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Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 483

Quaestio V. De definitione fidei ab Apostolo assignata.

Quinto quaeritur de descriptione fidei ab Apostolo assignata, quoniam ipsa inter ceteras est magis authentica. Definit autem Apostolus fidem sic, ad Hebraeos undecimop483-2: Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium. Ostenditur autem ista descriptio inconvenienter assignata propter quadruplicem defectum, qui videtur esse in ea, videlicet propter defectum veritatis, propter defectum convertibilitatis, propter defectum evidentiae et propter defectum sufficientiae. — Quod autem sit in ea defectus veritatis, ostenditur:

1. Primo in hoc, quod dicit, fidem esse substantiam; aut enim ibi accipitur substantia proprie, aut communiter. Si accipitur ibi proprie, cum substantia dividatur contra accidensp483-3, et fides sit accidens, falsum est, fidem esse substantiam. Si autem substantia ibi accipitur communiter pro essentia, et essentia uniuscuiusque non differt ab eo, cuius est essentia, fides autem differt a rebus sperandis; impossibile est, fidem esse substantiam rerum sperandarum.

2. Item, videtur falsa esse in hoc, quod dicit, fidem non tantum esse substantiam, sed etiam argumentum, quoniam nulla virtus est argumentum, nec e converso: si ergo fides est virtus, non ergo potest esse argumentum. Si tu dicas, quod argumentum sumitur ibi transsumtive; videtur, quod nec transsumtive, nec proprie debeat dici fides argumentum non apparentium. Si enim proprietas argumenti est, quod arguit ipsam mentem et convincit eam de eo ad quod est, faciens illud esse clarum et apertump483-1; videtur, quod sit ibi implicatio duplip. 484cis contradictionis, cum dicit, fidem esse argumentum non apparentium. Quae enim habent argumentum, hoc ipso quod habent argumentum, apparent esse vera; quae etiam habent argumentum, hoc ipso quod habent argumentum, convincuntur esse vera: igitur ratio argumenti repugnat tam rei non apparenti quam ipsi habitui fidei: ergo est ibi implicatio oppositorum in praedicta descriptione: videtur igitur, quod praedicta definitio redargui possit de defectu veritatis.

3. Item, videtur, quod possit reprehendi ob defectum convertibilitatisp484-1. Nam haec descriptio potest convenire ipsi spei. Spes enim est substantia rerum sperandarum, et etiam argumentum non apparentium, quia per spem certificamur, nos esse habituros res, quas non videmus: ergo videtur, quod si tota ista descriptio convenit spei, quod non convertatur cum ipsa fide.

4. Item, credere, poenam aeternam esse futuram, hoc pertinet ad ipsam fidem, ergo credulitas poenae aeternae fides est; sed credulitas poenae aeternae non est substantia rerum sperandarum, sed potius timendarum: ergo videtur, quod ista descriptio generaliter non conveniat ipsi fidei: ergo nec omni nec soli: videtur ergo posse reprehendi propter defectum convertibilitatis.

5. Item, videtur posse reprehendi ob defectum evidentiae, quia non debet prius definiri per posterius, nec ignotum per ignotiusp484-2; sed fides prior est quam spes, fides etiam, quae est in corde, notior est, quam ea quae non apparent: ergo male definitur fides per res sperandas, et per res non apparentes.

6. Item, ad evidentiam definitionis spectat, quod priora praemittantur posterioribus: si ergo cognitio praecedit affectionem, et fides, in quantum argumentum, respicit cognitionem, in quantum vero substantia rerum sperandarum, respicit affectionem; videtur, quod praedicta definitio assignata sit sicut per posterius et confuse: et ita redargui posse videtur propter defectum evidentiae.

7. Item, reprehensibilis videtur propter defectum sufficientiae, quia fides non tantummodo est de futuris, verum etiam de praesentibus et praeteritis, ut dicit Augustinusp484-3: si ergo speranda solummodo sunt futura, videtur, quod insufficienter definiatur, cum definitur solummodo per res sperandas.

8. Item, fides non tantummodo est fundamentum spei, immo etiam caritatis et totius aedificii spiritualis: ergo ita est substantia vel fundamentum caritatis et rerum diligendarum, sicut spei et sperandarum: videtur ergo insufficienter dixisse, cum dixit, eam esse fundamentum rerum sperandarum. Cum enim nobilior sit caritas quam spesp484-4, magis deberet definiri fides per res diligendas quam per res sperandas. — Et ita propter quatuor dictos defectus praedicta descriptio videtur esse penitus abiicienda et repudianda.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Fidei definitio data ab Apostolo est convenienter et secundum artem assignata.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod tunc definitio sive notificatio est recte assignata, quando nihil continet superfluum, nihil etiam diminutump484-5. Et hoc est, quando per ipsam notificationem ipsius definiti essentia plene indicatur et aperte manifestatur et ab omnibus aliis separatur; hoc autem est reperire in proposito, si quis attendat.

Nam ipsa fides secundum essentiam suam aliquid respicit ex parte intellectus et aliquid ex parte affectusp484-6. Habet enim affectum stabilire et intellectum illuminare. Et in quantum affectum stabilit, dicitur substantia sive fundamentum; in quantum autem intellectum illuminat, dicitur argumentum. Ut ergo plene fidei essentia explicaretur, oportuit eam definiri sive notificari, ut diceretur esse substantia simul et argumentum; debet enim definitio totam essentiam definiti in se claudere.

Debet etiam nihilominus aperte notificare; et quoniam habitus virtutis dupliciter notificari habet, videlicet per finem ultimum et per suum obiectump484-7; finis autem ipsius fidei consistit in aeterna beatitudine, quam speramus, et ita in rebus sperandis; obiectum autem consistit in veritate non visa, et ita in rebus non apparentibus: ideo opportunum fuit, fidem definiri per res sperandas et non appap. 485rentes, ut sic notificatio fidei non solum essentiam definiti explicaret plene per intellectum et affectum, sed etiam manifestaret aperte per finem et obiectum.

