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Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 189

Articulus I. De cognitione daemonum.

Quaestio I. Utrum in daemonibus cadat deceptio circa praesentia.

Quod autem deceptio cadat in daemonibus circa praesentia, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos primo1: Quoniam non probaverunt habere Deum in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum; hoc dicit Apostolus de hominibus. Si ergo aeque vel magis severus est Deus in Angelos, ergo videtur, quod dati sint in reprobum sensum; sed in omnibus talibus cadit error: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud intelligitur de sensu in agendis, non in cognoscendis; contra: Augustinus dicit super Genesim ad litteram2, quod « mali angeli intelliguntur per tenebras, boni vero per lucem »; sed tenebra magis dicit privationem luminis quam caloris: ergo videtur, quod cognitio eorum sit obscurata, ergo et errori subiecta.

2. Item, videtur, quod errori sit penitus subiecta, quia Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus3 dicit, quod « in daemonibus est furor irrationalis, amens concupiscentia, phantasia proterva »; sed phantasia est principium erroris: ergo videtur, quod ratio eorum penitus sit subiugata errori.

3. Item, per simile. Homini inflicta est pro peccato ignorantia non tantum agendorum, sed etiam cognoscendorum: ergo si non minus peccatum angelicum debuit puniri, patet etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur per simile. Sicut se habet affectus ad bonum, ita intellectus ad verum; p. 190 sed affectus daemonum adeo est depressus, quod non potest moveri in amorem boni, aut inordinate movetur, si amat4: ergo nec intellectus in speculationem veri. Si tu dicas, quod peccatum magis corrumpit affectum daemonum quam intellectum; contrarium videtur: nam omnem pravam electionem praecedit pravum iudicium, quia non eligit voluntas deliberative, nisi praecedat iudicium5: ergo videtur, quod prima ratio deordinandi sit in iudicio, et ita in cognitiva: ergo magis quam in voluntate vel aeque debet esse punitio. Item, hoc confirmatur, quia excaecatio et obstinatio sunt poenae peccati: ergo sicut affectio praesupponit cognitionem, ita obstinatio, quae est poena affectionis, excaecationem, quae est poena cognitionis: ergo cum diabolus sit obstinatus, etiam est excaecatus.

5. Item, « bonum est diffusivum sui6 » et verum similiter, et magis est diffusivum sui bonum quam verum, quia hoc habet de sua ratione: ergo Deus, in quantum bonus, subtrahit influentiam bonitatis affectivae ipsorum daemonum, ergo in quantum verum, diffusionem luminis ipsi cognitivae.

6. Item, quidquid sit de conservatione luminis dati, tamen daemonibus, cum sint in statu damnationis, nova dona non debent dari a Deo; sed « nihil potest aliquis addiscere, nisi Christo docente », sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Magistro7: ergo si Christus non debet nova dona dare eis, ergo nec novam cognitionem: ergo in his quae ante lapsum non cognoverunt, ex quo non habent doctorem veritatis, necessario errant et decipiuntur.

Sed contra: 1. Lucae decimo sexto8 dicitur, quod filii huius saeculi prudentiores sunt filiis lucis in generatione sua; loquitur de malis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus9: « Data ipsis dona nequaquam mutata dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidissima »; loquitur de daemonibus: ergo si habuerunt naturale iudicatorium illuminatum et potens dirigi in cognoscendis, videtur etc.

3. Item, Isidorus de Summo Bono10: « Praevaricatores angeli, etiam sanctitate dimissa, sensum angelicae naturae non amiserunt ».

4. Item, peccatum non est contra actum, sed contra ordinem actus: ergo non est contra cognitionem simpliciter, sed contra cognitionem ordinatam in finem: si ergo cognitio speculativa, quantum est de se, non dicit cognitionem ordinatam in finem, patet, quod per peccatum non debet depravari.

Conclusio

In daemonibus iudicium intellectus speculativi, etsi maneat integrum quantum ad substantiam potentiae, tamen per culpam est aliquo modo obnubilatum; iudicium vero intellectus practici est omnino subversum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod deceptio et error venit ex deordinatione sive deviatione iudicii. Iudicium autem duplex est in quolibet ratiocinante: unum, quod est cognoscendorum, quod est veri sub ratione veri; aliud agendorum sub ratione boni11. Et primum est intellectus speculativi nec spectat ad liberum arbitrium; secundum vero est intellectus practici et est pars liberi arbitrii.

