Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio V. Utrum liberum arbitrium a Deo cogi possit.

Quinto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium possit a Deo cogi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae decimo quarto¹: Exi in vias et sepes et compelle intrare, ut impleatur domus mea: si ergo in domum Dei non contingit intrare nisi per usum liberi arbitrii, et Dominus intrare compellit, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium cogit.

2. Item, Ioannis sexto²: Nemo venit ad me, nisi Pater traxerit illum; sed ad Christum non itur nisi per liberi arbitrii actum: si igitur liberum arbitrium non venit ad Filium, nisi trahatur a Patre, et tractus est motus violentus, sicut dicit Philosophus: liberum arbitrium a Deo violentatur et cogitur.

3. Item, Proverbiorum vigesimo primo³: Sicut divisiones aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini; quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud: ergo si liberum arbitrium inclinatur ad unam partem contradictionis; quantumcumque ad illam inclinetur, Deus potest perfecte facere, quod velit oppositum: ergo potest cogere liberum arbitrium ad volendum.

4. Item, omnis creatura est in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris: ergo si liberum arbitrium aliquid creatum a Deo est, necesse est, ipsum esse in perfecta obedientia respectu Dei: ergo si aliqua virtus potest a Deo compelli, potest et virtus liberi arbitrii. Sed Deus de aliis creaturis potest facere contra propriam naturam: ergo et de libero arbitrio potest facere contra propriam libertatem: ergo potest ipsum compellere.

5. Item, plus potest facere liberum arbitrium divinum super humanum, quam possit liberum arbitrium humanum super aliquod brutum; sed homo potest aliquod brutum cogere ad aliquam operationem inferendo sibi violentiam: ergo multo fortius virtus increata potest cogere voluntatem nostram.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram⁴: «Tam non potest Deus facere contra naturam, quam bonam instituit, quam non potest facere contra voluntatem suam»: si igitur Deus voluntarie liberum arbitrium dedit homini, impossibile est, eum de libero arbitrio facere contra inditam sibi libertatem. Sed si ipsum cogeret, contra libertatem eius faceret: ergo liberum arbitrium cogi a Deo est impossibile.

2. Item, Augustinus vigesimo primo⁵ de Civitate Dei: «Illud est unicuique rei naturale, quod de ipsa facere disposuerit Omnipotentis voluntas»: ergo si nullum naturale est violentum, nihil quod facit Deus, est violentum: si igitur omnis coactio est per violentiam, quidquid Deus de libero arbitrio faciat, nulla potest sibi a Deo inferri violentia, ac per hoc nulla coactio.

3. Item, voluntas hoc ipso libere vult, quia, cum vult, vult se velle et se ipsam movet⁶; sed impossibile est, voluntatem aliquid velle plene, quin illud velle sit a voluntate se ipsam movente, et quin voluntas velit se velle: ergo impossibile est, liberum arbitrium cogi non solum ab aliquo creato, verum etiam nec a Deo.

4. Item, nihil aliud est dicere, aliquem facere aliquid ex coactione, quam quod faciat illud invitus⁷: ergo liberum arbitrium vel voluntatem cogi ad actum proprium non est aliud, quam quod voluntas aliquid velit invita; sed si est invita respectu alicuius, illud non vult: ergo voluntatem cogere nihil aliud est facere nisi facere, voluntatem simul et semel velle et nolle. Si ergo duo contradictoria simul esse non tantum est impossibile creaturae, verum etiam creatrici essentiae, patet etc.

5. Item, tunc aliqua virtus cogitur, quando ad oppositum suae inclinationis movetur; sed liberum arbitrium, eo ipso quod liberum, ita natum est inclinari ad unum oppositum, sicut et ad reliquum: ergo libertas eius salvatur in inclinatione ad utrumque oppositum, sive ad hoc inclinetur, sive ad illud. Si ergo coactio excludit libertatem, et libertas non excluditur, ad quodcumque inclinetur, ergo ex nulla inclinatione cogi potest libertas arbitrii; sed non est alius modus ipsum cogendi, nisi inclinando ipsum ad aliquod volitum: ergo impossibile est, ipsum cogi nec per movens creatum nec per agens primum⁸.