Debet etiam definitio definitum ab omnibus aliis separare. Et quoniam fides formata distingui habet a fide informi, distingui etiam habet ab habitu cuiuslibet alterius virtutis; a fide, inquam, informi distinguitur, in quantum sustentat totam fabricam spiritualem, ab aliis autem virtutibus, in quantum veritati non visae facit adhaerere: ideo quantum ad haec duo dicitur substantia rerum sperandarum, ut distinguatur a fide informi, et argumentum non apparentium, ut distinguatur ab habitibus aliarum virtutum.

Et sic patet, quod praedicta notificatio nihil continet superfluum, nihil diminutum; nec est in ea clausula nec dictio, immo etiam nec syllaba otiosa. Fatendum est igitur, ipsam esse convenienter et secundum artem assignatam, ita quod in se habet veritatem, convertibilitatem, evidentiam et sufficientiam adeo perfecte et complete, ut nec peritissimi philosophorum possent eam artificialius et completius assignare.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod falso dicitur fides esse substantia; dicendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et transsumtive. Proprie quidem dicitur quatuor modis, scilicet substantia-materia, substantia-forma, substantia-compositum, substantia quae est essentia uniuscuiusquep485-1. Transsumtive dicitur substantia illud quod habet aliquam proprietatem substantiae dictae aliquo istorum modorum. Cum autem dicitur: fides est substantia, hoc non dicitur, secundum quod hoc nomen substantia sumitur in significatione propria, sed secundum quod sumitur in significatione transsumtiva. Dicitur enim substantia, quia est fundamentum fabricae spiritualis ad similitudinem materiae, quae praebet fulcimentum formis et accidentibus. Et quod ita accipiatur, patet per notificationem Damascenip485-2, qui loco eius quod dicit Apostolus: Fides est substantia, dicit hypostasis. Ait enim sic: « Fides est eorum quae sperantur, hypostasis, et redargutio earum rerum, quae non videntur »:

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod falso etiam dicitur esse argumentum; dicendum similiter, quod argumentum dicitur dupliciter, videlicet proprie et transsumtive. Proprie quidem argumentum accipitur secundum quadruplicem acceptionemp485-3. Nam uno modo dicitur argumentum ratiocinatio, secundum quod dividitur in quatuor species, videlicet in syllogismum, inductionem, enthymema et exemplum. Alio modo dicitur argumentum prolixae sententiae brevis collectio. Tertio modo dicitur argumentum ipsum medium, in quo consistit tota vis argumentationis. Quarto modo dicitur argumentum ipsa maxima propositio, in qua consistit firmitas totius illationis. In omnibus autem his acceptionibus argumentum dicitur, quia mentem arguit et illuminat ad aliquid intuendum et ei firmiter adhaerendum. — Et secundum hanc proprietatem potest transsumtive dici argumentum quidquid illud sit, quod mentem arguit et illuminat ad videndum aliquid occultum. Et hoc modo fides dicitur esse argumentum rerum non apparentium, quoniam ita facit intellectum eis assentire, sicut argumentum verum facit assentire conclusioni probatae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa quae arguebant praedictam definitionem ob defectum veritatis.

Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod in praeassignata definitione est defectus convertibilitatis; dicendum, quod praedicta notificatio non convenit spei, quoniam, etsi ipsa spes aliquo modo possit dici substantia rerum sperandarum, non tamen potest dici fundamentum, sicut fides, quia non est prima virtutum. Licet autem hoc aliquo modo possit ei attribui, tamen sequens pars definitionis, quae est argumentum non apparentium, convenit soli fidei, quae intellectum facit assentire ipsi Veritati; hoc autem nec spei competit nec caritati, licet eis competat quoddam genus certitudinis experimentalis, maxime ipsi speip485-4.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credulitas suppliciorum non est substantia rerum sperandarum, sed magis tip. 486mendarum; dicendum, quod fides dicitur esse substantia rerum sperandarum non tanquam subiectip486-1, sed tanquam finis, sicut praedictum est. Quamvis autem credulitas suppliciorum sit rerum timendarum per modum obiecti, est tamen rerum sperandarum per modum finis. Ideo enim quis credit aeterna supplicia, ut assequatur bona speranda.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi defectus evidentiae, quia fides definitur per posteriora et ignota; dicendum, quod falsum est; definitur enim per finem et obiectum, sicut prius visum est. Licet autem finis ipsius fidei, qui consistit in rebus sperandis, sit posterior ipsa fide quantum ad assecutionem, est tamen prior quantum ad intentionemp486-2. Licet etiam obiectum ipsius fidei, quod consistit in veritate non apparente, sit homini infideli incognitum, nihilominus cognitum est homini fidem habenti; quamvis etiam sit incognitum, quale sit, notum tamen est, ipsum non apparere. Et sic patens est, quod praedicta notificatio non est per posterius et incognitum, immo per prius et notius.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in ea est praeposteratio, quia prius deberet dici argumentum quam fundamentum ob hoc, quod intellectus praecedit affectum; dicendum, quod etsi actus intellectus praecedit actum affectus, nihil tamen impedit, quin intellectus aliquando sequatur affectum, utpote quando inclinatur ad assentiendum alicui rei secundum imperium voluntatis. Et hoc modo dictum est superiusp486-3 se habere in actu fidei, quae ideo habet rationem virtutis, quia assensus ille est a principio voluntatis; et ideo Apostolus rectissime ordinavit, quando illud fidei, quod respicit affectivam, praemisit ei quod respicit cognitivam.

Ad 7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu sufficientiae, quia deberet definiri per diligenda, sicut per speranda, ita per praeterita, sicut per futura; iam patet responsio: quia, quamvisp486-4 fides sit de praeteritis et futuris, sive etiam de sperandis et amandis, de solis sperandis est tanquam de fine, ad quem tendit; et per hoc, quod definitur hic fides per comparationem ad finem et complementum totius aedificii spiritualis, datur per consequens intelligi eiusdem aedificii tota fabrica. Et per hoc patent illa duo obiecta. Patet etiam, quare magis dicitur esse fundamentum rerum sperandarum quam credendarum, vel timendarum. Per hoc enim, quod dicitur sperandarum, magis datur intelligi finis virtutis, qui est ipsa beatitudo exspectata, quam per hoc, quod dicitur credendum, vel amandum, vel timendum. Nam isti actus non tantummodo sunt in finem, sed etiam in ea quae sunt ad finem.

