Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II. De principii unitate.

Consequenter quaeritur de principii unitate. Circa quod duo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum res productae sint in esse a pluribus principiis. Secundo, dato quod ab uno principio, quaeritur, utrum illud produxerit omnia a se ipso, an mediante alio.

Quaestio I. Utrum res productae sint in esse a pluribus principiis.

Quod autem a pluribus principiis sint productae res, dicunt Manichaei, qui ponunt aliud esse principium spiritualium et incorporalium sive invisibilium, aliud corporalium et corruptibilium sive visibilium; et primum vocant Deum lucis, secundum vocant Deum tenebrarum¹. Et quod positio eorum sit vera et catholica, videtur:

1. Per sacram Scripturam. Ioannis decimo octavo²: Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo, dicit ipse Rex gloriae et Deus lucis: ergo mundus iste visibilis ad Deum lucis non spectat: non ergo est conditus ab eo.

2. Item, Ioannis decimo quarto³: Venit princeps mundi huius. Rursus, Ioannes duodecimo vocat diabolum principem huius mundi; et ille est Deus tenebrarum: ergo videtur etc.

3. Item, Apostolus secundae ad Corinthios quarto⁴ et ad Ephesios secundo vocat diabolum Deum huius saeculi; sed non meretur aliquis dici Deus alicuius, nisi eius quod condidit: ergo etc. Alias plurimas adducunt auctoritates de Scriptura; sed his solutis, solvuntur et aliae.

4. Item, rationibus probant id ipsum hoc modo: «oppositorum oppositae sunt causae⁵»; sed spiritualia et corporalia habent repugnantiam. Unde ad Romanos septimo⁶: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et ad Galatas quinto: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum etc. Item, novum et vetus Testamentum adversantur, sicut patet Matthaei quinto, quia ibi praecipiuntur directe contraria, sicut iurare et non iurare, occidere et non occidere. Ergo necesse est ponere duo principia prima, unum spiritualium, aliud corporalium, unum veteris Testamenti⁷, aliud novi.

5. Item, «idem similiter se habens semper natum est facere idem⁸»: ergo cum Deus bonus uniformiter se habeat, et similiter semper facit idem. Ergo, cum sit causa conditiva, nullius est destructiva, et cum sit causa productionis, non erit causa destructionis nec corruptionis: ergo corruptibilia sunt ab alio principio.

6. Tertia ratio est: omne quod bonus Deus facit, est bonum; omne quod est bonum, est diligendum, et nihil omnino quod fecit est odiendum; sed iste mundus est odiendus et spernendus; similiter et vita carnalis, primae Ioannis secundo⁹: Nolite diligere mundum; et iterum Ioannis duodecimo: Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam: ergo etc.

In contrarium autem sunt rationes et auctoritates.

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1. Ioannis primo¹⁰ dicitur de Verbo: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt; sed Verbum est bonus Deus: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod omnia non distribuit pro visibilibus; contra: statim post sequitur: mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. Constat, quod de hoc mundo loquitur etc.

2. Item, Matthaei ultimo¹¹: Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra, dicit Deus bonus: aut ergo iuste data, aut iniuste. Si iuste; ergo caelum et terra sua sunt, et ipse fecit. Si iniuste: ergo videtur, quod ipse Deus bonus iniuste usurpaverit sibi alienum, et ita quod fuerit iniustus.

3. Item, ille fuit conditor rerum visibilium, qui dedit vetus Testamentum. Probatio: Actuum decimo tertio¹² dicit Paulus: Viri fratres, Deus plebis nostrae elegit patres nostros. Et post: Qui habitant Ierusalem principes hunc ignorantes et iudicantes impleverunt. Sed iste fuit Deus lucis: ergo etc.

4. Item, rationibus ostenditur: Omne bonum et pulchrum est a Deo bono; sed omnia visibilia bona sunt et pulchra: ergo etc. Probatio¹³: aut bona sunt, aut mala. Si bona, habeo propositum; si mala: ergo eorum corruptio bona: ergo corruptio est a Deo bono, quoniam omne bonum ab ipso: ergo etc.

