonibus; nulla enim est in eis deletio speciei. Si secundo modo, sic dico, quod cadit, immo cecidit magna oblivio, quia obliti sunt suae salutis, obliti beneficiorum Dei, quia, cum convertuntur ad mala, inhabiles fiunt ad recolenda bona; hoc modo bene concedo, quod obliti sunt.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. 2. Et sic procedunt duae primae rationes: prima, quae sumpta est a stultitia, secunda, quae sumpta est ab imagine deformata; nam procedunt hac via.

Ad 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligere cadit in tempore: dicendum, quod cadit in tempore, extenso nomine temporis, non prout est motus primi mobilis mensura, quia nec daemonum esse nec intelligere pendet ex illo. — Tamen aliter potest dici, quod quamvis actus ut « actus » cadat sub tempore vel in tempore, non tamen actus ut habitus, quia habet modum substantiae13, in ipsa nec habet variationem; et ideo, sicut substantia daemonum non corrumpitur nec senescit in tempore, nec habitus, ita etiam nec actus ut habitus; et talis est retentio speciei. — Et per hoc patet aliud, quod non est simile de intelligere et oblivisci; quia intelligere non tam est actus naturalis, quam etiam conformis voluntati, et similiter errare; sed speciem tenere vel amittere est ex potentia vel impotentia naturali. Praeterea, ratio illa non valet, cum memoria habeat naturam specularem sive speculi, intelligentia naturam luminosam sive luminis; et Angelus14 plus habet de natura speculi et de potentia recipiendi quam de natura luminis; illa enim in solo Deo est potissime, vel in his qui sunt deiformes per gloriam: ideo non valet nec est simile. Magis enim potest in tenendo speciem quam in recte iudicando; aliqua enim sunt supra iudicium Angeli, non sic est de retentione speciei.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem; verum est, nisi alterum naturaliter insit; et natura Angeli possibilis est15 ad receptionem per naturam, ad deletionem vero minime.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus Deus est maior mente humana; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad rationem perficiendi; tamen, quia mens humana ex coniunctione cum corpore terrestri aliquas contrahit proprietates et defectus deprimentes, quantum ad hoc est inferior mente angelica; et ideo, sicut mens humana impeditur ab actuali consideratione propter depressionem corporis, ita etiam compellitur oblivisci. Intellectus autem angelicus semper est in actu intelligendi; et ideo non est mirum, si memoria semper est in actu conservandi. Et sic patent obiecta16.

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English Translation
p. 192

Question II. Whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons.

In the second place it is asked whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons concerning things past. And that it does, seems thus:

For the opposite side:

1. No one becomes a fool from being wise unless he forgets something; but the demons have been made fools out of having been wise, most of all Lucifer, of whom Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight1 says: Thou wast full of wisdom etc., and of whom Ecclesiastes chapter four says: Better is a wise child than an old and foolish king — the Gloss expounds this of Lucifer or the devil: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, grace repairs and reforms the whole image, therefore sin deforms it; but deformation and corruption of the memory is by way of forgetfulness: therefore it seems that sin induces forgetfulness in the memorative power in the Angels.

3. Likewise, the understanding and remembering of the demons themselves takes place with variation, and therefore in time; but everything that is measured by time grows old and tends to corruption, since « time makes that which is depart from what it was », as the Philosopher says2, whence it is per se a principle of corruption: therefore since the only corruption regarding the memorative power is by forgetfulness, the point is plain.

4. Likewise, as the intellect stands to error, so the memory stands to forgetfulness; but in the Angel's intellect there falls deception, and in the will obliquity3: therefore in memory there falls forgetfulness.

5. Likewise, « opposites are by nature apt to occur about the same thing4 »; but the Angel's memory can advance by learning more: therefore by parity of reason it can decline by forgetting, since that state is more apt to defect than to progress.

6. Likewise, « only God is higher than the human mind », as Augustine holds5; but it happens that forgetfulness falls upon our mind: therefore if the angelic mind is on a par with ours, much more so will it fall upon the mind of the demons. And that forgetfulness falls upon our mind as regards its superior part is plain, because Augustine says that the cognition of those things that pertain to the divinity belongs to the superior part; but we frequently forget such things: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta:

1. What is natural is indelible; but the species existing in the angelic memory are innate and concreate to it: therefore they are indelible. If therefore forgetfulness comes about by deletion of species, the point is plain etc.

2. Likewise, « everything that is received in something is there after the manner of6 the receiver »: therefore the species which is in the angelic memory is there after the manner of the receiver; but the angelic memory is incorruptible and does not depend on anything corruptible, neither as to substance nor as to operation, neither per se nor per accidens: therefore the species which is received there is simply incorruptible.

