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Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 480

Quaestio IV. Utrum fides sit certior quam scientia.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum fides sit certior quam scientia. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinusp480-3: « Nihil est certius homini sua fide »: ergo videtur, quod fides maiorem, vel saltem aequalem certitudinem habeat quam scientia.

2. Item, Philosophusp480-4: « Virtus est certior omni arte »; sed fides ponitur in genere virtutis, scientia autem et ars sunt eiusdem generis: ergo maior est certitudo in fide, quam sit in habitu scientiae.

3. Item, certius cognoscitur quod cognoscitur in lumine Veritatis primae, quam quod cognoscitur in lumine veritatis creataep480-5; sed quod cognoscitur fide cognoscitur in lumine Veritatis primae, quod autem scientia, cognoscitur in lumine veritatis creap. 481tae cognoscitur: ergo maior est certitudo fidei quam scientiae.

4. Item, certius est illud, in quo non cadit error, quam circa quod contingit errarep481-1; sed fidei non permiscetur error, cognitioni autem philosophorum multi errores permiscentur: ergo maior est certitudo fidei, quam sit certitudo alicuius scientiae philosophicae.

5. Item, certior scientia certius habet fundamentum; sed quanto aliqua scientia nobilior et perfectior est, tanto certior est; sed scientia theologiae est omnino scientia altissima et nobilissimap481-2: ergo certissima. Si ergo fides est fundamentum totius scientiae theologicae, necesse est, ipsam esse certissimam: est igitur in ea maior certitudo quam in aliqua alia scientia.

Sed contra: 1. Hugo de sancto Victorep481-3: « Fides est certitudo quaedam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta »: ergo minor est certitudo in ipsa fide quam in habitu scientiae.

2. Item, certius cognoscitur id, de quo non potest dubitari, quam id de quo potest dubitari; sed quod quis cognoscit scientiali cognitione, sic novit, quod de eo dubitare non potestp481-4; qui autem novit aliquid cognitione fidei, potest de eo dubitare, sicut patet: ergo maior est certitudo scientiae quam fidei.

3. Item, certius cognoscitur quod cognoscitur aperta visione, quam quod cognoscitur sola credulitate; sed per scientiam cognoscitur aliquid aperta visione, per fidem sola credulitate: ergo certior est scientia quam fides.

4. Item, quanto aliquid cognoscitur clarius, tanto cognoscitur certius; sed fides cognoscit per speculum in aenigmate, scientia autem revelata faciep481-5: ergo maior est certitudo, quam habet scientia, quam illa, quam habet fides.

5. Item, certius cognoscitur quod potest probari, quam quod non potest probari; sed quod quis cognoscit habitu scientiae potest probare alii quantumcumque adversanti et eum convincere necessario, ita quod non potest contradicerep481-6; non sic autem est de fide: ergo fides non habet tantam certitudinem, quantam habet habitus scientiae.

Conclusio.

Certitudo fidei superatur a scientia, quae est visio Dei aperta, superat vero scientiam, quae est cognitio credibilium secundum statum viae, et interdum etiam scientiam aliorum cognoscibilium quoad certitudinem adhaesionis, non vero speculationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum comparamus certitudinem fidei ad certitudinem scientiae, potest intelligi dupliciter. Nam uno modo scientia potest dici aperta et certa visio Dei in patria; et hoc modo non est quaestio nec dubium, quin scientia isto modop481-7 praecellat in certitudine ipsam fidem, sicut gloria praecellit gratiam, et status patriae statum viae. — Alio modo dicitur scientia cognitio, quam quis habet in via; et ista potest esse dupliciter: aut respectu illorum, respectu quorum est fides; aut respectu aliorum cognoscibilium. Si respectu illorum, respectu quorum est fides, sic, simpliciter loquendo, certior est fides quam scientia. Unde si aliquis philosophorum cognovit aliquem articulorum ratiocinando, utpote Deum esse creatorem, vel Deum esse remuneratorem; nunquam ita certitudinaliter cognovit per suam scientiam, sicut cognoscit verus fidelis per suam fidem.

