Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod quatuor quidem Angelis videntur esse attributa. Primum, quia videtur sibi contradicere in enumeratione; enumerat enim sex, sicut patet1, quae sunt: essentiae simplicitas, personalis discretio, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas et liberum arbitrium. — Item, videtur sibi contradicere in repetitione; dicit enim in sequenti capitulo, quod circa tria est consideratio, scilicet circa substantiam, formam et potestatem. — Quaeritur ergo de sufficientia illorum quatuor. Videtur enim, quod multo plura debent attribui, scilicet incorruptibilitas, spiritualitas et huiusmodi ex parte essentiae; ex parte potentiarum etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et ita competit eis ingenium, sicut memoria2. — Item, videtur superfluitas, quia liberum arbitrium non discernitur a ratione et voluntate3: ergo non deberet quarto loco connumerari. — Item, tertium attributum, quod est ratio, aut accipitur pro cognitiva tantum, aut pro cognitiva et motiva; si primo modo: ergo male dividitur in intelligentiam et voluntatem; si secundo modo: ergo superfluit liberum arbitrium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illa attributa sunt convenientia Angelo per naturam suam et in sui creatione tanquam principalia, a quibus alia habent ortum. Et sumitur sufficientia sic: in Angelo enim est considerare esse et posse, sive substantiam et potentiam. Et circa substantiam duo, scilicet quo est, et penes hoc est substantiae simplicitas; vel ipsum quod est, et penes hoc est personalis discretio. Similiter circa posse est considerare ipsam potentiam, et penes hoc est tertium, scilicet ratio naturaliter insita. Est iterum considerare facultatem potentiae, et penes hoc est quartum attributum, scilicet liberum arbitrium.
Vel aliter: Angelus habet quadrupliciter considerari, scilicet in se, et sic essentiae simplicitas; ad alterum Angelum, et sic personalis discretio; ad Deum, et sic memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, in quibus consistit ratio imaginis; in comparatione ad ea quae subiecta sunt eorum regimini, et sic habet liberum arbitrium.
Vel aliter, et magis secundum consonantiam ad ea quae dicuntur in littera4: in Angelo est considerare substantiam, formam et potentiam. Substantia autem considerari potest dupliciter, sicut dictum est, et sic competit ei simplicitas et personalitas. p. 111 Formae attribuitur imaginis pulcritudo sive venustas. Potentiae attribuitur libertas. — Et sic patet, quomodo quatuor reducuntur ad tria. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum in tria dividitur, in quibus consistit imago. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum differt a quarto. Patet etiam sufficientia et responsio ad obiecta, quia hic enumerantur attributa principalia5.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Differentem essentiae tenuitatem habuisse intelligitur. Contra: simplicitas respicit essentiam sive substantiam, sicut dicit in littera6; sed substantia non recipit magis et minus: ergo etc. — Item, simplex dicit privationem compositionis; sed privationes non recipiunt magis et minus7: ergo etc. — Item, magis et minus si alicui imponitur, hoc est per impermixtionem cum suo opposito8; sed simplex spiritus non est permixtus alicui compositioni, quae sit opposita simplicitati angelicae, et omnes habent easdem compositiones: ergo omnes sunt aequaliter simplices.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dicendum, quod in Angelis est gradus simplicitatis, et hoc manifestat gradus virtutis, quia unus Angelus est potentior altero; et quanto in spiritualibus aliquid est simplicius, tanto virtuosius9. Hoc etiam manifestat approximatio ad Deum; si enim per naturam unus est Deo proximior altero et similior, ergo magis accedit ad divinam simplicitatem. Manifestat ulterius hoc ipsa cognitio, quia unus alterum purgat pellendo ignorantiam: ergo unus altero purior et simplicior. — Et ideo bene dicit Magister, quod est gradus in simplicitate essentiae.
