Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum mundus productus sit ab aeterno, an ex tempore.

Circa secundum quaeritur, utrum mundus productus fuerit ex tempore, an ab aeterno. Et quod non ex tempore, ostenditur.

I. Duabus rationibus sumtis a motu[^1].

1. Prima est ostensiva sic: ante omnem motum et mutationem est motus primi mobilis; sed omne quod incipit, incipit per motum vel mutationem: ergo ante omne illud quod incipit, est motus ille. Sed ille motus non potuit esse ante se nec ante suum mobile: ergo impossibile est incipere. Prima propositio supponitur, et eius probatio patet sic: quia suppositio est in philosophia², quod «in omni genere perfectum est ante imperfectum»; sed inter omnia genera motuum motus ad situm est perfectior, quia est entis completi; et inter omnia genera motuum localium motus circularis et velocior est et perfectior; sed talis est motus caeli: ergo perfectissimus, ergo primus: patet ergo etc.

2. Item, ostenditur per impossibile. Omne quod exit in esse, exit per motum vel mutationem: ergo si motus exit in esse, exit per motum vel mutationem; et similiter de illo quaeritur: ergo vel est abire in infinitum, vel est ponere aliquem motum sine principio; si motum: ergo mobile, ergo et mundum.

3. Similiter ratio sumitur ostensiva a tempore sic³: omne quod incipit, aut incipit in instanti, aut in tempore: si ergo mundus incipit, aut in instanti, aut in tempore. Sed ante omne tempus est tempus, et ante omne instans est tempus: ergo tempus est ante omnia quae inceperunt. Sed non potuit esse ante mundum et motum: ergo mundus non

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incepit. Prima propositio per se nota est. Secunda, scilicet quod ante omne tempus sit tempus, patet ex hoc, quod, si currit, curreret prius de necessitate⁴. — Similiter, quod ante omne instans sit tempus, patet sic: tempus est mensura circularis conveniens motui et mobili; sed omnis punctus, qui est in circulo, ita est principium, quod finis: ergo omne instans temporis ita est principium futuri, quod terminus praeteriti: ergo ante omne nunc fuit praeteritum: patet ergo etc.

4. Item, per impossibile. Si tempus producitur, aut in tempore, aut in instanti. Non in instanti, cum non sit in instanti: ergo in tempore. Sed in omni tempore est ponere prius et posterius, et praeteritum et futurum: ergo si tempus in tempore fuit productum⁵, ante omne tempus fuit tempus; et hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

Hae sunt rationes Philosophi, quae sunt sumtae a parte ipsius mundi.

5. Item, aliae rationes philosophorum sumuntur ex parte causae producentis; et generaliter ad duas possunt reduci, quarum prima est ostensiva, secunda vero per impossibile. Prima est haec: posita causa sufficienti et actuali, ponitur effectus⁶; sed Deus ab aeterno fuit causa sufficiens et actualis ipsius mundi: ergo etc. Maior propositio per se nota est. Minor patet, scilicet quod Deus sit causa sufficiens; quia cum nullo extrinseco indigeat ad mundi creationem, sed solum potentia, sapientia et bonitate, et haec in Deo fuerunt perfectissima ab aeterno, patet quod ab aeterno fuit sufficiens. Quod etiam actualis, patet: Deus enim est actus purus et suum velle, ut dicit Philosophus⁷; et Sancti dicunt, quod est suum agere: restat ergo etc.

6. Item, per impossibile⁸: Omne illud quod incipit agere vel producere, cum prius non produceret, exit ab otio in actum; si ergo Deus incipit mundum producere, exit ab otio in actum; sed circa omne tale cadit otiositas et mutatio sive mutabilitas: ergo circa Deum est otiositas et mutabilitas. Hoc autem est contra summam bonitatem et contra summam simplicitatem: ergo hoc est impossibile, et blasphemia dicere de Deo, et ita quod mundus coeperit. — Hae sunt rationes, quas commentatores⁹ et moderniores superaddunt rationibus Aristotelis, sive ad has possunt reduci.

Sed ad oppositum sunt rationes ex propositionibus per se notis secundum rationem et philosophiam.

1. Prima est haec. Impossibile est infinito addi: haec est manifesta per se, quia omne illud quod recipit additionem, fit maius, «infinito autem nihil maius¹⁰» — sed si mundus est sine principio, duravit in infinitum: ergo durationi eius non potest

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addi. Sed constat, hoc esse falsum, quia revolutio additur revolutioni omni die: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod infinitum est quantum ad praeterita, tamen quantum ad praesens, quod nunc est, est finitum actu, et ideo ex ea parte, qua finitum est actu, est reperire maius¹¹; contra, ostenditur, quod in praeterito est reperire maius: haec est veritas infallibilis, quod, si mundus est aeternus, revolutiones solis in orbe suo sunt infinitae; rursus, pro una revolutione solis necesse est fuisse duodecim ipsius lunae: ergo plus revoluta est luna quam sol; et sol infinities; ergo infinitorum ex ea parte, qua infinita sunt, est reperire excessum. Hoc autem est impossibile: ergo¹² etc.