Si autem loquamur de scientia, secundum quod est cognitio aliorum cognoscibilium, sic quodam modo certior est fides quam scientia, et quodam modo e contrario. Est enim certitudo speculationis, et est certitudo adhaesionis; et prima quidem respicit intellectump481-8, secunda vero respicit ipsum affectum. — Si loquamur de certitudine adhaesionis, sic maior est certitudo in ipsa fide, quam sit in habitu scientiae, pro eo quod vera fides magis facit adhaerere ipsum credentem veritati creditae, quam aliqua scientia alicui rei scitae. Videmus enim, veros fideles nec per argumenta nec per tormenta nec per blandimenta inclinari posse, ut veritatem, quam credunt, saltem oretenus negent; quod nemo sciens sanae mentis faceret pro aliquo, quod cognoscit, nisi in quantum doctrina fidei dictat, non esse mentiendum. Stultus enimp481-9 esset geometra, qui pro p. 482quacumque certa conclusione geometriae auderet subire mortem. Unde verus fidelis, etiam si sciret totam scientiam philosophicam, mallet totam illam scientiam perdere, quam unum solum articulum ignorare; adeo adhaeret veritati creditae. De certitudine igitur adhaesionis verum est, fidem esse certiorem scientia philosophica, et haec certitudo respicit veritatem et doctrinam secundum pietatemp482-1; et de hac certitudine concludunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

Si autem loquamur de certitudine speculationis, quae quidem respicit ipsum intellectum et nudam veritatem; sic concedi potest, quod maior est certitudo in aliqua scientia quam in fide, pro eo quod aliquis potest aliquid per scientiam ita certitudinaliter nosse, quod nullo modo potest de eo dubitare nec aliquo modo discredere nec in corde suo ullo modo contradicere, sicut patet in cognitione dignitatump482-2 et primorum principiorum. Et hoc modo procedunt rationes ad partem sequentem, sicut pertractanti patet. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Procedunt enim secundum diversas vias. Nam rationes ad primam partem adductae concludunt de certitudine adhaesionis; rationes vero ad oppositum de certitudine speculationis. Verumtamen rationes ad primam partem adductae videntur concludere de certitudine speculationis, quodp482-3 illa certitudine sit fides certior scientia, quod falsum est. Ideo tentandum est eas dissolvere.

1. Ad illud verbum Augustini, quo dicitur, quod nihil est homini certius sua fide: dici potest, quod nihil facit ad propositum, quia non loquitur de certitudine, quam quis habet per fidem, sed quam quis habet de fide, quam habet in mente; et illa est certitudo scientiae, scit enim homo fidelis, se habere fidemp482-4.

