Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
Articulus Unicus. De libero arbitrio in comparatione.
Quaestio I. Utrum liberum arbitrium sit aeque in omnibus, in quibus reperitur.
Ad intelligentiam huius partis, cum supra habitum sit de libero arbitrio in se, quaeritur hic de ipso in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.
Primo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad subiectum.
Secundo quaeritur de ipso in comparatione ad actum.
Tertio vero quaeritur in comparatione ad obiectum.
Quarto, in comparatione ad aliquod aliud agens creatum.
Quinto, in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet Deum.
Sexto et ultimo, in comparatione ad corpus coniunctum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de libero arbitrio per comparationem ad subiectum, utrum in omnibus, in quibus est, sit aequaliter, aut secundum magis et minus. Et quod sit in omnibus aequaliter, videtur:
1. Primo per Bernardum in libro de Libero Arbitrio1: « Manet libertas voluntatis tam plena in bonis quam in malis, sed in bonis ordinatior, tam integra quoque suo modo in creatura quam in Creatore ».
2. Item, in eodem2: « Libertas arbitrii cunctis pariter ratione utentibus competit, nec magis est in bonis quam in malis ». Et iterum subiungit, quod « nec augetur gratia nec minuitur culpa ».
3. Item, liberum arbitrium eo ipso dicitur liberum, quo est a coactione immune; sed omne liberum arbitrium est ab omni coactione immune: ergo si libertas arbitrii in quolibet universaliter privat coactionem, et in omnimoda privatione non est magis et minus reperire3; arbitrii libertas in omnibus, in quibus est, est aequaliter.
4. Item, magis et minus est per permixtionem unius ad aliud4; sed libertas arbitrii nullo modo potest permisceri in aliquo servituti sibi contrariae, quae quidem est servitus coactionis: ergo non videtur, quod possit secundum magis et minus participari: ergo aequaliter est in omnibus, in quibus invenitur.
Sed contra: 1. Liberum arbitrium « est potestas servandi rectitudinem », sicut dicit Anselmus5; sed maior est potestas servandi rectitudinem in bonis quam in malis, in confirmatis quam in non confirmatis: ergo liberum arbitrium contingit secundum magis et minus participari.
2. Item, libertas arbitrii est quaedam nobilis dignitas in anima rationali; sed in nulla proprietate dignitatis creatura potest6 aequari Creatori: ergo impossibile est, libertatem arbitrii in Creatore et creatura aequaliter reperiri.
3. Item, libertas arbitrii est facultas, quae fundatur super rationem et voluntatem7; sed vis cognitiva multo perfectius reperitur in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura plus quam in alia, similiter et vis appetitiva: ergo pari ratione et illa facultas, ex qua potentia rationis et potentia voluntatis liberae esse dicuntur.
4. Item, liberius est illud, in quo nullum cadit genus servitutis, quam in quo potest aliquod genus servitutis cadere: cum igitur aliqua sint, quae nullo modo possunt subiici nec peccato nec miseriae, quaedam vero, quae eis subiecta sunt et serviunt; videtur ergo, quod ab his et illis liberum arbitrium non participetur aequaliter8.
Conclusio. Liberum arbitrium quoad immunitatem a coactione aequaliter est in omnibus, in quibus reperitur; quoad excellentiae dignitatem praestantius est in Creatore, sed aequaliter in creaturis relatis ad invicem; quoad facultatem iustitiae servandae etiam in creaturis est inaequaliter.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit aequaliter in omnibus, non est quaestio de ipso, secundum quod dicitur liberum ea libertate, quae est a miseria, vel a culpa; hoc enim modo planum est, quod liberius est in uno quam in alio; sed est quaestio de libero arbitrio, secundum quod dicitur libertas a coactione9; sic enim videntur auctoritates Sanctorum sibi invicem repugnare.
Et propterea ad contrarietatem, quae videtur, de medio dirimendam, intelligendum est, quod liberum arbitrium sive libertas arbitrii et dicit comparationem ad illud a quo, et ad illud ad quod. Per comparationem ad illud a quo dicitur privative sive negative; dicitur enim liberum a coactione, pro eo quod est ab omni coactione immune. Per comparationem ad illud ad quod dicitur positive, quoniam10 libertas arbitrii est quaedam facultas sive potestas servandi rectitudinem. Haec autem facultas, prout privationi coactionis coniuncta est, habet quandam dignitatem; dignitatis enim est et potestatis non posse cogi. Et sic in liberi arbitrii intellectu tria clauduntur, videlicet a coactione immunitas, excellentiae dignitas et potestas sive facultas.