Quod ergo obiicitur, quod substantia non recipit magis et minus; responderi potest per interemptionem, quia una creatura veriori modo est ens quam alia. Et quod dicitur, substantiam non recipere magis et minus, hoc intelligendum est logice10. — Vel dicendum, quod aliud est dicere essentiam, aliud simplicitatem essentiae; et simplicitas est proprietas essentiae.
Quod obiicitur, quod dicit privationem; dicendum, quod etsi dicat privationem, non tamen pure privationem, quia aliquid ponit11; et ideo potest recipere magis et minus.
Quod obiicitur de permixtione, dicendum, quod illud non habet ubique veritatem, sed in his oppositis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura; in aliis vero est per maiorem accessum ad suum summum. Unde maior simplicitas est in Angelo non propter paucitatem compositionis, sed propter accessum maiorem ad summe simplex; hoc autem est propter maiorem nobilitatem formae, sicut ignis potest dici in corporalibus simplicior aere12.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In ipsa facultate arbitrii differentia animadvertenda est. Contra: Liberum arbitrium est liberum ab omni coactione, nec potest aliquo modo cogi: ergo in libertate arbitrii non potest esse gradus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod libertas arbitrii dupliciter potest considerari: aut in quantum dicit facultatem et facilitatem ad exeundum in opus; et sic dicit positionem et consequitur rationem et voluntatem, et istae potentiae consequuntur substantiam; et secundum quod substantia simplicior, sic etiam potentiae excellentiores et facultas maior, et sic est ibi gradus; et hoc modo loquitur Magister. Alio modo accipitur privative, ut dicatur libertas per privationem coactionis; et hoc modo est aequalitas, quia est privatio in termino13; et sic opponit.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod aequales sunt in hoc quod spiritus sunt et immortales sunt. Contra: Ideo sunt spiritus et immortales14, p. 112 quia sunt simplices; sed non sunt aequaliter simplices: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod spiritus privat corpulentiam, et immortalitas privat corruptionem — quia utrobique et respectu omnium Angelorum est privatio horum universalis — ideo dicit ista esse aequalia; nihilominus tamen, si attendatur ad id quod positionis est ibi, sic posset esse gradus, sicut opponit. Magister accipit secundum sensum verborum magis consuetum, et secundum quod huiusmodi nomina consueverunt intelligi a nobis15.
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Dub. I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which he says, that four [things] indeed seem to be attributed to the angels. First, because he seems to contradict himself in the enumeration; for he enumerates six, as is plain1, which are: simplicity of essence, personal distinction, memory, intelligence, will, and free choice. — Likewise, he seems to contradict himself in the repetition; for he says in the following chapter that there is a consideration about three [things], namely about substance, form, and power. — It is asked therefore concerning the sufficiency of those four. For it seems that more ought to be attributed, namely incorruptibility, spirituality, and the like, on the side of the essence; on the side of the powers also the irascible and the concupiscible; and thus intelligence befits them, as [does] memory2. — Likewise, there seems to be a superfluity, because free choice is not distinguished from reason and will3: therefore it ought not to be enumerated in the fourth place. — Likewise, the third attribute, which is reason, is taken either for the cognitive only, or for the cognitive and motive; if in the first mode: therefore it is badly divided into intelligence and will; if in the second mode: therefore free choice is superfluous.
I respond: It must be said that those attributes are befitting to the angel by its nature and in its creation as principal [ones], from which the others have their rise. And the sufficiency is taken thus: for in the angel there is to consider being and power, that is substance and potency. And about substance two [things], namely that by which it is, and in respect of this is the simplicity of essence; or the that-which-is itself, and in respect of this is personal distinction. Likewise about power there is to consider the potency itself, and in respect of this is the third, namely the naturally implanted reason. There is again to consider the faculty of the potency, and in respect of this is the fourth attribute, namely free choice.
Or otherwise: the angel can be considered in a fourfold way, namely in itself, and so the simplicity of essence; to another angel, and so personal distinction; to God, and so memory, intelligence, and will, in which the account of the image consists; in comparison to those [things] which are subject to their governance, and so it has free choice.
