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Dist. 25, Part 2, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 625

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod libertas arbitrii per peccatum ex parte est perdita, in illo capitulo: Unde manifestum est etc. Hoc enim est contra Bernardum, qui dicit in libro de Libero Arbitrio1, quod «liberum arbitrium nec miseria amittitur nec culpa minuitur». Item, in eodem libro loquens de libero arbitrio: «Sui omnino diminutionem vel defectum non patitur». Et iterum, ipse ibidem dicit: «Libertas arbitrii de ipso quo condita est statu aliquatenus non mutatur, sed aequaliter, quantum in se est, a caelis et terris et inferis possidetur»: ergo male assignat Magister diversos gradus2 libertatis. Item, si libertas arbitrii potest per peccatum diminui, cum non sit infinita, aliquando poterit amitti: ergo si impossibile est, creaturam rationalem absque libertate arbitrii esse, impossibile est, ipsum per peccatum diminui.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicendum, quod est loqui de libertate arbitrii3 quantum ad esse et quantum ad bene esse. Si loquamur quantum ad esse, sic liberum arbitrium non potest diminui per peccatum. Si autem loquamur quantum ad bene esse, sic excludit malum duplex, videlicet culpae et poenae; et quantum ad hanc4 liberum arbitrium potest diminui, et haec libertas per peccatum tolli potest, sicut in damnatis, qui necessario subiecti sunt malo culpae et malo poenae. Et per hoc patent obiecta contra hoc, quia procedunt de libertate, intelligendo quantum ad esse5.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Est namque libertas arbitrii triplex, scilicet a necessitate, a culpa et a miseria. Videtur, quod ista divisio sit superflua. Cum enim non sit nisi duplex malum, scilicet culpae et poenae, videtur, quod non sit nisi duplex libertas. Cum ergo libertas dicat ereptionem ab aliquo malo, videtur, quod non debeat esse nisi duplex libertatis differentia. — Item, cum non sit tantum malum culpae et poenae, sed etiam tentationis, videtur praedicta divisio esse diminuta, quae omittit unam differentiam, quae est libertas arbitrii a malo tentationis. Si tu dicas, eam contineri sub libertate a miseria; tunc ego quaero: quare similiter libertas a culpa non continetur sub libertate a miseria6? — Item, cum Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio7 dividat libertatem liberi arbitrii in libertatem arbitrii et consilii et complaciti; quaeritur, quae sit inter has divisiones differentia, et penes quid sumantur harum divisionum membra.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ex praecedentibus8 colligi potest, arbitrii libertas et privative dicitur et positive. Privative dicitur per comparationem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur libertas ut a quo; positive per comparationem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur libertas ut ad quod. — Libertas autem opponitur servituti. Servitus autem duplex est, videlicet servitus coactionis et servitus subiectionis. Servitus autem subiectionis potest esse sub duplici differentia, secundum quod duplex est malum, scilicet malum, quod patimur, et hoc est malum miseriae, et in hoc attenditur libertas a miseria; et malum quod facimus, et hoc est malum culpae, et in hoc attenditur tertia libertatis differentia9. Et sic patet, quod libertas, secundum quod consideratur per comparationem ad illud a quo liberat, habet dividi in tres differentias, quae sunt libertas a necessitate, a culpa et a miseria. — Si autem consideretur libertas per comparationem ad illud ad quod, scilicet ad actum, in quem exit, hoc potest esse tripliciter10: aut prout simpliciter consideratur respectu actus volendi, et sic dicitur libertas arbitrii; aut prout consideratur respectu actus volendi ad finem relati, qui dicitur usus vel uti, et sic attenditur libertas consilii; aut respectu actus volendi quietati11, qui quidem dicitur actus fruitionis, et penes hunc attenditur libertas complaciti. — Et sic patet sufficientia utriusque divisionis, et diversi modi, secundum quos praedictae divisiones habent assignari.