Primum iudicium, etsi maneat integrum quantum ad substantiam potentiae, nihilominus per culpam est in Angelis aliquo modo obnubilatum; quia errant frequenter in iudicando de multis et in multis decipiuntur, maxime cum iudicant de contingentibus. Aliud iudicium est in eis omnino subversum; et quantum ad hoc excaecati sunt angeli mali, sicut quantum ad affectum obstinati12; et propter istius iudicii subversionem dicuntur facti tenebra et dati in reprobum sensum.

1. Et sic patet responsio ad primum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Dionysio, quod est in daemonibus phantasia proterva; dicendum, quod phantasia dupliciter accipitur: aliquando pro vi sensitiva, collativa sensibilium receptorum; aliquando phantasia dicitur apparitio, secundum quod dicitur a phanos13, quod est apparitio; et primo modo est in solis corporalibus, secundo modo in spiritibus. Haec autem phantasia dicitur proterva esse in daemonibus, quoniam, etsi daemones intelligentes sint et multa vera cognoscant, tamen alios nolunt docere, sed14 a veritate seducere; et ideo, quia non possunt nisi per apparentes similitudines, hinc est, quod p. 191 studium daemonum maxime circa talia est intentum — sicut magnus clericus, qui vellet alios paralogizare, studeret in sophismatibus — et ideo phantastici dicuntur propter rationes phantasticas et apparentes, quas adinveniunt. Et hanc phantasiam dicit protervam, quia, cum secundum iudicium suum veritatem cognoscant, tamen cognitam scienter impugnant; et hoc est protervire, scilicet veritati intellectae obviare; ideo habent phantasiam protervam. Habent etiam concupiscentiam amentem, quia, cum non deberent appetere nisi honestum et conferens, appetunt res maxime nocivas, sicut peccare et alios in peccatum praecipitare, quamvis hoc non intendant finaliter. Est etiam15 furor irrationalis, quia cum solis malis deberent ex ratione irasci, irascuntur et furiunt contra bona.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homini inflicta est ignorantia secundum intellectum speculativum; dicendum, quod verum est in posteris; sed Adae non est inflicta ignorantia cognoscendorum, quia habuit cognitionem sibi innatam. Similiter et daemones, quia habuerunt cognitionem sibi innatam, et Deus vix subtrahit dona sua naturalia, scilicet gratis data; ideo non inflixit ita ignorantiam in intellectu speculativo; sed tamen ignorantiae poena acta est16 et caecitas in intellectu practico. Parvulis autem infligere dicitur ignorantiam, non subtrahendo scientiam, sed non apponendo. Praeterea, moles carnis corruptae aggravat intellectus iudicium17; et ideo non est simile.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affectus est privatus rectitudine voluntatis; dicendum, quod peccatum magis respicit voluntatem et magis directe opponitur bonitati affectionis quam veritati cognitionis; et ideo daemones non sunt ita privati lumine cognitionis per culpam, sicut bonitate affectionis. Verumtamen, sicut prius18 tactum est, quoddam est iudicium, quod est coniunctum voluntati, et est subversum in malis angelis et excaecatum. Et ideo patet solutio ad alia duo sequentia.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est diffusivum sui; dicendum, quod est loqui de diffusione boni simpliciter, vel boni gratuiti. Si loquimur de diffusione boni simpliciter, ad tot se extendit ratio boni, ad quot et veri, quia utrumque convertitur cum ente et in omnibus entibus19. Si autem de diffusione boni gratuiti, non est verum; quia multi sunt, qui idonei sunt ad capiendam intelligentiam, qui tamen non sunt idonei ad capiendam gratiam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debent dari eis dona; dicendum, quod donum dupliciter potest accipi: proprie et communiter. Proprie donum dicitur quod simpliciter aliunde est, cuiusmodi sunt gratiae infusae sive dona infusa; et talis est gratia gratum faciens vel ad eam habilitans. Alio modo dicitur donum, quod est per adiutorium divinum, nihilominus tamen per acquisitionem nostram; et illud non dicitur proprie donum, sed habito respectu ad hoc, quod non acquiritur sine Dei adiutorio; et hoc modo Deus dat dona bonis et malis. Quia enim Deus dedit lumen cognitionis ab initio, quod poterat in acquisitionem multorum scibilium; et ipse non subtrahit quod dedit, nec etiam conservationem, cum talia possint stare cum peccato mortali: ideo qui habet primum donum potest multiplicare, etiam reprobus existens; et Deus dicitur docere, non inspirando sive infundendo, sed cooperando lumini dato et conservando illud. — Exemplum huius est: Deus dedit frumentum avaro et dedit terram potentem fructificare; cum recolligit multum de blado de bona terra, Deus dat, sed non ita, sicut si ipse sterilem terram sine iactu seminis faceret fructificare; hoc enim proprie esset donum, primo modo solum large. Sic dat Deus dona20 bonis et malis, et daemonibus et hominibus, quamvis ipsis ipsa haec in mala convertantur.