5. Item, quaecumque ad invicem coniunguntur, necesse est coniungi per aliquid, in quo communicant¹⁴; sed in nullo communicant quae differunt in principiis primis: si ergo anima et corpus coniunguntur, necesse est, quod ab eodem Deo producantur; sed anima est a Deo lucis: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaero de istis duobus principiis, qualiter se habeant ad invicem: aut enim habent pacem, aut bellum¹⁵ — aliter enim non video, quomodo possit esse — sed Deus lucis non potest bellare, cum in eo sit summa pax et quies; Deus tenebrarum, cum in eo sit omnimoda malitia, non potest quiescere: ergo videtur, quod nec bellant nec quiescunt.

Conclusio.

Error Manichaeorum, quod duo sint rerum principia prima, et a fide et a ratione reprobatur.

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Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaestio de pluralitate principiorum tripliciter potest intelligi, et secundum hoc in diversis locis tractanda est. Potest enim quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, quorum utrumque bonum; et illud habet determinari in primo libro, ubi quaeritur de unitate divinae essentiae¹⁶. Potest nihilominus quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, ita quod unum sit summe bonum, alterum vero summe malum, ita quod ab uno sit omne bonum, ab alio omne malum; et illud habet determinari in tractatu de malo¹⁷; non enim potest haec quaestio sciri, nisi sciatur primo, quid sit malum. Potest etiam quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, quorum unum sit principium incorruptibilium et spiritualium, aliud sit principium corruptibilium et visibilium: et hoc habet determinari nunc, ubi quaeritur de exitu rerum in esse.

Ad hanc autem quaestionem dicendum, quod error iste de positione duorum principiorum non solum est contra fidem, immo adeo contra rationem, ut vix credam, hominem, qui aliquid de philosophia scivit, hunc errorem aut posuisse, aut defendisse. — Tamen¹⁸ iste error est pessimus, quia praetendit aliquam speciem pietatis. Videtur enim Deo bono attribuere bona et pulchra et nobilia, et alii principio alia. Ideo¹⁹ magis subintravit et Ecclesiam Dei magis foedavit, et quia etiam a simplicibus magis potest capi et falsa imaginatione cogitari. — Et ad istum errorem pessimum de multitudine²⁰ principiorum innumerabiles errores consequuntur et vanissimi, sicut illis est notum, qui sectam Manichaeorum novere, sicut de iuramento, matrimonio, homicidio et aliis pluribus, quae omnia suas habent improbationes per Scripturam.

Caput autem et principium erroris damnat omnis philosophia, quod duo sint rerum principia prima²¹: tum quia ordo universi destruitur, hoc posito, tum etiam quia divina potentia limitatur ex hoc, ut non possit corporalia producere, tum etiam quia ex hoc divina essentia circumscriptibilis ponitur, ut tantum sit in regione lucis; et si haec vera sunt, nec Deus est Deus, nec aliquid est bonum.

Ad argumenta.

Ad 1, 2, 3. Ad auctoritates, quas adducunt, dicendum, quod mundus dupliciter accipitur in Scriptura, videlicet pro mundana conversatione, quae vana est et immunda, et pro mundana creatura. Primo modo damnatur in Scripturis, et non dicitur esse a Deo tanquam malum, quia peccatum non est a Deo, sicut alibi patebit²²; secundo modo commendatur tanquam bonum et pulchrum, sicut dicitur Genesis primo²³: Vidit Deus omnia quae fecerat, et erant valde bona, et hoc modo est a Deo. Secundum hanc distinctionem solvuntur obiecta. Nam quod dicitur, regnum Christi non esse de hoc mundo, intelligitur de mundana conversatione, quia ipse non regnat in malis, sed in bonis, quorum conversatio est in caelis²⁴. Similiter, quod dicitur diabolus princeps mundi et Deus, intelligitur de mundane et saeculariter conversantibus. — Patet ergo, quod deceptus est stultus et impius Manichaeus, quia nescivit distinguere. Et iterum, peccavit in illatione²⁵; non enim sequitur: est princeps, ergo conditor; si enim sequeretur, cum rex Franciae sit princeps Franciae; ergo fecit eam. Qui sic argueret, stultus iudicaretur; certe multo stultius arguit Manichaeus. Rursus, non sequitur: est Deus, ergo conditor. Nam si sic, cum dicatur ad Philippenses tertio²⁶: Quorum Deus venter est, ergo venter creavit illos. Stulta igitur est haec ratio, quare et Manichaei.

