Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio IV. Utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato cogi possit.

Quarto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad aliud agens creatum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato possit cogi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tam Damascenus¹ quam Philosophus dicunt, quod quaedam sunt operationes partim voluntariae, partim involuntariae, et quodam modo permixtae ex voluntario et involuntario, sicut iactare merces in mare, et consimilia. Si igitur involuntarium est illud quod est per violentiam, aliquas operationes exeuntes a libero arbitrio contingit permisceri violentia: ergo si contingit magis et magis permisceri, contingit, eas simpliciter esse involuntarias et coactas: ergo liberum arbitrium cogi potest in actione sua.

2. Item, maior virtus potest inferre violentiam minori; sed quod potest inferre violentiam potest compellere: ergo minor virtus a maiori potest compelli. Sed aliqua virtus potentior est libero arbitrio viatoris, utpote virtus Angeli: ergo saltem ab Angelo liberum arbitrium nostrum potest cogi.

3. Item, si aliqua virtus potest impediri ab actu suo, potest violentari; et si sufficienter potest impediri, sufficienter potest violentari; et si sufficienter potest violentari, potest cogi. Cum igitur liberum arbitrium ab actu suo et usu impediri possit, sicut patet, quod diabolus potest auferre usum liberi arbitrii et facere hominem² furiosum: ergo videtur, quod ab eo liberum arbitrium nostrum possit compelli vel cogi.

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4. Item, quando radius est iunctus aquae, mota aqua, necesse est, moveri radium; sed multo maiori vinculo coniungitur anima corpori, quam coniungatur radius aquae: ergo, moto corpore, necesse est, moveri affectus animae. Si igitur aliqua virtus creata potest corpus transmutare, poterit per consequens liberum arbitrium vertere et compellere, ipso nolente.

5. Item, sicut se habet intellectus ad verum, ita se habet affectus ad bonum; sed intellectus compelli potest ad credendum aliquod verum: ergo et affectus ad amandum bonum. Si ergo liberum arbitrium non dicit aliud quam rationem et voluntatem, videtur, quod et ipsum compelli possit per actionem alicuius agentis creati.

6. Item, agens creatum sua actione potest liberum arbitrium cogere coactione inducente, quae est dispositio respectu coactionis sufficientis; sed dispositio per frequentem sui iterationem et intensionem potest fieri necessitas³: ergo videtur, quod si voluntas possit cogi coactione inducente, quod processu temporis compelli possit coactione sufficienti per actionem alicuius creaturae.

Sed contra: 1. Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio⁴: «Voluntas pro ingenita sui nobilitate nulla cogitur necessitate»: si igitur voluntas a nemine potest cogi, et hoc non est ob aliud nisi propter liberi arbitrii libertatem; ergo liberum arbitrium a nulla creatura cogi potest.

2. Item, si aliqua creatura posset liberum arbitrium hominis cogere, hoc maxime competeret ipsi diabolo, de quo dicitur Iob, quadragesimo primo⁵: Non est potestas super terram, quae ei possit comparari. Si ergo diabolus liberum arbitrium nostrum non potest cogere, quia tunc faceret, nos continue peccare; videtur, quod nulla alia creatura possit ipsum cogere.

3. Item, nulla maior compulsio potest fieri libero arbitrio hominis quam per intentationem mortis; sed mortis intentatio ad compellendum liberum arbitrium non sufficit, sicut patet in Martyribus sanctis et aliis, qui potius volunt mori quam fidem suam diffiteri: ergo non videtur, quod liberum arbitrium ab aliqua creatura possit compelli⁶.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium est secundum id quod est supremum in anima, cum ipsius sit regere et movere omnes potentias; sed eo quod supremum est in anima, solus Deus maior est⁷: ergo nulla creatura potest super illud: nulla ergo creatura potest in hominis liberum arbitrium compellendum.

Conclusio. Liberum arbitrium ab agente creato quoad actum exteriorem quidem potest cogi; quoad actum interiorem aliquo modo induci et impediri potest, non autem cogi.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est loqui de libero arbitrio quantum ad actum exteriorem et quantum ad actum interiorem, sive quantum ad actum proprium et quantum ad actum alienum. — Si loquamur de libero arbitrio quantum ad actum exteriorem, sic respectu talium actuum potest intervenire coactio; potest enim quis compelli, ut genua coram idolo flectat et ut manibus propriis thura altaribus imponat vel incendat. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad actum interiorem, qui scilicet est velle vel eligere aut consentire; sic respectu talis actus potest liberum arbitrium aliquo modo induci, potest et impediri, sed nullo modo potest compelli.

