Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
Quaestio II. Utrum liberum arbitrium sit actuum contingentium et necessariorum, an contingentium tantum.
Secundo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad actum, et quaeritur, utrum sit actuum contingentium et necessariorum, an contingentium tantum.
Et quod sit contingentium tantum, videtur:
1. Per Magistrum in secundo1 capitulo huius distinctionis, ubi ait sic: « Hoc autem sciendum, quod liberum arbitrium non refertur ad praesens, vel ad praeteritum, sed ad futura contingentia ».
2. Item, liberum arbitrium est respectu eorum actuum, qui sunt a nobis, et eorum, de quibus consiliamur. Si ergo non consiliamur de necessariis et impossibilibus, sed de contingentibus, et ea quae sunt in nobis, possumus facere et non facere; videtur, quod soli actus contingentes ad liberum arbitrium habeant pertinere2.
3. Item, liberum arbitrium est potestas rationalis; sed potestas rationalis est indifferens ad faciendum et non faciendum3; et nihil, quod exit a potentia indifferenter se habente ad hoc et ad eius oppositum, est necessarium, sed contingens: ergo etc.
4. Item, necessarium et voluntarium ex opposito dividuntur4: ergo si actus liberi arbitrii esset necessarius, non esset voluntarius: si ergo omnis actus liberi arbitrii est voluntarius, videtur, quod nullus sit necessarius.
Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio5: « Erit homo sic, ut velle male non possit, nec tamen ideo carebit libero arbitrio ». Et paulo post: « Neque aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati sic esse volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus ». Ex hoc expresse colligitur, quod liberum arbitrium est respectu actus necessarii et immutabilis.
2. Item, liberum arbitrium est in Deo et Angelis et hominibus beatis; sed Deus est immutabilis per naturam, Angelus vero et homo beatus per gloriam: ergo in ipsis liberum arbitrium necessario et immutabiliter in suum actum exit: ergo non solum est respectu actus contingentis, verum etiam necessarii.
3. Item, non est meritum sine actu liberi arbitrii; sed iste qui fecit bonum, vult se fecisse, et hoc ipso meretur: si igitur hunc fecisse bonum, demonstrato illo qui fecit, est necessarium, liberum arbitrium est respectu actus necessarii, etiam secundum statum meriti.
4. Item, liberum arbitrium est potestas non alligata, eo ipso quod liberum est6: si igitur potentia intellectiva, eo ipso quod non est alligata, potest cognoscere necessaria et contingentia: ergo cum voluntas vel arbitrii libertas ad nihil astringatur, videtur, quod erit respectu actuum necessariorum et contingentium simul.
Conclusio
Actus liberi arbitrii, ut liberi, non solum potest esse circa necessarium, sed etiam esse necessarius in se; actus eius, ut deliberantis, semper est contingens, licet possit esse circa necessarium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium dupliciter potest considerari: aut secundum quod liberum, aut secundum quod deliberans. — Si loquamur de ipso, secundum quod liberum, sic concedo, quod potest esse non solum respectu contingentis, sed etiam necessarii, sicut patet in Deo et in Christo et in Angelis et in hominibus beatis. Cum enim duplex sit necessitas, videlicet coactionis et immutabilitatis, necessitas coactionis repugnat libertati arbitrii, necessitas vero immutabilitatis non, pro eo quod arbitrium dicitur liberum, non quia sic velit hoc, ut possit velle eius oppositum, sed quia omne quod vult, appetit ad sui ipsius imperium, quia sic vult aliquid, ut velit, se velle illud; et ideo in actu volendi se ipsum movet et sibi dominatur, et pro tanto dicitur liberum, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud7.
Si autem loquamur de libero arbitrio, secundum quod deliberans, utrum hoc fiat, vel non fiat; sic actus eius, de quo deliberat, est contingens; nullus enim deliberat de necessario et impossibili; actus tamen ille potest esse circa necessarium, vel circa contingens. In libero enim arbitrio est considerare actum volendi et ipsum volitum. Et in quantum liberum arbitrium est deliberans, necesse est, quod contingentia8 sit circa utrumque istorum, vel circa alterum: circa utrumque, ut cum quis deliberat, utrum velit intrare religionem, vel diligere inimicum; circa alterum, ut cum quis deliberat, utrum debeat sibi placere, vel displicere malum, quod fecit; vel utrum debeat consentire, vel dissentire appetitui naturaliter inserto, utpote appetitui beatitudinis. Sic igitur actus liberi arbitrii deliberantis, quamvis possit esse circa necessarium, semper est contingens; actus vero liberi arbitrii, ut liberum est, non solum potest esse circa necessarium, sed9 etiam necessarius in se.
