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Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 187

Quaestio III. Utrum confirmatio in bono, vel obstinatio in malo diminuat libertatis dominium.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum confirmatio, vel obstinatio diminuat libertatis dominium. Et quod confirmatio minuat, videtur.

1. Liberior est potentia et magis suorum actuum domina, quae omnino nulli subiacet necessitati, quam quae subest; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum necessitatem habet ad benefaciendum, non confirmatum vero minime: ergo confirmatio diminuit dominium.

2. Item, quanto potentia amplior, tanto liberior; sed confirmatio arctat liberum arbitrium ad bonum, ante vero erat indifferens ad bonum et ad malum: ergo videtur, quod liberius erat ante et magis dominans actuum.

3. Item, potentia, quae exit in actum ex se ipsa, magis est suorum actuum domina, quam quae exit mediante alieno beneficio sive gratia; sed liberum arbitrium non confirmatum ex se ipso faciebat quod volebat, confirmatum autem quod facit implet per gratiam; ergo liberius erat ante confirmationem quam post.

Item, hoc ipsum videtur de obstinatione:

1. Primo per Anselmum1, qui dicit, quod « potentia peccandi, addita libero arbitrio, ipsum diminuit », ergo multo magis actus peccandi, ergo maxime necessitas peccandi; sed hoc est in obstinatione: ergo etc.

2. Item, liberius est aliquid, quod nulli subiacet servituti, quam quod subiacet; sed liberum arbitrium in obstinatis subiacet servituti peccati, ante vero minime: ergo etc.

3. Item, liberior est potentia, quanto facilius exit in actum, ad quem est, et tanto minus libera, quanto difficilior est ad illud; sed difficillimum est Angelo obstinato velle bonum: ergo videtur, quod in eis2 liberum arbitrium maxime sit diminutum.

Contra: Quod obstinatio non diminuat, videtur.

4. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus3: « Data, inquit, ipsis Angelis dona nequaquam mutata dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidissima »; ergo si liberum arbitrium fuit eis datum naturaliter, ergo non est diminutum.

5. Item, liberum arbitrium dicitur liberum, quia non potest cogi; ergo si libertas diminuitur, aliqua coactio introducitur; sed liberum arbitrium obstinati nullo modo potest cogi: ergo nullo modo potest diminui.

6. Item, si diminuitur per obstinationem et peccatum, ergo cum non sit infinitum, omnino poterit auferri: ergo videtur, quod aliquando perdant daemones liberum arbitrium, quod est supra improbatum4.

Quod autem confirmatio non diminuat, sed augeat, videtur:

4. Per Anselmum in libro de Libero Arbitrio5, qui sic dicit: « Quod habet quod decet et expedit nec potest illud perdere, liberius est, quam quod potest »; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum non potest perdere iustitiam et rectitudinem, quam expedit et decet habere, non confirmatum potest: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto magis aliquid assimilatur illi quod est liberum in fine libertatis6, tanto liberius est; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum magis as- p. 188 similatur Deo et eius arbitrio quam non confirmatum: ergo est liberius.

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae habet dispositionem elevantem et reddentem facilem ad illud ad quod est, liberior est, quam illa quae caret7; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum sic se habet respectu non confirmati: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Dominium libertatis, quod opponitur servituti coactionis, nec confirmatione nec obstinatione minuitur; dominium autem, quod opponitur servituti subiectionis, confirmatione augetur, obstinatione minuitur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de diminutione dominii libertatis arbitrii, distinguendum est in dominio. Quoddam enim est dominium, quod opponitur coactioni; quoddam, quod opponitur subiectioni. Si autem loquamur de dominio libertatis, quod opponitur servituti coactionis, sic privat coactionem; et hoc dominium est essentiale libero arbitrio, et ideo non minuitur nec augetur. Rursus, quia omnem privat coactionem, aequaliter est in omnibus tam bonis quam malis, tam Creatore quam creaturis, sicut dicit Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio8, ubi dicit, quod « manet libertas voluntatis tam integra in malis quam in bonis, tam in Creatore quam in creaturis ». — Si autem dicatur dominium, quod opponitur servituti subiectionis, sic recipit magis et minus nec inest aequaliter omnibus. Nam in miseris est subiectum miseriae, in beatis liberum; in malis subiectum culpae, in bonis liberum, et tanto liberius, quanto magis distant a malo; in creaturis subiectum mandatis, in Deo vero supra omne mandatum. Et hoc modo accipiendo dominium, per confirmationem augetur, quae magis elongat a subiectione culpae et miseriae, et per obstinationem minuitur, quae cervicem submittit utrique9. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quod obstinatio minuit, et confirmatio auget, quia hac via procedunt, et ideo verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod confirmatio diminuit propter necessitatem; dicendum, quod necessitas immutabilitatis ad bonum nullo modo repugnat libero arbitrio, nec in quantum liberum a coactione, quia coactio est ab extrinseco; nec in quantum liberum a culpa, vel miseria, et ideo non diminuit. Illa ergo propositio solum habet veritatem de necessitate coactionis, vel pronitatis ad malum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amplitudine, dicendum, quod potentiam ampliari est dupliciter: aut respectu eorum quae posse est posse, et de talibus verum est; aut respectu eorum quae posse non est posse, sed deficere; et respectu talium non est verum, et tale est malum. Unde divina potentia, quae est amplissima et liberrima, non est respectu mali10.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beneficio et gratia, dicendum, quod illud verum est, si aeque bene per se posset, sicut potest cum gratia; sed hoc non est verum, quia illud beneficium gratiae elevat potentiam ad ea, ad quae erat et per se11 attingere non poterat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obstinatio non minuit, quia integra manent data; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quantum ad substantiam naturalium, non quantum ad habilitates, ut infra12 melius videbitur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libertas est dominium propter privationem coactionis; dicendum, quod quantum ad illud non diminuitur, sicut praedictum est13.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totaliter posset tolli libertas; dicendum, quod verum est de ea quae diminuitur, qualis est libertas a culpa et miseria; de alia vero non est verum; et sic patet illud.