2. Secunda propositio est ista. Impossibile est infinita ordinari. Omnis enim ordo fluit a principio in medium¹³; si ergo non est primum, non est ordo: sed duratio mundi sive revolutiones caeli, si sunt infinitae, non habent primum: ergo non habent ordinem, ergo una non est ante aliam. Sed hoc est falsum: restat ergo, quod habeant primum. Si dicas, quod statum ordinis non est necesse ponere, nisi in his quae ordinantur secundum ordinem causalitatis, quia in causis necessario est status¹⁴; quaero, quare non in aliis? Praeterea, tu ex hoc non evades: nunquam enim fuit revolutio caeli, quin fuisset generatio animalis ex animali; sed constat, quod animal ordinatur ad animal, ex quo generatur secundum ordinem causae: ergo si secundum Philosophum¹⁵ et rationem necesse est ponere statum in his quae ordinantur secundum ordinem causae, ergo in generatione animalium necesse est ponere primum animal. Et mundus non fuit sine animalibus: ergo etc.

3. Tertia propositio est ista. «Impossibile est infinita pertransiri¹⁶»; sed si mundus non coepit, infinitae revolutiones fuerunt: ergo impossibile est illas pertransire: ergo impossibile fuit devenire usque ad hanc. Si tu dicas, quod non sunt pertransita, quia nulla fuit prima¹⁷, vel, quod etiam bene possunt pertransiri in tempore infinito; per hoc non evades. Quaeram enim a te, utrum aliqua revolutio praecesserit hodiernam in infinitum, an nulla? Si nulla: ergo omnes finitae distant ab hac, ergo sunt omnes finitae, ergo habent principium. Si aliqua in infinitum distat; quaero de revolutione, quae immediate sequitur illam, utrum distet in infinitum. Si non: ergo nec illa distat, quoniam finita distantia est inter utramque. Si vero distat in infinitum, similiter quaero de tertia et de quarta et sic in infinitum: ergo non magis distat ab hac una quam ab alia: ergo una non est ante aliam: ergo omnes sunt simul.

4. Quarta propositio est ista. Impossibile est infinita a virtute finita comprehendi¹⁸; sed si mundus non coepit, infinita comprehenduntur a virtute finita: ergo etc. Probatio maioris per se patet. Minor ostenditur sic. Suppono, solum Deum esse virtutis actu infinitae, et omnia alia habere finitatem. Rursus suppono, quod motus caeli nunquam fuit sine spirituali substantia creata, quae vel ipsum faceret, vel saltem cognosceret¹⁹. Rursus etiam hoc suppono, quod spiritualis substantia nihil obliviscitur. — Si ergo aliqua spiritualis substantia virtutis finitae simul fuit cum caelo, nulla fuit revolutio caeli, quam non cognosceret: et non est oblita: ergo omnes actu cognoscit; et fuerunt infinitae: ergo aliqua spiritualis substantia virtutis finitae simul comprehendit infinita. Si dicas, quod non est inconveniens, quod unica similitudine cognoscat omnes revolutiones, quae sunt eiusdem speciei et omnino consimiles; obiicitur, quod non tantum cognoverit circulationes, sed earum effectus; et effectus varii et diversi sunt infiniti: patet ergo²⁰ etc.

5. Quinta est ista. Impossibile est infinita simul esse²¹; sed si mundus est aeternus sine principio, cum non sit sine homine — propter hominem enim sunt quodammodo omnia²² — et homo duret finito tempore: ergo infiniti homines fuerunt. Sed quot fuerunt homines, tot animae rationales: ergo infinitae animae fuerunt. Sed quot animae fuerunt, tot sunt, quia sunt formae incorruptibiles: ergo infinitae animae sunt. Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod circulatio est in animabus, vel quod una anima est in

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omnibus hominibus²³; primum est error in philosophia, quia, ut vult Philosophus, «proprius actus est in propria materia»: ergo non potest anima, quae fuit perfectio unius, esse perfectio alterius, etiam secundum Philosophum. Secundum etiam magis est erroneum, quia multo minus una est anima omnium²⁴.

6. Ultima ratio ad hoc est: impossibile est, quod habet esse post non-esse habere esse aeternum, quoniam hic est implicatio contradictionis; sed mundus habet esse post non-esse: ergo impossibile est esse aeternum. Quod autem habeat esse post non-esse, probatur sic: omne illud quod totaliter habet esse ab aliquo, producitur ab illo ex nihilo: sed mundus totaliter habet esse a Deo: ergo mundus ex nihilo; sed non ex nihilo materialiter: ergo originaliter²⁵. Quod autem omne quod totaliter producitur ab aliquo differente per essentiam, habeat esse ex nihilo, patens est. Nam quod totaliter producitur, producitur secundum materiam et formam: sed materia non habet ex quo producatur, quia non ex Deo: manifestum est igitur, quod ex nihilo. Minor autem, scilicet quod mundus a Deo totaliter producatur, patet ex alio problemate²⁶.

