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Dist. 25, Part 1, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 606

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod philosophi, definientes liberum arbitrium, dixerunt, esse liberum de voluntate iudicium. Videtur enim, quod talis definitio, a philosophis assignata, nec sit bona nec sit secundum artem philosophicam assignata. Philosophus in sexto Topicorum1 reprehendit definitionem aequicolam, in qua sunt tot vocabula ex

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parte definitionis, quot ex parte definiti, utpote si quis definiens tunicam nigram, dicat, eam esse colobium atrum. Sed sic est in proposito. Si tu dicas, quod non est definitio, sed nominis2 interpretatio; tunc est quaestio: quare liberum arbitrium potius vocatur sic, quam dicatur liberum iudicium? — Item videtur, quod ad philosophos non pertineat definire liberum arbitrium, quia, cum anima sit imago Dei secundum liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Richardus3, et mediante libero arbitrio mereatur, philosophi autem non cognoverunt, animam esse Dei imaginem nec meriti originem: videtur, quod liberum arbitrium nec sciverunt nec potuerunt definire.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut praedictum est4, praedicta notificatio potius est nominis interpretatio quam definitio. Magis autem facultas illa censetur hoc nomine, ut dicatur liberum arbitrium quam liberum iudicium, pro eo quod iudicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis: arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis. Unde ille dicitur iudex, cuius est secundum iura causam terminare; ille autem dicitur arbiter, qui ad proprium voluntatis nutum causam terminare habet5. Et quoniam liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, decernere habet de agendis iuxta voluntatis nutum magis quam iuxta iuris praeceptum; hinc est, quod magis proprie nominatur per nomen arbitrii quam per nomen iudicii.

Ex hoc igitur et ex praedictis colligitur, quod magna fuit sapientia in eis qui imposuerunt nomina. Non enim sine causa haec facultas duplici nomine censetur; nec sine causa vocabulum spectans ad rationem significatur substantive, vocabulum spectans ad voluntatem vocatur adiective; nec sine causa vocabulum spectans ad rationem potius dicitur esse arbitrium quam iudicium. Est enim liberum arbitrium facultas duarum potentiarum, ita quod ratio se habet in ratione materialis et decernere6 habet ad nutum et imperium voluntatis.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod philosophorum non est liberum arbitrium cognoscere; dicendum, quod de libero arbitrio est loqui dupliciter: aut secundum quod est principium operum moralium, aut secundum quod est principium operum gratuitorum. Et primo modo est de consideratione philosophorum, illorum maxime, qui versati sunt circa mores componendos, quorum liberum arbitrium est principium secundum regulam et dictamen iuris naturalis, quod est unicuique impressum7. Secundo modo est de consideratione theologorum, quia sic habet aspectum ad divinam gratiam, cuius gratiae cognitio est per fidem catholicam, sine qua omnia opera hominum vana sunt, etsi etiam videantur laudabilia; et in hac consideratione defecit8 philosophorum peritia. — Et per hoc patent obiecta.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod secundum praedictam assignationem in his tantum videtur esse liberum arbitrium, qui voluntatem mutare possunt. Si enim liberum arbitrium non tantummodo est in homine secundum statum viatoris, immo etiam secundum statum comprehensionis et beatitudinis, sicut determinatum fuit supra distinctione septima9, praedicta assignatio sive definitio non videtur esse congrua. Praeterea, non solummodo hi qui habent voluntatem vertibilem, sed etiam hi qui habent voluntatem invertibilem, habent «liberum de voluntate iudicium»: ergo falsum dicit Magister, qui dicit, quod praedicta assignatio solum his convenit, qui habent voluntatem vertibilem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum diversae assignationes liberi arbitrii ponantur a Sanctis, et unius rei unica est definitio, quae sit illarum assignationum

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differentia. Augustinus enim definit, sicut habitum est in distinctione praecedenti10, sic: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur» etc. Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio11 definit sic: «Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam». Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio12 sic: «Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium». — Quaeritur igitur, quae sit istarum rationum differentia; de singulis enim disputare parum est utile et parum facit ad propositum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum Magistri propositum non refertur ad illam notificationem philosophorum in hac distinctione propositam: «Liberum arbitrium est liberum de voluntate iudicium», sed ad illam refertur, quae posita fuit in praecedenti distinctione: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur» etc. Et quantum ad illam dicit Magister, quod non convenit liberum arbitrium alicui13 nisi solum secundum statum mutabilitatis.