Induci quidem potest, quoniam⁸ amat aliud a se et quod infra se est. Unde per oblationem alicuius rei amatae, vel ablationem potest induci ad consentiendum in aliquid multum efficaci persuasione, per quem modum idololatrae tentabant sanctos Martyres consentire in idololatria, modo promittendo delectabilia, modo infligendo tristia. Ista tamen inductio longe distat a coactione; sicut probat ipse exitus, quia nec blandimentis allici nec tormentis terreri adeo potuerunt, ut a veritate iustitiae mutarentur. Et sic liberum arbitrium induci potest, quia amat aliquid infra se, utpote vitam temporalem, vel aliud consimile, quod potest agens creatum conferre vel auferre.

Potest etiam impediri propter inclinationem et coniunctionem sui ad naturam corporalem, quae subest virtuti creaturae⁹; unde bene posset aliquis alium ita laedere, quod usum liberi arbitrii amitteret; ex hoc tamen liberum arbitrium non cogeret. Coactio enim ponit liberi arbitrii actum et usum; sed ligatio vel impeditio tollit. Et iterum, impeditio provenire potest ab inferiori, coactio provenire habet a superiori. — Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi possit induci ab agente creato ratione boni exterioris amati, et possit impediri ratione corporis coniuncti, non potest cogi respectu actus proprii. Hanc enim dignitatem¹⁰ habet liberum arbitrium, ut, in quantum liberum, soli Deo sit subiectum; et quia,

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in quantum liberum, nulli agenti creato subest, cum coactio sit a superiori, nullum agens creatum potest ipsum cogere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod est actio mixta ex voluntario et involuntario; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de actione exteriori, et quantum ad illam potest intervenire coactio. Praeterea, intelligitur ibi de involuntario, prout dicitur involuntarium per violentiam, non inquam per violentiam coactionis sufficientis, sed solum inducentis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior virtus potest violentare minorem; iam patet responsio, quia quantum ad libertatis dignitatem, sicut ostensum fuit in primo problemate, omnes creaturae rationales habent aequalitatem; nec una nata est secundum istam proprietatem in alteram agere, et propter hoc nec alteram violentare nec cogere. Cum enim dicitur, quod maior virtus potest violentare minorem; hoc veritatem habet, si, secundum quod maior est, nata sit agere in minorem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium potest in sua actione impediri; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod possit cogi. Impedimentum enim privat actum libertatis, sed coactio ponit actum liberi arbitrii, et simul cum hoc ponit, quod non sit libertatis; et ista sunt incompossibilia, sicut si poneretur, quod aliquis actus esset voluntatis et non esset voluntarius; et hoc melius videbitur infra¹¹. Et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aqua mota, necessario movetur radius ei coniunctus; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod radii multiplicatio est naturalis, nec potest lux se ipsam non multiplicare, cum invenit materiam sibi aptam; et sicut multiplicatio radiorum est naturalis, ita et reflexio ipsorum est naturalis et repercussio; et propterea, cum aqua movetur, alio modo suscipitur radius; ideo necesse est, ipsum alio modo reflecti. Liberum autem arbitrium praeest corpori, cum¹² in suum actum voluntarie exit, et se ipso est proprii actus variatio, non ex hoc, quod sit aliqua mutatio in corpore coniuncto.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione intellectus ad verum, et affectus ad bonum, dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo sit comparatio consimilis, non tamen est omnimoda similitudo, quoniam, sicut ostensum fuit supra¹³, libertas arbitrii plus se tenet ex parte motivae quam cognitivae; et ideo coactio plus repugnat affectioni, quam repugnet cognitioni; et propterea non sequitur, quod si intellectus potest cogi, quod et affectus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest induci; dicendum, quod etsi inductio videatur esse quaedam coactio — maxime secundum humana iura¹⁴, quae dicunt, illud quod fit causa metus, non esse habendum ratum, maxime de eo metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, pro eo quod considerant exteriora opera — secundum veritatem tamen ista inductio stat cum libertate voluntatis, nec ei repugnat in aliquo, sed potius repugnat plenitudini amoris et voluntatis. Non enim ita plene vult aliquis, quando vult ex conditione¹⁵, sicut quando vult absolute, sicut patet de iactatione mercium in mare; nihilominus tamen salvatur ibi ratio libertatis et voluntatis. Unde talis metus apud Deum non excusat a culpa, sicut aperte patet in negatione a Petro facta¹⁶; et propterea non sequitur, quod si possit a creatura induci, quod possit cogi. — Nec valet quod obiicit de dispositione, quae habet fieri necessitas per iterationem. Hoc enim verum est respectu virtutis naturalis et actus, qui determinatur ad unam differentiam contrarietatis; non autem verum est respectu voluntatis, quae absoluta est, et quantum est de se, vertibilis est. Praeterea, illud habet locum in eo genere dispositionis, quae est eiusdem generis et proprietatis, ut est dispositio proxima et remota. Sic autem non est in proposito, ut ostensum est supra¹⁷. Et sic patent obiecta.