Or otherwise, and more according to the consonance with the [things] which are said in the text4: in the angel there is to consider substance, form, and potency. But substance can be considered in two ways, as has been said, and so simplicity and personality befit it. p. 111 To form is attributed the beauty or comeliness of the image. To potency is attributed liberty. — And so it is plain how the four are reduced to three. It is also plain how the third attribute is divided into three, in which the image consists. It is also plain how the third attribute differs from the fourth. There is also plain the sufficiency and the response to the objections, because here the principal attributes are enumerated5.
Dub. II.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: He is understood to have had a differing thinness of essence. On the contrary: simplicity regards the essence or substance, as he says in the text6; but substance does not receive more and less: therefore etc. — Likewise, the simple states the privation of composition; but privations do not receive more and less7: therefore etc. — Likewise, more and less, if it is imposed on anything, this is through unmixedness with its opposite8; but a simple spirit is not mixed with any composition which would be opposed to angelic simplicity, and all have the same compositions: therefore all are equally simple.
I respond: To this it must be said that in the angels there is a degree of simplicity, and this the degree of power manifests, because one angel is more powerful than another; and the simpler anything is in spiritual [things], the more powerful9. This also the approximation to God manifests; for if by nature one is nearer and more like to God than another, then it approaches more to the divine simplicity. This further manifests cognition itself, because one purges another by driving away ignorance: therefore one [is] purer and simpler than another. — And therefore the Master well says that there is a degree in the simplicity of essence.
As to what therefore is objected, that substance does not receive more and less; it can be answered by way of suppression, because one creature is a being in a truer mode than another. And as to what is said, that substance does not receive more and less, this is to be understood logically10. — Or it must be said that it is one [thing] to say essence, another the simplicity of essence; and simplicity is a property of the essence.
As to what is objected, that it states a privation; it must be said that although it states a privation, yet not a pure privation, because it posits something11; and therefore it can receive more and less.
As to what is objected concerning the mixture, it must be said that that does not hold true everywhere, but in those opposites of which each is some nature; but in others it is by a greater approach to its highest. Whence there is greater simplicity in an angel not on account of fewness of composition, but on account of a greater approach to the supremely simple; and this is on account of the greater nobility of the form, just as fire among corporeal [things] can be called simpler than air12.
Dub. III.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: In the very faculty of choice a difference is to be noted. On the contrary: free choice is free from all coercion, nor can it be coerced in any way: therefore in the liberty of choice there cannot be a degree.
I respond: It must be said that the liberty of choice can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it states a faculty and a facility for going forth into the work; and so it states a position and follows reason and will, and these potencies follow substance; and according as substance [is] simpler, so also the potencies [are] more excellent and the faculty greater, and so there is a degree there; and in this mode the Master speaks. In another mode it is taken privatively, so that liberty be called [the] privation of coercion; and in this mode there is equality, because it is a privation at the limit13; and so he objects.
Dub. IV.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that they are equal in this, that they are spirits and are immortal. On the contrary: they are spirits and immortal for this reason14, p. 112 because they are simple; but they are not equally simple: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that, according as spirit deprives [of] corpulence, and immortality deprives [of] corruption — because on both sides and with respect to all the angels the privation of these is universal — therefore he says these to be equal; nevertheless however, if attention be paid to that which is of position there, so there could be a degree, as he objects. The Master takes [it] according to the more customary sense of the words, and according as such names have been accustomed to be understood by us15.
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- Hic c. 1.Here, c. 1.
- Respicitur ad illud ex libro de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Ingenium investigat, ratio iudicat, memoria servat, intellectus separat, intelligentia comprehendit et ad meditationem sive contemplationem adducit.Reference is made to that [passage] from the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11: Wit investigates, reason judges, memory keeps, intellect separates, intelligence comprehends and leads to meditation or contemplation.
- Cfr. de hoc infra d. 25. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. seqq.Cf. on this below d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 ff.
- Hic c. 2.Here, c. 2.