Quantum ad primum, liberum arbitrium in omnibus, in quibus est, aequaliter se habet, sicut dicunt auctoritates Bernardi, et ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae, pro eo quod in omni, in quo ponitur, simpliciter et universaliter omnem excludit coactionem. Propterea dicit Bernardus, quod ita plena est arbitrii libertas in creatura suo modo, sicut in Creatore; quod etsi non possit intelligi veraciter esse dictum de aliquo, quod dicitur per positionem, potest tamen intelligi de eo quod dicitur per omnimodam privationem.
Quantum autem ad secundum, videlicet quantum ad excellentiae dignitatem, est inaequaliter in comparatione creaturarum ad Creatorem, sed aequaliter in comparatione creaturarum ad invicem. Dignitas enim liberi arbitrii increati superexcellit dignitatem omnis liberi arbitrii creati11, quia illa est dignitas summa, et omnis dignitas creata est dignitas infra illam et propter illam; et sic inaequalitas est in libertate arbitrii quantum ad dignitatem, prout consideratur in creaturis et Creatore. — Prout autem consideratur in creaturis relatis ad invicem, sic habet in eis reperiri aequaliter, pro eo quod omne liberum arbitrium immediate est sub Deo constitutum, et quodlibet est suarum operationum post Deum primum principium. Attenditur enim secundum rationalis creaturae supremum, quo solus Deus superior est, sicut vult Augustinus12.
Quantum autem ad tertium, videlicet quantum ad facultatem aut ad servandae iustitiae potestatem; sic inaequalitas reperitur non solum in creaturis et Creatore, sed etiam in creaturis comparatis ad invicem. Una enim creatura multo potentior est altera in rectitudine servanda, sicut beata quam misera; et hoc est, quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio13: « Libertas arbitrii alia est a se, quae nec est facta nec ab alio accepta, quae est solius Dei. Alia est a Deo facta et accepta, quae est Angelorum et hominum. Facta autem sive accepta, alia est habens rectitudinem, quam servet, alia carens; habens, alia tenet separabiliter, alia inseparabiliter; carens autem, alia caret recuperabiliter, alia irrecuperabiliter ». Ex hac divisione Anselmi apparent gradus libertatis non solum in creaturis respectu Creatoris, sed etiam in creaturis ad invicem relatis. Sumitur enim haec divisio libertatis secundum id quod est in ea positionis; et hoc modo contingit, eam secundum plus et minus in habentibus liberum arbitrium reperiri. Et sic procedunt rationes prius adductae.
Ad argumenta. Patet igitur ex praedictis responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet nihilominus responsio ad obiecta, quia rationes, quae probant aequalitatem, arguunt de libero arbitrio penes id quod dicit privationem; rationes vero ad oppositum penes id quod dicit positionem; et ideo utraeque concedendae sunt, quia diversis viis verum concludunt.
I. In solvenda hac quaestione, quae praedictis doctrinis non parum luminis affert, antiqui satis conveniunt. Petr. a Tar. etiam in verbis sequitur S. Bonaventuram. Tota haec doctrina fundata est in definitione liberi arbitrii, quam ex S. Augustino hausit S. Anselmus, et quae hic in fine responsionis magis determinatur, scil. quod sit potestas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem (cfr. supra p. I. dub. 2. et in p. II. q. 3. et dub. 2. 3.). Secundum istam explicationem S. Anselmi libertas in creaturis praesupponit rectitudinem acceptam a Deo, et est potestas propria electione servandi, prosequendi et exsequendi rectitudinem acceptam. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. unic. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
II. Sequens (2.) quaest. in corp. et ad 4. explicat duo genera necessarii et voluntarii et in specie, quomodo etiam circa obiectum necessarium possit esse actus contingens. Quod confirmat S. Thom., de Malo, q. 6. a. unic. in corp. ante finem, ubi inter alia, postquam docuit, quod homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem in communi, hoc addit: « Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum, non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle nunc cogitare de beatitudine, quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt ». — Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 9. 10.) non tantum quoad beatitudinem in communi, nec non in particulari, si obscure ostenditur, sed etiam quoad dilectionem Dei in patria vult, actum esse liberum, non quidem libertate contrarietatis, sed contradictionis (exercitii), scilicet quia in sensu diviso et potentia remota possit ab actu cessare. Etiam S. Bonav. eundem actum vocat liberum, cum distinguat duplicem libertatem, ut supra p. I. q. 1. in scholio notatum est. De hac (2.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 6. a. 2. — S. Thom., (quoad partem quaestionis), hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 13. a. 3, q. 17. a. 3. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 97. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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Article (Sole). On free choice in comparison.