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Conclusio. Liberum arbitrium, salva libertate, induci potest ab agente creato, immutari non nisi a Deo, cogi vero a nullo.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi a Deo, quod illud potest intelligi dupliciter: aut ita, quod intelligatur, quod possit auferre libertatem et auferendo libertatem superinducere⁹ coactionem; et hoc modo nulli dubium esse debet, quin Deus possit hoc facere, quantum est de immensitate suae potentiae. — Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod Deus cogat liberum arbitrium¹⁰, salva proprietate libertatis et eius natura: et hoc modo non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile, pro eo quod implicat in se duo contradictorie opposita. Ex hoc enim, quod liberum arbitrium liberum¹¹ est, si aliquid vult, libere vult; et ex hoc, quod voluntarium est, si aliquid vult, voluntarie vult, et se ipso movente vult. Ex hoc autem, quod cogitur, si aliquid vult, serviliter vult; et si quid vult, invite vult; et si quid vult, ab alio vult, quia «violentum est, cuius principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo¹²»: ergo liberum arbitrium, cogi non est aliud, quam actum liberi arbitrii simul et semel esse liberum et servilem, esse voluntarium et non voluntarium, esse a se et non a se. Si igitur impossibile, quod claudit intra se utramque partem contradictionis, non tantum est impossibile creaturae, verum etiam creatrici essentiae, quia illud posse non est posse, sicut in primo libro¹³ ostensum est; planum est, quod liberum arbitrium secundum hunc modum intelligendi a Deo cogi, est impossibile. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad intelligentiam autem rationum ad oppositum adductarum notandum est, quod differt dicere voluntatem induci, et voluntatem mutari, et voluntatem cogi. Tunc enim induci dicitur, quando aliqua persuasio fit, qua disponitur, ut ad aliquod appetibile inclinetur; quae si valde intensa sit, nomen coactionis sortitur, quamvis non sit vera coactio, ut ostensum est supra¹⁴. — Tunc autem voluntas mutatur, quando, ipsa volente unum, potenti virtute affectio immittitur ei ad contrarium, et de volente fit nolens, ita quod una affectio expellitur, et contraria inducitur; sicut patet, cum Deus de amatore temporalium facit temporalium contemptorem; et hoc dicitur esse quaedam compulsio et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur, cui per amoris glutinum fortiter iungebatur. — Tunc autem voluntas dicitur cogi, quando intelligitur, ipsam invitam aliquid velle, et repugnante actu voluntatis deliberativae, aliena virtute movente, et repugnantia manente, ad aliquid¹⁵ volendo inclinari; et hoc duo opposita implicat, sicut ostensum est. — Voluntas igitur induci potest ab agente creato; mutari vero ab alio non potest nisi ab agente increato; cogi vero ab aliquo non potest. Et pro tanto dicit Bernardus, quod libertas voluntatis est ita plena suo modo in creatura, sicut in Creatore, et quod in omnibus reperitur aequaliter. Hoc enim, sicut supra¹⁶ explanatum fuit, intelligitur quantum ad coactionis privationem; et per hoc manifesta est responsio ad auctoritates et rationes.

