Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligat superiorem, an parem, an inferiorem.
Circa secundum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligat1 superiorem, an parem, an inferiorem.
Et quod magis superiorem, videtur.
1. Si Angelus Angelum naturaliter diligit, aut ergo quia bonum, aut quia beneficum; sed quocumque modo Angelus superioris ordinis magis est bonus; et iterum amplius est beneficus, quia Angelus inferioris ordinis a superiori recipit illuminationes per eum modum, per quem Dionysius2 dicit: ergo etc.
2. Item, Angelus per naturam institutam Deum super omnia diligebat3: ergo si illud quod magis approximat ad summum, in omni genere est magis intensum, ergo si summe diligebat Deum, id est super omnia, ergo magis illud quod Deo erat similius et proximius; sed Angelus superioris ordinis est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
3. Item, Angelus inferioris ordinis nolebat aequiparari Angelo superioris ordinis, quantum erat de naturali appetitu, ergo magis et eminentius bonum illi volebat quam sibi: sed super omnes Angelos pares et inferiores se diligebat: ergo etc.
Quod autem magis diligeret Angelum eiusdem ordinis, videtur.
4. Dilectio naturalis concernit similitudinem; unde Ecclesiastici decimo tertio4: Omne animal diligit simile sibi; sed Angelus eiusdem ordinis similior est Angelo sui ordinis quam alterius: ergo magis diligit.
5. Item, naturalis dilectio intenditur per familiaritatem et domesticitatem — unde magis diligit homo naturaliter domesticum et socium suum quam extraneum5 — sed maior est familiaritas et societas Angelorum eiusdem ordinis: ergo etc.
6. Item, Ecclesia triumphans conformis est Ecclesiae militanti6: sed in Ecclesia militante est distinctio ordinum et religionum, et recto et ordinato affectu, qui non repugnat gratiae, plus iungitur homo ei qui est eiusdem professionis: ergo pari ratione et Angelus naturali dilectione plus diligebat Angelos eiusdem ordinis.
Quod autem magis Angelos inferioris ordinis, videtur.
7. Primo, quia «probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis7»; sed Angelus superioris ordinis plus se communicat Angelo inferioris quam paris vel superioris, et ad hoc faciendum ordinatur per naturam, non solum per gratiam: ergo etc.
8. Item, per naturam plus amat rationalis creatura praeesse quam subesse; sed Angelus medii ordinis ideo subest, quia habet superiores, ideo praeest, quia habet inferiores: ergo si magis diligit praeesse8, magis per naturam diligit habere ordines inferiores quam superiores: ergo etc.
9. Item, nos videmus in linea consanguinitatis carnalis, quod magis diligit homo eum qui est infra, quam eum qui est supra, vel iuxta, ut puta magis filium quam patrem vel fratrem, et hoc est per naturam: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod in ordinibus Angelorum magis affectio convertatur ad eum qui infra est, cum nullum sit vinculum consanguinitatis, nec supra nec iuxta.
CONCLUSIO.
Angelus ratione maioris boni optati magis diligit superiorem Angelum; ratione intensioris affectus plus diligit aequalem; ratione vero impensi beneficii plus diligit inferiorem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis diligere aliquem, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut ratione boni optati, aut ratione9 affectus intensi, aut ratione effectus impensi.