2. Ad illud Philosophi, quod virtus est certior omni arte; dicendum, quod ipse loquitur de virtute et arte, secundum quod comparantur ad idem. Multo enim melius scit aliquis invenire medium et obiectum per habitum virtutis quam per habitum purae cognitionis. Non est autem generaliter intelligendum, quod virtus sit certior circa proprium obiectum, quam aliqua scientia circa suump482-5.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod certius videtur quod videtur in lumine Veritatis increatae, quam quod videtur in lumine veritatis creatae; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando lumen Veritatis increatae irradiat plene, sicut erit in patria. Quando autem semiplene irradiat, non est necesse, quod habeat veritatem; sicut patet, quia certius potest homo videre ad lumen candelae quam ad lumen solis, ubi sol non plene irradiat; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. Licet enim fiat irradiatio mediante fide ab ipsa Veritate aeterna, non tamen est irradiatio plena, quoniamp482-6 manet speculum et aenigma.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod certior est cognitio, cui non permiscetur error; dicendum, quod verum est; sed sicut fidei non permiscetur error, ita etiam nec scientiaep482-7, in quantum scientia, sed hoc est solum ex defectu a parte cognoscentis. Sic etiam contingit in ipsa fide a parte credentis, sicut patet in fidelip482-8, qui propter distorsionem intellectus a cognitione fidei labitur in haeresim, dum credulitati verae intermiscet se credulitas falsa. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit certior quam scientia. Istud tamen verum est, quod doctrina fidei magis veraciter est tradita, quam aliqua scientia philosophica, quia Spiritus sanctus et ipse Christus, qui docuerunt veritatem fidei et sacrae Scripturae, in nullo falsum dixerunt nec in aliquo possunt reprehendi; quod de nullo philosopho arbitror vere posse dici in traditione alicuius doctrinae, immo inveniuntur veris multa falsa permiscuisse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto scientia nobilior est, tanto certior; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem. Nam, sicut dicit Philosophusp482-8b, p. 483« maior est certitudo mathematicae scientiae quam divinae » — et tamen nobilior est divina quam mathematica — hoc autem est propter defectum a parte intelligentis; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, « sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem, ita intellectus noster ad manifestissima naturae »; unde illa quae sunt certissima in se, cognoscit aliquando dubie. Et tamen illa cognitio minus certa magis est nobilis et perfecta, quoniam est de re nobiliori. Melius est enim vel modicum quid de Deo scire, quam caelestium vel terrestrium notitiam habere. — Rationes vero ad oppositam partem concedendae sunt; concludunt enim de certitudine speculationis, sicut satis clarum est et pertractanti apparet.

Scholion

I. « Fides habet maiorem certitudinem quantum ad firmitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus, quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit maior evidentia eorum quibus assentitur » (S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3.). « Certitudo scientiae consistit in duobus, scilicet in evidentia et in firmitate adhaesionis; certitudo autem fidei consistit in uno tantum, scilicet in firmitate adhaesionis; certitudo vero opinionis in neutro; quamvis certitudo fidei... quantum ad illud unum sit vehementior quam certitudo scientiae quantum ad illa duo » (ibid. ad 1.). « Credens secundum firmitatem adhaesionis magis recedit [a dubietate], quam sciens secundum illa duo » (ibid. ad 2.). — Haec dicta sunt quoad certitudinem ex parte subiecti credentis. Excepto Durando (hic q. 7.), qui hic in multis a communi via recedit, idem ab aliis antiquis doctoribus docetur, licet non iisdem verbis: v. g. auctor noster certitudini adhaesionis opponit non, ut S. Thom., evidentiam, sed certitudinem speculationis; et secundum hanc non negat maiorem certitudinem in scientia esse posse, cum certitudo fidei non excludat motus dubitationis, immo nec quod possit quis retractare assensum, ut manifestum est. — Aliter autem dicendum est de certitudine fidei ex parte suae causae obiectivae (hic arg. 3. pro parte affirm. et solut. ad 4.), cum fides innitatur primae Veritati infallibili et lumini supernaturali infuso, quae certitudine obiectiva omnino excedunt creatum rationis lumen (cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 8.). Tota responsio magis confirmatur infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1.

II. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 9. a. 1, et in Supplemento ad Summam Alexandri (collatio 35.) primo transcripta sunt omnia ab Alexandro dicta et deinde quaestio haec S. Bonaventurae, ut iam supra in scholio ad 2. quaest. observatum est. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 19. — B. Albert., hic a. 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 24. q. unica.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether faith is more certain than knowledge.

Fourthly it is asked whether faith is more certain than knowledge. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. Augustinep480-3: « Nothing is more certain to a man than his faith »: therefore it seems that faith has a greater, or at least an equal, certainty than knowledge.

2. Likewise, the Philosopherp480-4: « Virtue is more certain than every art »; but faith is placed in the genus of virtue, while knowledge and art are of the same genus: therefore there is greater certainty in faith than there is in the habit of knowledge.