Possent tamen ad unam communem rationem dividendi reduci sic. Est enim considerare libertatem arbitrii quantum ad esse et quantum ad bene

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esse. Si quantum ad esse, sic vocatur a Magistro libertas a coactione, et a Bernardo libertas arbitrii, ab uno positive, ab altero privative. — Si quantum ad bene esse, cum ad bene esse concurrat duplex bonum, videlicet bonum rectificans et bonum delectans, sive bonum ordinans et bonum quietans; et per oppositum excludatur duplex malum, videlicet malum deformans et malum affligens: sic est duplex differentia, quarum una sumitur respectu boni dirigentis, et haec dicitur libertas consilii a Bernardo, et a Magistro libertas a culpa; alia vero sumitur respectu boni quietantis, et haec a Bernardo vocatur libertas complaciti, a Magistro libertas a miseria. Idem enim ipsum, quod Bernardus nominat positive sive per comparationem ad terminum ad quem, Magister nominat privative sive per comparationem ad terminum a quo.

Et sic patet divisionum sufficientia. Patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Praeter enim malum culpae et poenae est assignare tertiam differentiam libertatis arbitrii, quae non sumitur respectu mali, utpote illa, quae attenditur quantum ad esse. Et malum tentationis quodam modo habet reduci ad malum culpae, quodam modo ad malum poenae: ad malum culpae, in quantum subintrat interius; ad malum vero poenae, in quantum affligit exterius; et sic non12 facit quartum membrum ab illis tribus diversum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Verum nobis magis placet, ut illa sit libertas arbitrii, qua quis liber est ad malum, et illa, qua quis liber est ad bonum. Hoc enim est contra Anselmum13, qui dicit, quod «potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis». — Item, etiam videtur esse contra rationem, quia unumquodque debet denominari a suo optimo; et libertas, quae est ab omni miseria et culpa, haec est ab omni miseria14; ergo liberum arbitrium debet denominari ab illa. — Item, si libertas arbitrii dicitur non solum, quia est in bonum, sed etiam, quia potest in malum; cum in Beatis non possit in malum: videtur, quod aequivoce dicatur libertas arbitrii in viatoribus et in Beatis. Sed contra hoc est, quia comparatio secundum maius et minus est respectu solius univoci15. Si ergo aequivoce diceretur liberum arbitrium in Beatis et in nobis, non esset maior libertas in Beatis quam in nobis; quod est contra Magistrum in littera, qui differenter gradus libertatis assignat.

Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum libertas a coactione et a culpa et a miseria dicatur aequivoce, vel univoce; et cui primo nomen libertatis imponatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum nomen imponatur rei a proprietate, quae est sibi inhaerens inseparabiliter et essentialiter; et libertas essentialis liberi arbitrii16 non sit libertas a culpa, vel a miseria, sed libertas a coactione: ab illa liberum arbitrium habet denominari. Et quoniam haec in creaturis, quantum est de se, indifferens est ad bonum et ad malum; ideo Magister, de hac intelligens, dicit in littera, quod libertas, a qua liberum arbitrium denominatur liberum, non est libertas ad bonum tantum, sed etiam ad malum; non quod principaliter respiciat malum, sed quia de generali nominis significatione non determinatur ad bonum, licet principalius respiciat bonum quam malum17. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod denominatio debet fieri ab optimo; dicendum, quod illud verum est de optimo non quocumque, sed essentiali et inseparabili.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum dicatur libertas aequivoce, vel univoce; dicendum, quod nec sic nec sic, sed secundum quandam analogiam, quae propter convenientiam cum univoco recipit comparationem secundum magis et minus; propter convenientiam cum aequivoco recipit quandam distinctionem multiplicitatis; analogum enim medium tenet inter univocum et aequivocum18. — Et sic patent ea quae quaesita sunt.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, that the freedom of choice has in part been lost through sin, in that chapter: Whence it is manifest etc. For this is against Bernard, who says in his book On Free Choice1 that «free choice is neither lost through misery nor diminished through fault». Likewise, in the same book, speaking of free choice: «It suffers no diminution or defect whatsoever of itself». And again, the same author there says: «The freedom of choice is in no way changed from that state in which it was created, but equally, so far as in it lies, it is possessed by the heavens and the earth and the realms below»: therefore the Master wrongly assigns diverse degrees2 of freedom. Likewise, if the freedom of choice can be diminished through sin, since it is not infinite, at some point it could be lost: therefore if it is impossible for a rational creature to be without freedom of choice, it is impossible for that freedom to be diminished through sin.