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1. 2. 3. Quod enim dicitur in Scriptura, Deum voluntatem hominis compellere, et voluntatem hominis trahere, et voluntatem hominis ad quodcumque voluerit inclinare, sicut ostendunt illae tres primae auctoritates; hoc¹⁷ intelligitur, non quia voluntatem cogat, sed quia voluntatem creatam non solum inducit, sicut agens creatum, verum etiam immutat, immittendo affectiones varias, in qua immissione non est coactio, pro eo quod ita voluntarie volo illud quod Deus immittit, sicut illud quod ex me ipso volo; et si aliquid volo, volens volo, non invitus, et ita in volendo ad nihil compellor.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de perfecta obedientia creaturae, dicendum, quod ex hac ratione potius potest concludi oppositum quam propositum. Quia enim ibi est obedientiae perfectio, et liberum arbitrium respectu Dei ad omne quod Deus voluerit, sic habet moveri, sicut pila ad omnem partem¹⁸; ideo quidquid de ipso vel circa ipsum faciat, non compellit nec violentat, nec etiam alicui creaturae violentiam inducit quantum ad illam potentiam obedientiae; quantum autem ad potentiam specialis naturae bene aliquando infert violentiam in miraculorum operatione. Sed talis violentia infertur virtuti naturali, non voluntati, quia virtus naturalis sic est determinata ad unum, ut si trahatur ad oppositum, hoc est per violentiam¹⁹. Voluntas vero vertibilis est ad utrumque oppositum, sicut et rota et pila habet vertibilitatem ad motum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus potest liberum arbitrium divinum super hominem, quam²⁰ humanum etc.; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae posse est potentiae; posse autem cogere brutum, hoc est potentiae, sed posse cogere liberum arbitrium manens liberum, hoc est inordinationis et impotentiae, sicut prius ostensum est. Coactio enim non sic repugnat naturae brutali, sicut repugnat libertati arbitrii; et propterea illa obiectio non concludit²¹.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether free choice can be compelled by God.

Fifthly, inquiry is made concerning free choice in relation to the first mover, namely to God himself, and the question is whether free choice can be compelled by God. And that it can, seems [the case].

1. Luke, the fourteenth chapter¹: Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled: if, therefore, one does not come to enter the house of God except by the use of free choice, and the Lord compels [men] to enter, it seems that free choice is compelled.

2. Likewise, John, the sixth chapter²: No one comes to me, unless the Father draw him; but one does not come to Christ except by an act of free choice: if, therefore, free choice does not come to the Son unless it is drawn by the Father, and what is drawn is a violent motion, as the Philosopher says: free choice is violated and compelled by God.

3. Likewise, Proverbs, the twenty-first chapter³: As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever he will, he shall turn it: therefore if free choice is inclined to one part of a contradiction, however much it is inclined to that part, God can perfectly bring it about that it will the opposite: therefore he can compel free choice to willing.

4. Likewise, every creature is in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator: therefore if free choice is something created by God, it must be in perfect obedience with respect to God: therefore if some power can be compelled by God, the power of free choice can be also. But God can act upon other creatures contrary to their proper nature: therefore he can also act upon free choice contrary to its proper liberty: therefore he can compel it.

5. Likewise, divine free choice can do more over the human than human free choice can over some brute; but a man can compel some brute to some operation by inflicting violence on it: therefore much more strongly can the uncreated power compel our will.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine on Genesis according to the letter⁴: "God can no more act contrary to the nature which he established as good than he can act contrary to his own will": if, therefore, God voluntarily gave free choice to man, it is impossible for him to act upon free choice contrary to the liberty implanted in it. But if he were to compel it, he would act contrary to its liberty: therefore for free choice to be compelled by God is impossible.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twenty-first [book]⁵ of The City of God: "That is natural to each thing which the will of the Omnipotent has disposed to make of it": therefore if nothing natural is violent, nothing that God does is violent: if, therefore, all coercion is by violence, whatever God may do concerning free choice, no violence can be inflicted upon it by God, and consequently no coercion.

3. Likewise, the will by this very fact wills freely, because, when it wills, it wills to will and moves itself⁶; but it is impossible for the will to will something fully unless that willing is from the will moving itself, and unless the will wills to will: therefore it is impossible for free choice to be compelled, not only by something created, but even by God.

4. Likewise, to say that someone does something out of coercion is nothing other than that he does it unwillingly⁷: therefore for free choice or the will to be compelled to its proper act is nothing other than that the will should will something unwillingly; but if it is unwilling with respect to something, it does not will it: therefore to compel the will is to do nothing other than to make the will will and not-will at one and the same time. If, therefore, two contradictories to exist at once is not only impossible to a creature, but even to the creating essence, it is evident, etc.