3. Likewise, that is known more certainly which is known in the light of the first Truth, than what is known in the light of created truthp480-5; but what is known by faith is known in the light of the first Truth, while what [is known] by knowledge is known in the light of created truthp. 481: therefore the certainty of faith is greater than that of knowledge.

4. Likewise, that is more certain in which error does not fall, than that about which it is possible to errp481-1; but error is not mingled with faith, whereas many errors are mingled with the cognition of the philosophers: therefore the certainty of faith is greater than the certainty of any philosophical knowledge.

5. Likewise, the more certain knowledge has a more certain foundation; but the nobler and more perfect any knowledge is, the more certain it is; but the knowledge of theology is altogether the highest and noblest knowledgep481-2: therefore it is most certain. If therefore faith is the foundation of the whole of theological knowledge, it is necessary that it be most certain: therefore there is in it a greater certainty than in any other knowledge.

On the contrary: 1. Hugh of Saint Victorp481-3: « Faith is a certain certitude of the mind concerning absent things, constituted above opinion and below knowledge »: therefore there is less certainty in faith itself than in the habit of knowledge.

2. Likewise, that is known more certainly about which one cannot doubt, than that about which one can doubt; but what one knows by scientific cognition, one knows in such a way that one cannot doubt about itp481-4; whereas one who knows something by the cognition of faith can doubt about it, as is plain: therefore the certainty of knowledge is greater than that of faith.

3. Likewise, that is known more certainly which is known by open vision, than what is known by mere belief; but through knowledge something is known by open vision, through faith [only] by mere belief: therefore knowledge is more certain than faith.

4. Likewise, the more clearly something is known, the more certainly it is known; but faith knows through a glass in an enigma, whereas knowledge [knows] with unveiled facep481-5: therefore the certainty that knowledge has is greater than that which faith has.

5. Likewise, that is known more certainly which can be proved, than what cannot be proved; but what one knows by the habit of knowledge one can prove to another, however much he opposes, and convince him of necessity, so that he cannot contradictp481-6; but it is not so with faith: therefore faith does not have as much certainty as the habit of knowledge has.

Conclusion.

The certainty of faith is surpassed by the knowledge that is the open vision of God, but it surpasses the knowledge that is the cognition of things believable according to the state of the wayfarer, and sometimes also the knowledge of other knowable things as regards the certainty of adherence, but not [the certainty] of speculation.

I respond: It must be said that when we compare the certainty of faith to the certainty of knowledge, it can be understood in two ways. For in one way knowledge can be called the open and certain vision of God in the fatherland; and in this way there is no question or doubt that knowledge in this wayp481-7 excels faith itself in certainty, just as glory excels grace, and the state of the fatherland the state of the wayfarer. — In another way knowledge is called the cognition which one has on the way; and this can be in two ways: either with respect to those things with respect to which there is faith; or with respect to other knowable things. If with respect to those things with respect to which there is faith, then, speaking simply, faith is more certain than knowledge. Hence if some philosopher knew one of the articles by reasoning, as that God is the creator, or that God is the rewarder; he never knew so certainly through his knowledge as the true believer knows through his faith.

But if we speak of knowledge insofar as it is the cognition of other knowable things, then in a certain way faith is more certain than knowledge, and in a certain way the contrary. For there is a certainty of speculation, and there is a certainty of adherence; and the first indeed regards the intellectp481-8, while the second regards the affect itself. — If we speak of the certainty of adherence, then there is greater certainty in faith itself than there is in the habit of knowledge, because true faith makes the believer himself adhere to the truth believed more than any knowledge [makes one adhere] to some thing known. For we see that true believers can be inclined neither by arguments nor by torments nor by blandishments to deny, at least in words, the truth which they believe; which no knowing man of sound mind would do for anything he knows, except insofar as the teaching of faith dictates that one ought not to lie. For a geometer would be foolishp481-9 who, for p. 482any certain conclusion of geometry, would dare to undergo death. Hence the true believer, even if he knew the whole of philosophical knowledge, would rather lose all that knowledge than be ignorant of a single article; so much does he adhere to the truth believed. Concerning the certainty of adherence, therefore, it is true that faith is more certain than philosophical knowledge, and this certainty regards truth and teaching according to pietyp482-1; and concerning this certainty the arguments adduced for the first part conclude.