Conclusio.

Si ponitur res omnes ex nihilo esse productas, implicat dicere, mundum aeternum esse sive ab aeterno productum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ponere, mundum aeternum esse sive aeternaliter productum, ponendo²⁷ res omnes ex nihilo productas, omnino est contra veritatem et rationem, sicut ultima ratio probat: et adeo contra rationem, ut nullum philosophorum quantumcumque parvi intellectus crediderim hoc posuisse. Hoc enim implicat in se manifestam contradictionem. — Ponere autem mundum aeternum, praesupposita aeternitate materiae, rationabile videtur et intelligibile, et hoc duplici exemplo. Egressus enim rerum mundanarum a Deo est per modum vestigii. Unde si pes esset aeternus, et pulvis, in quo formatur vestigium, esset aeternus; nihil prohiberet intelligere, vestigium pedi esse coaeternum, et tamen a pede esset vestigium²⁸. Per hunc modum, si materia sive principium potentiale esset coaeternum auctori, quid prohibet ipsum vestigium esse aeternum? immo videtur congruum. — Rursus aliud exemplum rationabile²⁹. Creatura enim procedit a Deo ut umbra, Filius procedit ut splendor; sed quam cito est lux, statim est splendor, et statim est umbra, si sit corpus opacum ei obiectum³⁰. Si ergo materia coaeterna est auctori tanquam opacum; sicut rationabile est ponere Filium, qui est splendor Patris, coaeternum: ita rationabile videtur, creaturas sive mundum, qui est umbra summae lucis, esse aeternum. Et magis rationabile est quam suum oppositum, scilicet quod materia fuerit aeternaliter imperfecta, sine forma vel divina influentia, sicut posuerunt quidam philosophorum; et adeo rationabilius, ut etiam ille excellentior inter philosophos, Aristoteles, secundum quod Sancti imponunt, et commentatores exponunt, et verba eius praetendunt, in hunc errorem dilapsus fuerit³¹.

Quidam tamen moderni dicunt, Philosophum

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nequaquam illud sensisse nec intendisse probare, quod mundus omnino non coeperit, sed quod non coeperit naturali motu³². — Quod horum magis verum sit, ego nescio; hoc unum scio, quod si posuit, ipsum non incepisse secundum naturam, verum posuit, et rationes eius sumtae a motu et tempore sunt efficaces. Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit; manifeste erravit, sicut pluribus rationibus ostensum est supra³³. Et necesse fuit, eum ad vitandam contradictionem ponere, aut mundum non esse factum, aut non esse factum ex nihilo. Ad vitandam autem infinitatem actualem necesse fuit ponere aut animae rationalis corruptionem, aut unitatem, aut circulationem; et ita auferre beatitudinem³⁴. Unde iste error et malum habet initium, et pessimum habet finem.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur primo de motu³⁵, quod est primus inter omnes motus et mutationes, quia perfectissimus; dicendum, quod loquendo de motibus et mutationibus naturalibus, verum dicit et non habet instantiam; loquendo autem de mutatione supernaturali, per quam ipsum mobile processit in esse, non habet veritatem. Nam illa praecedit omne creatum, et ita mobile primum, ac per hoc et eius motum.

2. Quod obiicitur: omnis motus exit in esse per motum; dicendum, quod motus non exit in esse per se, nec in se, sed cum alio et in alio. Et quoniam Deus in eodem instanti mobile fecit et ut motor super mobile influxit; ideo motum mobili concreavit. — Si autem quaeras de illa creatione, dicendum, quod ibi stare est sicut in primis. Et hoc melius infra patebit³⁶.

3. Quod tertio obiicitur de nunc temporis etc., dicendum, quod, sicut in circulo est dupliciter assignare punctum, aut cum fit, aut postquam factus est; et sicut, dum fit, est ponere et assignare primum punctum, dum vero iam est, non est ponere primum; sic est accipere in tempore nunc dupliciter: et in ipsa productione³⁷ temporis fuit nunc primum, ante quod non fuit aliud, quod fuit principium temporis, in quo omnia dicuntur esse producta. Si autem de tempore, postquam factum est, verum est, quod est terminus praeteriti et se habet per modum circuli; sed hoc modo non fuerunt res productae in tempore iam perfecto. Et ita patet, quod rationes Philosophi nihil valent omnino ad hanc conclusionem³⁸. — Et quod dicitur, quod ante omne tempus est tempus; verum est accipiendo intus dividendo, non extra anterius procedendo.

4. Quod obiicitur de tempore, quando coepit; dicendum, quod coepit in suo principio; principium autem temporis est instans vel nunc; et ita coepit in instanti. Et non valet illa ratio: non fuit in instanti, ergo non coepit in instanti; quia successiva³⁹ non sunt in sui initio. — Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de tempore: aut secundum essentiam, aut secundum esse. Si secundum essentiam, sic nunc est tota essentia temporis, et illud incepit cum re mobili, non in alio nunc, sed in se ipso, quia status est in primis, unde non habuit aliam mensuram. Si secundum esse, sic coepit cum motu variationis, scilicet⁴⁰ nec coepit per creationem, sed potius per ipsorum mutabilium mutationem, et maxime primi mobilis.

