← Back to Distinction 23

Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 478

Quaestio III. Utrum fides sit virtus una.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit virtus una. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Ephesios quartop478-1 dicitur: Unus Deus, una fides, et unum baptisma; sed baptisma unitatem habet secundum speciem, quod quidem est Sacramentum fidei: ergo videtur multo fortius, quod et ipsa fides.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios decimo tertiop478-2: Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; sed spes et caritas habent unitatem secundum speciem: ergo et fides.

3. Item, fides nulli assentit nisi propter summam Veritatem; et summa Veritas tantum una est: ergo ratio credendi est una. Sed habitus diversificatur secundum formam et speciem a parte rationis motivae et inclinativaep478-3: si ergo ratio credendi est una, necesse est, virtutem fidei, qua creditur, unam esse specie.

4. Item, qui credit Deo, non iudicatur esse fidelis, nisi credat in omnibus articulis; sed fides-virtus facit unumquemque esse fidelem: ergo non est vera fides-virtus, nisi per ipsam omnia credibilia credantur et in unum colligantur. Sed non colligerentur in unum per fidem, nisi fides esset virtus unap478-4: ergo necesse est, quod fides una sit respectu omnium credibilium.

5. Item, non est alia obedientia secundum speciem, qua obedio Deo in mandatis primae tabulae et in mandatis secundae, licet mandata primae tabulae ordinent ad Deum, mandata vero secundae ordinent ad proximump478-5: ergo pari ratione, non erit alia fides, qua assentitur primae Veritati in articulis respicientibus Divinitatem et in articulis respicientibus humanitatem. Et non est dare aliud, secundum quod fides plurificetur et diversificetur: ergo necesse est, fidei virtutem esse unam secundum speciem.

Sed contra: 1. « Habitus diversificantur per actus, et actus per obiectap478-6 »; sed obiectum fidei non solum est verum increatum, utpote quod Deus sit trinus et unus, sed etiam verum creatum, utpote quod Christus sit natus et passus: si ergo creatum et increatum nihil habent commune, immo differunt essentialiter et formaliter; necesse est ponere, quod fides, qua credimus Divinitatem, et fides, qua credimus humanitatem, sit alia et alia secundum speciem.

2. Item, sicut voluntas se habet ad volita, et scientia ad scibilia, sic se habet fides ad credibilia; sed voluntates diversificantur et numerantur secundum diversitatem volitorum, similiter scientiae secundum diversitatem scibiliump478-7: videtur ergo ratione consimili, quod fides diversificari habeat sep. 479cundum diversitatem credibilium; et sic redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, donum sapientiae et scientiae sunt diversa dona, et hoc non ob aliud, nisi quia unum est de aeternis, et aliud est de temporalibusp479-1: si ergo fides est de istis et de illis, videtur, quod et ipsa habeat formaliter diversificari.

4. Item, timor et spes sunt affectiones formaliter differentes, et hoc, quia timor est de futuris malis, spes autem de futuris bonisp479-2; sed fides non tantum est de futuris bonis, utpote de gloria aeterna, sed etiam de futuris malis, utpote de supplicio aeterno: ergo videtur, quod fides de his et de illis habeat formaliter diversificari.

5. Item, nulla virtus habet plenam rationem virtutis, nisi eam concomitetur recta intentio respectu finis; sed « fides est, quae dirigit intentionemp479-3 »: ergo necesse est, quod fides omnes virtutes circumeat quantum ad earum fines: ergo si virtus, quae omnes virtutes circuit, non est virtus specialis, sed virtus generalis ad omnes; videtur ex hoc posse colligi, fidem non esse virtutem unam secundum speciem.

Conclusio.