I respond: To this it must be said that freedom of choice3 may be spoken of in respect of being and in respect of well-being. If we speak of it in respect of being, then free choice cannot be diminished through sin. But if we speak of it in respect of well-being, then it excludes a twofold evil, namely that of fault and that of punishment; and in respect of this4 free choice can be diminished, and this freedom can be taken away through sin, as in the damned, who are necessarily subject to the evil of fault and the evil of punishment. And through this the objections against this are clear, because they proceed concerning freedom understood in respect of being5.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: For the freedom of choice is threefold, namely from necessity, from fault, and from misery. It seems that this division is superfluous. For since there is only a twofold evil, namely of fault and of punishment, it seems that there should be only a twofold freedom. Since therefore freedom denotes a deliverance from some evil, it seems that there ought to be only a twofold differentia of freedom. — Likewise, since there is not only the evil of fault and of punishment, but also that of temptation, it seems that the aforesaid division is deficient, since it omits one differentia, namely the freedom of choice from the evil of temptation. If you say that this is contained under freedom from misery; then I ask: why is freedom from fault likewise not contained under freedom from misery6? — Likewise, since Bernard in his book On Free Choice7 divides the freedom of free choice into the freedom of choice, of counsel, and of complacency; it is asked what is the difference among these divisions, and according to what the members of these divisions are taken.

I respond: It must be said that, as can be gathered from what precedes8, the freedom of choice is spoken of both privatively and positively. It is spoken of privatively by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as from which; positively by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as toward which. — Now freedom is opposed to servitude. But servitude is twofold, namely the servitude of coercion and the servitude of subjection. And the servitude of subjection can fall under a twofold differentia, according as evil is twofold, namely the evil which we suffer, and this is the evil of misery, and in this freedom from misery is regarded; and the evil which we do, and this is the evil of fault, and in this the third differentia of freedom is regarded9. And thus it is clear that freedom, insofar as it is considered by comparison to that from which it delivers, must be divided into three differentiae, which are freedom from necessity, from fault, and from misery. — But if freedom be considered by comparison to that toward which, namely toward the act into which it goes forth, this can be in a threefold way10: either as it is considered simply with respect to the act of willing, and so it is called the freedom of choice; or as it is considered with respect to the act of willing related to an end, which is called use or to use, and so the freedom of counsel is regarded; or with respect to the act of willing at rest11, which indeed is called the act of fruition, and according to this the freedom of complacency is regarded. — And thus the sufficiency of each division is clear, and the diverse modes according to which the aforesaid divisions are to be assigned.

They could, however, be reduced to one common ground of dividing in this way. For freedom of choice may be considered in respect of being and in respect of *well-

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being. If in respect of being, then it is called by the Master freedom from coercion, and by Bernard freedom of choice, by the one positively, by the other privatively. — If in respect of well-being, since to well-being there concur a twofold good, namely the good that rectifies and the good that delights, that is, the good that orders and the good that brings rest; and conversely there is excluded a twofold evil, namely the evil that deforms and the evil that afflicts: thus there is a twofold differentia, of which one is taken with respect to the directing good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of counsel, and by the Master freedom from fault; while the other is taken with respect to the quieting good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of complacency, by the Master freedom from misery. For the very same thing which Bernard names positively, that is, by comparison to the term toward which, the Master names privatively, that is, by comparison to the term from which*.