Ad argumenta: Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod liberum arbitrium potest esse respectu actus necessarii, concludunt de libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum, sicut manifeste apparet pertractanti. Auctoritates vero et rationes ad oppositum intelliguntur de libero arbitrio, secundum quod deliberans et consilians; aliter non cogunt.
Ad 1, 2. Nam quod primo obiicitur de verbo Magistri10, planum est, quod intelligit de libero arbitrio secundum statum viatoris, sicut ipse Magister in littera11 se ipsum exponit. — Similiter quod secundo obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium est eorum, de quibus consiliamur; hoc enim verum est de libero arbitrio, secundum quod tenet rationem deliberantis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationalis potestas est ad opposita; dicendum, quod illud non est verum de omni potestate rationali, sicut iam in sequenti problemate melius patebit12; sed hoc est verum de rationali potestate secundum statum mutabilitatis et vertibilitatis, secundum quem statum intelligitur verbum Philosophi.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessarium et voluntarium ex opposito dividuntur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod necessarium dictum est a necessitate coactionis; secundum autem quod necessarium dictum est a necessitate immutabilitatis13, non dividitur contra voluntarium, nisi voluntarium dicatur a voluntate deliberante et consiliante. Et hoc modo bene concedo, quod voluntarium est contingens, et hoc non obviat, sed potius consonat ei quod prius dictum est14.
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Question II. Whether free choice concerns acts that are contingent and necessary, or only contingent ones.
Secondly there is inquiry concerning free choice in comparison to its act, and it is asked whether it concerns acts that are contingent and necessary, or only contingent ones.
And that it concerns only contingent ones, it seems:
1. Through the Master in the second1 chapter of this distinction, where he speaks thus: "But this must be known, that free choice is not referred to the present, nor to the past, but to future contingent things."
2. Likewise, free choice concerns those acts which are from us, and those about which we deliberate. If therefore we do not deliberate about necessary and impossible things, but about contingent ones, and the things which are in our power we can do and not do; it seems that only contingent acts can pertain to free choice2.
3. Likewise, free choice is a rational power; but a rational power is indifferent to doing and not doing3; and nothing which proceeds from a power indifferently disposed toward this and toward its opposite is necessary, but contingent: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, the necessary and the voluntary are divided by opposition4: therefore if the act of free choice were necessary, it would not be voluntary: if then every act of free choice is voluntary, it seems that none is necessary.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the Enchiridion5: "Man will be such that he cannot will evil, nor on that account will he be deprived of free choice." And a little later: "Nor is it the case that there is no will, or that it should not be called free, by which we will to be blessed in such a way that we not only do not will to be wretched, but cannot will it at all." From this it is expressly gathered that free choice concerns a necessary and immutable act.
2. Likewise, free choice is in God and the Angels and the blessed; but God is immutable by nature, while the Angel and the blessed man are immutable by glory: therefore in them free choice goes out into its act necessarily and immutably: therefore it concerns not only a contingent act, but also a necessary one.
3. Likewise, there is no merit without an act of free choice; but he who has done good wills himself to have done it, and by this very fact merits: if therefore this man's having done good, the one who did it having been pointed out, is necessary, free choice concerns a necessary act, even according to the state of merit.
4. Likewise, free choice is a power that is not bound, by the very fact that it is free6: if therefore the intellective power, by the very fact that it is not bound, can know necessary and contingent things: therefore since the will, or the liberty of choice, is constrained to nothing, it seems that it will concern necessary and contingent acts together.
Conclusion
The act of free choice, as free, can not only be about something necessary, but even be necessary in itself; its act, as deliberating, is always contingent, although it can be about something necessary.
I respond: It must be said that free choice can be considered in two ways: either as it is free, or as it is deliberating. — If we speak of it as it is free, then I concede that it can concern not only the contingent, but also the necessary, as is clear in God and in Christ and in the Angels and in the blessed. For since necessity is twofold, namely of coercion and of immutability, the necessity of coercion is repugnant to the liberty of choice, but the necessity of immutability is not, for the reason that choice is called free, not because it so wills this that it could will its opposite, but because everything that it wills, it desires under its own command, since it so wills something that it wills to will it; and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and is master of itself, and to that extent it is called free, although it is immutably ordered to that thing7.
But if we speak of free choice as it is deliberating, whether this be done or not be done; then its act, about which it deliberates, is contingent; for no one deliberates about the necessary and the impossible; yet that act can be about something necessary, or about something contingent. For in free choice there is the act of willing and the thing willed itself to consider. And insofar as free choice is deliberating, it is necessary that the contingency8 be about each of these, or about one: about each, as when one deliberates whether he wills to enter religious life, or to love an enemy; about one, as when one deliberates whether he ought to take pleasure in, or be displeased by, an evil which he has done; or whether he ought to consent to, or dissent from, an appetite naturally implanted, such as the appetite for beatitude. Thus therefore the act of free choice as deliberating, although it can be about something necessary, is always contingent; but the act of free choice, as it is free, can not only be about something necessary, but9 even necessary in itself.