Ad ea autem quae obiiciuntur ad oppositum, dicendum, quod intelliguntur de iudicio speculativo; tamen de illo non est intelligendum, quod magis vigeat21 quam in bonis, vel etiam tantum, sicut ante lapsum, quia revera, quamvis multa clare cognoscant, maxime illa quorum cognitio est eis innata, ratione quorum dicit Dionysius, quod habent sibi data integra; tamen in multis errant et falluntur illi nefandi spiritus, quia praesumtuosi et curiosi sunt, et ideo frequenter iudicant de his quae eorum iudicio non subsunt; et ideo a veritatis tramite in errorem labuntur. Et sic patent omnia obiecta. p. 192

Scholion

I. Licet daemonibus interdum aliqua supernaturaliter communicari possint, Deo ita disponente, ipsi tamen nullam habent cognitionem, quae est proprie ex gratia, et nullo modo cognitionem affectivam. De naturali autem eorum cognitione docet S. Thom. (S. I. q. 64. a. 1.), eam in daemonibus « nec esse ablatam, nec diminutam ». Hoc autem intelligendum esse videtur de potentia intellectiva in se, non de eiusdem actuali usu, saltem non de usu quoad scientiam practicam et bonum morale. Sub hoc respectu eandem esse diminutam, plurimi doctores dicunt; immo S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., Aegidio R. aliisque tenet, ipsum speculativum eorum intellectum quoad usum esse aliquo modo obnubilatum, scil. spirituali vitio et malitia, eundemque in multis errare (hic ad ultim.).

II. De seq. quaest., quae agit de oblivione, pauci antiqui loquuntur. Sententiam S. Bonaventurae Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 3.) sic exponit: « Triplex est actus seu officium memoriae: recipere et retinere et super speciem receptam converti reminiscendo. Quoad primum et secundum in daemone non cadit oblivio, sed quoad tertium cecidit; non enim convertitur ad considerandum Dei misericordiam et suam culpam et huiusmodi ». Consentiunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 100. m. 3. a. 1. 2. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1; Dionys. Carth. (loc. cit.). Henr. Gand. (Quodl. II. q. 13.) oblivionem improprie dictam in daemone esse putat, quatenus « per passiones obnubilatus, sine variatione facta in habitu, sed solum in actu mentis, potuit aliquando ad horam ignorare quod prius scivit ».

III. De quaest. hac: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 1. 2. 3. 4. — Scoti loci collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 64. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 64. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de utraque q. hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article I. On the cognition of demons.

Question I. Whether deception falls upon demons concerning present things

That deception falls upon demons concerning present things, it seems.

1. Romans 11: Because they did not approve to have God in [their] knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense; the Apostle says this of men. If therefore God is equally or more severe toward the angels, then it seems that they were given up to a reprobate sense; but in all such [cases] error falls: therefore, etc. If you say that this is understood of sense in things-to-be-done, not in things-to-be-known; on the contrary: Augustine says on Genesis according to the letter2 that "the evil angels are understood by darkness, but the good by light"; but darkness signifies privation of light rather than of heat: therefore it seems that their cognition is darkened, therefore also subject to error.

2. Likewise, it seems that it is utterly subject to error, because Dionysius, On the Divine Names3, says that "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy"; but phantasy is the source of error: therefore it seems that their reason is utterly subjugated to error.

3. Likewise, by a likeness. Upon man, for sin, was inflicted ignorance not only of things-to-be-done, but also of things-to-be-known: therefore since the angelic sin ought to be punished no less, [the conclusion] is evident, etc.

4. Likewise, this is seen by a likeness. As affect is related to good, so intellect to truth; p. 190 but the affect of the demons is so depressed that it cannot be moved into the love of good, or is moved inordinately, if it loves4: therefore neither [can] the intellect [be moved] into the speculation of truth. If you say that sin corrupts the affect of the demons more than the intellect; the contrary is seen: for every depraved choice is preceded by a depraved judgment, because the will does not choose deliberatively unless a judgment precede5: therefore it seems that the first ground of disordering is in the judgment, and so in the cognitive [power]: therefore the punishment ought to be more in [it] than in the will, or equally. Likewise, this is confirmed, because blinding and obstinacy are punishments of sin: therefore just as affection presupposes cognition, so obstinacy, which is the punishment of the affection, [presupposes] blinding, which is the punishment of cognition: therefore since the devil is obstinate, he is also blinded.