Unde nota, quod liberum arbitrium potest tripliciter considerari: aut in sui generalitate, secundum quod convenit creaturae et Creatori; et sic definitur ab Anselmo, cum dicitur: Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem etc. Aut secundum esse, quod habet in creatura, non concernendo statum; et sic est definitio illa Bernardi: Liberum arbitrium est consensus etc. Aut quantum ad statum viatoris; et sic est illa Augustini: Liberum arbitrium est facultas etc.

Possunt tamen nihilominus praedictae notificationes aliter distingui ab invicem. Liberum enim arbitrium habet comparationem ad actum, habet comparari ad actum et14 obiectum, habet tertio comparari ad actum et obiectum et finem ultimum. Quantum ad primam considerationem definitur a Bernardo; quantum ad secundam ab Augustino; quantum ad tertiam ab Anselmo; et hoc patet consideranti ipsas notificationes. Unde Anselmus definiens liberum arbitrium, non solum dicit, ipsum esse potentiam servandi rectitudinem, sed etiam addit propter se; propter enim dicit causam finalem et refertur hoc quod est se ad rectitudinem, ut sit sensus, propter se, id est propter ipsam rectitudinem15. — Sed hic attendendum est, quod alia est rectitudo, quae servatur, et alia, propter quam servanda est. Haec16 enim est creata, illa increata. Quia tamen una intelligitur in altera, hoc relativum se, cum refertur ad rectitudinem creatam, potest supponere pro rectitudine increata, in ipsa17 creata rectitudine intellecta, sicut prima veritas in omni veritate, et prima bonitas in omni bonitate.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium in Creatore quam in creaturis. Sed contra hoc est quod Anselmus de Libero Arbitrio18 dicit, quod eadem debet esse definitio liberi arbitrii in homine et in Deo, sicut eadem est ratio hominis et asini in animali. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quam ipse19 assignat, quod «liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem», quae non tantum convenit Creatori, immo etiam creaturae. Item, si anima secundum liberum arbitrium maxime Deo assimilatur20; videtur, quod liberum arbitrium in Deo et in homine sit conformiter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum generales conditiones et secundum speciales21. Si loquamur secundum generales conditiones, sic liberum arbitrium dicit facultatem liberam a coactione et ordinatam ad rectitudinis conservationem22. Et hoc modo reperitur in creatura et Deo conformiter et secundum eandem rationem, non conformitate et unitate univocationis, sed potius analogiae et consimilis habitudinis, quae inter Deum et creaturam esse potest, sicut in primo libro in pluribus locis23 ostensum fuit. — Alio modo est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum proprietates speciales; et sic liberum arbitrium est facultas, quae quidem non est substantia rei, sed quaedam habilitas. Sic etiam est potestas servandi rectitudinem,

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quod24 non est ipsa rectitudo; et ideo potest a rectitudine obliquari, quantum est de se, in creatura. In Deo autem liberum arbitrium est ipsa divina essentia, est etiam ipsa iustitia, ideo nec obliquari potest nec mutari25. Et quantum ad has conditiones speciales dicit Magister in littera, liberum arbitrium aliter in Deo, aliter in creaturis reperiri.