Question I. Whether free choice is equally in all in which it is found.
For the understanding of this part, since above free choice has been treated in itself, here inquiry is made concerning it in comparison. And concerning this six questions are asked.
First, inquiry is made concerning free choice in comparison to the subject.
Second, inquiry is made concerning it in comparison to the act.
Third, in comparison to the object.
Fourth, in comparison to some other created agent.
Fifth, in comparison to the first mover, namely God.
Sixth and last, in comparison to the conjoined body.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning free choice by comparison to the subject, whether it is equally in all in which it is, or according to more and less. And that it is equally in all, it seems:
1. First, through Bernard in the book On Free Choice1: "The liberty of the will remains as full in the good as in the wicked, but in the good more ordered, just as also whole in its own way in the creature as in the Creator."
2. Likewise, in the same work2: "The liberty of choice belongs alike to all who use reason, nor is it greater in the good than in the wicked." And he again adds that "neither is grace increased nor fault diminished."
3. Likewise, free choice is called free by the very fact that it is immune from coercion; but every free choice is immune from all coercion: therefore if the liberty of choice in anything universally excludes coercion, and in a total privation there is no more and less to be found3; the liberty of choice is equally in all in which it is.
4. Likewise, more and less arise through the intermixing of one thing with another4; but the liberty of choice can in no way be intermixed in anything with a servitude contrary to it, which is indeed the servitude of coercion: therefore it does not seem that it can be participated according to more and less: therefore it is equally in all in which it is found.
On the contrary: 1. Free choice "is the power of preserving rectitude," as Anselm says5; but the power of preserving rectitude is greater in the good than in the wicked, in the confirmed than in the unconfirmed: therefore free choice happens to be participated according to more and less.
2. Likewise, the liberty of choice is a certain noble dignity in the rational soul; but in no property of dignity can the creature6 be equal to the Creator: therefore it is impossible that the liberty of choice be found equally in the Creator and the creature.
3. Likewise, the liberty of choice is a faculty which is founded upon reason and will7; but the cognitive power is found much more perfectly in God than in the creature, and in one creature more than in another, and likewise the appetitive power: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is that faculty, from which the power of reason and the power of will are said to be free.
4. Likewise, that is freer in which no kind of servitude falls than that in which some kind of servitude can fall: since therefore there are some things which can in no way be subjected either to sin or to misery, and certain others which are subjected to them and serve them; it seems therefore that free choice is not participated equally by these and by those8.
Conclusion. Free choice, as to immunity from coercion, is equally in all in which it is found; as to the dignity of excellence it is more eminent in the Creator, but equal in creatures related to one another; as to the faculty of preserving justice, even in creatures it is unequal.
Respondeo: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when it is asked whether free choice is equally in all, the question is not concerning it according as it is called free by that liberty which is from misery or from fault; for in this way it is plain that it is freer in one than in another; but the question is concerning free choice according as it is called liberty from coercion9; for in this way the authorities of the Saints seem to be at odds with one another.
And therefore, to settle the contrariety that appears, it must be understood that free choice or the liberty of choice both expresses a comparison to that from which and to that to which. By comparison to that from which it is named privatively or negatively; for it is called free from coercion, inasmuch as it is immune from all coercion. By comparison to that to which it is named positively, since10 the liberty of choice is a certain faculty or power of preserving rectitude. Now this faculty, inasmuch as it is joined to the privation of coercion, has a certain dignity; for it belongs to dignity and to power not to be able to be coerced. And so in the notion of free choice three things are enclosed, namely immunity from coercion, the dignity of excellence, and the power or faculty.