5. Likewise, "the good is diffusive of itself6" and the true likewise, and the good is more diffusive of itself than the true, because this it has of its own account: therefore God, insofar as He is good, withdraws the influence of affective goodness from the demons themselves; therefore, insofar as He is truth, [He withdraws] the diffusion of light from their cognitive [power].

6. Likewise, whatever [be the case] concerning the conservation of the light given, nevertheless to the demons, since they are in the state of damnation, new gifts ought not to be given by God; but "no one can learn anything except with Christ teaching," as Augustine says in the book On the Teacher7: therefore if Christ ought not to give them new gifts, then neither new cognition: therefore in those things which they did not know before the fall, since they have no teacher of truth, they necessarily err and are deceived.

On the contrary: 1. In Luke 168 it is said that the children of this world are wiser than the children of light in their generation; he speaks of the evil [ones]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Dionysius, On the Divine Names9: "The gifts given to them themselves we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; he speaks of the demons: therefore if they had a natural power of judgment, illuminated and able to be directed in things-to-be-known, it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore, On the Highest Good10: "The transgressing angels, even with sanctity sent away, did not lose the sense of the angelic nature."

4. Likewise, sin is not against the act, but against the order of the act: therefore it is not against cognition simply, but against cognition ordered to the end: if therefore speculative cognition, as far as it is of itself, does not state cognition ordered to the end, it is evident that by sin it ought not to be depraved.

Conclusion

In the demons the judgment of the speculative intellect, although it remains entire as to the substance of the power, is nevertheless in some way darkened by fault; but the judgment of the practical intellect is wholly subverted.

I respond: It must be said that deception and error come from the disordering or deviation of judgment. Now judgment is twofold in every reasoning [being]: one, which is of things-to-be-known, which is of the true under the account of the true; another, of things-to-be-done, under the account of the good11. And the first belongs to the speculative intellect and does not pertain to free choice; the second belongs to the practical intellect and is a part of free choice.

The first judgment, although it remains entire as to the substance of the power, is nevertheless in some way darkened in the angels by fault; because they frequently err in judging about many things and are deceived in many [things], especially when they judge about contingent [things]. The other judgment is in them wholly subverted; and as to this the evil angels are blinded, just as as to the affect [they are] obstinate12; and on account of the subversion of this judgment they are said to have been made darkness and given up to a reprobate sense.

1. And so the response to the first [objection] is evident.

2. To that which is objected from Dionysius, that there is in the demons a wanton phantasy; it must be said that "phantasy" is taken in two ways: sometimes for the sensitive power, collating the sensibles received; sometimes phantasy is called appearance, according as it is named from phanos13, which is "appearance"; and in the first way it is in corporeal [things] alone, in the second way in spirits. Now this phantasy is said to be wanton in the demons, since, although the demons are intelligent and know many true [things], nevertheless they do not wish to teach others, but14 to seduce [them] from the truth; and therefore, since they cannot [do so] except through apparent likenesses, hence it is that p. 191 the study of the demons is most of all bent upon such [things] — like a great cleric who would want to lead others into paralogism [and so] would study sophisms — and therefore they are called phantastic on account of the phantastic and apparent reasonings which they devise. And He calls this phantasy wanton, because, although by their own judgment they know the truth, nevertheless they knowingly impugn the known [truth]; and this is to be wanton, namely to set oneself against the understood truth; therefore they have a wanton phantasy. They also have mad concupiscence, because, since they ought not to desire anything but the honorable and the profitable, they desire things most harmful, such as to sin and to cast others into sin, although they do not intend this finally. There is also15 irrational fury, because, since they ought by reason to be angry at evil [things] alone, they are angry and rage against good [things].

3. To that which is objected, that upon man was inflicted ignorance as to the speculative intellect; it must be said that this is true in [his] posterity; but upon Adam was not inflicted ignorance of things-to-be-known, because he had cognition innate to him. Likewise also the demons, because they had cognition innate to them, and God scarcely withdraws their natural gifts, namely those freely given; therefore He did not so inflict ignorance in the speculative intellect; but yet there was an enacted punishment of ignorance16 and blindness in the practical intellect. But upon little children He is said to inflict ignorance, not by withdrawing knowledge, but by not adding [it]. Furthermore, the mass of corrupt flesh weighs down the judgment of the intellect17; and therefore it is not the same.