Scholion

I. Ut notat S. Thom. (locc. infra citt.), quidam asserebant, S. Paulum in verbis propositis intendere tantum ostendere, quid fides caritate formata faciat, non quid sit. Sed communiter antiqui doctores docent, « quod haec fidei notificatio sit completissima eius definitio, non ita quod sit secundum debitam formam definitionis tradita, sed quia in ea sufficienter tanguntur omnia quae exiguntur ad fidei definitionem » (S. Thom., de Verit. q. 14. a. 2.), ut ibi et brevius in Sum. et in Comment. exponitur. Quae omnia dicta sunt ad mentem S. Bonaventurae, in hac quaestione ingeniose et copiose expositam, licet hic dicat, hanc definitionem etiam secundum artem convenientissime esse assignatam, id est, si spectatur substantia, non autem vulgo tradita forma. Unde S. Thom. (de Verit. loc. cit.) sensum verborum Apostoli hac formula exprimit: « Fides est habitus mentis, quo inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum non apparentibus assentire ».

II. De obiecto fidei, quod hic tangitur, plura vide infra d. 24. a. 1. per totam; passim autem repetitur, hoc obiectum esse primam Veritatem non visam, non apparentem; quod intelligendum est non tantum de obiecto materiali, sed etiam de formali; et recte hic subiungitur, quod in hoc (fides) « distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus, in quantum veritati non visae facit adhaerere », quod etiam S. Thom. passim docet. Sed veritas non visa non determinat vel « movet intellectum ex propria virtute, sed ex inclinatione voluntatis » (S. Thom. de Verit. q. 14. a. 2, ad 13.). Unde primae Veritati sive obiecto formali fidei adhaeremus ex pio voluntatis affectu. Hinc recte dicitur, quod voluntas in fide quodam modo « praesidet » (S. Bonav.), vel, ut verbis S. Thomae utamur, « principalitatem habet », quod iam supra in scholio ad 2. quaest. notavimus.

Iuvat autem hic in fine I. articuli pauca commemorare, quae in scholis tractantur de analysi actus fidei et de ratione, qua obiectum formale eius a mente attingitur, ut credendo assentiamur ipsi primae Veritati in se et super omnia. In qua subtili quaestione plura sunt certa, alia cadunt in controversiam.

1. Certum est, quod ratio obiectiva assensus fidei divinae est auctoritas Dei revelantis; quod expresse docet Concil. Vatican. (c. 3. de Fide) dicens, nos credere vera esse, quae divinitus revelantur propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis.

2. Communiter etiam distinguitur prima Veritas tripliciter: in essendo (quasi ultima ratio omnium), in cognoscendo et in dicendo (veracitas), quae tria, quatenus sunt aliquid Deo intrinsecum et in re unum idemque, ad obiectivam fidei rationem spectant, licet veritas in cognoscendo primario et formalissime sit ratio assensus in fide theologica. Revelatio autem externe et in tempore facta, qua interna Veritas divina manifestatur (per se considerata), item motiva credibilitatis et ipsa Ecclesiae auctoritas (sive in se consideratur, sive quatenus divinam locutionem integrat), haec omnia non sunt ipsa ratio motiva, sed potius conditio quaedam, dispositio, vel etiam medium, quo obiectum formale applicatur sive cum obiecto materiali connectitur. Attamen nonnulli cum celeberrimo theologo cardinali Lugo actum externum revelationis et motiva credibilitatis volunt esse partiale et secundarium motivum fidei. S. Bonav. (infra d. 24. dub. 2.) dicit, verbum externum, per auditum receptum, tantum ad materiale fidei spectare.

3. Item concorditer docetur, in actu fidei implicari multos actus et intellectus et voluntatis: imprimis ipsum velle credere sive voluntatem imperantem assensum; hunc autem actum voluntatis iterum praecedere motivum, id est aliquod bonum cognitum ut appetendum, et iudicium, quod omnia revelata sint credibilia et credenda. In hoc iudicio iam supponitur vel implicatur, tum quod Deus sit et sit prima Veritas et suprema Auctoritas, tum quod de facto revelaverit credenda et fidei obedientiam imperaverit. Motiva autem credibilitatis aliquo modo sciri possunt et debent, antequam voluntas possit rationabiliter imperare fidem. Denique hi actus intellectus et voluntatis non possunt esse dispositio proxima ad fidem supernaturalem, nisi, Deo illuminante et inspirante, eliciantur. — Haec omnia praecedunt actum fidei eumque comitantur, sed ut conditio, vel dispositio, non ut causa proprie dicta, saltem principalis (cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 3.). Nihil autem obstat, quin praedicta motiva credibilitatis et ipsa Dei auctoritas et revelatio sub alia ratione etiam sint obiectum materiale fidei (cfr. supra q. 3. ad 1.).

4. Assensus in materiale obiectum fidei, v. g. quod Deus est trinus, totam suam rationem habet in obiecto formali, scilicet in auctoritate Dei revelantis; unde recte dicitur: credo, Deum esse trinum, quia prima Veritas hoc revelavit. In tali igitur actu simul attingitur et auctoritas Dei et eius revelatio (cfr. supra q. 3. in fine corp.).