Ad 4. Quod obiicitur, quod contrariorum contrariae sunt causae; illud intelligitur de causis proximis intrinsecis — nam de causa extrinseca²⁷ non habet veritatem — et ideo, quia nescivit distinguere, deceptus est pessimus Manichaeus. Et quod ita sit, patet. Si enim contrariorum contrariae sunt causae primae producentes, tot essent principia, quot sunt genera contrarietatum: ergo alius Deus fecisset calidum, et alius frigidum, et sic de aliis contrarietatibus. Si quis ita argueret, ab omnibus deridendus esset; quanto magis stultissimus Manichaeus.

Quod tamen dicitur, quod caro contrariatur spiritui; dicendum, quod nomen carnis aliquando accipitur pro natura, sicut ad Ephesios quinto²⁸: Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit; et sic non contrariatur, immo miro amore nectuntur. Accipitur etiam pro vitio et corruptione, quae est in carne: et ratione huius contrariatur; nec tamen habet causam contrariam, quia non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem.

Ad 5. Quod obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens etc.; dicendum, quod aliquod est agens, quod agit se ipso; et illud impossibile est, quod producendo diversa diversificetur; immo uno et eodem²⁹ producit multa. Aliud est agens, quod agit per aliud a se, et illud variatur in agendo diversa. Deus autem est agens primo modo, et non secundo. Et quia hoc non intellexit Manichaeus, posuit diversa principia et diversos legislatores, cum videat in legibus diversitatem et in rebus. — Et quod stulte motus fuerit, sensibiliter patet. Videmus enim, quod idem artifex per eandem artem domificandi facit aulam et cloacam; numquid duos artifices oportuit ad haec facienda invenire? Rursus, idem medicus secundum eandem artem medicinae diversa eidem aegroto secundum diversos status apponit medicamenta, et diversa dat praecepta et contraria secundum diversitates infirmorum; immo stultus esset medicus, qui eadem semper daret medicamenta et mandata. Si ergo diversus fuit status hominum incipientium, ut Iudaeorum, et virorum evangelicorum, quid prohibet, unum et eundem diversa et contraria praecepisse? Attamen contraria non sunt, spiritualiter intellecta.

Ad 6. Quod ultimo obiicitur, iam solutum est, quia vitiositas mundanorum est contemnenda, sed creatura amanda, et Deus in ea laudandus; et omnes creaturae laudant Deum et bonae sunt. Et haec sufficiant.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec militat contra immanem errorem Manichaeorum et contra omnes, qui plura principia absolute prima statuerunt. De Manichaeorum erroribus agitur hic dub. 2; de vana eorundem opinione circa originem animarum infra d. 18, a. 2, q. 2; item de origine mali d. 34, a. 1, q. 1; de carnis repugnantia adversus spiritum d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, et III. Sent. d. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

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II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 1, a. 1-4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 41, a. 1, 2; de Potent. q. 3, a. 3; S. c. Gent. II, c. 15, 16, III, c. 15. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2, a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article II. On the unity of the principle.

Next, the question is about the unity of the principle. Concerning which two things are asked. First, whether things were produced in being from several principles. Second, granted that from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things from itself, or by means of another.