Ratione boni optati dicitur quis aliquem magis diligere, quando maius bonum optat; et sic dicitur diligere magis, quia ad maius. Hoc modo naturali dilectione, procedente ex iudicio rationis rectae, magis diligebat Angelus Angelum superiorem. Volebat enim, ipsum excellere et plus boni habere, sicut et Deus conditor voluit sic ordinare. — Ratione affectus intensi dicitur aliquis magis alterum diligere, quando affectio eius plus trahit ad10 alterum, et magis consolatur de eius societate; et sic dicitur aliquis magis illum diligere, cum quo libentius cohabitat. Et sic Angelus magis diligebat per naturam Angelum eiusdem ordinis; quia, sicut naturali affectu magis diligit quis compatriotas suos, maxime quando conformantur11 sibi in moribus; et sicut magis diligit homo eum qui est eiusdem professionis et officii, ubi invidia non interponit partes suas: sic Angelus alterum Angelum eiusdem ordinis magis dilectione naturali amplecti intelligendus est12, cum se videret a Conditore in officii aequalitate et naturae similitudine illi sociatum, nec esset tunc morum diversitas nec invidiae malignitas. — Ratione effectus sive beneficii impensi dicitur quis magis eum diligere, cui plura bona impendit, et circa quem magis sollicitatur: sicut mater magis confovet filium tenellum et sollicitior est circa illum quam circa adultum, et magis circa infirmum quam circa sanum. Et huius ratio est consideratio maioris indigentiae. Et hoc modo dici potest, quod Angelus superioris ordinis magis diligit Angelum inferioris13, quia Angelus paris vel superioris ordinis non indiget sic sua instructione, sive purgatione, secundum quod Angelus inferioris ordinis.
Et sic secundum diversas vias membra propositae quaestionis se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, et ideo rationes ad tria praedicta membra decurrentes sibi non obviant, et concedi possunt, quamvis non sint multum cogentes. — Si autem quis ex praedictis rationibus simpliciter velit inferre maioritatem dilectionis, unica responsione potest omnibus obviari, scilicet quod omnes procedunt ab insufficienti. Si vero concluditur excessus dilectionis determinatae vel in bono optato, vel in affectu intenso, et in effectu impenso, satis de plano omnes possunt concedi.
SCHOLION.
I. Etiam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2.) adhibet distinctionem, qua utitur S. Bonav., et dicit: Magis diligere quis alterum altero potest dici tripliciter: aut ratione boni optati, aut ratione affectus intensi, aut effectus impensi»; atque etiam in conclusionibus cum Seraphico convenit. Alii nonnulli secundum membrum non admittunt, hac ducti ratione, quia non sit gradus in intensitate operationis angelicae, cum Angeli semper operentur toto conatu. — Etiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 7. q. 2.) paulo aliter resolvit, scil. quod Angelus naturaliter Angelum superiorem magis diligebat «quam sibi magis propinquum vel aequalem, et bonum maius illi volebat et bonum illius intensius optando».
II. Alii doctores de hoc non disputant, vel rem tangunt quaerendo, utrum unus Angelus naturali dilectione diligat alium, sicut se ipsum, de quo tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 60. a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lat. 1.
QUESTION II.
Whether the Angel by natural love loves more the superior, or the equal, or the inferior.
Concerning the second point one proceeds thus and inquires whether the Angel by natural love loves more1 the superior, or the equal, or the inferior.
And that he loves the superior more, it seems.
1. If an Angel naturally loves an Angel, then either because he is good, or because he is beneficent; but in whatever way the Angel of the higher order is more good; and again he is more beneficent, because the Angel of the lower order receives illuminations from the higher in that mode by which Dionysius2 speaks: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the Angel by instituted nature loved God above all things3: therefore if that which more closely approaches the highest is in every genus more intense, therefore if he loved God supremely, that is above all things, then more that which was more similar and nearer to God; but the Angel of the higher order is of this kind: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the Angel of the lower order did not wish to be equated to the Angel of the higher order, so far as natural appetite was concerned, therefore he willed the good more and more eminently to him than to himself: but above all equal and inferior Angels he loved himself: therefore etc.
That he would love more the Angel of the same order, it seems.
4. Natural love regards likeness; whence Ecclesiasticus, the thirteenth chapter4: Every animal loves what is like itself; but an Angel of the same order is more like an Angel of his own order than of another: therefore he loves it more.
5. Likewise, natural love is intensified by familiarity and domesticity — whence a man naturally loves his familiar and his companion more than a stranger5 — but the familiarity and society of Angels of the same order is greater: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, the Church triumphant is conformed to the Church militant6: but in the Church militant there is a distinction of orders and religious states, and with an upright and ordered affection, which does not conflict with grace, a man is more joined to him who is of the same profession: therefore by parity of reason the Angel too by natural love loved more the Angels of the same order.