III. Sed si ulterius quaerimus, quae sit ratio, propter quam in fide theologica assentimur ipsi divinae auctoritati revelanti; iam ab aetate Scoti inter doctissimos theologos est dissensus; et praecipue notandae sunt duae oppositae opiniones cardinalis Lugo S. I. et eximii Suarez. Remittentes lectorem ad recentiores auctores, obiter tantum notamus quasdam principales eorum assertiones. Cardinalis Lugo putat, nos assentiri formali obiecto fidei, prout post cognita praeambula fidei auctoritas Dei et revelatio Dei ex terminorum apprehensione sunt immediate notae; motiva autem extrinseca esse partim rationem formalem fidei saltem partialem, partim vero esse tantum conditionem; assensum autem in obiectum materiale non tantum in praeparatione ad actum fidei, sed etiam in ipso actu fundari in discursu logico (sive formali sive virtuali) ex auctoritate Dei et ex facto revelationis, quo discursu obiectum materiale cum formali nectitur, ita tamen, ut bonitas illationis, supernaturaliter et immediate in ipso formali assensu fidei cognita, sit tantum partiale motivum assentiendi obiecto revelato. — Econtra Suarez cum plurimis aliis vult, auctoritatem Dei revelantis eatenus esse obiectum formale, quatenus per se ipsam creditur ut revelata in actu exercito, eodem modo, quo obiectum materiale, revelatum in actu signato, creditur ob obiectum formale. — Tertia sententia, quam nuperrime propugnat cl. Professor C. Mazzella S. I. in tertia sua editione tractatus de Virtutibus infusis, reformans praecedentium editionum doctrinam, non parum restringit praedictam Suarezii doctrinam, ut progressus in infinitum vel circulus vitiosus manifeste evitetur; ipse autem, allatis multis locis, S. Thomae doctrinam (§ VI.) ita explicat: « Supposito iudicio certo de existentia et credibilitate revelationis, quo totum obiectum credendum fit menti praesens, immerito quaeri, arbitramur, novam ex parte intellectus obiectivam rationem, ob quam Dei revelantis auctoritati assentiamur: cum assensus in veritates revelatas unice in eius obsequium praestitus, « quem comitatur, sed cuius non est causa cognitio » (S. Thom., Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 1. ad 6.), a voluntate determinatur (S. II. II. q. 2. a. 1. ad 3.); ut illud cui assentitur intellectus, non moveat intellectum ex propria virtute, sed ex inclinatione voluntatis » (Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 2. ad 13.) etc. — Eandem fere sententiam diffuse et subtiliter propugnat cl. Prof. Dr. I. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik. Friburgi tom. I. 1873, libr. I., praesertim n. 633-652, 684-700). — Quidquid autem sit de veritate vel probabilitate harum sententiarum, exploratum est, nec S. Thomam nec Bonaventuram nec alios antiquos Scholasticos primam ut secundam opinionem, saltem explicite, docere. — Quoad analysim fidei S. Bonav. haec satis clare docet: si loquimur de fidei causa formali, fides resolvitur ultimo in primam Veritatem revelantem et dictantem; si vero de causa efficiente, haec ex parte Dei est « per infusionem vel divinam illustrationem » (infra a. 2. q. 2.), sive « per doctrinam Spiritus sancti loquentis per aurem cordis » (infra d. 24. dub. 2.), ex parte credentis est per imperium et adhaesionem voluntatis; si de causa materiali et disponente agitur, haec est per auditum locutionis exterioris, scilicet per verbum Dei in s. Scriptura et traditione cum magisterio Ecclesiae (cfr. locc. citt.), per motiva credibilitatis, et praecipue per Ecclesiam proponentem, « quae per se ipsam... magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile » (Concil. Vatican. c. 3. de Fide), quae etiam credenda infallibiliter discernit a non credendis eaque proponit (cfr. infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., d. 40. p. II. q. 3. ad ult.; Hexaem. Serm. 1. et 9.). De ipsa definitione Apostoli: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; de Verit. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

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English Translation

Question V. On the definition of faith assigned by the Apostle.

Fifth, inquiry is made concerning the description of faith assigned by the Apostle, since it is the most authentic among the rest. Now the Apostle defines faith thus, to the Hebrews, chapter elevenp483-2: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. But it is shown that this description is inconveniently assigned on account of a fourfold defect, which seems to be in it, namely on account of a defect of truth, on account of a defect of convertibility, on account of a defect of evidence, and on account of a defect of sufficiency. — That there is in it a defect of truth is shown:

1. First, in this, that it says faith is a substance; for either substance is taken there properly, or commonly. If it is taken there properly, since substance is divided against accidentp483-3, and faith is an accident, it is false that faith is a substance. But if substance is taken there commonly for essence, and the essence of each thing does not differ from that of which it is the essence, but faith differs from the things to be hoped for, it is impossible that faith be the substance of the things to be hoped for.

2. Likewise, it seems to be false in this, that it says faith is not only a substance, but also an argument, since no virtue is an argument, nor conversely: if therefore faith is a virtue, it cannot then be an argument. If you say that argument is taken there transumptively; it seems that faith ought to be called argument of things not appearing neither transumptively nor properly. For if it is the property of an argument that it argues the mind itself and convinces it of that to which it is directed, making that thing to be clear and openp483-1; it seems that there is in it an implication of a twofoldp. 484contradiction, when it says faith is the argument of things not appearing. For things which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, appear to be true; things also which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, are convinced to be true: therefore the account of argument is repugnant both to a thing not appearing and to the very habit of faith: therefore there is in the aforesaid description an implication of opposites: it seems therefore that the aforesaid definition can be refuted for a defect of truth.

3. Likewise, it seems that it can be censured for a defect of convertibilityp484-1. For this description can fit hope itself. For hope is the substance of things to be hoped for, and also the argument of things not appearing, since by hope we are made certain that we shall have the things which we do not see: therefore it seems that, if this whole description fits hope, then it is not convertible with faith itself.

4. Likewise, to believe that eternal punishment is to come pertains to faith itself, therefore the believing of eternal punishment is faith; but the believing of eternal punishment is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared: therefore it seems that this description does not fit faith itself generally: therefore it fits neither all nor it alone: therefore it seems able to be censured on account of a defect of convertibility.

5. Likewise, it seems able to be censured for a defect of evidence, because that which is prior ought not to be defined through that which is posterior, nor the unknown through the more unknownp484-2; but faith is prior to hope, faith too, which is in the heart, is better known than those things which do not appear: therefore faith is badly defined through things to be hoped for, and through things not appearing.

6. Likewise, it pertains to the evidence of a definition that what is prior be set before what is posterior: if therefore cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is argument, regards cognition, but insofar as it is substance of things to be hoped for, regards affection; it seems that the aforesaid definition is assigned as it were through what is posterior and confusedly: and so it seems able to be refuted on account of a defect of evidence.

7. Likewise, it seems reprehensible on account of a defect of sufficiency, because faith is not only of things future, but also of things present and past, as Augustine saysp484-3: if therefore the things to be hoped for are only future, it seems that it is insufficiently defined, since it is defined only through things to be hoped for.