Question I. Whether things were produced in being from several principles.

That things were produced from several principles is what the Manichaeans say, who posit one principle of spiritual and incorporeal or invisible things, and another of corporeal and corruptible or visible things; and the first they call the God of light, the second they call the God of darkness¹. And that their position is true and catholic, it seems:

1. From sacred Scripture. John 18²: My kingdom is not of this world, says the King of glory and the God of light himself: therefore this visible world does not belong to the God of light: therefore it was not founded by him.

2. Likewise, John 14³: The prince of this world is coming. Again, John 12 calls the devil the prince of this world; and that one is the God of darkness: therefore it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 4⁴ and in Ephesians 2 calls the devil the God of this age; but no one merits being called the God of something unless of that which he founded: therefore etc. They adduce many other authorities from Scripture; but when these are solved, the others are solved too.

4. Likewise, they prove the same thing by reasons in this way: «the causes of opposites are opposed⁵»; but spiritual and corporeal things have a mutual repugnance. Hence Romans 7⁶: I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind; and Galatians 5: The flesh lusts against the spirit etc. Likewise, the New and Old Testaments are opposed, as is plain from Matthew 5, because there directly contrary things are commanded — like to swear and not to swear, to kill and not to kill. Therefore one must posit two first principles: one of spiritual things, the other of corporeal; one of the Old Testament⁷, the other of the New.

5. Likewise, «what remains the same in the same way is naturally fitted always to do the same⁸»: therefore since the good God remains uniformly, he likewise always does the same. Therefore, since he is the cause of founding, he is the cause of destroying nothing; and since he is the cause of production, he will not be the cause of destruction or of corruption: therefore corruptible things are from another principle.

6. The third reason is: everything which the good God makes is good; everything which is good is to be loved, and nothing at all that he made is to be hated; but this world is to be hated and spurned; likewise also the carnal life, as 1 John 2⁹: Do not love the world; and again John 12: He who loves his soul will lose it: therefore etc.

But on the contrary side there are reasons and authorities.

1. John 1¹⁰ says of the Word: All things were made through him; but the Word is the good God: therefore etc. If you say that all does not distribute over visible things, the contrary: immediately afterwards follows: the world was made through him, and the world knew him not. It is clear that he is speaking of this world etc.

2. Likewise, the last chapter of Matthew¹¹: All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth, says the good God: therefore either it was given justly or unjustly. If justly, then heaven and earth are his, and he made them. If unjustly, then it seems that the good God himself unjustly usurped what belonged to another, and so was unjust.

3. Likewise, he was the founder of visible things who gave the Old Testament. Proof: Acts 13¹² Paul says: Brothers, men, the God of our people chose our fathers. And afterwards: The dwellers in Jerusalem, and their princes, in ignorance and by judging him fulfilled [the prophecies]. But that one was the God of light: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reasons: Everything good and beautiful is from the good God; but all visible things are good and beautiful: therefore etc. Proof¹³: they are either good or bad. If good, I have my point; if bad, then their corruption is good; therefore the corruption is from the good God, since every good is from him: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, whatever things are joined to one another, must necessarily be joined through something in which they communicate¹⁴; but things which differ in their first principles communicate in nothing: therefore if soul and body are joined, it is necessary that they be produced by the same God; but the soul is from the God of light: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, I ask concerning these two principles, how they stand toward one another: for either they have peace or war¹⁵ — for otherwise I do not see how it can be — but the God of light cannot wage war, since in him is the highest peace and rest; the God of darkness, since in him is total malice, cannot rest: therefore it seems that they neither wage war nor rest.

Conclusion.

The error of the Manichaeans, that there are two first principles of things, is rejected by both faith and reason.

