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Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum primum principium produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.

Secundo, supposito quod omnia sint ab uno principio, quaeritur, utrum illud produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.

1. Et quod mediante alio, videtur congruum. De liberalitate agentis est, ut non tantum communicet1 alii actum, sed etiam potentiam multiplicandi et diffundendi; sed Deus est agens liberalissimum: ergo videtur, quod primae creaturae, quam fecit, dederit potentiam faciendi aliam, et illa dat alii, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimam. Si dicas, quod creatura non est capax tantae potentiae; contra: maius est facere aliquid, cum2 est resistentia, quam ubi nulla; sed creatura in faciendo ex contrario habet resistentiam, in faciendo ex nihilo, nullam: ergo si capax est primae potentiae, et secundae.

2. Item, de nobilitate agentis est facere nobiliora opera per se ipsum, et minus nobilia per ministrum3, ut patet — decet enim regem iudicare, sed non decet eum coquinam facere — ergo si primus rex est nobilissimus et producit res, secundum quod decet eius nobilitatem, videtur, quod ipse debuerit unum producere, et per illud minus nobilia, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimum. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile de Deo et aliquo agente creato, quia Deus non perficitur ab aliquo opere; obiicitur, quod opus regiminis, propagationis et gubernationis divinum est, et tamen Deus regit et gubernat unam creaturam per aliam; et hoc est ad ostensionem suae nobilitatis: quare non similiter creat4?

3. Item, ostenditur, quod necessarium sit ita esse, sic: omnis effectus, qui exit ab aliqua causa universali, exit ab ea vel per aliam causam propriam, vel per se ipsam appropriatam; sed Deus est causa universalissima, non valens arctari nec appropriari, cum nulla possit ei fieri additio: ergo cum producit multa, producit per aliam causam propriam.

4. Item, ego video, quod virtus unitatis est ad numeros infinitos; tamen unitas nullum numerum producit, quin producatur pariter a numero, qui immediate ipsam sequitur, scilicet dualitate — unde nullo modo unitas faceret ternarium numerum nisi per dualitatem, et sic in aliis procedendo — ergo videtur similiter, quod non procedit a Deo multitudo rerum, cum ipse sit summe unus, nisi per ipsas res5.

Sed contra:

1. Quod illud non sit congruum, videtur. Quantum homo recipit ab alio, in tantum ei tenetur; sed ad solum Deum tenetur creatura ex toto — solum enim Deum debet diligere homo ex toto corde6, et nihil aliud aequaliter — ergo solus Deus dat totum. Sed creatio est actio, in qua totum producitur: ergo etc.

2. Item, maius est rem de non-esse ad esse producere quam conservare et perficere: ergo si Deus mediante alio produceret res, videtur, quod mediante alio conservaret et perficeret: ergo res nullo modo Deo indigerent, ergo nec ad Deum tenderent. Sed omnia sunt bona, quia tendunt ad ipsum, et ordinata7: ergo nihil esset bonum nec ordinatum; in quo enim principaliter est ratio finis, in eodem est ratio boni.

3. Item, quod sit impossibile, videtur. Impossibile est, creaturam agere se tota, cum nulla sit omnino simplex8: ergo impossibile est, quod agat totum, ergo solum partem.

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4. Item, impossibile est, creaturam agere per potentiam infinitam; sed inter omnino nihil et aliquid est distantia infinita: ergo non potest reduci nisi ab agente virtutis infinitae; tale autem est solus Deus: ergo9 etc.

Conclusio.

Deus omnia immediate produxit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ponere, quod Deus produxerit res per aliud agens, est contra veritatem et contra fidem, sed solum per Filium suum: Dixit enim, et facta sunt10; nec solum contra fidem, verum etiam contra rationem.

Et ponenti res omnes productas ex nihilo, omnino est contra rationem, ita ut non possit capi, quomodo agens potentiae finitae aliquid ex nihilo producat. Nec credo, aliquem philosophorum hoc posuisse.