5. Likewise, then is a power compelled, when it is moved to the opposite of its inclination; but free choice, by the very fact that it is free, is of a nature to be inclined to one opposite just as to the other: therefore its liberty is preserved in its inclination to either opposite, whether it be inclined to this or to that. If, therefore, coercion excludes liberty, and liberty is not excluded, to whatever it be inclined, then by no inclination can the liberty of choice be compelled; but there is no other mode of compelling it except by inclining it to some object willed: therefore it is impossible for it to be compelled, neither by a created mover nor by the first agent⁸.

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Conclusion. Free choice, with its liberty preserved, can be induced by a created agent, can be changed only by God, but can be compelled by none.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that when it is asked whether free choice can be compelled by God, this can be understood in two ways: either so that it is understood that he can take away [its] liberty and, by taking away [its] liberty, superinduce⁹ coercion; and in this mode there must be no doubt to anyone that God can do this, as far as concerns the immensity of his power. — In another way, so that it is understood that God should compel free choice¹⁰ with the property of liberty and its nature preserved: and in this mode it is not only impossible, but even unintelligible, for the reason that it implicates in itself two contradictorily opposite [things]. For from the fact that free choice is free¹¹, if it wills something, it wills freely; and from the fact that it is voluntary, if it wills something, it wills voluntarily, and wills by moving itself. But from the fact that it is compelled, if it wills something, it wills servilely; and if it wills anything, it wills unwillingly; and if it wills anything, it wills from another, because "that is violent whose principle is from without, the one suffering [it] contributing nothing of force¹²": therefore for free choice to be compelled is nothing other than for the act of free choice at one and the same time to be free and servile, to be voluntary and not voluntary, to be from itself and not from itself. If, therefore, the impossible, which encloses within itself both parts of a contradiction, is not only impossible to a creature, but even to the creating essence — because that capacity is not a capacity, as was shown in the first book¹³ — it is plain that for free choice, according to this mode of understanding, to be compelled by God is impossible. — Hence the arguments adduced for this are to be conceded.

But for the understanding of the arguments adduced for the opposite, it must be noted that to say the will is induced, and the will is changed, and the will is compelled differ. For it is said to be induced then, when some persuasion is made by which it is disposed to be inclined toward some appetible [thing]; and if this be very intense, it takes on the name of coercion, although it is not a true coercion, as was shown above¹⁴. — But the will is changed then, when, while it itself wills one thing, by a powerful force an affection is infused into it toward the contrary, and from willing it becomes unwilling, in such a way that one affection is expelled and the contrary is induced; as is evident when God makes a lover of temporal things into a despiser of temporal things; and this is said to be a kind of compulsion and drawing, while the will is separated from that thing to which it was strongly joined by the glue of love. — But the will is said to be compelled then, when it is understood that it itself unwillingly wills something, and, the act of the deliberative will resisting, while another force moves [it] and the resistance remains, it is inclined to willing something¹⁵; and this implicates two opposites, as was shown. — The will, therefore, can be induced by a created agent; but it cannot be changed by another except by the uncreated agent; and it cannot be compelled by anyone. And for this reason Bernard says that the liberty of the will is so full in its own mode in a creature as in the Creator, and that it is found equally in all. For this, as was explained above¹⁶, is understood as to the privation of coercion; and through this the response to the authorities and arguments is manifest.

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1. 2. 3. For as to what is said in Scripture, that God compels the will of man, and draws the will of man, and inclines the will of man to whatever he wills, as those first three authorities show; this¹⁷ is understood not because he compels the will, but because he not only induces the created will, as a created agent [does], but even changes it, by infusing various affections, in which infusing there is no coercion, for the reason that I will so voluntarily what God infuses as that which I will from myself; and if I will something, I will it willingly, not unwillingly, and thus in willing I am compelled to nothing.