But if we speak of the certainty of speculation, which indeed regards the intellect itself and bare truth; then it can be conceded that there is greater certainty in some knowledge than in faith, because one can know something through knowledge so certainly that one can in no way doubt about it, nor in any way disbelieve it, nor in his heart contradict it in any way, as is plain in the cognition of axiomsp482-2 and of first principles. And in this way the arguments for the following part proceed, as is plain to one who treats [the matter]. — And through this the response to the question proposed is plain; the response to the objections is also plain. For they proceed by diverse ways. For the arguments adduced for the first part conclude about the certainty of adherence; but the arguments to the opposite, about the certainty of speculation. Nevertheless the arguments adduced for the first part seem to conclude about the certainty of speculation, thatp482-3 by that certainty faith is more certain than knowledge, which is false. Therefore it must be attempted to resolve them.

1. To that word of Augustine, by which it is said that nothing is more certain to a man than his faith: it can be said that it does nothing for the matter, because he is not speaking of the certainty which one has through faith, but which one has about faith, which one has in the mind; and that is a certainty of knowledge, for the faithful man knows that he has faithp482-4.

2. To that of the Philosopher, that virtue is more certain than every art; it must be said that he is speaking of virtue and art insofar as they are compared to the same [object]. For one knows much better how to find the mean and the object through the habit of virtue than through the habit of pure cognition. But it is not to be understood generally that virtue is more certain about its proper object than any knowledge is about its ownp482-5.

3. To that which is objected, that what is seen in the light of the uncreated Truth seems to be seen more certainly than what is seen in the light of created truth; it must be said that this is true when the light of the uncreated Truth shines fully, as it will be in the fatherland. But when it shines half-fully, it is not necessary that it have truth; as is plain, because a man can see more certainly by the light of a candle than by the light of the sun, where the sun does not shine fully; and so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For although the irradiation by the mediation of faith comes from the eternal Truth itself, nevertheless the irradiation is not full, sincep482-6 the glass and the enigma remain.

4. To that which is objected, that the cognition with which error is not mingled is more certain; it must be said that it is true; but just as error is not mingled with faith, so neither [is it mingled] with knowledgep482-7, insofar as it is knowledge, but this is only from a defect on the part of the knower. So too it happens in faith itself on the part of the believer, as is plain in the faithful manp482-8 who, on account of a distortion of the intellect, falls from the cognition of faith into heresy, while a false belief mingles itself with true belief. Hence from this it cannot be concluded that faith is more certain than knowledge. Yet this is true, that the teaching of faith has been handed down more truthfully than any philosophical knowledge, because the Holy Spirit and Christ himself, who taught the truth of faith and of sacred Scripture, said nothing false in anything nor can be reprehended in anything; which I judge can truly be said of no philosopher in the handing down of any teaching, but rather they are found to have mingled many false things with true ones.

5. To that which is objected, that the nobler knowledge is, the more certain; it must be said that this does not have truth. For, as the Philosopher saysp482-8b, p. 483« the certainty of mathematical knowledge is greater than that of divine [knowledge] » — and yet the divine is nobler than the mathematical — but this is on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding; because, as the Philosopher says, « as the eye of the night-owl is to the light, so is our intellect to the most manifest things of nature »; whence those things which are most certain in themselves, it sometimes knows doubtfully. And yet that less certain cognition is more noble and perfect, since it is about a nobler thing. For it is better to know even a little something about God than to have knowledge of the heavenly or earthly things. — But the arguments to the opposite part are to be conceded; for they conclude about the certainty of speculation, as is sufficiently clear and appears to one who treats [the matter].