- De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 4-8; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13-16; S. Thom., Richard. et Petr., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic p. 1. dub. litt. 1.On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 4–8; Summa p. II, tract. 4, q. 13–16; St. Thomas, Richard, and Peter, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here p. 1, doubt on the text 1.
- Hic c. 2. — Minor exhibetur ab Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.Here, c. 2. — The minor is exhibited by Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance.
- Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.) dicit, quod sicut in nihilo nulla est diversitas, ita et in privatione non est diversitas. Et I. de Part. animal. c. 3. ait: Privationis, qua privatio est, nulla est differentia; non enim fieri potest, ut species eius sit, quod non est.Aristotle, IV Physics text 67 (c. 8) says that just as in nothing there is no diversity, so also in privation there is no diversity. And I On the Parts of Animals c. 3 says: Of privation, insofar as it is privation, there is no difference; for it cannot happen that there be a species of it, which is not.
- Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.): Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius. — Vat. mixtionem, non pauci codd. immixtionem pro impermixtionem, quod habent codd. C R T V cc et ed. 1.Aristotle, III Topics c. 4 (c. 5): And [the things] which are more unmixed from contraries are more such; as the whiter [is] indeed more unmixed from black. — The Vatican [edition reads] mixtionem, not a few codices immixtionem for impermixtionem, which codices C R T V cc and ed. 1 have.
- Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 17, in qua et sequens ratio insinuatur. Tertia est Dionys. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3.Cf. the Book of Causes, proposition 17, in which the following reason also is insinuated. The third is Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 3.
- In cod. Q (a secunda manu) hoc intelligendum est, qui logice considerat essentiam rei, sed physice non est verum, qui considerat rem sub motu et varietate. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. ad 1.In codex Q (by a second hand) [it reads]: this is to be understood [of him] who considers the essence of a thing logically, but it is not true physically, [for him] who considers the thing under motion and variety. Cf. I Sentences d. 17, p. II, q. 1, in reply to 1.
- Scil. modum unitatis nobilem. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, et d. 24. a. 1. q. 1.Namely, the noble mode of unity. Cf. I Sentences d. 8, p. II, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 1, q. 1.
- Vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13. m. 3; S. Thom., Petr., Richard., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R. hic p. I. dub. litt. 3.See I Sentences d. 17, p. II, q. 1 f.; Blessed Albert, here a. 9; Summa p. II, tract. 4, q. 13, m. 3; St. Thomas, Peter, Richard, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here p. I, doubt on the text 3.
- Gilbert. Porretanus in libro Sex Principiorum, c. ult., cum agit de eo, quod est plus minusve suscipere, respectu eorum, quae non suscipiunt magis et minus, utitur his verbis: « Impositio [nominum ipsorum] in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est »; et rationem affert B. Albert. in Comment. super hunc locum, scil. quia ille terminus indivisibilis est. — De hoc dubio cfr. infra d. 25. p. II. q. 1, ubi etiam ceteri Scholastici hanc quaestionem resolvunt; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 29. m. 1. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 16. m. 4; Ægid. R., hic p. I. dub. litt. 5.Gilbert of Poitiers in the book Six Principles, the last chapter, when he treats of that which is to admit more or less, with respect to those [things] which do not admit more and less, uses these words: « The imposition [of the names themselves] is at the limit, beyond which to transgress is impossible »; and Blessed Albert in his Commentary on this place adduces the reason, namely because that limit is indivisible. — On this doubt cf. below d. 25, p. II, q. 1, where the other Scholastics also resolve this question; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 9; Summa p. II, tract. 4, q. 16, m. 4; Giles of Rome, here p. I, doubt on the text 5.
- Vat. falso spiritus mortales.The Vatican [edition] falsely [reads] spiritus mortales.
- Idem dubium solvitur a B. Alberto, hic a. 11; Ægid. R., hic p. II. dub. litt. 6.The same doubt is solved by Blessed Albert, here a. 11; Giles of Rome, here p. II, doubt on the text 6. ---