Scholion

I. Hanc et sequentem quaest. alii commentatores Lombardi unica quaest. absolvunt, exceptis Petro a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R. Omnes in solutionibus satis conveniunt. — Bene distinguitur in hac quaest. inter induci, impediri, compelli (sive cogi in proprio sensu). Pro distinctione inter induci et compelli S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 2.) cum aliis distinguit inter coactionem sufficientem (compulsionem) et insufficientem (impulsionem). — In seq. quaest. distinguitur inter induci, immutari et cogi. Cum autem ad essentiam liberi arbitrii pertineat, quod se ipsum moveat; manifeste implicat, quod ipsum, salva libertate, cogatur extrinsecus ad actum. Item patet, quod solus Deus speciali modo, scilicet intrinsecus, possit operari et influere in potentias animae, dum creaturae non nisi extrinsecus influendo (inducendo) in alienum intellectum et voluntatem agere possunt. Unde S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.), plene consentiens S. Bonaventurae, respectu actus liberi arbitrii dicit, quod «nulla virtus est ei superior, nisi Deus, quamvis forte aliqua virtus creata simpliciter potentior sit. Unde nulla virtus creata liberum arbitrium cogere nec immutare potest; Deus autem potest quidem immutare, sed non cogere» (cfr. de Verit. q. 22. a. 8; S. I. q. 105. a. 4. 5, et q. 111. a. 2.). Si autem intimius inquiritur de modo, quo Deus voluntatem, salva eius libertate, immutet; non eandem viam ineunt scholae catholicae, ut patet ex controversiis de auxiliis et de concursu generali ad actiones liberas. Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2.) mentionem facit quorundam, qui tunc docebant, quod Deus «posset facere, quod liberum arbitrium post consiliationem in intellectu moveretur ad aliquid volendum de necessitate, non a se, sed a voluntate divina eliciente illum motum in voluntate, ita quod illo motu voluntas non esset movens, sed tantummodo mota; et hoc posset facere, salva natura potestatis liberi arbitrii». De hac autem opinione idem recte dicit: «Haec opinio videtur esse contra communem opinionem doctorum et etiam contra auctoritatem» etc. Addit etiam idem, quod Deus «bene potest ipsum [liberum arbitrium] efficaciter inclinare et facere, ut liberum arbitrium moveat se ipsum libere ad quamcumque partem Deus voluerit» (cfr. S. Thom., I. II. q. 10. a. 4, q. 21. a. 1. ad 2.).

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 4. § 1. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 29. n. 6; Report. ibid. n. 9. — S. Thom., praeter locos citt. S. I. II. q. 6. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. 85. seqq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. et dub. lat. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent.

Fourthly, inquiry is made concerning free choice in relation to another created agent, and the question is whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent. And that it can, seems [the case].

1. Both Damascene¹ and the Philosopher say that there are certain operations partly voluntary, partly involuntary, and in a certain way mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary, such as throwing merchandise into the sea, and the like. If, therefore, the involuntary is that which is by violence, it happens that some operations issuing from free choice are mixed with violence: therefore if it happens that they are mixed more and more, it happens that they are simply involuntary and compelled: therefore free choice can be compelled in its action.

2. Likewise, a greater power can inflict violence on a lesser; but what can inflict violence can compel: therefore a lesser power can be compelled by a greater. But some power is more powerful than the free choice of the wayfarer, such as the power of an Angel: therefore free choice of ours can be compelled at least by an Angel.