4. To that which is objected, that the affect is deprived of the rectitude of the will; it must be said that sin regards the will more and is more directly opposed to the goodness of affection than to the truth of cognition; and therefore the demons are not so deprived of the light of cognition by fault as of the goodness of affection. Nevertheless, as was touched on before18, there is a certain judgment which is conjoined to the will, and it is subverted in the evil angels and blinded. And therefore the solution to the [other] two following [objections] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that the good is diffusive of itself; it must be said that there is speaking of the diffusion of good simply, or of gratuitous good. If we speak of the diffusion of good simply, the account of good extends to as many [things] as that of the true, because each is convertible with being and [is] in all beings19. But if [we speak] of the diffusion of gratuitous good, it is not true; because there are many who are fit to receive intelligence, who nevertheless are not fit to receive grace.

6. To that which is objected, that gifts ought not to be given to them; it must be said that "gift" can be taken in two ways: properly and commonly. Properly a gift is called that which is simply from elsewhere, of which kind are infused graces or infused gifts; and such is sanctifying grace or [grace] enabling for it. In another way a gift is called that which is through divine help, yet nevertheless through our own acquisition; and that is not called properly a gift, but [only] with respect to this, that it is not acquired without God's help; and in this way God gives gifts to good and evil [alike]. For since God gave the light of cognition from the beginning, which could [extend] to the acquisition of many knowables; and He Himself does not withdraw what He gave, nor even [its] conservation, since such [things] can stand with mortal sin: therefore he who has the first gift can multiply [it], even being a reprobate; and God is said to teach, not by inspiring or infusing, but by cooperating with the light given and conserving it. — An example of this is: God gave grain to a miser and gave land able to bear fruit; when he gathers much corn from the good land, God gives, but not as if He Himself made barren land bear fruit without the casting of seed; for this would properly be a gift, [whereas] in the first way only broadly [so]. So God gives gifts20 to good and evil [alike], and to demons and men [alike], although these very [gifts] are turned into evil for them.

But to those things which are objected on the opposite side, it must be said that they are understood of the speculative judgment; yet of that it is not to be understood that it is more vigorous21 than in the good [angels], or even as much [as] before the fall, because in truth, although they know many [things] clearly, especially those whose cognition is innate to them, by reason of which Dionysius says that they have the [gifts] given to them entire; nevertheless in many [things] those unspeakable spirits err and are deceived, because they are presumptuous and curious, and therefore frequently judge about things which are not subject to their judgment; and therefore they slip from the path of truth into error. And so all the objections are clear. p. 192

Scholion

I. Although some things can sometimes be supernaturally communicated to the demons, God so disposing, they themselves nevertheless have no cognition which is properly from grace, and in no way an affective cognition. But concerning their natural cognition S. Thomas teaches (S. I, q. 64, a. 1) that in the demons it is "neither taken away nor diminished." But this seems to be understood of the intellective power in itself, not of its actual use, at least not of [its] use as to practical knowledge and moral good. Under this respect that [cognition] is diminished, very many doctors say; indeed S. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales, Aegidius Romanus, and others holds that their speculative intellect itself, as to [its] use, is in some way darkened, namely by spiritual vice and malice, and that the same errs in many [things] (here, at the end).

II. Of the following question, which treats of forgetfulness, few of the ancients speak. The opinion of S. Bonaventure Petr. a Tar. (here q. 2, a. 3) expounds thus: "The act or office of memory is threefold: to receive, and to retain, and to turn back upon the species received by recollecting. As to the first and second, forgetfulness does not fall upon a demon, but as to the third it has fallen; for he does not turn to considering God's mercy and his own fault and the like." Alex. of Hales agrees, S. p. II, q. 100, m. 3, a. 1, 2, 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1; Dionysius the Carthusian (loc. cit.). Henry of Ghent (Quodl. II, q. 13) thinks that forgetfulness is improperly said [to be] in a demon, inasmuch as "darkened by passions, with no variation made in the habit, but only in the act of the mind, he could at some time for an hour be ignorant of what he previously knew."