That he loves more the Angels of the lower order, it seems.
7. First, because «the proof of love is the showing of the work7»; but the Angel of the higher order communicates himself more to the Angel of the lower than to the equal or the superior, and to do this he is ordained by nature, not only by grace: therefore etc.
8. Likewise, by nature the rational creature loves more to preside than to be subject; but the Angel of the middle order is subject for the reason that he has superiors, and presides for the reason that he has inferiors: therefore if he loves more to preside8, he loves more by nature to have lower orders than higher: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, we see in the line of carnal consanguinity that a man loves more him who is below than him who is above, or beside, as for instance a son more than a father or a brother, and this is by nature: therefore it seems by parity of reason that in the orders of the Angels the affection turns more to him who is below, since there is no bond of consanguinity, neither above nor beside.
CONCLUSION.
The Angel, by reason of the greater good wished, loves more the superior Angel; by reason of the more intense affection he loves more the equal; but by reason of the benefit bestowed he loves more the inferior.
I respond: It must be said that to love someone more can be in three ways: either by reason of the good wished, or by reason of9 the intense affection, or by reason of the benefit bestowed.
By reason of the good wished one is said to love someone more when one wishes a greater good; and so one is said to love more, because for a greater. In this way, by natural love proceeding from the judgment of right reason, the Angel loved the superior Angel more. For he willed him to excel and to have more good, as also God the founder willed thus to ordain. — By reason of the intense affection one is said to love another more when one's affection is drawn more toward10 the other, and one is more consoled by his society; and so one is said to love that one more with whom one more gladly dwells together. And thus the Angel loved more by nature the Angel of the same order; because, just as by natural affection one loves more one's fellow-countrymen, especially when they conform11 to oneself in character; and just as a man loves more him who is of the same profession and office, where envy does not interpose its part: so the Angel is to be understood12 as embracing more by natural love the other Angel of the same order, since he saw himself associated with him by the Founder in equality of office and likeness of nature, nor was there then any diversity of character nor malignity of envy. — By reason of the effect or benefit bestowed one is said to love more him on whom one bestows more goods, and about whom one is more solicitous: just as a mother cherishes more the tender child and is more solicitous about him than about the grown one, and more about the sick than about the healthy. And the reason for this is the consideration of the greater indigence. And in this way it can be said that the Angel of the higher order loves more the Angel of the lower13, because the Angel of the equal or higher order does not need his instruction or purgation in the way the Angel of the lower order does.
And thus, according to the diverse ways, the members of the proposed question stand as exceeding and exceeded, and therefore the arguments running to the three aforesaid members do not oppose one another, and can be conceded, although they are not very cogent. — But if anyone from the aforesaid arguments wishes simply to infer a greater-ness of love, all can be met with a single response, namely that they all proceed from an insufficient ground. But if there is concluded an excess of love determined either in the good wished, or in the intense affection, and in the benefit bestowed, all can quite plainly be conceded.
SCHOLION.
I. Petr. a Tar. also (here q. 5. a. 2.) employs the distinction which St. Bonaventure uses, and says: «To love one more than another can be said in three ways: either by reason of the good wished, or by reason of the intense affection, or of the benefit bestowed»; and also in his conclusions he agrees with the Seraphic Doctor. Some others do not admit the second member, led by this reasoning, that there is no degree in the intensity of angelic operation, since the Angels always operate with their whole effort. — Richard a Med. also (here a. 7. q. 2.) resolves it somewhat otherwise, namely that the Angel naturally loved the superior Angel more «than one nearer or equal to himself, and willed him a greater good and wished his good more intensely».
II. Other doctors do not dispute about this, or touch the matter by asking whether one Angel by natural love loves another as himself, on which Alex. of Hales treats, S. p. II. q. 30. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 60. a. 4. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 3. — Aegid. R., here p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lat. 1.