And thus the sufficiency of the divisions is clear. The reply to the objections is also clear. For besides the evil of fault and of punishment there is to be assigned a third differentia of the freedom of choice, which is not taken with respect to an evil, such as that one which is regarded in respect of being. And the evil of temptation must be reduced in one way to the evil of fault, in another way to the evil of punishment: to the evil of fault, insofar as it enters within; to the evil of punishment, insofar as it afflicts without; and thus it does not12 constitute a fourth member distinct from those three.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: But it is more pleasing to us that that be the freedom of choice whereby one is free toward evil, and that whereby one is free toward good. For this is against Anselm13, who says that «the power of sinning is not freedom nor a part of freedom». — Likewise, it also seems to be against reason, because each thing ought to be named from its best; and the freedom which is from all misery and fault, this is from all misery14; therefore free choice ought to be named from it. — Likewise, if the freedom of choice is so called not only because it is toward good, but also because it can incline toward evil; since in the Blessed it cannot incline toward evil: it seems that the freedom of choice is spoken of equivocally in wayfarers and in the Blessed. But against this is the fact that comparison according to greater and lesser is with respect to the univocal alone15. If therefore free choice were spoken of equivocally in the Blessed and in us, there would not be a greater freedom in the Blessed than in us; which is against the Master in the text, who assigns the degrees of freedom differently.

On account of this there is the question, whether freedom from coercion and from fault and from misery is spoken of equivocally or univocally; and to which the name of freedom is first applied.

I respond: It must be said that, since a name is imposed on a thing from a property which inheres in it inseparably and essentially; and the essential freedom of free choice16 is not freedom from fault, or from misery, but freedom from coercion: from this free choice is to be named. And since this, in creatures, of itself is indifferent toward good and toward evil; therefore the Master, understanding it of this, says in the text that the freedom from which free choice is named free is not freedom toward good only, but also toward evil; not that it principally regards evil, but because by the general signification of the name it is not determined to good, although it more principally regards good than evil17. — And through this the reply to the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that naming ought to be done from the best; it must be said that this is true of the best not in any sense whatever, but of the essential and inseparable best.