To the arguments: And by this the answer to the question proposed is clear, and the answer to the objections is also clear. For the reasons which show that free choice can concern a necessary act conclude about free choice as it is free, as is manifestly apparent to one who examines them. But the authorities and reasons to the contrary are understood of free choice as it is deliberating and taking counsel; otherwise they do not compel.
To 1 and 2. For as to what is objected first, concerning the word of the Master10, it is plain that he understands it of free choice according to the state of the wayfarer, as the Master himself expounds himself in the text11. — Similarly, as to what is objected secondly, that free choice concerns the things about which we deliberate; this indeed is true of free choice insofar as it holds the character of deliberating.
To 3. As to what is objected, that a rational power is for opposites; it must be said that this is not true of every rational power, as will become clearer in the following problem12; but it is true of a rational power according to the state of mutability and changeableness, according to which state the word of the Philosopher is understood.
To 4. As to what is objected, that the necessary and the voluntary are divided by opposition; it must be said that this is true according as the necessary is said from the necessity of coercion; but according as the necessary is said from the necessity of immutability13, it is not divided against the voluntary, unless the voluntary be said from a will deliberating and taking counsel. And in this way I readily concede that the voluntary is contingent, and this is not opposed but rather consonant with what was said before14.
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- Sic codd. et edd.; in nostra ed. verba citt., divisione capit. emendata, habentur in cap. primo.Thus the codices and editions; in our edition the cited words, the division of chapters having been emended, are found in chapter one.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 3; Nemesius, de Natura hominis, c. 34. et 39; Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 25. seqq.; Boeth., III. Maior. Comment. in librum Aristotelis de Interpret. ed. secunda. — Dictio quae sunt in nobis (Graece τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) delibata est ex modo memoratis auctoribus Graecis et nihil aliud significat quam: quae sunt in nostra potestate. Cfr. supra pag. 565, nota 1.Cf. Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 3; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, cc. 34 and 39; Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 25 ff.; Boethius, Greater Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation, second edition. — The phrase which are in our power (in Greek τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is drawn from the Greek authors just mentioned and signifies nothing other than: the things that are in our power. Cf. above, p. 565, note 1.
- Sive, ut Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.) ait, rationalis potestas est ad opposita; quod dictum Aristotelis in solut. huius obiect. explicatur.Or, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics IX, texts 3 and 10 (VIII, cc. 2 and 5), a rational power is for opposites; which saying of Aristotle is explained in the solution of this objection.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. Magn. moral. c. 14. seq. et II. Moral. Eudem. c. 8. seq. (c. 7. seq.).Cf. Aristotle, Magna Moralia I, c. 14 f. and Eudemian Ethics II, c. 8 f. (c. 7 f.).
- Cap. 105. n. 28. — Seq. textus est ibid., qui in originali sic sonat: Neque enim culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est etc. — Codd. H T Aut voluntas non est libera, aut libera etc.Chapter 105, n. 28. — The following text is in the same place, which in the original runs thus: For neither is the will to be blamed, or there is no will, etc. — Codices H, T: Either the will is not free, or it is free, etc.
- Vide supra p. I. huius dist. q. I. in corp. et q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius Vat. omittit et contingentia. In fine arg. pro simul cod. cc et ed. 1 similiter.See above, Part I of this distinction, q. I in the body and q. 3 in the body. — A little below, the Vatican edition omits and contingent things. At the end of the argument, for together codex cc and edition 1 read similarly.
- Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — Paulo inferius post nullus enim cod. O subiicit deliberans.Cf. above, d. 7, Part I, a. 2, q. 3, to the first. — A little below, after for no one codex O adds deliberating.
- Codd. E K contingens.Codices E, K: contingent.
- Vide supra pag. 612, nota 3. — Immediate post non codd., inter quos K T W Y aa bb cc ee, cum ed. 1 substituunt et pro sed.See above, p. 612, note 3. — Immediately after not, the codices, among which K, T, W, Y, aa, bb, cc, ee, together with edition 1, substitute and for but.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq. et dist. praeced. c. 3.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8 f., and the preceding distinction, c. 3.
- Hic c. 1. seqq.Here at c. 1 ff.
- Cfr. etiam supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, ubi hoc dictum Aristotelis simili modo explanatum est.Cf. also above, d. 7, Part I, a. 2, q. 1, to the third, where this saying of Aristotle is explained in a similar manner.
- Codd. F K T W et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 mutabilitatis; perperam.Codices F, K, T, W and others, together with editions 2, 3, 4, read of mutability; wrongly.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — Paulo superius post et hoc cod. Y bene repetit modo.See the scholion to the preceding question. — A little above, after and this codex Y rightly repeats manner. ---