3. Likewise, if some power can be impeded from its act, it can be violated; and if it can be sufficiently impeded, it can be sufficiently violated; and if it can be sufficiently violated, it can be compelled. Since, therefore, free choice can be impeded from its act and use, as is evident — for the devil can take away the use of free choice and make a man² frenzied — therefore it seems that by him our free choice can be compelled or coerced.

4. Likewise, when a ray [of light] is joined to water, when the water is moved, the ray must be moved; but the soul is joined to the body by a far greater bond than the ray is joined to the water: therefore, when the body is moved, the affections of the soul must be moved. If, therefore, some created power can transmute the body, it will consequently be able to turn and compel free choice, [the soul] itself being unwilling.

5. Likewise, as the intellect stands to the true, so the affection stands to the good; but the intellect can be compelled to believe some truth: therefore also the affection [can be compelled] to love a good. If, then, free choice says nothing other than reason and will, it seems that it too can be compelled by the action of some created agent.

6. Likewise, a created agent by its action can compel free choice by an inducing coercion, which is a disposition with respect to sufficient coercion; but a disposition can, through frequent repetition and intensification of itself, become a necessity³: therefore it seems that, if the will can be compelled by an inducing coercion, then in the course of time it can be compelled by a sufficient coercion through the action of some creature.

On the contrary: 1. Bernard, On Free Choice⁴: "The will, by reason of its innate nobility, is compelled by no necessity": if, therefore, the will can be compelled by no one, and this is for no other reason than because of the liberty of free choice; therefore free choice can be compelled by no creature.

2. Likewise, if some creature could compel a man's free choice, this would most of all belong to the devil himself, of whom it is said in Job, the forty-first chapter⁵: There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him. If, therefore, the devil cannot compel our free choice — since then he would make us sin continually — it seems that no other creature can compel it.

3. Likewise, no greater compulsion can be brought against a man's free choice than by the threat of death; but the threat of death is not sufficient to compel free choice, as is evident in the holy Martyrs and others, who would rather die than disavow their faith: therefore it does not seem that free choice can be compelled by any creature⁶.

4. Likewise, free choice is according to that which is supreme in the soul, since it belongs to it to rule and move all the powers; but than that which is supreme in the soul, God alone is greater⁷: therefore no creature has power over it: therefore no creature has [the power] of compelling a man's free choice.

Conclusion. Free choice can indeed be compelled by a created agent as to the exterior act; as to the interior act it can in some way be induced and impeded, but not compelled.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that there is [a way of] speaking of free choice as to the exterior act and as to the interior act, or as to its proper act and as to an act belonging to another. — If we speak of free choice as to the exterior act, then with respect to such acts coercion can intervene; for someone can be compelled to bend his knees before an idol and to place incense on the altars with his own hands or to burn it. — But if we speak as to the interior act, which is, namely, to will or to choose or to consent; then with respect to such an act free choice can in some way be induced, and it can be impeded, but in no way can it be compelled.

It can indeed be induced, since⁸ it loves something other than itself and what is beneath itself. Hence, by the offering of some loved thing, or by its removal, it can be induced to consent to something by a very efficacious persuasion, in the manner in which idolaters tempted the holy Martyrs to consent to idolatry, now by promising delights, now by inflicting griefs. Yet this inducement is far removed from coercion; as the outcome itself proves, since they could neither be allured by blandishments nor terrified by torments to the point of being turned from the truth of justice. And thus free choice can be induced, because it loves something beneath itself, such as temporal life, or another like thing, which a created agent can confer or take away.

It can also be impeded on account of its inclination and conjunction to corporeal nature, which is subject to the power of a creature⁹; hence someone could well injure another in such a way that he would lose the use of free choice; yet from this he would not compel free choice. For coercion posits the act and use of free choice; but binding or impeding takes [them] away. And again, impeding can come from below, [whereas] coercion has to come from above. — And hence it is that free choice, although it can be induced by a created agent by reason of an exterior good loved, and can be impeded by reason of the conjoined body, cannot be compelled with respect to its proper act. For free choice has this dignity¹⁰, that, insofar as it is free, it is subject to God alone; and because,

insofar as it is free, it is subject to no created agent, since coercion is from a superior, no created agent can compel it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that there is an action mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary; it must be said that this is understood of the exterior action, and as to that coercion can intervene. Moreover, it is understood there of the involuntary, insofar as the involuntary is said [to be] by violence — not, I say, by the violence of sufficient coercion, but only of inducing [coercion].