8. Likewise, faith is not only the foundation of hope, but even of charity and of the whole spiritual edifice: therefore it is the substance or foundation of charity and of the things to be loved, just as of hope and of the things to be hoped for: it seems therefore that he spoke insufficiently, when he said it is the foundation of the things to be hoped for. For since charity is nobler than hopep484-4, faith ought rather to be defined through the things to be loved than through the things to be hoped for. — And so on account of the four said defects the aforesaid description seems to be utterly cast off and repudiated.

Conclusion

Conclusion. The definition of faith given by the Apostle is conveniently and according to art assigned.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that a definition or notification is then rightly assigned, when it contains nothing superfluous, nothing also diminishedp484-5. And this is, when through that notification the essence of the thing defined is fully indicated and openly manifested and separated from all others; but this is found in the matter proposed, if one attends.

For faith itself according to its essence regards something on the part of the intellect and something on the part of the affectp484-6. For it has to stabilize the affect and to illuminate the intellect. And insofar as it stabilizes the affect, it is called substance or foundation; but insofar as it illuminates the intellect, it is called argument. In order, therefore, that the essence of faith might be fully explicated, it was necessary that it be defined or notified so that it be said to be substance and argument together; for a definition ought to enclose in itself the whole essence of the thing defined.

It ought also nonetheless to notify openly; and since the habit of a virtue is to be notified in two ways, namely through its ultimate end and through its objectp484-7; now the end of faith itself consists in the eternal beatitude which we hope for, and so in the things to be hoped for; but its object consists in truth not seen, and so in the things not appearing: therefore it was fitting that faith be defined through the things to be hoped for and not appeap. 485ring, so that thus the notification of faith might not only explicate fully the essence of the thing defined through the intellect and the affect, but might also manifest it openly through the end and the object.

A definition ought also to separate the thing defined from all others. And since formed faith is to be distinguished from unformed faith, it is also to be distinguished from the habit of any other virtue; from unformed faith, I say, it is distinguished insofar as it sustains the whole spiritual fabric, but from the other virtues insofar as it makes one adhere to truth not seen: therefore with respect to these two it is called substance of things to be hoped for, that it may be distinguished from unformed faith, and argument of things not appearing, that it may be distinguished from the habits of the other virtues.

And so it is clear that the aforesaid notification contains nothing superfluous, nothing diminished; nor is there in it a clause nor a word, indeed not even a syllable idle. It must therefore be confessed that it is conveniently and according to art assigned, so that it has in itself truth, convertibility, evidence, and sufficiency so perfectly and completely that not even the most skilled of the philosophers could assign it more artfully and more completely.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that faith is falsely said to be a substance; it must be said that substance is said in two ways, namely properly and transumptively. Properly indeed it is said in four ways, namely substance-matter, substance-form, substance-composite, substance which is the essence of each thingp485-1. Transumptively that is called substance which has some property of substance said in one of those ways. But when it is said: faith is a substance, this is not said insofar as this noun substance is taken in its proper signification, but insofar as it is taken in its transumptive signification. For it is called substance because it is the foundation of the spiritual fabric after the likeness of matter, which provides support for forms and accidents. And that it is so taken is clear through the notification of Damascenep485-2, who, in place of that which the Apostle says: Faith is a substance, says hypostasis. For he says thus: « Faith is the hypostasis of the things which are hoped for, and the refutation of those things which are not seen »:

To 2. To that which is objected, that it is also falsely said to be an argument; it must be said similarly that argument is said in two ways, namely properly and transumptively. Properly indeed argument is taken according to a fourfold acceptationp485-3. For in one way argument is called a ratiocination, according as it is divided into four species, namely into the syllogism, induction, enthymeme, and example. In another way argument is called the brief collection of a lengthy discourse. In a third way argument is called the middle itself, in which consists the whole force of the argumentation. In a fourth way argument is called the maximal proposition itself, in which consists the firmness of the whole inference. But in all these acceptations it is called argument, because it argues and illuminates the mind to intuit something and firmly to adhere to it. — And according to this property whatever it be that argues and illuminates the mind to see something hidden can transumptively be called argument. And in this way faith is said to be the argument of things not appearing, since it so makes the intellect assent to them as a true argument makes one assent to a proved conclusion. — And through this is clear the response to those things which argued against the aforesaid definition for a defect of truth.

To 3. To that which is objected, that in the aforesaid definition there is a defect of convertibility; it must be said that the aforesaid notification does not fit hope, since, although hope itself can in some way be called substance of things to be hoped for, it cannot nevertheless be called foundation, like faith, because it is not the first of the virtues. But although this can in some way be attributed to it, nevertheless the following part of the definition, which is argument of things not appearing, fits faith alone, which makes the intellect assent to Truth itself; but this belongs neither to hope nor to charity, although there belongs to them a certain kind of experiential certitude, most of all to hope itselfp485-4.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the believing of punishments is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feap. 486red; it must be said that faith is called the substance of things to be hoped for not as of a subjectp486-1, but as of an end, as has been said before. But although the believing of punishments is of things to be feared by way of object, it is nevertheless of things to be hoped for by way of end. For one believes in eternal punishments in order that he may attain the goods to be hoped for.

To 5. To that which is objected, that there is there a defect of evidence, because faith is defined through things posterior and unknown; it must be said that this is false; for it is defined through the end and the object, as was seen before. But although the end of faith itself, which consists in the things to be hoped for, is posterior to faith itself with respect to attainment, it is nevertheless prior with respect to intentionp486-2. And although the object of faith itself, which consists in truth not appearing, is unknown to the unbelieving man, it is nonetheless known to the man having faith; and although it be unknown what it is, it is nevertheless known that it itself does not appear. And so it is plain that the aforesaid notification is not through what is posterior and unknown, but rather through what is prior and better known.

To 6. To that which is objected, that in it there is a preposterous order, because argument ought to be said before foundation on the ground that the intellect precedes the affect; it must be said that, although the act of the intellect precedes the act of the affect, nothing nevertheless prevents the intellect from sometimes following the affect, as for instance when it is inclined to assent to something according to the command of the will. And in this way it was said abovep486-3 to be the case in the act of faith, which therefore has the account of a virtue, because that assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore the Apostle most rightly ordered [it], when he set that of faith which regards the affective before that which regards the cognitive.