Scholion

I. « Faith has a greater certainty as regards the firmness of adherence than is the certainty of knowledge or of the intellect, although in knowledge and in the intellect there is a greater evidence of the things to which assent is given » (St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3). « The certainty of knowledge consists in two things, namely in evidence and in firmness of adherence; but the certainty of faith consists in one only, namely in firmness of adherence; while the certainty of opinion [consists] in neither; although the certainty of faith... as regards that one thing is more vehement than the certainty of knowledge as regards those two » (ibid. ad 1). « One who believes, according to the firmness of adherence, departs more [from doubt] than one who knows, according to those two » (ibid. ad 2). — These things are said as regards certainty on the part of the believing subject. With the exception of Durandus (here q. 7), who here departs in many things from the common way, the same is taught by the other ancient doctors, though not in the same words: e.g. our author opposes to the certainty of adherence not, as St. Thomas, evidence, but the certainty of speculation; and according to this he does not deny that there can be a greater certainty in knowledge, since the certainty of faith does not exclude movements of doubt, indeed not even that one can retract assent, as is manifest. — But it must be said otherwise concerning the certainty of faith on the part of its objective cause (here arg. 3 for the affirmative part and the solution to 4), since faith relies on the first infallible Truth and on the supernatural light infused, which by objective certainty altogether exceed the created light of reason (cf. St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 4, a. 8). The whole response is more confirmed below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1.

II. Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 68, m. 9, a. 1, and in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander (collation 35) first all the things said by Alexander were transcribed and then this question of St. Bonaventure, as was already observed above in the scholion to the 2nd question. — Scotus, here the sole question, n. 19. — Blessed Albert, here a. 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 7, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III Sent., d. 24, the sole question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 3, sententialiter; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.
    Book XIII On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 3, in substance; cf. here Lombard's text, c. 7.
  2. Libr. II. Ethic. c. 6. De scientia et arte cfr. ibid. VI. c. 4. et 6.
    Book II of the Ethics, c. 6. On knowledge and art cf. ibid. VI, c. 4 and 6.
  3. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 20. (c. 24.): Scientia, « quae magis ex principio, ea quae minus est, certior est ». Et I. Metaph. c. 2: Scientiarum autem illae certiores sunt, quae maxime primorum sunt.
    Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics], c. 20 (c. 24): The knowledge « which is more from a principle is more certain than that which is less so ». And I Metaphysics, c. 2: But those forms of knowledge are more certain which are most of all of first things.
  4. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 8. (III. c. 3.), proprietates primi philosophiae principii recensens ait: Omnium autem certissimum principium est, circa quod impossibile est mentiri. — De minori cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1.
    Aristotle, IV Metaphysics, text 8 (III, c. 3), reviewing the properties of the first principle of philosophy, says: But the most certain of all principles is that about which it is impossible to be mistaken. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1.
  5. Quia theologia, ut S. Bonav. in fine prooemii Brevil. ait, tanquam scientia et doctrina omnia resolvit in Deum, tanquam in principium primum et summum. — August., Enchirid. c. 5: Certum vero propriumque fidei catholicae fundamentum Christus est. Fundamentum enim aliud, ait Apostolus (I. Cor. 3, 11.) nemo potest ponere praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus. — De nobilitate scientiarum cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2. et III. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). — In fine arg. codd. partim omittunt aliqua, partim alia.
    Because theology, as St. Bonaventure says at the end of the prologue of the Breviloquium, as a knowledge and a teaching resolves all things into God as into the first and highest principle. — Augustine, Enchiridion c. 5: But the certain and proper foundation of the Catholic faith is Christ. For other foundation, says the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:11) can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus. — On the nobility of the sciences cf. Aristotle, I Metaphysics, c. 2, and III, text 3 (II, c. 2). — At the end of the argument the codices in part omit some things, in part others.
  6. Libr. I. de Sacram. p. X. c. 2.
    Book I On the Sacraments, p. X, c. 2.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.).
    Cf. Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics], c. 26 (c. 33).
  8. Respicitur illud I. Cor. 13, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate etc., et illud II. 3, 18: Nos vero omnes revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes etc. — Pro cognoscit multi codd. falso cognoscitur, nisi pro fides substituatur fide.
    Reference is made to 1 Cor. 13:12: We see now through a glass in an enigma etc., and to II [Cor.] 3:18: But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with unveiled face etc. — For cognoscit many codices wrongly [read] cognoscitur, unless fide is substituted for fides.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et 6. seqq.
    Cf. Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics], c. 2 and 6 ff.
  10. Verba isto modo absunt a codd. G I L V aa.
    The words isto modo are absent from codices G, I, L, V, aa.
  11. Codd. G I L V aa ipsum intellectum. Mox ante affectum dicti codd., excepto cod. aa, omittunt ipsum et paulo post pro quam sit in habitu scientiae substituunt quam in ipsa scientia.
    Codices G, I, L, V, aa [read] ipsum intellectum. Just before affectum the said codices, except codex aa, omit ipsum, and a little after, for quam sit in habitu scientiae substitute quam in ipsa scientia.
  12. Pro enim (sic codd. A K P Q) alii codd. nec non edd. etiam. Non ita multo post pro philosophicam quod habent codd. L Z aa bb (alii codd. dubiae sunt lectionis), edd. physicam. Mox post ignorare Vat. subiungit vel negare.
    For enim (thus codices A, K, P, Q) the other codices as well as the editions [read] etiam. Not much after, for philosophicam which codices L, Z, aa, bb have (the other codices are of doubtful reading), the editions [read] physicam. Just after ignorare the Vatican [edition] adds vel negare.
  13. Epist. ad Tit. 1, 1: Et agnitionem veritatis, quae secundum pietatem est.
    Epistle to Titus 1:1: And the acknowledging of the truth which is according to piety.
  14. Graece ἀξιώματα. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2, quem locum B. Albert., tr. 1. c. 4, exponens ait: Illam enim propositionem immediati principii, quam necesse est habere apud se per naturalem habitum eum qui est docendus, et non accipit eam per doctrinam, dicimus dignitatem vel maximam propositionem, quae, ut dicit Boethius [in libr. de Hebdom.], communis animi conceptio est, quam scilicet cognitis terminis quilibet probat auditam. Haec autem dignitas vocatur, quia omnibus dignior est, eo quod omnibus influit cognitionem et veritatem; maxima dicitur, eo quod virtute influentiae lucis et veritatis omnia excedit immediata principia etc. Cfr. III. Metaph. text. 4. (II. c. 2.).