2. To that which is objected, that a greater power can violate a lesser; the response is already evident, because as to the dignity of liberty, as was shown in the first problem, all rational creatures have equality; nor is one [creature] of a nature to act upon another according to this property, and on this account neither to violate nor to compel another. For when it is said that a greater power can violate a lesser, this holds true if, according as it is greater, it is of a nature to act upon the lesser.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice can be impeded in its action; it must be said that this is true; yet from this it does not follow that it can be compelled. For an impediment deprives [it] of the act of liberty, but coercion posits the act of free choice, and along with this posits that it is not [an act] of liberty; and these are incompossible, just as if it were posited that some act were of the will and were not voluntary; and this will be better seen below¹¹. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected, that when water is moved, the ray joined to it is necessarily moved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the multiplication of the ray is natural, nor can light not multiply itself when it finds matter suitable to it; and as the multiplication of rays is natural, so too is their reflection natural, and [their] repercussion; and therefore, when the water is moved, the ray is received in another mode; thus it must necessarily be reflected in another mode. But free choice presides over the body, since¹² it goes forth into its act voluntarily, and the variation of its proper act is from itself, not from the fact that there is some change in the conjoined body.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of the intellect to the true, and of the affection to the good, it must be said that, although there is in some way a similar comparison, nevertheless there is not an altogether perfect likeness, since, as was shown above¹³, the liberty of choice holds more on the side of the motive [power] than of the cognitive; and therefore coercion is more repugnant to the affection than it is repugnant to cognition; and on this account it does not follow that, if the intellect can be compelled, the affection [can be] also.

6. To that which is objected, that it can be induced; it must be said that, although inducement may seem to be a kind of coercion — especially according to human laws¹⁴, which say that what is done by reason of fear is not to be held valid, especially concerning that fear which can fall upon a constant man, for the reason that they consider exterior works — nevertheless according to truth this inducement stands together with the liberty of the will, nor is it repugnant to it in any respect, but rather is repugnant to the fullness of love and will. For one does not will so fully when he wills under a condition¹⁵ as when he wills absolutely, as is evident in the throwing of merchandise into the sea; nevertheless the account of liberty and will is preserved there. Hence such fear does not excuse from fault before God, as is openly evident in the denial made by Peter¹⁶; and on this account it does not follow that, if it can be induced by a creature, it can be compelled. — Nor is what is objected concerning the disposition that becomes a necessity through repetition of any avail. For this is true with respect to a natural power and act, which is determined to one term of a contrariety; but it is not true with respect to the will, which is absolute, and, as far as it is concerned, is changeable. Moreover, that has place in that genus of disposition which is of the same genus and property, as is a proximate and a remote disposition. But it is not so in the case at hand, as was shown above¹⁷. And thus the objections are clear.

Scholion

I. This question and the following one other commentators on Lombard dispatch in a single question, except Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, and Giles of Rome. All agree well enough in their solutions. — In this question a good distinction is drawn between being induced, being impeded, being compelled (or coerced in the proper sense). For the distinction between being induced and being compelled, St. Thomas (here in the single question, a. 2.) with others distinguishes between a sufficient coercion (compulsion) and an insufficient one (impulsion). — In the following question a distinction is drawn between being induced, being changed, and being coerced. But since it pertains to the essence of free choice that it move itself, it manifestly involves a contradiction that it should, with liberty preserved, be coerced extrinsically to an act. Likewise it is evident that God alone in a special mode, namely intrinsically, can operate and have influence upon the powers of the soul, whereas creatures can act upon another's intellect and will only extrinsically, by influencing (inducing). Hence St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3.), fully consenting to St. Bonaventure, says concerning the act of free choice that "no power is superior to it except God, although perhaps some created power may be simply more powerful. Hence no created power can compel or change free choice; God, however, can indeed change [it], but not compel" (cf. On Truth q. 22, a. 8; Summa I, q. 105, a. 4–5, and q. 111, a. 2.). But if it is inquired more intimately concerning the mode by which God changes the will with its liberty preserved, the Catholic schools do not enter upon the same way, as is evident from the controversies de auxiliis and concerning the general concurrence to free actions. Richard of Middleton (here a. 4, q. 2.) makes mention of certain men who at that time were teaching that God "could bring it about that free choice, after deliberation in the intellect, should be moved to willing something of necessity, not by itself but by the divine will eliciting that motion in the will, in such a way that by that motion the will would not be the mover but only moved; and this He could do with the nature of the power of free choice preserved." But of this opinion the same [Richard] rightly says: "This opinion seems to be against the common opinion of the doctors and also against authority," etc. The same also adds that God "can well efficaciously incline it [free choice] and bring it about that free choice move itself freely to whichever side God wills" (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 4; q. 21, a. 1, ad 2.).