Sed supposito potentiali sive materiali principio, plures fuerunt philosophi11 qui posuerunt ordinem in producendo gradatim descendendo hoc modo: Deus, cum sit omnino simplex, cuius actus est intelligere, non produxit nisi intelligentiam primam et unicam. Illa vero propter distare a primo12 intellexit se et primum, et ita aliquo modo fuit composita, et ita produxit orbem suum et intelligentiam secundi orbis; et sic deinceps usque ad orbem lunae et intelligentiam decimam, quae irradiat super animas rationales; et sicut ordo est in producendo, ita in irradiando.

— Sed iste error falsum habet fundamentum, videlicet quod materiale principium non sit productum, sicut supra probatum est13. Item, falsam habet rationem. Dicit enim, quod, quia simplicissimus est Deus, non producit nisi unum; sed hoc magis est ad oppositum, quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius14, et quanto potentius, tanto in plura potest: ergo si Deus simplicissimus, hoc ipso potest in omnia sine medio.

Rursus, haec ratio repugnat eis. Si enim propter simplicitatem non producit nisi unum, cum intelligentia secunda sit simplicior inter omnes, unde venit15 in orbe eius maior varietas stellarum, quam in aliquo orbium inferiorum? Quia videtur per rationem suam, quod uniformes sint; et ita ratio positionis contradicit positioni.

Propter hoc dicendum, sicut dicit fides nostra, quod omnia in prima conditione immediate a Deo sunt producta. Quia enim creatio est totius substantiae secundum totum, ideo decuit esse solius Dei, nec potuit esse alterius sive per alterum, ut probant rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

Ad argumenta.

Ad 1, 2. Quod obiicitur de liberalitate et nobilitate, dicendum, quod tam liberalitas quam nobilitas supponit ordinem et possibilitatem in actu16. In actu autem creationis non attenditur ordo; aequalis enim virtutis et dignitatis est producere asinum ex nihilo et Angelum, quia utrumque est infinitae potentiae. Non est etiam in hoc actu possibilitas creaturae, ut visum est17, propter infinitatem. Non sic est de actu regiminis et propagationis; ideo patet, quod non est simile.

Quod obiicitur, quod creatura est capax, quia non habet resistens; dicendum, quod in contrariis resistentia confert ad operationem. Praeterea, esto quod impediat, nihilominus habet iuvans, scilicet fundamentum et appetitum materiae; sed in creatione nullum habet iuvamentum; ideo difficilius: ideo non est locus a minori18, ut patet.

Ad 3. Quod obiicitur, quod causa universalis non potest in effectus proprios; dicendum, quod causa universalis, quae non est actus purus, indiget actualitate causae particularis; sed illa quae omnino est actus, simul habet in se rationem universalis causae et particularis, quia simul habet primitatem et actualitatem: ideo potest in multa, et secundum totum potest in illa19.

Ad 4. Quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unitas non potest in numeros posteriores sine prioribus; dicendum, quod nec in puncto est omnino potentia activa et sufficiens ad lineam, nec in unitate ad numerum. Nam ipsa unitas est potentia omnis numeri20, non potentia sufficiens per se, et ideo non omnino actualis, verum etiam aliquo modo passiva, quoniam est pars numeri.

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Deus autem in omnia potest potentia omnino activa, et ideo sine omni medio potest creare omnia.

Scholion

I. Ex libris philosophorum Arabum multi errores irrepserunt etiam in scholas catholicas medii aevi, inter quos condemnatus fuit a Stephano Tempier, Parisiensi Episcopo, etiam hic: «Quod primum principium non potest immediate producere generabilia, quia sunt effectus novi. Effectus autem novi exigunt causam immediatam, quae potest aliter se habere» (D'Argentré, Collect. iudicior. t. I, pag. 190, cap. VI de Deo, n. 27.) et (ibid. n. 36.): «Quod effectus immediatus a primo debet esse unus tantum et simillimus primo» (cfr. etiam n. 30.).