5. Quod obiicitur de causae sufficientia et actualitate, dicendum, quod causa sufficiens ad aliquid est duobus modis: aut operans per naturam, aut per voluntatem et rationem. Si operans per naturam, sic statim cum est, producit. Si autem operans per voluntatem⁴¹, quamvis sit sufficiens, non oportet, quod statim cum est operetur; operatur enim secundum sapientiam et discretionem, et ita considerat congruitatem. Quoniam igitur non conveniebat naturae ipsius creaturae aeternitas, nec decebat, Deum alicui hanc nobilissimam conditionem donare: ideo divina voluntas, quae operatur secundum sapientiam, produxit non ab aeterno, sed in tempore; quia sicut produxit, sic disposuit et sic voluit. Ab aeterno enim voluit producere tunc, quando produxit; sicut ego nunc volo cras audire missam. Et ita patet, quod sufficientia non cogit.

Similiter de actualitate dicendum, quod causa duobus modis potest esse in actu: aut in se, ut si dicam: sol lucet; aut in effectu, ut si dicam: sol

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illuminat. Primo modo Deus semper fuit in actu, quoniam ipse est actus purus, nihil habens admixtum de possibili; alio modo non semper in actu; non enim semper fuit producens⁴².

6. Quod obiicitur secundo⁴³: si de non producente factus est producens, mutatus est ab otio in actum; dicendum, quod quoddam est agens, in quo actio et productio addit aliquid supra agentem et producentem. Tale, cum de non agente fit agens, variatur aliquo modo⁴⁴; et in tali ante operationem cadit otium, et in operatione additur complementum. Aliud est agens, quod est sua actio; et tali nihil omnino advenit, cum producit, nec etiam in eo fit aliquid, quod non prius erat⁴⁵; et tale nec in operando recipit complementum, nec in non-operando est otiosum, nec cum de non-producente fit producens, mutatur ab otio in actum. Tale autem est Deus etiam secundum philosophos, qui posuerunt Deum simplicissimum. — Patet igitur, quod stulta est eorum ratio. Si enim propter otium vitandum res ab aeterno produxisset, sine rebus perfectum bonum non esset, ac per hoc nec cum rebus, quia perfectissimum se ipso perfectum est. Rursus, si propter immutabilitatem⁴⁶ oporteret res ab aeterno esse, nihil posset nunc de novo producere. Qualis igitur Deus esset, qui nunc nihil per se posset? Haec omnia dementiam indicant magis quam philosophiam vel rationem aliquam. — Si tu quaeras, qualiter possit capi, quod Deus agat se ipso, et tamen non incipiat agere⁴⁷; dicendum, quod, etsi hoc non possit plene capi propter imaginationem coniunctam, potest tamen necessaria ratione convinci; et si quis a sensibus se retrahat ad intelligibilia aspicienda⁴⁸, aliquo modo percipiet. Si enim aliquis quaerat, utrum Angelus possit facere potum⁴⁹ figuli, cum non habeat manus, vel proiicere lapidem; respondetur, quod potest; quia hoc potest sola virtute sua absque organo, quod potest anima cum corpore et membro suo. Si igitur Angelus propter suam simplicitatem et perfectionem tantum excedit hominem, ut possit facere sine organo medio illud, ad quod homo necessario indiget organo; possit etiam facere per unum, quod homo potest per plura: quanto magis Deus, qui est in fine totius simplicitatis et perfectionis⁵⁰, absque omni medio suae voluntatis imperio, quae non est aliud quam ipse, potest omnia producere, ac per hoc in producendo immutabilis permanere! Sic potest homo manuduci ad hoc intelligendum. — Hoc autem perfectius capiet, si quis ista duo potest in suo opifice contemplari, scilicet quod est perfectissimus et simplicissimus. Quia perfectissimus, omnia quae sunt perfectionis ei attribuuntur; quia simplicissimus, nullam diversitatem in eo ponunt, ac per hoc nullam varietatem nec mutabilitatem; ideo «stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri⁵¹».

Scholion

I. Aristoteles cum plurimis, ut non dicam omnibus, antiquis philosophis docuit, mundum fuisse ab aeterno. Eundem errorem philosophi Arabes, ut Avicenna, Averroes aliique, late sparserunt, ut videri potest ex multis thesibus reprobatis ab Episcopo Parisiensi (Collectio iudicior. d'Argentré, tom. I. pag. 196. cap. XI: Errores de mundo et mundi aeternitate). Fide autem constat, tum mundum secundum totam suam substantiam esse a Deo creatum, tum eum incepisse in tempore vel cum tempore. Conveniebant praecipui Scholastici etiam in assertione, sola duce ratione probari posse, mundum a Deo in sensu proprio creatum esse; sed quoad alterum dogma, quod scilicet non ab aeterno productus sit, celebris fuit controversia, utrum hoc a sola ratione efficaciter possit demonstrari, an sola fide teneatur.