Fides, sive sit in eodem, sive in diversis, est una virtus secundum speciem, quamvis in diversis diversificetur secundum numerum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fides, sive in eodem, sive in diversis, una est secundum speciem, pro eo quod non dividitur in speciesp479-4, quamvis in diversis diversificetur secundum numerum. — Et huius ratio est, quoniam unitas virtutis attenditur secundum unitatem actus principalis; unitas autem actus principalis attenditur secundum unitatem obiecti primi; et quoniam obiectum primum fidei unum est: hinc est, quod necesse est, virtutem fidei esse unam. — Hoc autem planius fit per exemplum in consimili. Sicut enim videmus in habitu videndi, quod virtus visiva habet obiectum per accidens, sicut dicimur videre equum et hominem; habet etiam obiectum per se, sicut dicimur videre album et nip. 480grum; habet etiam obiectum non solum per se, sed etiam primo, sicut dicimur videre lucidump479-5 — et quamvis obiectum per accidens sive obiectum materiale ipsius visus diversificetur in specie, sicut equus differt specie ab homine, et etiam obiectum per se specie differat, sicut album specie differt a nigro; non tamen habitus videndi secundum speciem diversificatur, quia ratio obiecti primi, videlicet ipsa ratio luminositatis, una est in omni visibili — sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod licet fides habeat multa obiecta per accidens, sicut omnia quae consequuntur ad articulos, multa etiam obiecta per se, sicutp479-6 ipsos articulos plures et distinctos; quia tamen una est ratio credendi in omnibus, videlicet ipsa summa Veritas, cui ipsa fides innititur propter se et super omnia: ideo ipsa fides est specie una, quantacumque reperiatur in credibilibusp479-7 differentia. — Et est simile: si ego crederem alicui homini veraci, quia verax est, eadem credulitate, qua crederem, ipsum esse veracem, crederem, omnia esse vera, quae dicit, quantumcumquep479-8 de diversis materiis loqueretur. Per hunc modum in proposito intelligendum est. — Et idcirco concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, fidem habere unitatem secundum speciem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod actus diversificantur per obiecta; iam patet responsio, quoniam hoc non intelligitur de quocumque obiecto, sed de obiecto, quod est obiectum per se et primo, quod quidem non tantum habet rationem materialis, sed etiam rationem activi et motivi; hoc autem modo non est obiectum fidei, nisi ipsa Veritas summa, sicut infrap479-9 melius patebit, cum de obiecto fidei inquiretur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sic se habet fides ad credibilia, sicut voluntas ad volita, et scientia ad scibilia; dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam scientia in diversis scibilibus diversas intuetur rationes et diversa media, per quae illa cognoscitp479-10: similiter voluntas in diversis volitis diversa intuetur appetibilia, propter quae illa appetit. Ideo tam voluntas quam scientia diversificatur penes illa quae appetit et cognoscit. Fides autem unicam intuetur rationem, secundum quam omnia credibilia credit. Et ideo propter diversitatem credibilium non habet diversificari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae et scientiae diversificatur; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia sapientia negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas, et scientia circa temporalia secundum rationes temporales; et ideo diversificantur, quia negotiantur secundum rationes alias et alias. Fides autem non sic, immo tam circa creata quam circa increata versatur secundum dictamen Veritatis aeternae; et ideo non sic habet diversificari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor et spes diversificantur, quia sunt de bonis et malis; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia timor respicit malum, secundum quod malum, et spes bonum, secundum quod bonum, et ita secundum rationes diversas. Fides autem bona et mala non considerat, nisi in quantum cadunt sub dictaminep480-1 Veritatis, et ita sub ratione una. Ita enim credit, malos puniri, sicut bonos praemiari; ita enim est verum unum, sicut et reliquum, et ita dictat Veritas unum, sicut alterum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides dirigit omnes virtutes; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod fides sit virtus generalis, pro eo quod contingit, virtutes se ipsas circumincedere, et obiectum unius virtutis bene potest esse materiale alterius virtutis, et tamen ab invicem distinctae sunt, quia distinguuntur penes obiecta propria, quae non tantum habent rationem materialis, verum etiam rationem motivi. Obiectum enim materiale nec facit convenientiam in specie nec differentiam. — Et propter hoc non sequitur, quod fides sit communis aliis virtutibus, quia respicit earump480-2 obiecta et fines. Respicit enim illa solummodo per modum materiae, circa quam versatur; obiectum tamen proprium et primum habet distinctum ab aliis virtutibus, secundum cuius obiecti unitatem est ponere, fidem esse unam secundum speciem, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum est.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec ab aliis etiam sic proponitur: utrum fides sit una virtus, specialis, vel generalis. Distinguitur enim triplex unitas: numerica, specifica, generica (cfr. 5. arg. ad oppos.). Quoad numericam unitatem patet, quod fidei habitus plurificetur secundum numerum subiectorum credentium. Restat igitur dubium, utrum fides (sicut diversae scientiae) habeat tantum unitatem genericam, an potius specificam. Haec autem, ut omnes docent, dependet non ab eius obiecto materiali, sed a formali. — In scholis nunc passim distinguitur obiectum formale quod et obiectum formale quo. Obiectum formale quod est illud, de quo agitur primo et per se et de aliis, ut ordinantur ad illud; quod vocatur hic in corp. obiectum primum. Obiectum formale quo est ratio formalis motiva, sub qua sive qua mediante attinguntur obiectum formale quod et omnia obiecta materialia, sive, ut auctor dicit (ad 1.), quod « habet rationem activi et motivi ». — Tamen est notandum, quod in fide divina idem re est obiectum formale quod, scilicet prima Veritas obiectiva, quae primo et per se cognoscitur (unde etiam dici potest primum et principale obiectum materiale); et obiectum formale quo, scilicet prima Veritas formalis, sive ratio motiva, propter quam intellectus tendit in obiectum (cfr. de hoc infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2.). Hinc vulgo obiectum formale quo etiam vocatur obiectum formale quod, sive potius utrumque hoc uno vocabulo significatur. — Observandum etiam, quod usus loquendi et modus dividendi fidei obiectum in diversis auctoribus minime est conveniens et constans; unde saepe eorum positiones magis apparenter quam realiter sunt diversae. Circa ipsam conclusionem nulla est opinionum diversitas.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 4. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation

Question III. Whether faith is one virtue.

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is one virtue. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. To the Ephesians, chapter fourp478-1, it is said: One God, one faith, and one baptism; but baptism has unity according to species, and indeed it is the Sacrament of faith: therefore it seems much more strongly that faith itself does too.

2. Likewise, first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteenp478-2: Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but hope and charity have unity according to species: therefore faith does too.

3. Likewise, faith assents to nothing except on account of the highest Truth; and the highest Truth is only one: therefore the ground of believing is one. But a habit is diversified according to form and species on the side of the motive and inclining groundp478-3: if therefore the ground of believing is one, it is necessary that the virtue of faith, by which one believes, be one in species.

4. Likewise, one who believes God is not judged to be faithful unless he believes in all the articles; but faith-the-virtue makes each one to be faithful: therefore there is no true faith-the-virtue unless through it all things believable are believed and gathered into one. But they would not be gathered into one through faith unless faith were one virtuep478-4: therefore it is necessary that faith be one with respect to all things believable.

5. Likewise, there is not, according to species, another obedience by which I obey God in the commandments of the first table and in the commandments of the second, although the commandments of the first table order [us] to God, while the commandments of the second order [us] to the neighborp478-5: therefore by parity of reasoning there will not be another faith by which one assents to the first Truth in the articles regarding the Divinity and in the articles regarding the humanity. And there is nothing else to be given according to which faith is multiplied and diversified: therefore it is necessary that the virtue of faith be one according to species.

On the contrary: 1. « Habits are diversified through acts, and acts through objectsp478-6 »; but the object of faith is not only uncreated truth, as that God is three and one, but also created truth, as that Christ was born and suffered: if therefore the created and the uncreated have nothing in common, but rather differ essentially and formally; it is necessary to hold that the faith by which we believe the Divinity, and the faith by which we believe the humanity, are one and another according to species.