    In Greek ἀξιώματα. Cf. Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics], c. 2, which passage Blessed Albert, tr. 1, c. 4, expounding, says: For that proposition of an immediate principle, which the one who is to be taught must necessarily have within himself by a natural habit, and does not receive through teaching, we call a dignitas or maximal proposition, which, as Boethius says [in the book On the Hebdomads], is a common conception of the mind, which, namely, with the terms known, anyone, having heard it, approves. But this is called a dignitas because it is worthier than all, in that it pours into all cognition and truth; it is called maximal because by the power of the influence of light and truth it exceeds all immediate principles etc. Cf. III Metaphysics, text 4 (II, c. 2).
  15. Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 quia, cod. Iv et.
    Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] quia, codex Iv et.
  16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et infra dub. 4.
    Cf. here Lombard's text, c. 3, and below, dub. 4.
  17. S. Thom., in II. Ethic. c. 6. (lect. 6.) ait: Unde et boni artifices... operantur respicientes ad medium. Sed virtus est certior omni arte et etiam melior, sicut et natura. Virtus enim moralis agit inclinando determinate ad unum, sicut et natura. Nam consuetudo in naturam vertitur. Operatio autem artis est secundum rationem, quae se habet ad diversa. Unde certior est virtus quam ars, sicut et natura. Similiter etiam virtus est melior quam ars, quia per artem est homo potens facere bonum opus, non tamen ex arte est ei, quod faciat bonum opus; potest enim pravum opus agere, quia ars non inclinat ad bonum usum artis, sicut grammaticus potest incongrue loqui. Sed per virtutem aliquis non solum potest bene operari, sed etiam est bene operans; quia virtus inclinat ad bonam operationem, sicut et natura; ars autem sola facit cognitionem solam bonae operationis. Unde relinquitur a minori, quod virtus, quae est melior arte, sit coniectatrix medii.
    St. Thomas, on II Ethics, c. 6 (lect. 6), says: Hence good craftsmen too... work looking to the mean. But virtue is more certain than every art and also better, as is nature too. For moral virtue acts by inclining determinately to one thing, as does nature too. For custom is turned into nature. But the operation of art is according to reason, which is disposed to diverse things. Hence virtue is more certain than art, as is nature too. Likewise virtue is also better than art, because by art a man is able to make a good work, yet it is not from art that he makes a good work; for he can do a bad work, since art does not incline to the good use of art, just as a grammarian can speak incongruously. But by virtue someone not only can work well, but is also working well; because virtue inclines to good operation, as does nature too; whereas art alone produces only the cognition of good operation. Hence it is left, from the lesser [case], that virtue, which is better than art, is a conjecturer of the mean.
  18. Codd. M O quamdiu.
    Codices M, O [read] quamdiu.
  19. Edd. et multi codd. perperam in infideli.
    The editions and many codices wrongly [read] in infideli.
  20. Non expresse, sed sententialiter in Metaph. II. text. 16. (I. brevior, c. 3.), ubi dicit: « Certitudinem vero sermonis mathematicam non oportet in cunctis quaerere, sed in his quae non habent materiam ». Quibus verbis secundum commentatores (Averroem, B. Albert., S. Thom., Scotum) docetur, de iis quae materiam habent consideranturque a physica, eo quod motui et transmutationi subiecta sint, certitudinem omnimode non posse haberi; neque de immaterialibus, licet sint certissima in se, scientiam plane certam haberi posse propter defectum intellectus nostri; de mathematicis autem rebus, utpote a materia abstractis et intellectum nostrum non excedentibus, haberi
    Not expressly, but in substance in Metaphysics II, text 16 (I, the shorter, c. 3), where he says: « But one must not seek mathematical certainty of discourse in all things, but in those which do not have matter ». By which words, according to the commentators (Averroes, Blessed Albert, St. Thomas, Scotus), it is taught that, concerning those things which have matter and are considered by physics, in that they are subject to motion and transmutation, certainty cannot be had in every way; nor concerning immaterial things, although they are most certain in themselves, can a fully certain knowledge be had, on account of the defect of our intellect; but concerning mathematical things, as abstracted from matter and not exceeding our intellect, [certainty] can be had
  21. [Continuatio notae 8. paginae praecedentis, in p. 483:] « maior est certitudo mathematicae scientiae quam divinae » — et tamen nobilior est divina quam mathematica — hoc autem est propter defectum a parte intelligentis; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus: « sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem, ita intellectus noster ad manifestissima naturae »; unde illa quae sunt certissima in se, cognoscit aliquando dubie. — Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. c. 1.
    [Continuation of note 8 from the preceding page, on p. 483:] « the certainty of mathematical knowledge is greater than that of divine [knowledge] » — and yet the divine is nobler than the mathematical — but this is on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding; because, as the Philosopher says: « as the eye of the night-owl is to the light, so is our intellect to the most manifest things of nature »; whence those things which are most certain in themselves, it sometimes knows doubtfully. — Cf. Aristotle, II Metaphysics, c. 1.
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