4. To that which is objected concerning the perfect obedience of the creature, it must be said that from this argument the opposite can rather be concluded than the [original] proposition. For since there is there the perfection of obedience, and free choice with respect to God has to be moved to everything that God wills, just as a ball [is moved] to every part¹⁸; therefore whatever he does of it or about it, he does not compel nor violate, nor even does he induce violence on any creature as regards that power of obedience; but as regards the power of [its] special nature he sometimes indeed inflicts violence in the working of miracles. But such violence is inflicted on the natural power, not on the will, because the natural power is so determined to one [term] that if it is drawn to the opposite, this is by violence¹⁹. But the will is convertible to either opposite, just as a wheel and a ball have convertibility to motion.

5. To that which is objected, that divine free choice can do more over man than human [free choice can], etc.²⁰; it must be said that this is true in those things in which the capacity is [a capacity] of power; but to be able to compel a brute, this is [a capacity] of power, while to be able to compel free choice while it remains free, this is [a mark] of disorder and impotence, as was shown before. For coercion is not so repugnant to the brute nature as it is repugnant to the liberty of choice; and on this account that objection does not conclude²¹.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 23.
[Luke 14] v. 23.
Vers. 44: Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum. — De sententia Philosophi cfr. VII. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.), ubi tractio (quae ab alio ad se ipsum, aut ad aliud) connumeratur inter motus, qui sunt ab alio, et ut tractionis species afferuntur compulsio et depulsio.
[John 6] v. 44: No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him. — On the statement of the Philosopher cf. VII Physics text 10 (c. 2.), where drawing (which is from another toward itself, or toward something else) is counted among the motions which are from another, and as species of drawing compulsion and repulsion are adduced.
Vers. 1.
[Proverbs 21] v. 1.
Libr. VI. c. 18. n. 29. Verba ipsa vide supra pag. 433, nota 1.
Book VI [On Genesis according to the Letter] c. 18, n. 29. See the words themselves above, p. 433, note 1.
Cap. 8. n. 2: Quomodo est enim contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate, cum voluntas tanti utique Conditoris conditae rei cuiusque natura sit? Cfr. ibid. c. 7. n. 1. — Mox in prima conclus. pro violentum edd., excepta 1, per violentiam.
[Book 21] c. 8, n. 2: "For how is it contrary to nature, what is done by the will of God, since the will of so great a Founder is surely the nature of each founded thing?" Cf. ibid. c. 7, n. 1. — Soon, in the first conclusion, for violentum the editions, except 1, [read] per violentiam.
Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 5: Velle autem non potest invitus, quia velle non potest nolens velle; nam omnis volens ipsum suum velle vult. — Cod. T quia cum vult se velle plene ipsam movet.
Cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Free Choice c. 5: "But he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will [while] not-willing to will; for everyone who wills, wills his own willing itself." — Codex T [reads] quia cum vult se velle plene ipsam movet ["because, when it wills to will itself, it fully moves itself"].
Cod. cc et ed. 1 invite.
Codex cc and edition 1 [read] invite ["unwillingly," adverb].
Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis nec non cum edd., excepta 1, liberum arbitrium. In fine arg. ante per agens codd. F M Q aa bb ee et alii interserunt etiam.
Codex T, together with several others as well as the editions, except 1, [reads] liberum arbitrium. At the end of the argument, before per agens, codices F, M, Q, aa, bb, ee and others insert etiam.
Codd. F aa bb ee et alii insuper inducere, codd. K T cum ed. 2 insuper ducere.
Codices F, aa, bb, ee and others [read] insuper inducere; codices K, T with edition 2 [read] insuper ducere.
Cod. X alio modo intelligi potest quod Deus cogere possit liberum arbitrium; cod. aa post Alio modo addit ita.
Codex X [reads] alio modo intelligi potest quod Deus cogere possit liberum arbitrium ["in another way it can be understood that God can compel free choice"]; codex aa, after Alio modo, adds ita.