Cum saepius articulorum censuratorum ab Episcopis Parisiensibus, cum consilio theologorum, mentionem fecerimus et facturi simus, non inutile erit, pauca de eis hic annotare. Prima istarum censurarum facta est a Gulielmo, Episcopo Parisiensi, a. 1240 in octava Epiphaniae, cum consilio doctorum, inter quos eminebat Alexander Hal. Haec censura reprobat 10 articulos, infra d. 23 in fine a S. Bonaventura integre recensitos; ipsa autem ab omnibus est recepta. Secundam censuram promulgavit Stephanus Tempier a. 1270, die Mercurii post festum S. Nicolai hiemalis, contra 13 articulos communiter reprobatos. Tertia ab eodem facta est post mortem SS. Thomae et Bonaventurae, a. 1276, dominica Laetare; et cum modo nominatis 13 reprobavit articulos 219. Hi articuli cum litteris Episcopi Stephani impressi sunt in citato libro Collectio iudicior. pag. 175-184. — Adiectis pluribus aliis in Anglia condemnatis, postea facta est collectio harum censurarum, secundum materiam in 22 capitula distributa. Haec autem collectio saepissime impressa est, praesertim in plurimis editionibus libri Sententiarum et in antiquis editionibus Commentatorum Lombardi. Magis correcti et cum multis observationibus editi sunt iterum in Collectio iudicior. pag. 184-225. — Sed imprimis observandum est, secundam Stephani censuram, licet plerumque manifestos errores philosophorum praesertim Arabum reprobet, tamen in nonnullis thesibus condemnandis limites veritatis et moderationis excessisse.

Nonnullae enim positiones S. Thomae, v. g. de Angelis, de unitate formae substantialis, vel directe vel indirecte impetuntur, ut videri potest in libro Collectio iudiciorum. Unde a non paucis viris doctis illius aetatis contra has censuras instantiae factae sunt, et a. 1324 vel 1325 (iuxta computationem anni civilis) ab altero Stephano Episc. Paris. omnes censurae revocatae sunt, «in quantum doctrinam B. Thomae praedicti, doctoris eximii, tangere possunt». — Hinc patet, ex istis censuris nullum praeiudicium fieri posse auctoritati doctrinae Angelici; nec nos, quando interdum veritatis historicae causa praedictos articulos citamus, ullam eis contra doctrinam S. Thomae auctoritatem tribuimus. Hoc semel dictum sufficiat.

II. Constat apud omnes doctores, soli Deo propriam esse potentiam creativam, et de facto ipsum solum omnia immediate creasse. Sed de quaestione, utrum possibile sit, quod Deus alicui creaturae communicet potentiam vel actum creandi, non eodem modo omnes sentiebant. Durandus (hic q. 4.) putat, probari non posse, impossibile esse, quod Deus suae creaturae communicet potentiam et actum creandi, non quidem secundum totum suum ambitum, sed ad aliquem specialem effectum. Alii ut Magister (IV. Sent. d. 5. c. 3.) docent, repugnare quidem, creaturam fieri causam creandi principalem, non vero, fieri causam instrumentalem. Alii recentiores iterum potentiam instrumentalem distinguunt in naturalem et obedientialem, de qua ultima opinantur, eam a Deo communicari posse. Quidquid sit de hac ultima opinione, communior sententia, cui suffragantur Alex. Hal., S. Thom., S. Bonav., Scot. aliique, simpliciter negat, hoc esse possibile. Cfr. S. Bonav., hic fundam. 3, 4, et d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in fine; III. Sent. d. 11. dub. 1, d. 40. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6; IV. Sent d. 1. p. I. q. 4. in fine; et Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4; de Scoto cfr. Montefortino Sum. t. II. q. 65. a. 5.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 9. m. 7. 8. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1; et de Rerum princip. q. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 6; Quodl. 4. q. 37. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the first principle produced all things by itself, or by means of another.