To 7 and 8. To that which is objected concerning a defect of sufficiency, that it ought to be defined through things to be loved, just as through things to be hoped for, so through things past, just as through things future; the response is already clear: because, although faith is of things past and future, or even of things to be hoped for and to be loved, it is of the things to be hoped for alone as of an end, toward which it tends; and through this, that faith is here defined by comparison to the end and the completion of the whole spiritual edifice, there is given consequently to understand the whole fabric of that same edifice. And through this those two objections are clear. It is clear also why it is rather said to be the foundation of things to be hoped for than of things to be believed, or to be feared. For through this, that it is said of things to be hoped for, there is rather given to understand the end of the virtue, which is the very beatitude awaited, than through this, that it is said to be believed, or to be loved, or to be feared. For those acts are not only toward the end, but also toward the things which are toward the end.

Scholion

I. As S. Thomas notes (in the passages cited below), some asserted that S. Paul in the words proposed intended only to show what faith formed by charity does, not what it is. But the ancient doctors commonly teach « that this notification of faith is its most complete definition, not in such a way that it is handed down according to the due form of a definition, but because in it are sufficiently touched all the things that are required for the definition of faith » (S. Thom., de Verit. q. 14. a. 2.), as is there and more briefly in the Summa and in the Commentary expounded. All these things have been said according to the mind of S. Bonaventure, expounded in this question ingeniously and copiously, although he here says that this definition is even according to art most conveniently assigned, that is, if substance is regarded, but not the form commonly handed down. Whence S. Thomas (de Verit. loc. cit.) expresses the sense of the words of the Apostle by this formula: « Faith is a habit of the mind, by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing ».

II. Concerning the object of faith, which is here touched upon, see more below at d. 24. a. 1. throughout; but it is repeated here and there that this object is the first Truth not seen, not appearing; which is to be understood not only of the material object, but also of the formal; and it is rightly added here that in this (faith) « is distinguished from the other virtues, insofar as it makes one adhere to truth not seen », which S. Thomas also teaches here and there. But truth not seen does not determine or « move the intellect by its own power, but by the inclination of the will » (S. Thom. de Verit. q. 14. a. 2, ad 13.). Whence we adhere to the first Truth or to the formal object of faith by a pious affect of the will. Hence it is rightly said that the will in faith in a certain way « presides » (S. Bonav.), or, to use the words of S. Thomas, « has the principality », which we have already noted above in the scholion to the 2nd question.

It is helpful here at the end of the first article to recall a few things which are treated in the schools concerning the analysis of the act of faith and concerning the account by which its formal object is attained by the mind, so that by believing we may assent to the first Truth itself in itself and above all things. In which subtle question many things are certain, others fall into controversy.

1. It is certain that the objective ground of the assent of divine faith is the authority of God revealing; which the Vatican Council expressly teaches (c. 3. de Fide), saying that we believe to be true those things which are divinely revealed on account of the authority of God revealing.

2. It is also commonly distinguished that the first Truth is threefold: in being (as it were the ultimate ground of all), in knowing, and in speaking (veracity), which three, inasmuch as they are something intrinsic to God and in reality one and the same, pertain to the objective ground of faith, although truth in knowing is primarily and most formally the ground of assent in theological faith. But the revelation made externally and in time, by which the internal divine Truth is manifested (considered in itself), likewise the motives of credibility and the very authority of the Church (whether considered in itself, or insofar as it integrates the divine locution), all these are not the motive ground itself, but rather a certain condition, disposition, or even medium, by which the formal object is applied or connected with the material object. Nevertheless some, with the most celebrated theologian cardinal Lugo, hold the external act of revelation and the motives of credibility to be a partial and secondary motive of faith. S. Bonaventure (below d. 24. dub. 2.) says that the external word, received through hearing, pertains only to the material of faith.

3. Likewise it is harmoniously taught that in the act of faith many acts both of intellect and of will are implicated: first of all the very willing to believe or the will commanding the assent; and that this act of the will is again preceded by a motive, that is, some good known as to be sought, and by a judgment, that all revealed things are credible and to be believed. In this judgment it is already supposed or implicated, both that God exists and is the first Truth and supreme Authority, and that he has in fact revealed things to be believed and commanded the obedience of faith. But the motives of credibility can and ought in some way to be known, before the will can reasonably command faith. Finally these acts of intellect and will cannot be the proximate disposition to supernatural faith, unless, with God illuminating and inspiring, they be elicited. — All these precede the act of faith and accompany it, but as a condition, or disposition, not as a cause properly so called, at least a principal one (cf. below d. 24. dub. 3.). But nothing prevents the aforesaid motives of credibility and the very authority and revelation of God, under another aspect, from being also the material object of faith (cf. above q. 3. ad 1.).

4. The assent to the material object of faith, e.g. that God is triune, has its whole ground in the formal object, namely in the authority of God revealing; whence it is rightly said: I believe that God is triune, because the first Truth has revealed this. In such an act, therefore, both the authority of God and his revelation are simultaneously attained (cf. above q. 3. at the end of the body).