2. Likewise, just as the will is related to things willed, and knowledge to things knowable, so is faith related to things believable; but wills are diversified and numbered according to the diversity of things willed, likewise forms of knowledge according to the diversity of things knowablep478-7: it seems therefore by like reasoning that faith must be diversified acp. 479cording to the diversity of things believable; and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, the gift of wisdom and [the gift] of knowledge are diverse gifts, and this for no other reason than that the one is about eternal things, and the other is about temporal thingsp479-1: if therefore faith is about these and about those, it seems that it too must be formally diversified.

4. Likewise, fear and hope are formally differing affections, and this because fear is about future evils, but hope about future goodsp479-2; but faith is not only about future goods, as about eternal glory, but also about future evils, as about eternal punishment: therefore it seems that faith too must be formally diversified about these and about those.

5. Likewise, no virtue has the full character of a virtue unless a right intention with respect to the end accompanies it; but « it is faith that directs the intentionp479-3 »: therefore it is necessary that faith range over all the virtues as regards their ends: therefore if a virtue that ranges over all the virtues is not a special virtue, but a virtue general to all; it seems that from this it can be gathered that faith is not one virtue according to species.

Conclusion.

Faith, whether it be in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one virtue according to species, although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number.

I respond: It must be said that faith, whether in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one according to species, because it is not divided into speciesp479-4, although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number. — And the reason for this is that the unity of a virtue is regarded according to the unity of its principal act; and the unity of the principal act is regarded according to the unity of the first object; and since the first object of faith is one: hence it is that the virtue of faith must necessarily be one. — But this becomes plainer through an example in something similar. For as we see in the habit of seeing, that the visive power has an object per accidens, as we are said to see a horse and a man; it has also an object per se, as we are said to see white and blackp. 480; it has also an object not only per se, but even primarily, as we are said to see the luminousp479-5 — and although the object per accidens, that is, the material object of sight itself, is diversified in species, as a horse differs in species from a man, and even the object per se differs in species, as white differs in species from black; nevertheless the habit of seeing is not diversified according to species, because the character of the first object, namely the character of luminosity itself, is one in every visible thing — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, although faith has many objects per accidens, as all the things that follow upon the articles, and also many objects per se, asp479-6 the articles themselves, many and distinct; nevertheless, because the ground of believing is one in all of them, namely the highest Truth itself, on which faith itself relies for its own sake and above all: therefore faith itself is one in species, however great a difference is found among things believablep479-7. — And there is a parallel: if I were to believe some truthful man, because he is truthful, with the same credence by which I would believe him to be truthful, I would believe all the things he says to be true, howeverp479-8 he might speak about diverse matters. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — And therefore the arguments showing that faith has unity according to species are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected first, that acts are diversified through objects; the response is already clear, since this is not understood of just any object, but of the object that is an object per se and primarily, which indeed has not only the character of the material, but also the character of the active and the motive; in this way, however, there is no object of faith except the highest Truth itself, as will appear better belowp479-9, when the object of faith is inquired into.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is related to things believable just as the will to things willed, and knowledge to things knowable; it must be said that it is not alike, since knowledge in diverse knowable things beholds diverse grounds and diverse media, through which it knows themp479-10: likewise the will in diverse things willed beholds diverse desirable things, on account of which it desires them. Therefore both the will and knowledge are diversified in respect of those things which they desire and know. But faith beholds a single ground, according to which it believes all things believable. And therefore on account of the diversity of things believable it need not be diversified.

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom and [the gift] of knowledge are diversified; it must be said that it is not alike: because wisdom is occupied about eternal things according to eternal grounds, and knowledge about temporal things according to temporal grounds; and therefore they are diversified, because they are occupied according to other and other grounds. But faith is not so; rather, it is concerned both with created and with uncreated things according to the dictate of eternal Truth; and therefore it does not have to be diversified in this way.