II. Ad hanc quaestionem S. Bonav. respondet cum distinctione. Si supponatur error philosophorum, qui et fidei et rationi est contrarius, mundum non fuisse secundum totam substantiam de nihilo creatum, tunc nec probari posse dicit, eum non esse productum ab aeterno; supposita autem creatione, omnino impossibile esse, ipsum, ab aeterno creatum, semper fuisse. Haec impossibilitas non est ex parte Dei creantis, sed ex parte mundi, qui non est creabilis ab aeterno, sive aliis verbis: ab aeterno potuit Deus mundum creare, sed mundus ab aeterno creari non potuit. Hoc probare nituntur qui hanc sententiam profitentur partim ex ipso conceptu creationis, qui importet quandam mutationem de non-esse ad esse, sive ad esse post non-esse, partim et praecipue per demonstrationem a posteriori et per deductionem ad impossibilia.

III. Sententiam S. Bonaventurae, quam Matth. ab Aquasparta in quadam egregia quaestione disputata inedita magis explanat, profitentur Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petrus a Tar., Ulricus ab Argentina, Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand. et plurimi ex recentioribus. — Durandus media via incedens putat, creationem aeternam repugnare quoad res successioni et motui subiectas, non autem quoad res, quae sunt naturae permanentis. In eodem sensu verba S. Thomae, qui oppositam sententiam defendit, a suis discipulis plerumque explicantur, ut supra p. 22, nota 2 dictum est. S. Thomae consentit Aegid. Rom. Scotus praecipue rationes Henr. Gand. pro more suo impugnat et argumenta utriusque partis solvere nititur; magis tamen sententiae S. Thomae favere videtur. Ita etiam Biel aliique Nominales. — Ceterum ab utraque parte asseritur, quod ante mundi initium non fuerit tempus, sed aeternitas, et quod mundus non sit productus de aliquo, licet secunda opinio neget, sola ratione probari posse, eum factum esse post nihilum.

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 8; p. II. q. 14. m. 1. a. 1. 2, q. 9. m. 9. — Scot., hic q. 3; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 46. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 18. c. 31-38; opusc. XXIII. de aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 4. m. 2. a. 5. partic. 2. q. 1. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. a. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. I. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the world was produced from eternity, or in time.

Concerning the second matter it is asked, whether the world was produced in time or from eternity. And that it was not in time, is shown.

I. By two arguments taken from motion[^1].

1. The first is ostensive, thus: before every motion and change is the motion of the first mobile; but everything that begins, begins through motion or change: therefore before everything that begins, there is that motion. But that motion could not be before itself nor before its mobile: therefore it is impossible that [the world] begins. The first proposition is presupposed, and its proof is patent thus: because it is a supposition in philosophy² that «in every genus the perfect is prior to the imperfect»; but among all the genera of motions, motion with respect to place is more perfect, because it is of a complete being; and among all the genera of local motions, circular motion is both swifter and more perfect; but such is the motion of the heavens: therefore most perfect, therefore first: thus the conclusion follows.

2. Likewise, it is shown per impossibile. Everything that comes into being comes into being through motion or change: therefore if motion comes into being, it comes into being through motion or change; and the same is asked of that: therefore one must either go to infinity, or posit some motion without a beginning; if a motion: therefore a mobile, therefore also a world.

3. Similarly an ostensive argument is taken from time, thus³: everything that begins, begins either in an instant or in time: therefore if the world begins, [it begins] either in an instant or in time. But before every time there is time, and before every instant there is time: therefore time is before all things that began. But it could not be before the world and motion: therefore the world did not

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begin. The first proposition is self-evident. The second, namely that before every time there is time, is patent from this: that, if it runs, it would necessarily have been running before⁴. — Similarly, that before every instant there is time, is patent thus: time is a circular measure befitting motion and the mobile; but every point that is on a circle is no less a beginning than an end: therefore every instant of time is no less a beginning of the future than a terminus of the past: therefore before every now there was a past: thus the conclusion follows.

4. Likewise, per impossibile. If time is produced, it is either in time or in an instant. Not in an instant, since it is not in an instant: therefore in time. But in every time one must posit a before and an after, and a past and a future: therefore if time was produced⁵ in time, before every time there was time; and this is impossible: therefore etc.

These are the arguments of the Philosopher, taken from the side of the world itself.

5. Likewise, other arguments of the philosophers are taken from the side of the producing cause; and generally they can be reduced to two, of which the first is ostensive and the second per impossibile. The first is this: when the cause is sufficient and actual, the effect is posited⁶; but God was from eternity the sufficient and actual cause of the world itself: therefore etc. The major proposition is self-evident. The minor is patent — namely that God is a sufficient cause; because, since he needs nothing extrinsic for the creation of the world, but only power, wisdom and goodness, and these were most perfect in God from eternity, it is patent that he was sufficient from eternity. That he was also actual, is patent: for God is pure act and his own willing, as the Philosopher says⁷; and the Saints say, that he is his own acting: therefore the conclusion follows.