To that which is asked, whether freedom is spoken of equivocally or univocally; it must be said that it is neither thus nor thus, but according to a certain analogy, which, on account of its agreement with the univocal, admits of comparison according to greater and lesser; on account of its agreement with the equivocal, admits of a certain distinction of multiplicity; for the analogous holds a middle place between the univocal and the equivocal18. — And thus the things which were asked are clear.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 4. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 610, nota 2, ubi et seq. locus, qui ex c. 9. n. 28 sumtus est, integer affertur. Locus tertio citatus sumtus est ex c. 9. n. 30, in quo loco text. orig. post aequaliter insertum exhibet semper.
    [Bernard, On Free Choice] c. 4, n. 9. Compare above, p. 610, note 2, where also the following passage, which is taken from c. 9, n. 28, is given in full. The passage cited in the third place is taken from c. 9, n. 30, in which place the original text exhibits, inserted after equally, the word always.
  2. Cod. aa status. In codd. V X Z et aliis nec non in ed. 2 legitur assignat Magister arbitrium libertatis. Voci libertatis Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt arbitrii.
    Codex aa reads of the state. In codices V X Z and others, and also in ed. 2, is read the Master assigns the choice of freedom. To the word of freedom the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add of choice.
  3. Cod. T adiicit dupliciter.
    Codex T adds in a twofold way.
  4. Scilicet libertatem. Pro hanc Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 hoc.
    That is, the freedom. For this (fem.) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads this (neut.).
  5. Cfr. supra q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 5; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 95; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. et q. 4. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 8.
    Compare above, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 5; Blessed Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 15, q. 95; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text and q. 4, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt concerning the text, 8.
  6. Verba tunc ego quaero, quare... a miseria desunt in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4. Subinde pro Item Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit Contra.
    The words then I ask: why ... from misery are absent in the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4. Shortly after, for Likewise the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 substitutes On the contrary.
  7. Cap. 4. n. 11. et c. 7. n. 21.
    [Bernard, On Free Choice] c. 4, n. 11, and c. 7, n. 21.
  8. Quaest. 1.
    Question 1 [of this part].
  9. August., Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, c. 26: Dupliciter enim appellatur malum; unum, quod homo facit; alterum, quod patitur; quod facit, peccatum est; quod patitur, poena. — In seq. propos. pro liberat, quod fide codd. F aa bb ee posuimus, cum contextus hanc lect. exigat, Vat. est libertas, aliqui codd. cum primis edd. libertas tantum.
    Augustine, Against Adimantus, Disciple of Mani, c. 26: For evil is called in a twofold way; one, which a man does; the other, which he suffers; what he does is sin; what he suffers is punishment. — In the following clause, for delivers, which on the authority of codices F aa bb ee we have set down, since the context requires this reading, the Vatican edition has is freedom, while some codices with the earliest editions have freedom only.
  10. Maior pars codd. falso dupliciter.
    The greater part of the codices falsely [read] in a twofold way.
  11. Cod. cc et ed. 1 quietativi.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] of the quieting [act].
  12. Codd. C H I K R S T V aa bb et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt non; perperam. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 96; S. Thom., hic a. 5; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 7. et dub. lit. 9.
    Codices C H I K R S T V aa bb and others, with editions 2, 3, 4, omit not; wrongly. — On this doubt compare Blessed Albert, here a. 7; Summa p. II, tr. 15, q. 96; St. Thomas, here a. 5; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 7, and on the doubt concerning the text, 9.
  13. Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 613, nota 9.
    [Anselm,] Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 1. Compare above, p. 613, note 9.
  14. Et ideo est optima; sed locus est corruptus. — Pro haec est plures codd. hoc est, et pro ab omni miseria et culpa Vat. ab omni culpa tantum. Paulo ante cod. C pro a suo optimo legit a suo fine vel optimo. De maiori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 49. (c. 4.), ubi haec: A fine appellare omnia iustum est. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 14, nota 7.
    And therefore it is best; but the passage is corrupt. — For this is several codices [read] this is [neut.], and for from all misery and fault the Vatican edition has from all fault only. A little before, codex C for from its own best reads from its own end or best. On the major premise compare Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 49 (c. 4), where these words occur: It is right to name all things from their end. Compare also tom. I, p. 14, note 7.
  15. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.), ubi de iis quae ad comparationem faciendam requiruntur, agitur et inter alia legitur: Sed non solum oportet, comparabilia non aequivoca esse, sed et non habere differentiam etc. — Paulo inferius pro quam in nobis codd. F H T W bb ee cum ed. 1 et in nobis. — De sententia Magistri cfr. hic lit. ipsius c. 3. seqq.
    Compare Aristotle, Physics VII, text 24 ff. (c. 4), where there is treatment of the things which are required for making a comparison, and among other things it is read: But it is necessary not only that the comparables be not equivocal, but also that they not have a difference etc. — A little below, for than in us codices F H T W bb ee with ed. 1 [read] and in us. — On the opinion of the Master compare here his own text, c. 3 ff.
  16. Codd. W aa et alii cum ed. 1 libero arbitrio; plurimorum codd. lectio hic dubia est propter abbreviationem verborum. Mox pro ab illa liberum arbitrium Vat. ab illa libertate arbitrium.
    Codices W aa and others with ed. 1 [read] to free choice; the reading of most codices is here doubtful on account of the abbreviation of the words. Shortly after, for from it free choice the Vatican edition [reads] from that freedom the choice.
  17. Cfr. supra q. 3. — Paulo inferius pro denominatio codd. F K T W bb cc et alii cum ed. 1 nominatio.
    Compare above, q. 3. — A little below, for denomination codices F K T W bb cc and others with ed. 1 [read] naming.
  18. Ut dicit Averroes, IV. Metaph. text. 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 3. § 3; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    As Averroes says, Metaphysics IV, text 2. — On this doubt compare Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 3, § 3; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text. ---
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