Patent etiam omnia litteralia per haec dicta14.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether confirmation in good, or obstinacy in evil, lessens the dominion of freedom

Thirdly it is asked whether confirmation, or obstinacy, lessens the dominion of freedom. And that confirmation lessens [it], it seems.

1. A power is more free and more the mistress of its own acts which is subject to no necessity at all, than [one] which is subject [to it]; but confirmed free choice has a necessity to doing good, whereas the non-confirmed [has it] not at all: therefore confirmation lessens dominion.

2. Likewise, the ampler a power, the more free; but confirmation constricts free choice to good, whereas before it was indifferent to good and to evil: therefore it seems that it was more free before and more the master of [its] acts.

3. Likewise, a power which goes forth into act of itself is more the mistress of its own acts than [one] which goes forth by means of another's benefit or grace; but non-confirmed free choice of itself did what it willed, whereas confirmed [free choice] fulfils what it does through grace; therefore it was more free before confirmation than after.

Likewise, this same [thing] is seen concerning obstinacy:

1. First, through Anselm1, who says that "the power of sinning, added to free choice, lessens it," therefore much more the act of sinning, therefore most of all the necessity of sinning; but this is [present] in obstinacy: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is more free which is subject to no servitude, than [one] which is subject; but free choice in the obstinate is subject to the servitude of sin, whereas before [it was] not at all: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a power is more free the more easily it goes forth into the act for which it is, and so much the less free, the more difficult it is toward it; but it is most difficult for an obstinate angel to will good: therefore it seems that in them2 free choice is most of all lessened.

On the contrary: That obstinacy does not lessen [it], it seems.

4. Dionysius, On the Divine Names3: "The gifts given to the angels themselves," he says, "we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; therefore if free choice was given to them naturally, then it is not lessened.

5. Likewise, free choice is called free because it cannot be coerced; therefore if freedom is lessened, some coercion is introduced; but the free choice of the obstinate can in no way be coerced: therefore it can in no way be lessened.

6. Likewise, if it is lessened through obstinacy and sin, then since it is not infinite, it could be wholly taken away: therefore it seems that the demons would at some time lose free choice, which was disproved above4.

But that confirmation does not lessen [it], but increases [it], it seems:

4. Through Anselm in the book On Free Choice5, who says thus: "That which has what is fitting and expedient and cannot lose it is more free than that which can [lose it]"; but confirmed free choice cannot lose the justice and rectitude which it is expedient and fitting to have, [whereas] non-confirmed [free choice] can: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the more a thing is assimilated to that which is free at the term of freedom6, the more free it is; but confirmed free choice is more as- p. 188 similated to God and His choice than non-confirmed [free choice]: therefore it is more free.

6. Likewise, every power which has a disposition elevating [it] and rendering [it] easy toward that for which it is, is more free than [one] which lacks [it]7; but confirmed free choice is so disposed with respect to the non-confirmed: therefore, etc.

Conclusion

The dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of coercion is lessened neither by confirmation nor by obstinacy; but the dominion which is opposed to the servitude of subjection is increased by confirmation, lessened by obstinacy.

I respond: It must be said that, when it is asked concerning the lessening of the dominion of the freedom of choice, a distinction must be made in "dominion." For one [kind] is the dominion which is opposed to coercion; another, [the one] which is opposed to subjection. Now if we speak of the dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of coercion, thus it excludes coercion; and this dominion is essential to free choice, and therefore is neither lessened nor increased. Again, since it excludes all coercion, it is equally in all, both good and evil, both in the Creator and in creatures, as Bernard says in the book On Free Choice8, where he says that "the freedom of the will remains as entire in the evil as in the good, as [much] in the Creator as in creatures." — But if "dominion" be taken [as] that which is opposed to the servitude of subjection, thus it admits of more and less and is not equally present in all. For in the miserable it is subject to misery, in the blessed free; in the evil subject to fault, in the good free, and so much the more free, the more they are distant from evil; in creatures subject to commands, but in God above every command. And taking "dominion" in this manner, by confirmation it is increased, which more removes [one] from the subjection of fault and misery, and by obstinacy it is lessened, which submits the neck to both9. — The reasons, therefore, that obstinacy lessens and confirmation increases [it] are to be granted, because they proceed by this way, and therefore conclude truly.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that confirmation lessens [it] on account of necessity; it must be said that the necessity of immutability toward good in no way is repugnant to free choice, neither insofar as it is free from coercion, because coercion is from outside; nor insofar as it is free from fault or misery, and therefore it does not lessen [it]. That proposition, then, has truth only concerning the necessity of coercion, or of proneness to evil.