III. But if we ask further what is the ground on account of which in theological faith we assent to the divine authority itself revealing; from the age of Scotus there has been disagreement among the most learned theologians; and to be noted especially are the two opposed opinions of cardinal Lugo S. I. and the eminent Suarez. Referring the reader to more recent authors, we note only in passing some of their principal assertions. Cardinal Lugo holds that we assent to the formal object of faith, inasmuch as, after the preambles of faith have been known, the authority of God and the revelation of God are immediately known from the apprehension of the terms; but that the extrinsic motives are partly the formal ground of faith, at least a partial one, and partly are only a condition; and that the assent to the material object is founded, not only in the preparation for the act of faith, but also in the act itself, in a logical discourse (whether formal or virtual) from the authority of God and from the fact of revelation, by which discourse the material object is joined with the formal, yet in such a way that the goodness of the inference, supernaturally and immediately known in the very formal assent of faith, is only a partial motive of assenting to the revealed object. — On the contrary, Suarez with very many others holds that the authority of God revealing is the formal object, inasmuch as it is believed through itself as revealed in the exercised act, in the same way in which the material object, revealed in the signified act, is believed on account of the formal object. — A third opinion, which most recently the distinguished Professor C. Mazzella S. I. defends in the third edition of his treatise on the Infused Virtues, reforming the doctrine of the preceding editions, not a little restricts the aforesaid doctrine of Suarez, that progress to infinity or a vicious circle may be manifestly avoided; he himself, however, with many passages adduced, thus explains the doctrine of S. Thomas (§ VI.): « Supposing a certain judgment concerning the existence and credibility of revelation, by which the whole object to be believed is made present to the mind, we judge that it is wrongly sought to find a new objective ground on the part of the intellect on account of which we assent to the authority of God revealing: since the assent to revealed truths, given solely in his obedience, « which cognition accompanies but of which it is not the cause » (S. Thom., Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 1. ad 6.), is determined by the will (S. II. II. q. 2. a. 1. ad 3.); so that that to which the intellect assents does not move the intellect by its own power, but by the inclination of the will » (Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 2. ad 13.) etc. — Nearly the same opinion is defended diffusely and subtly by the distinguished Prof. Dr. I. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik. Freiburg, tom. I. 1873, libr. I., especially nn. 633-652, 684-700). — But whatever may be of the truth or probability of these opinions, it is established that neither S. Thomas nor Bonaventure nor the other ancient Scholastics taught either the first or the second opinion, at least explicitly. — As to the analysis of faith, S. Bonaventure teaches this clearly enough: if we speak of the formal cause of faith, faith is resolved ultimately into the first Truth revealing and dictating; but if of the efficient cause, this on the part of God is « through infusion or divine illustration » (below a. 2. q. 2.), or « through the teaching of the Holy Spirit speaking through the ear of the heart » (below d. 24. dub. 2.), on the part of the believer it is through the command and adhesion of the will; if it is a question of the material and disposing cause, this is through the hearing of the external locution, namely through the word of God in sacred Scripture and tradition with the magisterium of the Church (cf. the passages cited), through the motives of credibility, and especially through the Church proposing, « which by itself... is a certain great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of its divine legation » (Vatican Council c. 3. de Fide), which also infallibly discerns the things to be believed from those not to be believed and proposes them (cf. below d. 25. a. 1. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, d. 40. p. II. q. 3. at the end; Hexaem. Serm. 1. and 9.). Concerning the very definition of the Apostle: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; de Verit. loc. cit. — B. Albert., here a. 18. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 4. q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Boeth., I. Comment. in Topic. Cicer. ait: Argumentum namque est, quod rem arguit, id est probat (ed. Migne, Patr. lat. tom. 64. col. 1048). Isidor., VI. Etymolog. c. 8. n. 16: Argumentum vero dictum quasi argutum vel quasi argute inventum ad comprobandas res. — Mox pro contradictionis cod. F oppositionis. In fine arg. pro de defectu Vat. ob defectum.
    Boethius, I Commentary on Cicero's Topics says: For an argument is that which argues a matter, that is, proves it (ed. Migne, Patr. lat. tom. 64. col. 1048). Isidore, VI Etymologies c. 8. n. 16: But "argument" is so called as it were "argute" [clever] or as it were cleverly found out for the proving of matters. — Then for of contradiction cod. F [reads] of opposition. At the end of the argument, for concerning a defect the Vatican [edition reads] on account of a defect.
  2. Vers. 1. — Paulo inferius pro ista descriptio inconvenienter codd. G I L V ista definitio non bene.
    Verse 1. — A little below, for this description inconveniently codd. G I L V [read] this definition not well.
  3. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.). Ibid. text. 11. (c. 1.) docetur, quod essentia « uno quidem modo substantiam et quod quid significat, alio vero singula eorum, quae praedicantur, quantitatem, qualitatem et quaecumque cetera talia sunt », i. e. uno modo essentia idem est ac substantia, alio modo etiam accidentibus convenit. Hoc secundo modo paulo inferius accipitur, ut secundi membri arg. suppositio sit: fides est accidens, cuius essentia consistit in rebus sperandis.
    Cf. Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 2. (VI. c. 1.). Ibid. text 11. (c. 1.) it is taught that essence « in one way signifies substance and the what-it-is, but in another the individual things which are predicated, quantity, quality, and whatever other such things there are », i.e. in one way essence is the same as substance, in another way it also belongs to accidents. In this second way it is taken a little below, so that the supposition of the second member of the argument is: faith is an accident, whose essence consists in the things to be hoped for.
  4. Boeth., I. Dialog. in Porphyr. c. de Genere circa finem: Quascumque definitiones convertere potes, illae verae atque pares sunt; quascumque convertere non potes, aut maiores aut minores sunt, pares inveniri non possunt. — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. — Codd. A K Z verbo reprehendi praemittunt etiam.
    Boethius, I Dialogue on Porphyry, c. on Genus, near the end: Whatever definitions you can convert, those are true and equal; whatever you cannot convert, are either greater or lesser, they cannot be found equal. — On the minor cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8. — Codd. A K Z prefix to the word censured [the word] also.
  5. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.) ostendit, definitionem faciendam esse per notiora, et adiungit, quod unus locus probandi, definitionem non factam esse per notiora, sit, « quod [si definitio] per posteriora, priora indicat ». De minori vide supra q. 1. in corp. et q. 4. ad 1. — Mox ante spes codd. A K inserunt sit.