Second, granted that all things are from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things by itself, or by means of another.

1. That it should be by means of another seems fitting. It belongs to the liberality of an agent not only to communicate1 an act to another, but also the power of multiplying and spreading; but God is the most liberal of agents: therefore it seems that to the first creature he made he gave the power of making another, and that one gives it to another, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that the creature is not capable of so great a power, the contrary: it is greater to make something where2 there is resistance than where there is none; but the creature in making out of a contrary has resistance, in making out of nothing has none: therefore if it is capable of the first power, it is also capable of the second.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of an agent to do the nobler works by itself and the less noble through a servant3, as is plain — for it befits a king to judge, but it does not befit him to do the cooking — therefore if the first king is the most noble and produces things in a manner befitting his nobility, it seems that he himself ought to produce one [creature], and through that [produce] the less noble ones, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that it is not the same with God as with some created agent, because God is not perfected by any work, the objection is that the work of governing, propagating, and ruling is divine, and yet God rules and governs one creature through another; and this is to display his nobility: why does he not similarly create4?

3. Likewise, it is shown that it is necessarily so, thus: every effect which proceeds from a universal cause proceeds from it either through another proper cause or through itself as appropriated; but God is the most universal cause, who cannot be narrowed or appropriated, since no addition can be made to him: therefore when he produces many things, he produces through another proper cause.

4. Likewise, I see that the power of unity reaches to infinite numbers; yet unity produces no number except that it be produced equally by the number which immediately follows it, namely duality — whence unity in no way would make the number three except through duality, and so proceeding in the rest — therefore similarly it seems that the multitude of things does not proceed from God, since he is supremely one, except through the things themselves5.

On the contrary:

1. That this should not be fitting, it seems. As much as a man receives from another, so much is he bound to him; but the creature is bound wholly to God alone — for man ought to love God alone with his whole heart6, and nothing else equally — therefore God alone gives the whole. But creation is an action in which the whole is produced: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is greater to produce a thing from non-being into being than to preserve and perfect it: therefore if God produced things by means of another, it seems that he would also preserve and perfect them by means of another: therefore things would in no way need God, therefore would not tend toward God. But all things are good because they tend toward him and are ordered7: therefore nothing would be good or ordered; for in that in which the account of end principally lies, in the same lies the account of good.

3. Likewise, that it is impossible, it seems. It is impossible for a creature to act with its whole self, since none is wholly simple8: therefore it is impossible that it act as a whole, therefore only as to a part.

4. Likewise, it is impossible for a creature to act through an infinite power; but between utter nothing and something there is an infinite distance: therefore it cannot be brought about except by an agent of infinite power; and such is God alone: therefore9 etc.

Conclusion.

God produced all things immediately.

I respond: It must be said that to posit that God produced things through another agent is against the truth and against the faith — except through his Son: For he spoke, and they were made10; nor only against faith but also against reason.

And for one who posits that all things have been produced from nothing, it is altogether against reason — so much so that it cannot be conceived how an agent of finite power could produce anything from nothing. Nor do I believe any philosopher posited this.

But on the supposition of a potential or material principle, there were several philosophers11 who posited an order of production descending step by step in this way: God, since he is altogether simple, whose act is to understand, produced only one and unique first intelligence. That intelligence, on account of standing apart from the First12, understood itself and the First, and thus was in some way composite, and so produced its own sphere and the intelligence of the second sphere; and so on down to the sphere of the moon and the tenth intelligence, which irradiates upon rational souls; and as the order is in producing, so it is in irradiating.

— But this error has a false foundation, namely that the material principle is not produced, as has been proved above13. Likewise, it has a false reasoning. For it says that, because God is most simple, he produces only one; but this rather tells against [their position], since the simpler something is, the more powerful14 it is, and the more powerful, the more it can do: therefore if God is most simple, by that very fact he can do everything without an intermediary.