As to the first, free choice is held equally in all in which it is, as the authorities of Bernard say, and as the reasons adduced to this effect show, inasmuch as in everything in which it is placed it simply and universally excludes coercion. Therefore Bernard says that the liberty of choice is as full in the creature in its own way as in the Creator; which, although it cannot be truly understood to be said of anything that is named by position, can nevertheless be understood of that which is named by total privation.
But as to the second, namely as to the dignity of excellence, it is unequal in the comparison of creatures to the Creator, but equal in the comparison of creatures to one another. For the dignity of uncreated free choice supereminently surpasses the dignity of all created free choice11, because the former is the supreme dignity, and every created dignity is a dignity beneath it and on account of it; and so there is inequality in the liberty of choice as to dignity, insofar as it is considered in creatures and in the Creator. — But insofar as it is considered in creatures related to one another, thus it is to be found in them equally, inasmuch as every free choice is immediately constituted under God, and each is, after God, the first principle of its own operations. For it is regarded according to the supreme element of the rational creature, above which God alone is superior, as Augustine holds12.
But as to the third, namely as to the faculty or to the power of preserving justice; thus inequality is found not only in creatures and the Creator, but also in creatures compared to one another. For one creature is much more powerful than another in preserving rectitude, as the blessed than the wretched; and this is what Anselm says in the book On Free Choice13: "The liberty of choice is one kind that is from itself, which is neither made nor received from another, which belongs to God alone. Another is made and received from God, which belongs to the angels and to men. But of that which is made or received, one kind has rectitude which it preserves, another lacks it; of that which has it, one holds it separably, another inseparably; of that which lacks it, one lacks it recoverably, another irrecoverably." From this division of Anselm there appear degrees of liberty not only in creatures with respect to the Creator, but also in creatures related to one another. For this division of liberty is taken according to what is of position in it; and in this way it happens that it is found according to more and less in those having free choice. And thus the reasons previously adduced proceed.
To the arguments. It is therefore clear from what has been said what the response is to the question proposed; the response to the objections is likewise no less clear, because the reasons that prove equality argue concerning free choice as regards what it expresses of privation; the reasons to the opposite, as regards what it expresses of position; and therefore both are to be granted, because by diverse ways they conclude what is true.
I. In solving this question, which sheds no little light upon the foregoing doctrines, the ancients are in fair agreement. Peter of Tarentaise even in his words follows St. Bonaventure. This whole doctrine is founded on the definition of free choice, which St. Anselm drew from St. Augustine, and which here at the end of the response is more fully determined, namely that it is the power of preserving rectitude for the sake of rectitude itself (cf. above p. I, dub. 2, and in p. II, q. 3 and dub. 2, 3). According to this explanation of St. Anselm, liberty in creatures presupposes the rectitude received from God, and is the power of preserving, pursuing, and carrying out by its own choice the rectitude received. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. unic. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 5. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, on this and the following questions here, q. unica.
II. The following (2nd) question, in the body and in the reply to the fourth, explains the two genera of the necessary and the voluntary, and in particular how even concerning a necessary object there can be a contingent act. This St. Thomas confirms, On Evil, q. 6, a. unic. in the body before the end, where among other things, after he has taught that man by necessity desires beatitude in general, he adds this: "But I say by necessity as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite, but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can will not to think now about beatitude, since even the very acts of intellect and will are particular." — Scotus (IV Sent. d. 49, q. 9, 10) holds that the act is free not only as to beatitude in general, and indeed in particular, if it is shown obscurely, but even as to the love of God in the fatherland — free not indeed by liberty of contrariety, but of contradiction (of exercise), namely because in the divided sense and in remote potency it could cease from the act. St. Bonaventure too calls the same act free, since he distinguishes a twofold liberty, as was noted above in p. I, q. 1, in the scholion. On this (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 6, a. 2. — St. Thomas (as to part of the question), here q. unica a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 13, a. 3, q. 17, a. 3, 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. II, tr. 13, q. 97, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- Cap. 4. n. 9: Manet ergo libertas voluntatis, ubi etiam fit captivitas mentis, tam plena quidem in malis quam in bonis, sed... tam integra quoque pro suo modo etc.Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, c. 4, n. 9: "There remains therefore the liberty of the will, even where there occurs captivity of the mind, indeed as full in the wicked as in the good, but... whole also in its own way, etc."