    Aristotle, VI Topics c. 3. (c. 4.) shows that a definition is to be made through things better known, and adds that one place for proving that a definition has not been made through things better known is, « that [if the definition is] through what is posterior, it indicates what is prior ». On the minor see above q. 1. in the body and q. 4. ad 1. — Then before hope codd. A K insert be.
  6. Enchirid. c. 8. n. 2: Est etiam fides et praeteritarum rerum et praesentium et futurarum.
    Enchiridion c. 8. n. 2: Faith is also of things past and present and future.
  7. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13: Fides, spes, caritas, tria haec, maior autem horum est caritas. — Quomodo fides fundamentum sit fabricae spiritualis, exponit Gregor., XXVIII. Moral. c. 9. n. 20. — Superius post sicut spei et codd. F U supplent rerum.
    Epistle, I Cor. 13, 13: Faith, hope, charity, these three, but the greater of these is charity. — How faith is the foundation of the spiritual fabric, Gregory expounds, XXVIII Morals c. 9. n. 20. — Above, after just as of hope and codd. F U supply of the things.
  8. Cfr. Aristot., VI Topic. c. 1. seq., et VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), ubi etiam aliae proprietates definitionis infra occurrentes tanguntur.
    Cf. Aristotle, VI Topics c. 1. ff., and VII Metaphysics text 43. (VI. c. 12.), where also the other properties of a definition occurring below are touched upon.
  9. Cfr. supra q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro stabilit [Hebr. 13, 9: Optimum est enim gratia stabilire cor] plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 stabilitat.
    Cf. above q. 2. — A little below, for stabilizes [Heb. 13, 9: For it is best that the heart be stabilized by grace] very many codd. and edd. 1, 2 [read] establishes.
  10. Vide Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. et 7. seqq.; II. c. 1, et II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. et pag. 683, nota 6. — Pro et quoniam edd. quoniam ergo.
    See Aristotle, I Ethics c. 1. and 7. ff.; II. c. 1, and II On the Soul, text 33. (c. 4.). Cf. tom. II. p. 561, note 3. and p. 683, note 6. — For and since the editions [read] since therefore.
  11. Ut docet Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 7. (VI. c. 3.). Cfr. ibid. V. text. 15. (IV. c. 8.) et II. de Anima, text. 2. (c. 1.).
    As Aristotle teaches, VII Metaphysics text 7. (VI. c. 3.). Cf. ibid. V. text 15. (IV. c. 8.) and II On the Soul, text 2. (c. 1.).
  12. Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10. Vide infra dub. 1. — Paulo ante pro praebet codd. G I L T V aa pluribus, quae lectio mutila integrari posset addito verbo praestat, quod cod. F post accidentibus exhibet.
    Book IV On the Orthodox Faith c. 10. See below dub. 1. — A little before, for provides codd. G I L T V aa [read] to many, which mutilated reading could be made whole by adding the verb furnishes, which cod. F exhibits after accidents.
  13. De his agit Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1. et II. c. 23. seqq. (c. 23. seqq.) nec non Boeth., II. de Different. topic. — Quod ad secundum modum attinet, quo argumentum sumitur, dicit Quintilian., V. Institut. orat. c. 10: Sed argumentum quoque plura significat. Nam... et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens Pedianus, « argumentum, inquit, tale est ». — Quoad tertium modum nota illud Boeth., I. Comment. in Topic. Cicer. (ed. Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 64. col. 1050.): Quoniam igitur extremi termini medii interpositione copulantur, eoque modo quaestionis inter se membra conveniunt, adhibitaque probatione solvitur dubitatio, nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio; haec enim vel coniungere, si affirmatio defendatur, vel disiungere, si negatio vindicetur, poterit extremos. — Ibid. etiam quarta acceptio argumenti profertur. Definitis enim maximis propositionibus, scil. « quae et universales sunt et ita notae atque manifestae, ut probatione non egeant eaque potius quae in dubitatione sunt probent », auctor, diversas argumentationis et argumenti acceptationes recensens ait: Aut argumentatio quidem vocabitur tota contextio syllogismi cum sententia, sed argumentum maxima propositio etc. (col. 1053). Cfr. II. de Different. topic. — Paulo superius pro accipitur cod. A sumitur, cod. U dicitur. In fine solut. cod. O plura addit, quae propter varias lacunas etc. non digna sunt commemoratu.
    Aristotle treats of these, I Prior [Analytics] c. 1. and II. c. 23. ff. (c. 23. ff.), and also Boethius, II On Topical Differences. — As to the second way in which argument is taken, Quintilian says, V Institutes of Oratory c. 10: But "argument" too signifies several things. For... Pedianus, expounding the very theme as it were of Cicero's orations, says, « the argument is such-and-such ». — As to the third way note that of Boethius, I Commentary on Cicero's Topics (ed. Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 64. col. 1050.): Since therefore the extreme terms are coupled by the interposition of a middle, and in that way the members of the question agree among themselves, and, proof being applied, the doubt is resolved, an argument is nothing other than the finding of the middle; for this will be able either to join, if an affirmation is defended, or to disjoin, if a negation is vindicated, the extremes. — There also a fourth acceptation of argument is brought forward. For, the maximal propositions being defined, namely « which are both universal and so known and manifest that they need no proof and rather prove those things which are in doubt », the author, reviewing the diverse acceptations of argumentation and of argument, says: Either the whole texture of the syllogism with the sentence will be called argumentation, but the maximal proposition [will be called] argument etc. (col. 1053). Cf. II On Topical Differences. — A little above, for is taken cod. A [reads] is assumed, cod. U is called. At the end of the solution cod. O adds more, which on account of various lacunae etc. are not worthy of mention.
  14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq. — In prima solutionis propos. pro aliquo modo possit codd. A H K aliquo modo posset.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 8. f. — In the first proposition of the solution, for can in some way codd. A H K [read] could in some way.
  15. Sive, quod in idem redit, obiecti, quam lectionem exhibent codd. B C D (K primitus) M O P R cc. In edd. legitur: dicendum, quod verum est, quod non est substantia rerum sperandarum tanquam subiecti etc.
    Or, what comes to the same, of an object, which reading codd. B C D (K originally) M O P R cc exhibit. In the editions one reads: it must be said that it is true that it is not the substance of things to be hoped for as of a subject etc.
  16. Finem priorem esse secundum intentionem, docet Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 4. (c. 6.); IX. Metaph. text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.) et III. Ethic. c. 3. nec non VI. c. 9. — Pro assecutionem codd. A H K L Z exsecutionem. Mox codd. M O voci veritate praefigunt ipsa.
    That the end is prior according to intention, Aristotle teaches, II On the Generation of Animals c. 4. (c. 6.); IX Metaphysics text 15. (VIII. c. 8.) and III Ethics c. 3. and also VI. c. 9. — For attainment codd. A H K L Z [read] execution. Then codd. M O prefix to the word truth [the word] the very.
  17. Quaest. 2. — Paulo superius pro impedit, quin multi codd. et edd. impedit, quod.
    Question 2. — A little above, for prevents... from many codd. and edd. [read] prevents... that.
  18. Cod. U quamvis enim.
    Cod. U [reads] for although.
← Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 4Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1→