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 4, § 1. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 29, n. 6; Report. ibid. n. 9. — St. Thomas, besides the places cited, Summa I-II, q. 6, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles III, 85 seqq. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1–2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 1–2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3, and dub. lat. 1. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 24; Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. — Vat., post operationes addita voce voluntatis, mox pro et quodam modo permixtae cum edd. 3, 4 substituit et quaedam mixtae, ac deinde pro magis et magis cum edd. 2, 3 falso magis et minus.
[John Damascene], Book II of On the Orthodox Faith c. 24; Aristotle, III Ethics c. 1. — The Vatican edition, after operationes, adds the word voluntatis, then for et quodam modo permixtae, with editions 3 and 4, substitutes et quaedam mixtae, and thereafter for magis et magis, with editions 2 and 3, falsely [reads] magis et minus.
Codd. et edd. I, 2 eum, incongrue; quare lectionem Vat., quacum concordat et ed. 4, retinuimus. Ed. 3 omittit eum.
Codices and editions 1 and 2 [read] eum ["him"], incongruously; wherefore we have retained the reading of the Vatican edition, with which edition 4 also agrees. Edition 3 omits eum.
Cfr. supra pag. 301, nota 3.
Cf. above, p. 301, note 3.
Cap. 3. n. 6: Sola ergo voluntas, quoniam pro sui ingenita libertate nulla vi, nulla etc.
[Bernard, On Free Choice] c. 3, n. 6: "The will alone, therefore, since by reason of its innate liberty [it is compelled] by no force, by no" etc.
Vers. 24.
[Job 41] v. 24.
Vat., bis substituto cum edd. 3, 4 comminationem pro intentationem, cum omnibus edd. omittit verba qui potius... diffiteri, et ultimam arg. propositionem sic exhibet: ergo a nulla creatura potest compelli.
The Vatican edition, twice substituting (with editions 3 and 4) comminationem ["threatening"] for intentationem, together with all the editions omits the words qui potius... diffiteri ["who would rather... disavow"], and presents the last proposition of the argument thus: ergo a nulla creatura potest compelli ["therefore it can be compelled by no creature"].
De hac Augustini sententia vide supra pag. 611, nota 2. — In principio arg. post Item Vat. interserit si, quod omisimus auctoritate codd. F aa cc ee et ed. I, et in fine arg. substituit ad hominis pro in hominis.
Concerning this statement of Augustine see above, p. 611, note 2. — At the beginning of the argument, after Item, the Vatican edition inserts si, which we have omitted on the authority of codices F, aa, cc, ee and edition 1, and at the end of the argument it substitutes ad hominis for in hominis.
Vat. cum cod. ee et aliis paucis quando.
The Vatican edition, with codex ee and a few others, [reads] quando ["when"].
Cfr. infra q. 6.
Cf. below, q. 6.
Cod. V addit libertatis.
Codex V adds libertatis ["of liberty"].
Hic q. 6. — Paulo superius pro non sit libertatis cod. cc cum ed. I non sit libertas.
Here, q. 6. — A little above, for non sit libertatis codex cc with edition 1 [reads] non sit libertas.
Codd. H T cum ei.
Codices H and T [read] cum ei ["with it"].
Huius dist. part. I. q. 6.
Part I of this distinction, q. 6.
Cfr. 1. Decret. Greg. tit. 40.
Cf. Decretals of Gregory [IX], book 1, tit. 40.
Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 inductione.
The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] inductione ["by inducement"].
Matth. 26, 69. seqq.; Luc. 22, 55. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro necessitas codd. B H K P Q (T a prima manu) et alii perperam voluntas.
Matthew 26:69 ff.; Luke 22:55 ff. — A little below, for necessitas codices B, H, K, P, Q (T by the first hand) and others [read] erroneously voluntas.
Hic in corp. quaest. — Paulo superius post quae est cod. aa addit gradus.
Here in the body of the question. — A little above, after quae est codex aa adds gradus.

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