Again, this reasoning is repugnant to them. For if on account of simplicity he produces only one, since the second intelligence is the simplest among them all, whence comes15 in its sphere a greater variety of stars than in any of the lower spheres? For by their own reasoning it seems that they should be uniform; and so the reasoning of the position contradicts the position itself.

On account of this it must be said, as our faith says, that all things in the first foundation were produced immediately by God. For since creation is of the whole substance as to its whole, it was therefore fitting that it belong to God alone, nor could it belong to another or be through another — as the reasons brought forward on this side prove.

To the arguments.

To 1, 2. What is objected concerning liberality and nobility, it must be said that both liberality and nobility presuppose order and possibility in act16. But in the act of creation no order is regarded; for it is of equal power and dignity to produce an ass from nothing and an Angel, since either is [the work] of infinite power. Nor is there in this act any possibility on the part of the creature, as has been seen17, because of the infinity. It is not so with the act of governing and propagating; therefore it is plain that the cases are not alike.

What is objected, that the creature is capable [of creating], because it has no resistance; it must be said that in contrary things resistance contributes to operation. Besides, granted that it impedes, nonetheless one has helps, namely the foundation and the appetite of matter; but in creation there is no help; therefore it is more difficult: therefore there is no argument from the lesser18, as is plain.

To 3. What is objected, that a universal cause cannot reach to its proper effects; it must be said that a universal cause which is not pure act needs the actuality of a particular cause; but that which is altogether act has in itself at once the account of universal cause and particular cause, because it has at once priority and actuality: therefore it can reach to many things, and reach to them as to the whole19.

To 4. What is finally objected, that unity cannot reach to later numbers without the prior ones; it must be said that neither in the point is there an altogether active and sufficient power for the line, nor in unity for the number. For unity itself is the power of every number20, not a power sufficient by itself, and therefore not altogether actual but in some way also passive, since it is part of the number.

But God reaches to all things by an altogether active power, and therefore can create all things without any intermediary.

Scholion

I. From the books of the Arab philosophers many errors crept also into the catholic schools of the Middle Ages, among which the following was condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in this very place: «That the first principle cannot immediately produce things that come to be, because they are new effects. But new effects require an immediate cause which can be otherwise» (D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum t. I, p. 190, ch. VI On God, n. 27); and (ibid. n. 36): «That an effect immediate from the First must be only one and most like the First» (cf. also n. 30).

Since we have often, and shall often, make mention of the articles censured by the Bishops of Paris with the counsel of the theologians, it will not be useless to note a few things about them here. The first of these censures was made by William, Bishop of Paris, in 1240 on the octave of Epiphany, with the counsel of doctors among whom Alexander of Hales was eminent. This censure rejects 10 articles, listed in full by St Bonaventure below at the end of d. 23; and it was received by all. The second censure was promulgated by Stephen Tempier in 1270, on the Wednesday after the feast of St Nicholas of winter, against 13 commonly rejected articles. The third was made by the same after the death of SS. Thomas and Bonaventure, in 1276, on Laetare Sunday; and along with the 13 already named, it rejected 219 articles. These articles together with Bishop Stephen's letters were printed in the cited book, Collectio iudiciorum pp. 175-184. — With many others condemned in England being added, a collection of these censures was afterward made, divided by subject matter into 22 chapters. This collection was very often printed, especially in many editions of the Sentences and in the old editions of the Commentators on Lombard. More correctly and with many observations it was again edited in the Collectio iudiciorum pp. 184-225. — But it must above all be noted that the second censure of Stephen, although for the most part it rejects manifest errors of the philosophers, especially the Arabs, nevertheless in some of its condemned theses exceeded the limits of truth and moderation.