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English Translation

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, namely that the philosophers, in defining freedom of choice, said it was "free judgment about the will." For it seems that such a definition, assigned by the philosophers, is neither good nor assigned according to philosophical art. The Philosopher in the sixth book of the Topics1 reproves an "equimembered" definition, in which there are as many words on the side of the definition as on the side of the thing defined — as, for instance, if someone defining a black tunic should say that it is a dark cloak. But so it is in the matter at hand. If you should say that it is not a definition, but an interpretation of the name2; then there is a question: why is freedom of choice rather called this, than called "free judgment"? — Likewise it seems that it does not pertain to the philosophers to define freedom of choice, because, since the soul is the image of God according to freedom of choice, as Richard says3, and merits by means of freedom of choice, but the philosophers did not know that the soul is the image of God nor the origin of merit: it seems that they neither knew nor could define freedom of choice.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been said before4, the aforesaid notification is rather an interpretation of the name than a definition. But that faculty is more reckoned by this name, so as to be called freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium) than free judgment (liberum iudicium), for the reason that judgment (iudicium) implies an act of reason regulated according to the rules of truth or of the higher law: but choice (arbitrium) implies an act of reason regulated according to the command of the will. Hence he is called a judge (iudex) whose office is to settle a case according to the laws; but he is called an arbiter (arbiter) who has to settle a case at the proper nod of the will5. And since freedom of choice, as far as it is of itself, has to decide about things to be done according to the nod of the will more than according to the precept of law; hence it is that it is more properly named by the name of choice than by the name of judgment.

From this, therefore, and from what has been said, it is gathered that there was great wisdom in those who imposed the names. For not without cause is this faculty reckoned by a double name; nor without cause is the word pertaining to reason signified substantively, while the word pertaining to will is named adjectivally; nor without cause is the word pertaining to reason rather said to be choice than judgment. For freedom of choice is the faculty of two powers, so that reason stands in the character of what is material, and the deciding6 belongs to the nod and command of the will.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it is not for the philosophers to know freedom of choice; it must be said that freedom of choice can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is the principle of moral works, or insofar as it is the principle of gratuitous works. And in the first way it is of the consideration of the philosophers, especially of those who were occupied about the composing of morals, whose freedom of choice is a principle according to the rule and dictate of the natural law, which is impressed upon each one7. In the second way it is of the consideration of the theologians, because thus it has regard to divine grace, the knowledge of which grace is through the Catholic faith, without which all the works of men are vain, even if they should also seem praiseworthy; and in this consideration the skill8 of the philosophers failed. — And by this the objections are clear.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, namely that according to the aforesaid assignation freedom of choice seems to be only in those who can change their will. For if freedom of choice is not only in man according to the state of the wayfarer, but also according to the state of comprehension and beatitude, as was determined above in the seventh distinction9, the aforesaid assignation or definition does not seem to be fitting. Moreover, not only those who have a changeable will, but also those who have an unchangeable will, have "free judgment about the will": therefore the Master says falsely, who says that the aforesaid assignation befits only those who have a changeable will.

In connection with this it is asked — since diverse assignations of freedom of choice are set down by the Saints, and of one thing there is one definition — what is the difference of those assignations.

Augustine indeed defines, as was had in the preceding distinction10, thus: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. Anselm in the book on Freedom of Choice11 defines thus: "Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake." Bernard in the book on Freedom of Choice12 thus: "Freedom of choice is consent on account of the inamissible liberty of the will and the indeclinable judgment of reason." — It is asked, therefore, what is the difference of these accounts; for to dispute about each one is of little use and contributes little to the matter at hand.

I respond: It must be said that the word of the Master here proposed does not refer to that notification of the philosophers proposed in this distinction: "Freedom of choice is free judgment about the will," but refers to that which was set down in the preceding distinction: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. And with respect to that the Master says that freedom of choice befits no one13 except only according to the state of mutability.

Hence note that freedom of choice can be considered in three ways: either in its generality, insofar as it befits the creature and the Creator; and thus it is defined by Anselm, when it is said: Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude, etc. Or according to the being which it has in the creature, not regarding the state; and thus is that definition of Bernard: Freedom of choice is consent, etc. Or with respect to the state of the wayfarer; and thus is that of Augustine: Freedom of choice is the faculty, etc.