I respond: It must be said that the question of the plurality of principles can be understood in three ways, and accordingly is to be treated in different places. For it can be asked whether there are several principles, each of which is good; and that is to be determined in the first book, where the question is asked about the unity of the divine essence¹⁶. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, such that one is supremely good and the other supremely bad, so that from the one is every good, from the other every bad; and that is to be determined in the treatise on evil¹⁷; for this question cannot be known unless one first knows what evil is. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, of which one is the principle of incorruptible and spiritual things, the other the principle of corruptible and visible things: and this is to be determined now, where the question is asked about the procession of things into being.

To this question it must be said that this error of positing two principles is not only against the faith but is so much against reason that I can scarcely believe that any man who knew anything of philosophy posited or defended this error. — Nevertheless¹⁸, this error is the worst, because it puts forward some appearance of piety. For it seems to attribute to the good God the good, beautiful, and noble things, and to the other principle the rest. For that reason¹⁹ it crept in further and defiled the Church of God more deeply, and also because it can more easily be grasped and pictured by simple folk through false imagination. — And from this worst error about a multitude²⁰ of principles innumerable and most empty errors follow, as is known to those who are acquainted with the sect of the Manichaeans — about oaths, marriage, homicide, and many other things, all of which have their refutations from Scripture.

But all philosophy condemns the head and source of the error, namely that there are two first principles of things²¹: both because the order of the universe is destroyed on this supposition, and also because divine power is limited by this — so that it cannot produce corporeal things — and also because by this the divine essence is rendered circumscribable, so as to be only in the region of light; and if these things are true, then God is not God, and nothing is good.

To the arguments.

To 1, 2, 3. To the authorities they adduce, it must be said that world is taken in Scripture in two ways, namely for worldly conduct, which is vain and unclean, and for the worldly creation. In the first way it is condemned in the Scriptures, and is not said to be from God as evil, because sin is not from God, as will be made plain elsewhere²²; in the second way it is commended as good and beautiful, as it is said in Genesis 1²³: God saw all the things which he had made, and they were very good, and in this way it is from God. According to this distinction the objections are solved. For when it is said that Christ's kingdom is not of this world, it is understood of worldly conduct, because he does not reign in the wicked, but in the good, whose conversation is in the heavens²⁴. Likewise, when the devil is called prince of the world and God, it is understood of those who live in a worldly and secular manner. — It is plain therefore that the foolish and impious Manichaean is deceived, because he knew not how to distinguish. And again, he sinned in the inference²⁵; for it does not follow: he is prince, therefore founder; since if it followed, then since the king of France is prince of France, therefore he made it. He who argued so would be judged a fool; but much more foolishly does the Manichaean argue. Again, it does not follow: he is god, therefore founder. For if so, since it is said to the Philippians 3²⁶: Their god is the belly, therefore the belly created them. Foolish therefore is this reasoning, and so are the Manichaeans.

To 4. What is objected, that the causes of opposites are opposed; that is understood of proximate intrinsic causes — for it does not hold of the extrinsic cause²⁷ — and therefore, because he knew not how to distinguish, the worst Manichaean was deceived. And that it is so is plain. For if the causes of opposites were opposed first producing causes, there would be as many principles as there are kinds of contraries: therefore one God would have made the hot, another the cold, and so for the other contraries. If anyone argued thus he would be derided by all; how much more the most foolish Manichaean.

But what is said, that the flesh is contrary to the spirit, it must be said that the name flesh is sometimes taken for nature, as Ephesians 5²⁸: No one ever hated his own flesh; and so it is not contrary, but on the contrary they are bound by wondrous love. It is also taken for the vice and corruption that is in the flesh: and by reason of this it is contrary; yet it has no contrary cause, because it has no efficient cause, but a deficient one.