3. Likewise, this is shown from the lesser case. The will is more changeable than any of the interior powers; but the fault that adheres to the will adheres unchangeably: therefore much more so the species which is in the memory is there indelibly: if then forgetfulness is on account of the deletion of species, the point is plain etc.

4. Likewise, « everything that is corrupted is corrupted either because it has a contrary, or because it is from contraries, or because it is in something which has a contrary, or is from contraries » — this is written by the Philosopher in the book On Life and Death7 — but

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the species existing in the demon's memory is not corruptible in any of the aforesaid modes: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the sensitive power does not grow old of itself, but only by reason of the organ. Whence in book one On the Soul8 he says: « If an old man were to receive the eye of a boy, he would certainly see as the boy sees »: therefore since the memorative power of the demon does not depend on an organ, it does not grow old or weary in operating: therefore neither in receiving species, and so, as it seems, it forgets nothing.

Conclusion

In so far as memory denotes a habit, there is no forgetfulness in the demons; but in so far as it denotes the act of remembering, and indeed with respect to God's benefits and to salvation, there can be forgetfulness.

I respond: It must be said that the act of memory may be taken9 after the manner of a habit; and this is to retain a species, and is said to be after the manner of a habit because it continuously holds and denotes a state or conservation rather than an action. There is another act of memory10, which is to remember or to recall. The first is indeed a natural act and is not subject to the will, nor is merit or demerit reckoned in regard to it. The second act, however, can be ordered to the good and to its opposite, namely to evil. — According to this twofold mode a distinction must be made in forgetfulness.

For if forgetfulness be spoken of by opposition to the retention of a species, in that sense11 it is the deletion of the species from the memory; if however it be spoken of by opposition to recollection, in that sense it denotes a disabling as regards that act which is to remember. And this can be good, namely when we forget evils inflicted upon us, and evil, when we forget the benefits conferred upon us by God, or forget the things which would be expedient to us for salvation; against which it is said in Deuteronomy chapter four12: Beware lest thou ever forget the Lord thy God etc.

If therefore we speak of forgetfulness in the first mode, in that sense I say that it does not fall upon the demons; for there is no deletion of species in them. If in the second mode, in that sense I say that it does fall — nay, that there fell upon them a great forgetfulness, because they have forgotten their own salvation, forgotten God's benefits; since, when they turned to evils, they became unfit for recalling good things; in this mode I freely concede that they have forgotten.

To the arguments:

To 1, 2. And so the first two reasons proceed: the first, which was taken from foolishness; the second, which was taken from the deformed image; for they proceed in this way.

To 3, 4. To the objection that understanding falls in time, it must be said that it does fall in time, with the name of time taken broadly, not as it is the measure of the motion of the first mobile, because neither the being nor the understanding of the demons depends on that. — Yet it can be put another way: that although the act qua « act » falls under time or in time, nevertheless not the act qua habit, because it has the mode of substance13, in which there is no variation; and therefore, just as the substance of the demons is not corrupted nor grows old in time, nor is the habit, so neither is the act qua habit; and such is the retention of species. — And by this is plain the other point: that the case is not similar with understanding and forgetting; because understanding is not so much a natural act as also one conformed to the will, and likewise erring; but to hold or to lose a species is from natural power or impotence. Moreover, that reason does not hold, since memory has a mirror-like nature or that of a mirror, the intellect a luminous nature or that of light; and the Angel14 has more of the nature of a mirror and of receptive power than of the nature of light; for that nature is most fully in God alone, or in those who are deiform by glory: therefore the parity does not hold, nor is the case similar. For the Angel can do more in holding a species than in judging rightly; some things indeed are above the judgment of the Angel, but it is not so with the retention of species.

To 5. To the objection that opposites are by nature apt to occur about the same thing, it is true unless one of them is naturally present; and the nature of the Angel is in potency15 to reception by nature, but by no means to deletion.