2. To that which is objected concerning amplitude, it must be said that for a power to be made ampler is twofold: either with respect to those things of which to be able is [really] to be able, and concerning such it is true; or with respect to those things of which to be able is not [really] to be able, but to fail; and with respect to such it is not true, and such is evil. Whence the divine power, which is most ample and most free, is not [a power] with respect to evil10.

3. To that which is objected concerning benefit and grace, it must be said that this is true, if it could [do] equally well of itself as it can with grace; but this is not true, because that benefit of grace elevates the power to those things to which it was [ordered] and of itself11 could not attain.

4. To that which is objected, that obstinacy does not lessen [it], because the gifts remain entire; it must be said that that is to be understood as to the substance of the natural [endowments], not as to the aptitudes, as will be seen better below12.

5. To that which is objected, that freedom is dominion on account of the privation of coercion; it must be said that as to that it is not lessened, as was said before13.

6. To that which is objected, that freedom could be wholly taken away; it must be said that this is true of that [freedom] which is lessened, such as freedom from fault and misery; but of the other it is not true; and so that [point] is evident.

The literal points too are all evident through these things said14.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1: Potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita voluntati minuit eius libertatem etc. — Circa finem arg. plures codd. ut F P Q aa sed haec est pro sed hoc est.
    Dialogue On Free Choice ch. 1: "The power of sinning, therefore, which added to the will lessens its freedom" etc. — Near the end of the argument several manuscripts, such as F P Q aa, [read] sed haec est for sed hoc est.
  2. Vat. in eo.
    The Vatican edition [reads] in eo.
  3. Cap. 4. § 23. Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8. — Paulo inferius post fuit eis datum non pauci codd. cum tribus primis edd. interserunt ergo; cod. aa bene ergo naturale est.
    Ch. 4, § 23. Cf. above, p. 122, note 8. — A little below, after fuit eis datum not a few manuscripts with the first three editions insert ergo; codex aa [reads] bene ergo naturale est.
  4. Quaest. praeced.
    The preceding question.
  5. Cap. 1: Qui sic habet quod decet et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere non queat, liberior est, quam ille qui sic habet hoc ipsum, ut possit perdere.
    Ch. 1: "He who so has what is fitting and what is expedient that he cannot lose it is more free than he who so has this very thing that he can lose [it]."
  6. Haec dictio respondet aliis similibus in libro de Causis, prop. 21. in fine simplicitatis et in Averrois Comment. super XII. Metaph. text. 39. in fine nobilitatis. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 638, nota 1. et pag. 806, nota 6. — Vat. substituit infinitae libertatis. Plures codd. est liberrimum pro est liberum.
    This expression corresponds to other similar ones in the book On Causes, prop. 21, in fine simplicitatis (at the term of simplicity), and in Averroes' Commentary on Metaphysics XII, text 39, in fine nobilitatis (at the term of nobility). Cf. tom. I, p. 638, note 1, and p. 806, note 6. — The Vatican edition substitutes infinitae libertatis. Several manuscripts [read] est liberrimum for est liberum.
  7. Nonnulli codd. supplent illa dispositione. Vat. hac dispositione.
    Several manuscripts supply illa dispositione. The Vatican edition [reads] hac dispositione.
  8. Cap. 4. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.
    Ch. 4, n. 9. Cf. above, p. 115, note 6.
  9. Fusius haec monstrantur infra d. 25. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    These things are shown more fully below, d. 25, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 ff.
  10. Sicut probatum est I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2.
    As was proved [in] I Sent. d. 42, q. 2.
  11. Cod. F cum edd. 2, 3 ad quae per se, omissis erat et. Cod. T exit pro erat.
    Codex F with the 2nd and 3rd editions [reads] ad quae per se, with erat et omitted. Codex T [reads] exit for erat.
  12. In secunda parte huius dist. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    In the second part of this distinction, a. 1, q. 1 ff.
  13. In corp. quaest.
    In the body of the question.
  14. Vide scholion praecedentis quaest. — Ut patet ex ultimis verbis, S. Doctor hoc loco dubia circa litteram Magistri, quae in aliis distinctionibus ponere consuevit, non esse solvenda iudicavit.
    See the scholion of the preceding question. — As is evident from the last words, the Holy Doctor judged that here the dubia circa litteram Magistri (doubts concerning the text of the Master), which he was accustomed to set down in other distinctions, were not to be solved. ---
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