To 5. What is objected, that what remains the same in the same way etc.; it must be said that there is one kind of agent which acts by itself, and it is impossible for this one to be diversified by producing diverse things; rather, by one and the same²⁹ it produces many. There is another kind of agent which acts through something other than itself, and this one is varied in doing diverse things. Now God is an agent of the first kind, and not of the second. And because the Manichaean did not understand this, he posited diverse principles and diverse lawgivers, since he saw diversity in laws and in things. — And that he was foolishly moved is plain to the senses. For we see that the same craftsman by the same art of building makes hall and sewer; was it necessary to find two craftsmen to make these? Again, the same physician by the same art of medicine applies diverse medicines to the same sick person according to his diverse states, and gives diverse and contrary precepts according to the diversities of the sick; rather, a physician who always gave the same medicines and commands would be a fool. If, therefore, the state of men in their beginnings was different — like the Jews and the men of the Gospel — what prevents one and the same [God] from prescribing diverse and contrary things? And yet they are not contrary, spiritually understood.

To 6. What is finally objected has already been solved, because the viciousness of worldly things is to be despised, but the creature to be loved, and God in it to be praised; and all creatures praise God and are good. And let these things suffice.

Scholion

I. This question wars against the monstrous error of the Manichaeans and against all who posited several absolutely first principles. The errors of the Manichaeans are treated here in dub. 2; their vain opinion about the origin of souls is below at d. 18, a. 2, q. 2; likewise the origin of evil at d. 34, a. 1, q. 1; the repugnance of the flesh against the spirit at d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, and III Sent. d. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scotus, On the Principles of Things q. 1, a. 1–4. — St Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 1, 2; De Potentia q. 3, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 15, 16, III, c. 15. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. August., de Moribus Manichaeorum; de Genesi contra Manichaeos; de Natura boni; liber contra Faustum etc. — Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 paulo superius omittunt sive invisibilium.
Cf. Augustine, On the Manners of the Manichaeans; On Genesis against the Manichaeans; On the Nature of the Good; the book Against Faustus etc. — Most codices with ed. 1 a little above omit sive invisibilium ("or invisible").
Vers. 36.
Verse 36.
Vers. 30. — Sequens textus est loc. cit. v. 31: Nunc princeps huius mundi eiicietur foras.
Verse 30. — The following text is the same place, v. 31: Now the prince of this world will be cast out.
Vers. 4: Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium. — Ad Eph. v. 2: Ambulastis... secundum principem potestatis aeris huius.
Verse 4: The god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers. — At Ephesians, v. 2: You walked... according to the prince of the power of this air.
Codd. P Q in marg. bene addunt Aristoteles, II. de Generatione, text. 56. (c. 10.). Cfr. IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.).
Codices P, Q rightly add in the margin Aristotle, On Generation II, text 56 (c. 10). Cf. Meteorology IV, text 41 (c. 7).
Vers. 23. — Sequens textus est Gal. 3, 17. — Alius textus est Matth. 5, 21.
Verse 23. — The following text is Galatians 3:17. — The other text is Matthew 5:21.
Fide codd. K M (bb a secunda manu) cc et ed. 1 adiecimus Testamenti.
On the faith of codices K, M (bb by a second hand), cc, and ed. 1 we added Testamenti ("of the Testament").
Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10). — De seq. prop. cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 20 et 24, ubi docetur, causam primam, stando in sua unitate, regere omnia et existere in omnibus secundum unam dispositionem. — Edd. 3, 4 Secunda ratio pro Item. Circa finem argumenti Vat. nec corruptibilitatis pro nec corruptionis.