6. Likewise, per impossibile⁸: Everything that begins to act or to produce, when before it was not producing, passes from rest to act; if therefore God begins to produce the world, he passes from rest to act; but about every such thing fall idleness and change or mutability: therefore about God there is idleness and mutability. But this is against the highest goodness and against the highest simplicity: therefore this is impossible, and a blasphemy to say of God, and so [it is impossible] that the world began. — These are the arguments which the commentators⁹ and the more modern thinkers add to the arguments of Aristotle, or which can be reduced to those.

But on the contrary stand arguments from propositions self-evident according to reason and philosophy.

1. The first is this. It is impossible to add to the infinite: this is manifest in itself, because everything which receives addition becomes greater, «but nothing is greater than the infinite¹⁰» — but if the world is without a beginning, it has lasted to infinity: therefore to its duration nothing can

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be added. But it is plain that this is false, because a revolution is added to a revolution every day: therefore etc. If you say, that the infinite is so as regards the past, but as regards the present, which now is, it is finite in act, and therefore on that side, on which it is finite in act, one can find a greater¹¹; on the contrary, it is shown that in the past one can find a greater: this is an infallible truth, that, if the world is eternal, the revolutions of the sun in its orbit are infinite; again, for one revolution of the sun there must have been twelve of the moon: therefore the moon has revolved more than the sun; and the sun infinitely; therefore among infinites, on the side on which they are infinite, one can find an excess. But this is impossible: therefore¹² etc.

2. The second proposition is this. It is impossible that infinites be ordered. For every order flows from a principle through a middle¹³; if therefore there is no first, there is no order: but the duration of the world or the revolutions of the heavens, if they are infinite, have no first: therefore they have no order, therefore one is not before another. But this is false: it remains, therefore, that they have a first. If you say that the standing of order does not have to be posited except in those things which are ordered according to the order of causality, because in causes there must necessarily be a standing¹⁴; I ask, why not in other [orders] also? Besides, you do not escape on this account: for there has never been a revolution of the heavens without a generation of an animal from an animal; but it is plain that an animal is ordered to an animal, from which it is generated, according to the order of cause: therefore if, according to the Philosopher¹⁵ and reason, one must posit a standing in those things which are ordered according to the order of cause, therefore in the generation of animals one must posit a first animal. And the world was not without animals: therefore etc.

3. The third proposition is this. «It is impossible that infinites be traversed¹⁶»; but if the world did not begin, infinite revolutions have been: therefore it is impossible to traverse them: therefore it was impossible to come down to this [present] one. If you say, that they have not been traversed, because none was first¹⁷, or that they can well be traversed in an infinite time; by this you do not escape. For I will ask you, whether some revolution preceded today's by an infinity, or none? If none: then all finite ones are distant from this one, then all are finite, then they have a beginning. If some is distant by an infinity, I ask of the revolution which immediately follows that one, whether it is distant by an infinity. If not: then neither does that one [the prior one] stand at an infinite distance, since the distance between the two is finite. If indeed it is distant by an infinity, similarly I ask of the third and of the fourth, and so on to infinity: therefore [the one prior] is no more distant from this one than from another: therefore one is not before another: therefore all are simultaneous.

4. The fourth proposition is this. It is impossible that infinites be comprehended by a finite power¹⁸; but if the world did not begin, infinites are comprehended by a finite power: therefore etc. The proof of the major is patent in itself. The minor is shown thus. I suppose that God alone is of actually infinite power, and that all other things have finitude. Again I suppose, that the motion of the heavens was never without a created spiritual substance, which either was making it, or at least cognized it¹⁹. Again, I also suppose this, that a spiritual substance forgets nothing. — If therefore some spiritual substance of finite power was simultaneous with the heaven, no revolution of the heaven was, which it would not cognize: and it has not forgotten: therefore it cognizes all in act; and they were infinite: therefore some spiritual substance of finite power simultaneously comprehends infinites. If you say, that it is not incongruous, that by a single similitude it cognizes all revolutions, which are of the same species and altogether alike; the objection is, that it would have cognized not only the revolutions, but also their effects; and the effects are varied and diverse and infinite: thus the conclusion follows²⁰.

5. The fifth is this. It is impossible that infinites be simultaneously²¹; but if the world is eternal without a beginning, since it is not without man — for on man's account all things in a certain manner are²² — and man endures for a finite time: therefore infinite men have been. But as many men as there have been, so many rational souls: therefore there have been infinite souls. But as many souls as there have been, so many there are, because they are incorruptible forms: therefore there are infinite souls. If you say on this account, that there is a circulation in souls, or that one soul is in

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all men²³; the first is an error in philosophy, because, as the Philosopher wills, «the proper act is in proper matter»: therefore the soul, which was the perfection of one, cannot be the perfection of another, even according to the Philosopher. The second is even more erroneous, because much less is one soul of all²⁴.