III. On this question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. a. 1, 2, 3, 4. — The passages of Scotus collected by Hier. de Montefortino, t. II, q. 64, a. 1. — S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 64, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 2, a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on both questions here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 28: Et sicut non probaverunt etc.
    Verse 28: "And as they did not approve" etc.
  2. Libr. I. c. 17. n. 33.
    Book I, ch. 17, n. 33.
  3. Cap. 4. § 23.
    Ch. 4, § 23.
  4. Cod. I si movetur et amat. Cod. aa legit aut si movetur, inordinate movetur sive amat.
    Codex I [reads] si movetur et amat. Codex aa reads aut si movetur, inordinate movetur sive amat.
  5. De ordine actuum rationis et voluntatis vide Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut E P Q V ratio deordinationis pro ratio deordinandi. Dein post ultimum ergo Vat. interiicit in cognitiva.
    On the order of the acts of reason and will see Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 22. — A little below several manuscripts, such as E P Q V, [read] ratio deordinationis for ratio deordinandi. Then after the last ergo the Vatican edition inserts in cognitiva.
  6. Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 1. § 1. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi hoc et ratio addita exponitur.
    Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy ch. 4, and On the Divine Names ch. 1, § 1. See also I Sent. d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, where this and the added reason are expounded.
  7. In his verbis exprimitur libri praedicti summa, quae praecipue c. 14. n. 38. seqq. innotescit. Cfr. etiam V. Confess. c. 6. n. 10. et Enarr. in Ps. 118. Serm. 18. n. 4.
    In these words is expressed the gist of the aforesaid book, which becomes known especially [at] ch. 14, n. 38 ff. Cf. also Confessions V, ch. 6, n. 10, and Enarrationes in Ps. 118, Sermon 18, n. 4.
  8. Vers. 8.
    Verse 8.
  9. Cap. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 122, nota 8.
    Ch. 4, § 23. See above, p. 122, note 8.
  10. Sive Sententiarum libro I. c. 10. n. 17: Praevaricatores angeli, etiam sanctitate amissa, non tamen amiserunt vivacem creaturae angelicae sensum.
    Or [in] the book of the Sentences I, ch. 10, n. 17: "The transgressing angels, even with sanctity lost, nevertheless did not lose the keen sense of the angelic creature."
  11. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 46. seqq. (c. 9. seq.). — Vat. post agendorum addit quod est boni.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 46 ff. (ch. 9 f.). — The Vatican edition after agendorum adds quod est boni.
  12. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 12. ait: Nam pravitas distorquet facitque, ut circa activa principia fallamur. — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 omittunt facti.
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, ch. 12, says: "For depravity distorts and brings it about that we are deceived about the principles of action." — A little below several manuscripts with the 2nd and 3rd editions omit facti.
  13. Graece φανός. — Paulo superius post receptorum in cod. W additur in sensibus particularibus, in Vat. a sensu particulari.
    In Greek φανός. — A little above, after receptorum, in codex W is added in sensibus particularibus, in the Vatican edition a sensu particulari.
  14. Supple cum cod. V volunt.
    Supply, with codex V, volunt.
  15. Cod. aa adiungit in eis. In fine responsionis Vat. bonos pro bona.
    Codex aa adds in eis. At the end of the response the Vatican edition [reads] bonos for bona.
  16. Poenae actae opponuntur poena inflicta et poena contracta, de quibus cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 1. ad ult. — Vat. poena contraria est, quae etiam cum uno alteroque cod. istam ignorantiam, plures codd. ibi ignorantiam pro ita ignorantiam.
    To enacted (acta) punishments are opposed inflicted (inflicta) punishment and contracted (contracta) punishment, concerning which cf. I Sent. d. 40, a. 4, q. 1, ad ult. — The Vatican edition [reads] poena contraria est, which also with one or another codex [reads] istam ignorantiam, [while] several manuscripts [read] ibi ignorantiam for ita ignorantiam.
  17. Sap. 9, 15: Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.
    Wisdom 9, 15: "For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul."
  18. In corp. quaest.
    In the body of the question.
  19. Ut ostendit Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 1. seqq. — Non negat S. Doctor, quod etiam verum, quatenus convertitur cum ente, sit sui diffusivum; hoc autem profunde explicat Hexaëm. Serm. 11. a medio.
    As Dionysius shows, On the Divine Names ch. 5, § 1 ff. — The Holy Doctor does not deny that the true also, inasmuch as it is convertible with being, is diffusive of itself; but he explains this profoundly [in the] Hexaëmeron, Sermon 11, from the middle.
  20. Multi codd. bona; non cohaerenter cum praemissis.
    Many manuscripts [read] bona; not coherently with what precedes.
  21. Supple cum aliquibus mss. et Vat. in malis.
    Supply, with some manuscripts and the Vatican edition, in malis. ---
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