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (c. 10). — On the following proposition cf. the Book of Causes, props. 20 and 24, where it is taught that the first cause, standing in its unity, rules all things and exists in all of them according to a single disposition. — Editions 3 and 4 read Secunda ratio for Item. Near the end of the argument the Vatican ms. reads nec corruptibilitatis for nec corruptionis.
Vers. 15. — Sequens textus est Ioan. 12, 25, ex quo non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 aliam partem allegant, scil. qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo etc.; sensus in idem recidit. — Aliquanto superius ex codd. F P Q substituimus fecit pro fecerit.
Verse 15. — The following text is John 12:25, from which not a few codices with ed. 1 cite another part, namely He who hates his soul in this world etc.; the sense comes to the same. — A little above, on the faith of codices F, P, Q we substituted fecit ("made") for fecerit.
Vers. 3; alius locus est v. 10.
Verse 3; the other place is v. 10.
Vers. 18.
Verse 18.
Vers. 16, ubi Vulgata: Viri Israelitae et qui timetis Deum, audite: Deus plebis Israel elegit patres nostros. Quae dein allegantur sunt ibid. v. 27: Qui enim habitabant Ierusalem et principes eius hunc ignorantes et voces prophetarum, quae per omne sabbatum leguntur, iudicantes impleverunt. — Sola Vat. minorem transponit: sed iste fuit Deus lucis post verba vetus Testamentum.
Verse 16, where the Vulgate reads: Israelite men, and you who fear God, hear: the God of the people of Israel chose our fathers. What is then cited is the same place, v. 27: For the dwellers in Jerusalem and their princes, in ignorance of him and of the voices of the prophets which are read every sabbath, in judging him fulfilled them. — Only the Vatican ms. transposes the minor: but that one was the God of light after the words Old Testament.
Cod. M Probatio minoris. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum pluribus mss. post ergo corruptio adiicit eorum.
Codex M reads Probatio minoris ("Proof of the minor"). Near the end of the argument the Vatican ms. with several mss. adds eorum ("of them") after ergo corruptio.
Averroes, IV. Phys. text. 71: Universaliter omnia duo, quae non communicant in eadem natura, non habent comparationem ad invicem.
Averroes, Physics IV, text 71: Universally, any two things which do not communicate in the same nature have no comparison with one another.
In cod. F additur et hoc argumentum facit Damascenus primo libro, scil. de Fide orthod. c. 3, et diffusius IV. c. 20.
In codex F is added and Damascene makes this argument in the first book, namely On the Orthodox Faith c. 3, and more at length in IV, c. 20.
Dist. 2. q. 1.
Distinction 2, question 1 [of the first book of the Sentences].
Infra d. 34.
Below at distinction 34.
Codd. X Z interserunt hic error: non pauci codd. vero indebite omittunt Ideo, pro quo cod. aa ponit Sed, qui deinde post foedavit omittit particulam et. Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut B E F Cum pro Tamen et item sit pro est.
Codices X, Z insert error here; not a few codices wrongly omit Ideo, for which codex aa puts Sed, which then after foedavit omits the particle et. A little above some codices (B, E, F) read Cum for Tamen and item sit for est.
Vide annotationem praecedentem (de variantibus circa Ideo / Sed).
See the preceding annotation on the variants concerning Ideo / Sed.
Plures codd. ut C H I O R S multiplicatione [pro multitudine].
Several codices (C, H, I, O, R, S) read multiplicatione ("multiplication") [for multitudine].
In cod. A additur: cum omnia sint ordinatissima, ut patet, quia motus inferiorum est a motu superiorum, et motus superiorum a motu intelligentiarum, et unus sine altero esse non possit. Hic ordo ex propriis naturis esse non potest propter diversitatem et oppositionem earum, quae magis facerent distinctionem quam unionem, ut a diversis principiis et contrariis ordinantibus, quia non intenderent unum ordinem ex se ipsis sive finem; ergo oportet, quod reducantur ad unum principium ordinans omnia ad unum finem, aut quod hic ordo sit per accidens; sed per accidens esse non potest, cum non possit abesse, sed habeat semper esse: ergo etc. Item, in quolibet genere multitudo reducitur ad unum illius generis: ergo cum omnia in esse conveniant, oportet esse unum ens principium omnium, a quo dependeant, tum quia ordo universi etc. — De prima ratione, quam S. Doctor adducit, cfr. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 32-56. (XI. c. 10.), ubi concludit: At entia nolunt male gubernari; non est bonum pluralitas: unus ergo princeps.