6. The final argument for this is: it is impossible that what has being after non-being should have being eternal, since this is an implication of contradiction; but the world has being after non-being: therefore it is impossible that it be eternal. That it has being after non-being is proved thus: everything which totally has its being from another is produced by that one from nothing: but the world totally has being from God: therefore the world [is] from nothing; but not from nothing materially: therefore originally²⁵. That, however, everything which is totally produced by another differing in essence has its being from nothing, is patent. For what is totally produced is produced according to matter and form: but matter has nothing from which it would be produced, because not from God: it is therefore manifest that [it is] from nothing. The minor, namely that the world is totally produced by God, is patent from another problem²⁶.

Conclusion.

If it is posited that all things have been produced from nothing, it is implied [as a contradiction] to say, that the world is eternal or was produced from eternity.

I respond: It must be said that to posit that the world is eternal or was eternally produced, while positing²⁷ that all things were produced from nothing, is altogether against truth and reason, as the last argument proves: and so against reason, that I would not believe any philosopher of however small intellect to have posited this. For this implies in itself a manifest contradiction. — But to posit the world eternal, presupposing the eternity of matter, seems reasonable and intelligible, and this by a twofold example. For the egress of mundane things from God is by way of vestige. Hence if the foot were eternal, and the dust in which the vestige is formed were eternal, nothing would prevent one's understanding the vestige to be coeternal with the foot, and yet the vestige would be from the foot²⁸. By this manner, if matter or the potential principle were coeternal with the author, what prevents the vestige itself being eternal? Indeed it seems congruous. — Again, another reasonable example²⁹. For the creature proceeds from God as a shadow, the Son proceeds as a splendor; but as soon as there is light, immediately there is splendor, and immediately there is shadow, if there is an opaque body set against it³⁰. If therefore matter is coeternal with the author as the opaque [body]; just as it is reasonable to posit that the Son, who is the splendor of the Father, is coeternal: so it seems reasonable that creatures or the world, which is the shadow of the highest light, are eternal. And it is more reasonable than its opposite, namely that matter was eternally imperfect, without form or divine influence, as some of the philosophers posited; and so much the more reasonable, that even that more excellent one among the philosophers, Aristotle, according to what the Saints impute, and the commentators expound, and his words pretend, fell into this error³¹.

Certain moderns however say, that the Philosopher

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in no way held that, nor intended to prove, that the world altogether did not begin, but that it did not begin by a natural motion³². — Which of these is more true, I do not know; this one thing I know: that if he held that it did not begin according to nature, he held truly, and his arguments taken from motion and time are effective. But if he held this, that it began in no manner at all, he manifestly erred, as has been shown above by many arguments³³. And he had necessarily, to avoid contradiction, to posit either that the world was not made, or that it was not made from nothing. And to avoid an actual infinity, he had necessarily to posit either a corruption of the rational soul, or its unity, or its transmigration; and thus take away beatitude³⁴. Hence this error and evil has a beginning, and has a most evil end.

1. As to the first objection from motion³⁵, that it is first among all motions and changes because most perfect; it must be said, that speaking of natural motions and changes, he speaks truly and there is no instance against him; but speaking of the supernatural change, by which the mobile itself proceeded into being, he has no truth. For that change precedes every created thing, and so the first mobile, and through this its motion.

2. As to the objection: every motion comes into being through motion; it must be said, that motion does not come into being through itself, nor in itself, but with another and in another. And because God in the same instant made the mobile and as mover influenced the mobile; therefore he con-created motion with the mobile. — But if you ask about that creation, it must be said, that there one must stop as in first things. And this will be made clearer below³⁶.

3. As to the third objection concerning the now of time, etc., it must be said, that, just as in a circle one assigns a point in two ways, either while it is being made, or after it has been made; and just as, while it is being made, one can posit and assign a first point, but when it now is, one cannot posit a first; so the now in time is to be taken in two ways: and in the very production³⁷ of time there was a first now, before which there was no other, which was the beginning of time, in which all things are said to have been produced. But if of time after it has been made, it is true that it is the terminus of the past and behaves after the manner of a circle; but in this manner the things were not produced in already-completed time. And so it is patent that the arguments of the Philosopher are worth nothing whatever for this conclusion³⁸. — And as to what is said, that before every time there is time; this is true taking [it] by dividing within, not by proceeding outside earlier.

4. As to the objection concerning time, when it began; it must be said, that it began in its own beginning; but the beginning of time is the instant or now; and so it began in an instant. And that argument is invalid: it was not in an instant, therefore it did not begin in an instant; because successive things³⁹ are not in their own initial moment. — One can however also say otherwise, that to speak of time is twofold: either according to essence, or according to being. If according to essence, then now is the whole essence of time, and that began with the mobile thing, not in another now, but in itself, because there is a standing at first things, whence it had no other measure. If according to being, then it began with the motion of variation, namely⁴⁰ it did not begin through creation, but rather through the change of the mutable things themselves, and especially of the first mobile.