For several positions of St Thomas — for example on the Angels, on the unity of the substantial form — are directly or indirectly attacked, as can be seen in the Collectio iudiciorum. Hence not a few learned men of that age lodged protests against these censures, and in 1324 or 1325 (according to the civil-year reckoning) all the censures were revoked by another Stephen, Bishop of Paris, «inasmuch as they can touch the doctrine of the said Blessed Thomas, that pre-eminent doctor». — Hence it is plain that no prejudice against the authority of the Angelic Doctor's teaching can come from those censures; nor do we, when we cite the said articles now and then for the sake of historical truth, attribute to them any authority against the doctrine of St Thomas. Let this once said suffice.

II. It is agreed among all the doctors that creative power belongs to God alone and that in fact he alone created all things immediately. But on the question whether it is possible that God should communicate the power or the act of creating to some creature, not all held the same view. Durandus (here q. 4) thinks that it cannot be proved impossible that God should communicate to his creature the power and act of creating — not indeed in its whole scope, but for some special effect. Others, like the Master (IV Sent. d. 5, c. 3), teach that it is repugnant indeed that a creature become a principal cause of creating, but not that it become an instrumental cause. Others among the more recent again distinguish the instrumental power into natural and obediential, and they hold that this last can be communicated by God. Whatever may be the case with this last opinion, the more common opinion, supported by Alexander of Hales, St Thomas, St Bonaventure, Scotus, and others, simply denies that this is possible. Cf. St Bonaventure, here at fundam. 3, 4, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 in fine; III Sent. d. 11, dub. 1; d. 40, dub. 3; I Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6; IV Sent. d. 1, p. I, q. 4 in fine; and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 4; for Scotus cf. Montefortino Summa t. II, q. 65, a. 5.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 9, m. 7, 8. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1; and On the Principles of Things q. 6. — St Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Summa I, q. 45, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 5. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 28, q. 6; Quodl. 4, q. 37. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. addit se.
    The Vatican ms. adds se ("itself").
  2. Nonnulli codd. ut P V W aa nihil. Paulo inferius Vat. verbis ex contrario praemittit aliquid.
    Some codices (P, V, W, aa) read nihil ("nothing"). A little below the Vatican ms. before the words ex contrario prefaces aliquid ("something").
  3. Sub simili respectu Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 3. ait: Quasi id ordo divinae legis sanxerit, ut per superiora ista quae inferiora sunt, ad divinum numen adducantur.
    With a similar regard Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 4, § 3, says: As if the order of divine law had so sanctioned, that through these higher things those which are lower might be led to the divine majesty.
  4. Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 creatur.
    Codices aa, cc and ed. 1 read creatur ("is he created" / passive).
  5. Processus creaturarum a primo comparatur processui numeri ab unitate secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 6: Siquidem in unitate omnis numerus uniformiter praeexstitit, habetque unitas in se ipsa singulariter omnem numerum, et omnis numerus in unum copulatus est et in unitate est, et quanto longius ab unitate procedit, tanto magis dividitur et multiplicatur. — Aliquanto superius post ternarium plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt numerum, pro quo aliqui ut C L R T ponunt et novum, cod. bb et nonum, cui lectioni assentit Vat. legens et novum, procedendo; cod. Y exhibet lectionem nostram.
    The procession of creatures from the First is compared to the procession of number from unity, according to Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 5, § 6: Since in unity every number pre-exists uniformly, and unity has in itself singularly every number, and every number is coupled into one and is in unity, and the further it proceeds from unity, the more it is divided and multiplied. — A little above, after ternarium several codices with ed. 1 omit numerum, for which some (C, L, R, T) put et novum, codex bb et nonum, with which reading the Vatican ms. agrees, reading et novum, procedendo; codex Y exhibits our reading.