4. To that which is objected, that fear and hope are diversified, because they are about goods and evils; it must be said that it is not alike: because fear regards evil, as evil, and hope [regards] good, as good, and thus according to diverse grounds. But faith does not consider good and evil except insofar as they fall under the dictatep480-1 of Truth, and thus under one ground. For it believes that the wicked are punished just as that the good are rewarded; for the one is true just as the other, and Truth dictates the one just as the other.

5. To that which is objected, that faith directs all the virtues; it must be said that from this it does not follow that faith is a general virtue, because it happens that the virtues encompass one another, and the object of one virtue can well be the material [object] of another virtue, and yet they are distinct from one another, because they are distinguished in respect of their proper objects, which have not only the character of the material, but also the character of the motive. For the material object brings about neither agreement in species nor difference. — And on account of this it does not follow that faith is common to the other virtues, because it regards theirp480-2 objects and ends. For it regards those only by way of matter, about which it is concerned; yet it has its proper and first object distinct from the other virtues, and according to the unity of this object it is to be held that faith is one according to species, as was shown in what precedes.

Scholion

I. This question is also proposed by others in this way: whether faith is one virtue, special, or general. For a threefold unity is distinguished: numerical, specific, generic (cf. the 5th argument ad oppositum). As to numerical unity, it is clear that the habit of faith is multiplied according to the number of believing subjects. It remains therefore a question whether faith (like the diverse sciences) has only generic unity, or rather specific. But this, as all teach, depends not on its material object, but on its formal one. — In the schools there is now commonly distinguished the formal object which (obiectum formale quod) and the formal object by which (obiectum formale quo). The formal object which is that which is treated primarily and per se, and the others insofar as they are ordered to it; this is here called in the body the first object. The formal object by which is the formal motive ground, under which, or by the mediation of which, the formal object which and all the material objects are attained, or, as the author says (in reply 1), that which « has the character of the active and the motive ». — Yet it must be noted that in divine faith the formal object which is in reality the same, namely the first objective Truth, which is known primarily and per se (whence it can also be called the first and principal material object); and the formal object by which, namely the first formal Truth, or the motive ground on account of which the intellect tends toward the object (cf. on this below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2). Hence the formal object by which is commonly also called the formal object which, or rather both are signified by this one word. — It must also be observed that the usage of speaking and the manner of dividing the object of faith among diverse authors is by no means fitting and consistent; whence often their positions are diverse more in appearance than in reality. Concerning the conclusion itself there is no diversity of opinions.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 68, m. 4. — Scotus, III Sent., d. 25, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2; Summa III, q. 4, a. 6. — Blessed Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — In minori pro quod quidem codd. A K U quae quidem. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 26, nota 11. in fine, et pag. 355, nota 3. — Proxime ante pro per fidem edd. cum pluribus codd. perfecte.
    Verse 5. Cf. here Lombard's text, c. 6. — In the minor [premise], for quod quidem codices A, K, U read quae quidem. Cf. tom. II, p. 26, note 11, at the end, and p. 355, note 3. — Just before, for per fidem the editions with several codices read perfecte.
  2. Vers. 13. — De minori cfr. infra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.
    Verse 13. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 27, a. 1, q. 2.
  3. Ita bene cod. N; in aliis et edd. intellectivae. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3. seqq., et supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Thus rightly codex N; in the others and the editions, intellectivae. Cf. Aristotle, VI Ethics, c. 3 ff., and above, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