In codex A is added: Since all things are most well-ordered, as is plain, because the motion of lower things is from the motion of higher things, and the motion of higher things from the motion of the intelligences, and the one cannot exist without the other. This order cannot come from their own natures on account of their diversity and opposition, which would rather produce distinction than union — as [we should expect] from diverse and contrary principles doing the ordering, since they would not intend one order out of themselves nor one end; therefore it is necessary that they be reduced to one principle ordering all things to one end, or else that this order be by accident; but it cannot be by accident, since it cannot fail to be, but always has being: therefore etc. Likewise, in any genus multitude is reduced to one in that genus: therefore since all things converge in being, there must be one being which is the principle of all, on which they depend, both because the order of the universe etc. — On the first reason which the Holy Doctor adduces, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 32-56 (XI, c. 10), where he concludes: But beings refuse to be ill-governed; plurality is no good: therefore [let there be] one ruler.
Infra d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, et a. 2, q. 1.
Below at distinction 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.
Vers. 31: Viditque Deus cuncta, quae fecerat etc.
Verse 31: And God saw all the things which he had made etc.
Alluditur ad illud Philipp. 3, 20: Nostra autem conversatio in caelis est. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. ut B D E F H I N Q post saeculariter adnectunt viventibus et.
An allusion to Philippians 3:20: But our conversation is in the heavens. — A little below, several codices (B, D, E, F, H, I, N, Q) after saeculariter add viventibus et ("living, and").
Codd. O aa in illa ratione. Dein Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post est princeps subdit mundi. Paulo post Vat. Sic enim sequeretur pro si enim sequeretur.
Codices O and aa read in illa ratione ("in that reasoning"). Then the Vatican ms. with one or two other codices after est princeps adds mundi ("of the world"). A little later the Vatican ms. reads Sic enim sequeretur ("For it would thus follow") for si enim sequeretur.
Vers. 19. — Post ergo nonnulli codd. cum Vat. repetunt Deus.
Verse 19. — After ergo some codices with the Vatican ms. repeat Deus.
Vat. cum plurimis mss. extra; secuti sumus codd. T X cc et ed. 1.
The Vatican ms. with most mss. reads extra ("outside"); we follow codices T, X, cc, and ed. 1 [reading extrinseca].
Vers. 29. — Mox Vat. cum plurimis codd. non contrariantur pro non contrariatur, quod tamen exstat in codd. aa cc et ed. 1. Idem cod. cc cum ed. 1 ponit hoc modo pro sic, quod a plurimis mss. abest. Paulo inferius Vat. modo plurali contrariantur pro contrariatur, sed contra mss. et primas edd. Eadem Vat. dein cum plurimis codd. bis habent pro habet, contradicentibus contextu et cod. cc cum ed. 1; cod. H legit habuit.
Verse 29. — Then the Vatican ms. with most codices reads non contrariantur (plural) for non contrariatur (singular), which however stands in codices aa, cc and ed. 1. The same codex cc with ed. 1 puts hoc modo for sic, which is absent from most mss. A little below the Vatican ms. has the plural contrariantur for contrariatur, but against the mss. and first editions. The same Vatican ms. then with most codices twice reads habent (plural) for habet, against the context and codex cc with ed. 1; codex H reads habuit.
Codd. T aa supplent modo; forsan melius, si quid supplendum, suppleretur actu, qui identificatur cum divina essentia. Cfr. supra a. 1, q. 2 in fine et I. Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — Paulo inferius Cod. aa diversos status. Paulo inferius pro et mandata aliqui codd. ut F III Z ponunt et praecepta.
Codices T, aa supply modo ("in a manner"); perhaps better, if anything is to be supplied, would be actu ("by an act"), which is identified with the divine essence. Cf. above at a. 1, q. 2 in fine and I Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — A little below codex aa reads diversos status. A little below, for et mandata some codices (F, III, Z) put et praecepta. ---

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