  6. Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. Cfr. August., de Quant. animae, c. 34. n. 78: Deus igitur solus ei colendus est, qui solus eius est auctor. — Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 4 Deus creat pro Deus dat, quod maior pars codd. cum edd. 1, 2 exhibet.
    Deuteronomy 6:5; Matthew 22:37. Cf. Augustine, On the Greatness of the Soul c. 34, n. 78: God alone, therefore, is to be worshipped by him whose author God alone is. — Then not a few codices with ed. 4 read Deus creat ("God creates") for Deus dat ("God gives"), which the greater part of codices with eds. 1, 2 exhibits.
  7. Cfr. August., de Natura boni, c. 1. seqq., et Boeth., de Hebdomad. seu Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint. — De ultima prop. argumenti cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2. seqq. et I. Magn. Moral. c. 2. seq., ubi ostendit, in ultimo fine summum consistere bonum. — Vat. ut ordinata pro et ordinata. Paulo inferius codd. Z cc cum ed. 1 principalis pro principaliter.
    Cf. Augustine, On the Nature of the Good c. 1ff., and Boethius, De Hebdomadibus or How Substances are Good in That They Are. — On the last proposition of the argument cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 2ff., and Magna Moralia I, c. 2f., where he shows that in the ultimate end the highest good consists. — The Vatican ms. reads ut ordinata for et ordinata. A little below codices Z, cc with ed. 1 read principalis for principaliter.
  8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. q. 2. et hic a. 1. q. 1. fund. 3.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. I, q. 2, and here at a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3.
  9. Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1. ad 4, ubi obiectio contra hoc argumentum solvitur.
    See I Sent. d. 43, q. 1, ad 4, where an objection against this argument is resolved.
  10. Psalm. 148, 5: Ipse dixit, et facta sunt. — Mox Vat. Ponere enim pro Et ponenti.
    Psalm 148:5: He spoke, and they were made. — Then the Vatican ms. reads Ponere enim ("For to posit") for Et ponenti ("And for one positing").
  11. Scil. Neoplatonici, inter quos eminent Plotinus (205-270 p. Chr.) et Proclus (411-485), ex cuius libro στοιχείωσις θεολογική etiam compositus est liber de Causis, in quo prop. 3, 9 et 16 eadem insinuatur opinio; nec non Arabes, quorum praecipui sunt: Alfarabi († 950), cuius opinionem invenies in eius operibus de Intellectu et intellecto (invenitur in ed. Venet. operum Avicennae, 1508) et in eiusdem Fontibus quaestionum, c. 6. seqq. (habetur in opere: Documenta philosophiae Arabum, auct. Schmoelders, Bonnae 1833); Avicenna, qui de hac re tractat in sua Metaph. IX. c. 4; Avicebron, qui de hac re scripsit in suo libro de Forma et materia sive de Fonte vitae, de quo cfr. B. Albert., de Caus. et processu universitatis I. tract. 1. c. 0; Averroes, qui Avicennae et suam opinionem breviter proponit in suo Epitome in libros Metaph. tract. 4.
    Namely the Neoplatonists, among whom Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) and Proclus (411-485) are eminent — from whose book Elements of Theology (στοιχείωσις θεολογική) the Book of Causes was also composed, in which props. 3, 9, and 16 suggest the same opinion; likewise the Arabs, whose principal figures are: Alfarabi († 950), whose opinion you will find in his works On the Intellect and the Intelligible (found in the Venetian ed. of Avicenna's works, 1508) and in his Fountains of Questions c. 6ff. (contained in the work Documents of Arabian Philosophy by Schmoelders, Bonn 1833); Avicenna, who treats of this in his Metaphysics IX, c. 4; Avicebron, who wrote on this in his book On Form and Matter or On the Fountain of Life, on which cf. Bl. Albert, On the Causes and Procession of the Universe I, tract 1, c. 0; Averroes, who briefly proposes Avicenna's opinion and his own in his Epitome of the Metaphysics, tract 4.
  12. Haec phrasis «propter distare a primo» iam occurrit in Aristot., II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.): διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 180, nota 8. — Plures codd. ut I N X Z post primo adiungunt principio; dein cod. cc et ed. 1 ponunt intellexit se ipsam pro intellexit se, et paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H O R cum edd. 3, 4 irradiabat pro irradiat.