Nevertheless the aforesaid notifications can also be distinguished from one another in another way. For freedom of choice has a comparison to the act, has to be compared to the act and14 the object, has thirdly to be compared to the act and the object and the ultimate end. With respect to the first consideration it is defined by Bernard; with respect to the second, by Augustine; with respect to the third, by Anselm; and this is clear to one considering the notifications themselves. Hence Anselm, defining freedom of choice, not only says that it is the power of preserving rectitude, but also adds for its own sake; for for the sake of states the final cause, and this word self (se) is referred to rectitude, so that the sense is, for its own sake, that is, for the sake of rectitude itself15. — But here it must be attended to that the rectitude which is preserved is one thing, and that for the sake of which it is to be preserved is another. For the former16 is created, the latter uncreated. Yet because the one is understood in the other, this relative self (se), when it is referred to created rectitude, can stand for uncreated rectitude, understood within the created rectitude itself17, just as the first truth in every truth, and the first goodness in every goodness.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: But freedom of choice is taken otherwise in the Creator than in creatures. But against this is what Anselm on Freedom of Choice18 says, namely that the definition of freedom of choice ought to be the same in man and in God, just as the account of man and of an ass is the same in "animal." Likewise, this seems to be so by the reason which he himself19 assigns, namely that "freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude," which not only befits the Creator, but also the creature. Likewise, if the soul is most assimilated20 to God according to freedom of choice; it seems that freedom of choice in God and in man is in conformity.

I respond: It must be said that one may speak of freedom of choice according to general conditions and according to special21 ones. If we speak according to general conditions, thus freedom of choice states a faculty free from coercion and ordered to the preservation of rectitude22. And in this way it is found in the creature and in God in conformity and according to the same account — not by conformity and unity of univocation, but rather of analogy and of a similar relation, which can exist between God and the creature, as was shown in the first book in many places23. — In another way one may speak of freedom of choice according to special properties; and thus freedom of choice is a faculty which indeed is not the substance of the thing, but a certain aptitude. Thus also it is the power of preserving rectitude,