To 6. To the objection that only God is greater than the human mind, it must be said that this is true as regards the manner of perfecting; nevertheless, because the human mind, by reason of its conjunction with an earthly body, contracts certain properties and depressing defects, in this respect it is inferior to the angelic mind; and therefore, just as the human mind is impeded from actual consideration on account of the depression of the body, so it is also compelled to forget. The angelic intellect, however, is always in the act of understanding; and therefore it is no wonder if the memory is always in the act of conserving. And so the objections are plain16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 12. — Sequens textus est Eccle. 4, 13, in quo Vulgata post puer addit pauper et. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum in hunc locum habetur, est Hieronymi, Comment. in Eccle., ubi dicit, praedictam explicationem factam fuisse ab Origene et Victorino, qui « super Christo et diabolo hunc locum interpretati sunt, quod puerum pauperem et sapientem Christum velint... Iste natus est in regno senis; et idcirco dicit: Si esset de hoc mundo regnum meum etc. »
    Verse 12. — The following text is Eccle. 4:13, in which the Vulgate after child adds poor and. — The Gloss, which is found at this place in Lyranus, is from Jerome's Commentary on Ecclesiastes, where he says that the foregoing exposition was given by Origen and Victorinus, who « interpreted this passage of Christ and the devil, taking the poor and wise child to mean Christ... He is born in the kingdom of the old man; and therefore he says: If my kingdom were of this world etc. »
  2. Libr. IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.), ubi etiam principia huius argumenti indicantur. Cfr. supra pag. 66, nota 2. — In cod. U post distare quod est additur scilicet a principio, et ideo corrumpit per elongationem ab ipso.
    Book IV of the Physics, text 117 (c. 12), where the principles of this argument are also indicated. Cf. above p. 66, note 2. — In codex U, after that which is depart from what it is, there is added namely from its principle, and so it corrupts by elongation from it.
  3. Ut in quaest. praeced. ostensum est.
    As was shown in the preceding question.
  4. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.).
    Aristotle, Categories, chapter On Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7).
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 45, nota 5. — De sententia Augustini, quae paulo inferius affertur, vide XII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12.
    Cf. above p. 45, note 5. — On the opinion of Augustine which is brought in a little below, see On the Trinity XII, c. 7, n. 12.
  6. Libr. de Causis, prop. 10. 20. seqq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4.
    The Book of Causes, propositions 10, 20 and following. Cf. also Boethius, Consolation V, prose 4.
  7. Duo opuscula composuit Aristoteles, quae de vita agunt; unum inscribitur: de Longitudine et brevitate vitae; alterum de Iuventute et senectute, vita et morte. In posteriore, c. 3. (c. 5.), duo modi corruptionis recensentur, scil. a se ipso et a contrario; in priore autem, c. 2, triplex corruptionis modus insinuatur. — Post haec supple cum cod. aa divisio vel etiam propositio. Vat. scripta sunt.
    Aristotle composed two short works which treat of life: one is entitled On the Length and Shortness of Life; the other On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death. In the latter, c. 3 (c. 5), two modes of corruption are reviewed, namely of itself and from a contrary; in the former, however, c. 2, a threefold mode of corruption is suggested. — After this supply with codex aa division, or even proposition. The Vatican edition reads are written.
  8. Text. 65. (c. 4.), in quo textu antiqui codd., graeco verbo πρεσβύτης servato, Si presbyter pro Si senex.
    Text 65 (c. 4), in which text the ancient codices, preserving the Greek word πρεσβύτης, read If a presbyter for If an old man.
  9. Codd. U aa bene adiciunt dupliciter, scilicet. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 substituunt actus memoriae pro actum memoriae; incongrue, et deinde post accipere multi addunt et.
    Codices U and aa well add in two ways, namely. Most codices with editions 1 and 2 substitute acts of memory for act of memory; incongruously, and then after to take many add and.
  10. Cod. I addit per modum usus, scilicet super speciem se convertere; Vat. per modum usus sive actus. Cod. aa, omissis verbis Est alius actus memoriae, ponit et per modum actus memoriae.
    Codex I adds after the manner of use, namely to turn upon the species; the Vatican edition reads after the manner of use or of act. Codex aa, omitting the words There is another act of memory, has and after the manner of an act of memory.
  11. Supple cum cod. I oblivio. In nonnullis mss. ut F cc (T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 perperam hic additur non. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituunt tentionem speciei pro retentionem speciei. — Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 20. ait: Oblivio est memoriae ablatio (iactura).
    Supply with codex I forgetfulness. In several manuscripts such as F and cc (T by a second hand) and edition 1, not is here wrongly added. Most codices with editions 1, 2, and 3 substitute holding of species for retention of species. — Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 20, says: Forgetfulness is the loss (deprivation) of memory.
  12. Vers. 23: Cave, ne quando obliviscaris pacti Domini Dei tui.
    Verse 23: Beware lest at any time thou forget the covenant of the Lord thy God.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius post modum substantiae Vat. prosequitur: intra, sive in qua est, nec habet etc.
    Cf. above, dist. 2, pars I, art. 1, quest. 1 and following. — A little below, after mode of substance, the Vatican edition continues: within, or in which it is, nor has it etc.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.
    Cf. above p. 83, note 1.
  15. Multi codd. non bene possibilis sit pro possibilis est; paulo superius cod. aa bene legit sed natura pro et natura. — Cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9.
    Many codices read, not well, be in potency for is in potency; a little above, codex aa rightly reads but the nature for and the nature. — Cf. above p. 182, note 9.
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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