Ex codd. T aa adiecimus hoc secundum liberum. In codd. F H I K Y bb ee et aliis, sicut et in ed. 1 exhibetur tantum: Ex hoc enim quod liberum est.
From codices T and aa we have added this second liberum ["free"]. In codices F, H, I, K, Y, bb, ee and others, as also in edition 1, only this is exhibited: Ex hoc enim quod liberum est ["For from the fact that it is free"].
Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. Cfr. etiam I. Magnor. Moral. c. 13. seqq. (c. 14. seqq.) et II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 7. seq.).
Aristotle, III Ethics c. 1. Cf. also I Magna Moralia c. 13 ff. (c. 14 ff.) and II Eudemian Ethics c. 9 (c. 7 f.).
Dist. 42. q. 3. — In edd. haec proposit. sic incipit: Si igitur impossibile est, quod claudat; lectio evidenter falsa, quippe quae contextum propositionis prorsus disturbat. Cum edd. etiam plures codd. in initio huius propos. post impossibile incongrue adiiciunt est, et dein Vat. sola verbis non tantum praemittit et.
[Book I] dist. 42, q. 3. — In the editions this proposition begins thus: Si igitur impossibile est, quod claudat; a reading evidently false, inasmuch as it wholly disturbs the context of the proposition. With the editions several codices also, at the beginning of this proposition, after impossibile incongruously add est, and then the Vatican edition alone prefixes et to the words non tantum.
Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius post quando cod. bb inserit ipsi; paulo inferius pro et de volente fit nolens plures codd., ut F K Y bb cc etc., cum ed. 1 et de nolente fit volens. Deinde pro et tractatio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur, quam lect. ex codd. F X aa bb ee etc. restituimus, Vat. et tractatio divina, ut voluntas ab eo separetur; nonnulli codd., magis cum nostra lect. convenientes, et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea separetur.
The preceding question. — A little above, after quando codex bb inserts ipsi; a little below, for et de volente fit nolens several codices, such as F, K, Y, bb, cc etc., with edition 1 [read] et de nolente fit volens. Then for et tractatio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur, the reading which we have restored from codices F, X, aa, bb, ee etc., the Vatican edition [reads] et tractatio divina, ut voluntas ab eo separetur; some codices, agreeing more with our reading, [read] et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea separetur.
Vat. ad idem aliquid. Mox edd. cum pluribus codd. et haec; cod. bb, posito et haec, deinde substituit implicant pro implicat.
The Vatican edition [reads] ad idem aliquid. Soon the editions, with several codices, [read] et haec; codex bb, having set et haec, then substitutes implicant for implicat.
Hic q. 1, ubi et sententia Bernardi, immediate ante memorata, integra redditur (sumta est ex eius libro de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 4. n. 9.).
Here, q. 1, where also the statement of Bernard, just mentioned above, is given in full (it is taken from his book On Grace and Free Choice c. 4, n. 9.).
Codd. aa bb hoc dictum, codd. F H I K T V Y et alii cum ed. 1 hoc enim. Circa finem solut. post ex me ipso volo cod. aa addit voluntarie.
Codices aa, bb [read] hoc dictum; codices F, H, I, K, T, V, Y and others with edition 1 [read] hoc enim. Near the end of the solution, after ex me ipso volo codex aa adds voluntarie.
Isa. 12, 28: Quasi pilam mittet [Dominus] te in terram latam. — Cod. O sicut pila ad hominem, cod. cc et ed. ... sicut pila ad motum. Paulo inferius pro nec etiam alicui codd. K T nec etiam aliam, cod. W nec etiam aliquam.
Isaiah 22:18: "[The Lord] will toss thee like a ball into a wide land." — Codex O [reads] sicut pila ad hominem; codex cc and an edition sicut pila ad motum. A little below, for nec etiam alicui codices K, T [read] nec etiam aliam; codex W [reads] nec etiam aliquam.
Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. et 6.
Cf. above, [book II] dist. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5 and 6.
Permulti codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 vel pro quam; cod. aa omittit hominem quam.
Very many codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] vel for quam; codex aa omits hominem quam.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion on the preceding question.

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