which24 is not rectitude itself; and therefore it can deviate from rectitude, as far as it is of itself, in the creature. But in God freedom of choice is the divine essence itself, is also justice itself, and therefore it can neither deviate nor be changed25. And with respect to these special conditions the Master says in the text that freedom of choice is found otherwise in God, otherwise in creatures.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 5. (c. 11.): «Amplius [videndum est], si, cum sit compositum, quod definitur, aequimembris [aequicola, in Graeco idiomate ἰσόκωλος] oratio assignetur definitio. Aequimembris autem dicitur oratio esse, quando quot fuerint composita, tot et in oratione nomina et verba fuerint… sic enim et in simplicibus qui nomen commutat non definiturus est, ut pro tunica vestem. Amplius autem maius peccatum, si et per ignotiora nomina commutationem fecerit, ut pro homine albo terrigenam candentem; neque enim definivit, cum minus sit clarum quod sic dicitur». Averroes in suo Comment. in hunc loc. haec exempla affert: «ut qui definiret in lingua Arabica leonem furentem, quod sit leo pravus, sive Latine tunicam nigram, quod sit colobium atrum [voce κολόβιον Graeci significabant, ut in veteribus lexicis e. g. Suidas, Hesychius (Etymologica), Photius docent, tunicam brevem sine manicis]. — Pro philosophicam Vat. et ed. 1 physicam. Paulo inferius Vat. et nonnulli codd. vocem aequicolam transformarunt in aequivocam.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 5 (c. 11): "Further [it must be considered], whether, when that which is defined is a compound, an equimembered phrase is assigned as the definition. A phrase is called equimembered when there are as many nouns and verbs in the phrase as there were components… for so also in simple cases one who exchanges the name will not be defining, as 'garment' for 'tunic.' And it is a still greater fault if he should make the exchange by means of more unfamiliar names, as 'a glowing earthborn one' for 'a white man'; for he has not defined, since what is so stated is less clear." Averroes in his Commentary on this passage adduces these examples: "as one who should define, in the Arabic tongue, a raging lion as a 'savage lion,' or in Latin a black tunic as a 'dark cloak'" [by the word κολόβιον the Greeks signified, as the old lexicographers — e.g. Suidas, Hesychius (Etymologica), Photius — teach, a short sleeveless tunic]. — For philosophicam the Vatican edition and ed. 1 read physicam. A little below, the Vatican edition and several codices transformed the word aequicolam into aequivocam.
  2. Multi codd., ut F H I K T W X Y Z etc., cum ed. 1 rationis, sed non recte, ut patet ex ipsa solutione. Fortasse primitus legebatur rationis nominis interpretatio, ut huius propos. sententia haec esset: hoc non est definitio, sed indicatur tantummodo, quare liberum arbitrium vocetur liberum arbitrium.
    Many codices, such as F H I K T W X Y Z etc., with ed. 1 read rationis ("of reason"), but not rightly, as is clear from the solution itself. Perhaps it was originally read as rationis nominis interpretatio ("an interpretation of the name of reason"), so that the sense of this proposition would be this: this is not a definition, but it is only indicated why freedom of choice is called freedom of choice.
  3. Richard. a S. Vict., De Statu hominis interioris, tr. 1. c. 3: Quid dignius inveniri potest [in homine] quam illud, in quo ad imaginem Dei creatus est? Habet sane libertas arbitrii imaginem non solum aeternitatis, sed et divinae maiestatis.
    Richard of St. Victor, On the State of the Interior Man, tr. 1, c. 3: "What can be found more worthy [in man] than that in which he was created to the image of God? The liberty of choice indeed has the image not only of eternity, but also of the divine majesty."
  4. Paulo superius in fine primae obiectionis. Cfr. etiam supra q. 3. et 6. in corp. — Mox pro potius est Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 potius dicitur.
    A little above, at the end of the first objection. Cf. also above, q. 3 and 6, in the body. — Presently, for potius est ("is rather"), the Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 read potius dicitur ("is rather said").
  5. Isidor., I. de Differentiis, sub lit. A. n. 33: Inter arbitrum et iudicem [differentia est]; arbiter ex voluntate fit, iudex ex lege. Cfr. XVIII. Etymol. c. 15. n. 6. — Paulo inferius pro decernere cod. A et ed. 1 substituunt determinare, et deinde pro proprie codd. F Y exhibent et prius, cod. aa et principatius, codd. T V W bb ee cum ed. 2 proprius.
    Isidore, on Differences I, under letter A, n. 33: "[There is a difference] between an arbiter and a judge; an arbiter is made from will, a judge from law." Cf. Etymologies XVIII, c. 15, n. 6. — A little below, for decernere ("to decide") cod. A and ed. 1 substitute determinare, and then for proprie ("properly") codd. F Y exhibit et prius, cod. aa et principatius, codd. T V W bb ee with ed. 2 proprius.
  6. Vat. cum aliquibus codd. et edd. 2, 3 subiungit se. — Cfr. supra q. 6. in corp.
    The Vatican edition with some codices and edd. 2, 3 subjoins se ("itself"). — Cf. above, q. 6, in the body.
  7. Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et ad 5.
    Cf. below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, in the body and to objection 5.
  8. Codd. F I T aa cc etc. nec non ed. 1 deficit. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 3. § 4. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.
    Codd. F I T aa cc etc., and also ed. 1, read deficit (present tense, "fails"). — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 3, § 4 ff.; Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. on the text 1.
  9. Part. I. a. 2. q. 1. et 3. — Libertatis definitio, de qua hic sermo est, invenitur in dub. 1., scilicet: liberum de voluntate iudicium.
    [Above, d. 7] Part I, a. 2, q. 1 and 3. — The definition of liberty here spoken of is found in doubt 1, namely: "free judgment about the will."