- Cap. 5. n. 13: Libertas... utentibus convenit, non minor, quantum in se est, in malis quam in bonis. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 9. n. 28. et sic sonat in originali: Nam etsi habuerit initium, nescit tamen occasum, nec de iustitia vel gloria capit augmentum, nec de peccato sive miseria detrimentum. Et c. 4. n. 9. dicit Bernardus: Nec peccato nec miseria amittitur vel minuitur.Ibid. c. 5, n. 13: "Liberty... befits those who use [reason], no less, so far as in itself it is, in the wicked than in the good." — The following text is ibid. c. 9, n. 28, and in the original it runs thus: "For although it had a beginning, it nevertheless knows no setting, nor does it take increase from justice or glory, nor diminution from sin or misery." And at c. 4, n. 9, Bernard says: "It is lost or diminished neither by sin nor by misery."
- Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3, ubi ex Aristot. monstratur, quod in privatione nulla est differentia. — Vat. ultimam huius propos. partem sic exhibet: et omnimodam privationem non est magis et minus reperiri in toto quam in altero; arbitrii libertas in omnibus etc. Particulam in ante omnimoda nostri codd. omittunt, sed habent reperire et vel omnimoda privatione vel omnimodam privationem; insuper plurimi codd. in fine arg. supprimunt unum ex duobus est ante aequaliter. Nostra lectio exhibet correctionem factam in cod. bb a manu antiqua.Cf. above p. 111, note 3, where from Aristotle it is shown that in a privation there is no difference. — The Vatican edition presents the last part of this proposition thus: "and a total privation cannot be found more and less in the whole than in another; the liberty of choice in all, etc." Our codices omit the particle in before omnimoda, but they have reperire and either omnimoda privatione or omnimodam privationem; moreover most codices at the end of the argument suppress one of the two est before aequaliter. Our reading presents a correction made in codex bb by an ancient hand.
- Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.): Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 Item, secundum magis et minus est permixtionem fieri unius ad aliud.Aristotle, Topics III, c. 4 (c. 5): "And those things that are less mixed with their contraries are more such; as the whiter is less mixed with black." — Codex cc and edition 1 read: "Likewise, according to more and less there comes to be an intermixing of one thing with another."
- Dialogus de lib. arb. c. 3. et 13.Anselm, Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 3 and 13.
- Cod. T sed in nulla dignitate creatura proprie potest. Versus finem arg. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 minus aeque sic legunt: arbitrii inter creaturam et Creatorem etc. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 607, nota 2.Codex T reads "but in no dignity can the creature properly." Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read minus aeque ("less equally") thus: "of choice between the creature and the Creator, etc." — On the major premise cf. above p. 607, note 2.
- Vide lit. Magistri, dist. praeced. c. 3. Paulo inferius Vat. multo perfectior pro multo perfectius.See the text of the Master, preceding distinction, c. 3. A little below the Vatican edition reads multo perfectior for multo perfectius.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. seqq.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3 and following.
- De hac triplici libertate, a Bernardo sic divisa et nominata, scil. a miseria, a culpa, a coactione, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. et infra dub. 2.On this threefold liberty, thus divided and named by Bernard, namely from misery, from fault, from coercion, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8, and below dub. 2.
- Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 pro eo quod. Paulo inferius pro dignitatis enim est et potestatis codd. T V aa dignitas enim est potestatis.The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads pro eo quod ("inasmuch as"). A little below, for dignitatis enim est et potestatis ("for it belongs to dignity and to power") codices T V aa read dignitas enim est potestatis ("for dignity is of power").
- Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 superexcellit omnem dignitatem liberi arbitrii creati.The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads superexcellit omnem dignitatem liberi arbitrii creati ("supereminently surpasses every dignity of created free choice").
- Cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 8. p. II. q. 2. et d. 10. a. 2. q. 1, ubi haec Augustini sententia fusius exponitur.Cf. above d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2; d. 8, p. II, q. 2; and d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, where this opinion of Augustine is more fully expounded.
- Cap. 14. In textu originali post inseparabiliter pro hac duplici libertate in exemplum subiiciuntur Angeli ante et post confirmationem, et homines ante mortem, et electi post mortem.Anselm, On Free Choice, c. 14. In the original text, after inseparabiliter there are subjoined as an example of this twofold liberty the angels before and after confirmation, and men before death, and the elect after death.