    This phrase «propter distare a primo» ("on account of standing apart from the First") already occurs in Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 59 (c. 10): διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι ("on account of standing far off from the principle"). Cf. tom. I, p. 180, note 8. — Several codices (I, N, X, Z) after primo add principio; then codex cc and ed. 1 put intellexit se ipsam for intellexit se, and a little below several codices (C, H, O, R) with eds. 3, 4 read irradiabat ("was irradiating") for irradiat ("irradiates").
  13. Art. 1. q. 1.
    Article 1, question 1 [above].
  14. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 3, ubi haec propositio explicatur.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. II, q. 2, ad 3, where this proposition is explained.
  15. Cod. K unde non erit. — Ante uniformes supple stellae.
    Codex K reads unde non erit ("whence it will not be"). — Before uniformes supply stellae ("the stars").
  16. Scilicet in illo actu, in quo se manifestat liberalitas, et qui alteri communicatur. — Plures codd. ut F S cc cum edd. 1, 4 in actum; plures codd. ut R X Z aa bb omittunt in actu. Paulo inferius ex codd. I M Q U Z aa cc et ed. 1 pro infinite substituimus est infinitae potentiae; codd. F K infinitae virtutis.
    Namely in that act in which liberality is manifested and which is communicated to another. — Several codices (F, S, cc, with eds. 1, 4) read in actum ("into act"); several codices (R, X, Z, aa, bb) omit in actu. A little below, on the faith of codices I, M, Q, U, Z, aa, cc and ed. 1, for infinite we substituted est infinitae potentiae ("it is of infinite power"); codices F, K read infinitae virtutis ("of infinite strength").
  17. Hic in fundam. 4. — Sententia est: Actus creandi nec est possibilis creaturae.
    Here at fundamentum 4 [of this question]. — The meaning is: The act of creating is not even possible to a creature.
  18. De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.
    On this manner of arguing cf. tom. I, p. 835, note 5.
  19. Plura de hoc vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 40. dub. 7.
    See more on this at I Sent. d. 35, q. 2, ad 3, and d. 40, dub. 7.
  20. Sequimur codd. F N bb ponentes omnis numeri pro omnis numerus, quae lectio non bene retineri potest propter constructionem grammaticalem sequentium propositionum, respectu quarum etiam in codd. invenitur mira varietas; sic cod. V sufficiens per se et omnino actualis, cod. M sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis (omnino?) actualis; plures codd. et ideo actualis; Vat. cum pluribus codd. et ideo non solum actualis; eadem Vat. cum paucis mss. post actualis addit et omnino activa. Dein aliqui codd. ut P Q potestas numeri, plures cum Vat. potentia numeri pro quoniam est pars numeri, quam lectionem ex codd. M aa (bb a secunda manu) in textum recepimus, et a qua cod. V cum ed. 1 in hoc recedit, quod omittit quoniam est.
    We follow codices F, N, bb, which read omnis numeri ("of every number," genitive) for omnis numerus ("every number," nominative), since that reading cannot well be kept on account of the grammatical construction of the following propositions; with respect to which a marvellous variety is also found in the codices: thus codex V sufficiens per se et omnino actualis ("sufficient by itself and altogether actual"), codex M sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis (omnino?) actualis ("sufficient by itself, and therefore not every / wholly? actual"); several codices et ideo actualis ("and therefore actual"); the Vatican ms. with several codices et ideo non solum actualis ("and therefore not only actual"); the same Vatican ms. with a few mss. after actualis adds et omnino activa ("and altogether active"). Then some codices (P, Q) read potestas numeri ("the power of number"), several with the Vatican ms. potentia numeri ("the potency of number") for quoniam est pars numeri ("since it is part of the number"), which reading we have admitted into the text on the faith of codices M, aa (bb by a second hand), and from which codex V with ed. 1 departs in this, that it omits quoniam est ("since it is"). ---
← Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1→