  4. Nam multitudo non reducitur ad unitatem nisi per unum.
    For a multitude is not reduced to unity except through one.
  5. Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 1. et 2. — Superius pro qua [codd. G I L aa secundum quam] obedio edd. qua obeditur.
    Cf. below, d. 37, a. 1 and 2. — Above, for qua [codices G, I, L, aa secundum quam] obedio the editions read qua obeditur.
  6. Vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. — De minori cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2.
    See above, p. 470, note 8. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2.
  7. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.): « Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res » (pro quo in versione Arabico-Latina sic legitur: Dicamus igitur, quod scire et sentire dividuntur secundum divisionem entium). De diversitate voluntatis vide supra pag. 308, nota 1. — Vat., pro sed voluntates posito sed scientiae, omittit deinde volitorum, similiter scientiae secundum diversitatem.
    Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 38 (c. 8): « Knowledge therefore and sense are cut up into things » (in place of which, in the Arabic-Latin version, it reads thus: Let us say therefore that knowing and sensing are divided according to the division of beings). On the diversity of the will, see above, p. 308, note 1. — The Vatican [edition], having put sed scientiae for sed voluntates, then omits volitorum, similiter scientiae secundum diversitatem.
  8. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 1, seqq., et Comment. ibid. q. 1. seq.
    See below, Lombard's text, d. 35, c. 1 ff., and the Commentary there, q. 1 ff.
  9. Cfr. infra d. 26. dub. 2. et d. 31. p. II. dub. 1.
    Cf. below, d. 26, dub. 2, and d. 31, p. II, dub. 1.
  10. Ut dicit August., supra pag. 471, nota 8. allegatus. — Codd. G I (L a prima manu) V voci intentionem praefigunt rectam.
    As Augustine says, cited above at p. 471, note 8. — Codices G, I (L by the first hand), V prefix rectam to the word intentionem.
  11. Codd. G I L V aa non diversificatur secundum species. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.
    Codices G, I, L, V, aa read non diversificatur secundum species. Cf. here Lombard's text, c. 6.
  12. De hoc triplici obiecto vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.) nec non de Sensu et sens. c. 2. seqq. — Superius pro in habitu videndi codd. A K Q Z in actu videndi.
    On this threefold object, see Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 63 ff. (c. 6), and also On Sense and the Sensible, c. 2 ff. — Above, for in habitu videndi codices A, K, Q, Z read in actu videndi.
  13. Non pauci codd. nec non edd. post sicut adiiciunt etiam, quod recte omittunt codd. H bb et etiam codd. G I L V aa, qui insuper omittunt ipsos.
    Not a few codices and also the editions add etiam after sicut, which codices H, bb rightly omit, as do codices G, I, L, V, aa, which moreover omit ipsos.
  14. Pro credibilibus, quod auctoritate codd. A C D M O W Z posuimus, alii codd. credentibus, edd. credendis.
    For credibilibus, which on the authority of codices A, C, D, M, O, W, Z we have put, other codices read credentibus, the editions credendis.
  15. Codd. L aa quandocumque, et paulo inferius pro idcirco cum codd. G I V ideo.
    Codices L, aa read quandocumque, and a little further on, for idcirco, with codices G, I, V, ideo.
  16. Dist. 24. a. 1. q. 2.
    D. 24, a. 1, q. 2.
  17. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. et XI. c. 1. (III. c. 1. seq. et X. c. 1.). — Pro diversis scibilibus Vat. diversis speciebus scibilibus. Paulo inferius pro propter quae edd. cum nonnullis codd. per quae. Subinde pro unicam cod. U magis.
    Cf. Aristotle, IV Metaphysics, text 1 ff. and XI, c. 1 (III, c. 1 f. and X, c. 1). — For diversis scibilibus the Vatican [edition reads] diversis speciebus scibilibus. A little further on, for propter quae the editions with some codices read per quae. Thereupon, for unicam codex U [reads] magis.
  18. Pro dictamine codd. G I (L a prima manu) V ratione. Post pauca pro bonos edd. cum aliquot codd. beatos et subinde ita etiam pro ita enim; denique pro dictat cod. Z indicat.
    For dictamine codices G, I (L by the first hand), V read ratione. A little after, for bonos the editions with several codices read beatos, and thereupon ita etiam for ita enim; finally, for dictat codex Z reads indicat.
  19. Pro earum cod. Q eadem.
    For earum codex Q [reads] eadem. ---
← Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 4→