  10. Cap. 3. lit. Magistri. Cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 6. — Quod unius rei unica sit definitio, docet Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). — Pro qua bonum codd. F X T V etc. cum edd. 1, 2 qua malum.
    [Augustine's definition:] Chapter 3 of the text of the Master. Cf. above, p. 592, note 6. — That of one thing there is one definition, Aristotle teaches, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4). — For qua bonum ("by which the good") codd. F X T V etc. with edd. 1, 2 read qua malum ("by which evil").
  11. Cap. 1: Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero arbitrio Dei et Angelorum bonorum, definitio tamen huius libertatis in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse; licet enim animal differat ab animali sive substantialiter sive accidentaliter, definitio tamen secundum nomen animalis omnibus animalibus est eadem.
    Anselm, On Freedom of Choice, c. 1: "Although the freedom of choice of men differs from the freedom of choice of God and of the good Angels, nevertheless the definition of this liberty in both, according to this name, ought to be the same; for although an animal differs from an animal whether substantially or accidentally, nevertheless the definition according to the name 'animal' is the same for all animals."
  12. Cap. 2. n. 4. Vide supra pag. 598, nota 1.
    Bernard, On Freedom of Choice, c. 2, n. 4. See above, p. 598, note 1.
  13. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 sic: quod non contingit liberum arbitrium aliter. Paulo superius eaedem edd. in hac definitione in hac definitione pro in hac distinctione. Paulo inferius pro sui generalitate cod. aa sua generalitate.
    The Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 read thus: quod non contingit liberum arbitrium aliter ("that freedom of choice does not occur otherwise"). A little above the same editions read, in this definition, in hac definitione for in hac distinctione. A little below, for sui generalitate cod. aa reads sua generalitate.
  14. Vat. omittit actum et, ac deinde post ad primam cum edd. 2, 3, 4 interserit definitionem sive.
    The Vatican edition omits actum et ("act and"), and then after ad primam ("to the first") inserts, with edd. 2, 3, 4, definitionem sive ("the definition, or").
  15. In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 desunt verba sequentia ut sit sensus… rectitudinem. Immediate post haec verba non pauci codd., inter quos K M P T W, cum ed. 2 Sed hoc pro Sed hic.
    In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 the following words are wanting: ut sit sensus… rectitudinem ("so that the sense is… rectitude"). Immediately after these words not a few codices, among which K M P T W, with ed. 2 read Sed hoc for Sed hic.
  16. Scilicet rectitudo, quae servatur.
    That is, the rectitude which is preserved.
  17. Cod. cc et ed. 1 ut in ipsa. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Cod. cc and ed. 1 read ut in ipsa ("as in the very"). — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text.
  18. Anselm., de Lib. Arb. c. 1: Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero arbitrio Dei et Angelorum bonorum, definitio tamen huius libertatis in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse; licet enim animal differat ab animali sive substantialiter sive accidentaliter, definitio tamen secundum nomen animalis omnibus animalibus est eadem.
    Anselm, On Freedom of Choice, c. 1: "Although the freedom of choice of men differs from the freedom of choice of God and of the good Angels, nevertheless the definition of this liberty in both, according to this name, ought to be the same; for although an animal differs from an animal whether substantially or accidentally, nevertheless the definition according to the name 'animal' is the same for all animals."
  19. Ibid. c. 3: Ergo quoniam omnis libertas est potestas, illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem etc.
    Ibid., c. 3: "Therefore, since all liberty is a power, that liberty of choice is the power of preserving rectitude," etc.
  20. Cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.
    Cf. above, p. 115, note 6.
  21. In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 desiderantur verba et secundum speciales et etiam sequentia Si loquamur secundum generales conditiones. Deinde eaedem edd. pro conservationem habent observationem, et codd. B D E K legunt ordinatam ad rectitudinem et conservationem.
    In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 the words and according to special ones are wanting, and also the following words If we speak according to general conditions. Then the same editions have observationem for conservationem ("observance" for "preservation"), and codd. B D E K read ordered to rectitude and preservation.
  22. Vide infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. et 3.
    See below, Part II of this distinction, q. 1 and 3.
  23. Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 3, d. 23. a. 2. q. 2, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.
    [First book references:] d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, to 1; d. 3, p. I, q. 2, to 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 2; d. 29, a. 1, q. 2.
  24. Codd. A K quae; sensus utriusque lectionis est idem. In principio huius propos. pro Sic etiam ed. 1 sicut etiam.
    Codd. A K read quae ("which," feminine); the sense of either reading is the same. At the beginning of this proposition, for Sic etiam ("Thus also") ed. 1 reads sicut etiam ("just as also").
  25. Cfr. infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. et 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4. seq.; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 3. seq. et tr. 15. q. 94. m. 2. seq.; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.
    Cf. below, Part II of this distinction, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 3 and 4; Bl. Albert, here a. 4 ff.; Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 3 ff. and tr. 15, q. 94, m. 2 ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. on the text 2.
← Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 6Dist. 25, Part 2, Dubia→