5. As to the objection about the sufficiency and actuality of the cause, it must be said, that a sufficient cause for something is so in two ways: either as operating by nature, or by will and reason. If operating by nature, then as soon as it is, it produces. If however operating by will⁴¹, although it be sufficient, it is not necessary that as soon as it is it should operate; for it operates according to wisdom and discretion, and so considers congruity. Since therefore eternity did not befit the nature of the creature itself, nor was it fitting that God should give to anyone this most noble condition: therefore the divine will, which operates according to wisdom, produced not from eternity, but in time; because as he produced, so he disposed and so he willed. For from eternity he willed to produce then, when he produced; just as I now will to hear mass tomorrow. And so it is patent that sufficiency does not compel.

Similarly concerning actuality, it must be said, that a cause can be in act in two ways: either in itself, as if I say: the sun shines; or in its effect, as if I say: the sun

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illuminates. In the first way God was always in act, since he himself is pure act, having nothing of the possible admixed; in the other way not always in act; for he was not always producing⁴².

6. As to the second objection⁴³: if from non-producing he became producing, he was changed from rest to act; it must be said, that there is a certain agent in which action and production adds something above the agent and the producer. Such an agent, when from a non-agent it becomes an agent, is varied in some manner⁴⁴; and in such a one, before the operation rest falls, and in the operation completion is added. There is another agent which is its own action; and to such a one nothing whatever accrues when it produces, nor does anything come to be in it which was not there before⁴⁵; and such an agent neither in operating receives completion, nor in not-operating is idle, nor, when from a non-producer it becomes a producer, is it changed from rest to act. Such, however, is God, even according to the philosophers, who posited God most simple. — It is patent therefore that their argument is foolish. For if to avoid idleness he had produced things from eternity, without things he would not have been a perfect good, and through this nor with things, because the most perfect is perfect through itself. Again, if on account of immutability⁴⁶ things would have to be from eternity, he could now produce nothing anew. What kind of God would he be, who could now do nothing through himself? All these things indicate madness rather than philosophy or any reasoning. — If you should ask, how it can be grasped that God acts through himself, and yet does not begin to act⁴⁷; it must be said, that, although this cannot be fully grasped on account of the conjoined imagination, it can however be convinced of by necessary reason; and if anyone withdraws himself from the senses to looking at intelligibles⁴⁸, in some manner he will perceive [it]. For if anyone should ask, whether an Angel can make a potum⁴⁹ of a potter, since he has not hands, or throw a stone; the response is that he can; because he can by his power alone, without an instrument, what the soul can do with its body and member. If therefore the Angel, on account of his simplicity and perfection, so exceeds man that he can do without a mediating instrument that for which man necessarily needs an instrument; and can do through one [act] what man can do through many: how much more God, who is at the end of all simplicity and perfection⁵⁰, without any medium, by the command of his will, which is nothing other than himself, can produce all things, and through this remain immutable in producing! Thus a man can be led by hand to this understanding. — But he will grasp it more perfectly, if anyone can contemplate these two in his Maker, namely that he is most perfect and most simple. Because most perfect, all things which are of perfection are attributed to him; because most simple, they place no diversity in him, and through this no variety nor mutability; therefore «remaining stable, he gives all things to be moved⁵¹».

Scholion

I. Aristotle, with most — not to say all — the ancient philosophers, taught that the world was from eternity. The same error the Arab philosophers — such as Avicenna, Averroes, and others — spread broadly, as can be seen from many theses reproved by the Bishop of Paris (Collectio iudiciorum of d'Argentré, vol. I, p. 196, ch. XI: Errors concerning the world and the eternity of the world). It stands by faith, however, both that the world was created by God according to its whole substance, and that it began in time or with time. The principal Schoolmen also agreed in asserting that by reason alone it can be proved that the world was created by God in the proper sense; but as for the other dogma — that it was not produced from eternity — there was a celebrated controversy, whether this could be efficaciously demonstrated by reason alone, or whether it is held by faith alone.

II. To this question St. Bonaventure responds with a distinction. If the error of the philosophers is supposed — which is contrary both to faith and to reason — that the world was not created out of nothing according to its whole substance, then he says it cannot be proved that it was not produced from eternity; but creation being supposed, it is altogether impossible that the world, created from eternity, should always have been. This impossibility is not on the part of God creating, but on the part of the world, which is not creatable from eternity, or in other words: God could have created the world from eternity, but the world could not have been created from eternity. Those who profess this position strive to prove it partly from the concept of creation itself, which imports a certain change from non-being to being, or to being-after-non-being, and partly and chiefly by a posteriori demonstration and by deduction to impossibilities.

III. St. Bonaventure's position — which Matthew of Aquasparta further explains in a certain excellent disputed question, unpublished — is professed by Alexander of Hales, Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Ulric of Strasbourg, Richard of Mediavilla, Henry of Ghent, and very many of the more recent. — Durandus, taking a middle path, holds that eternal creation is repugnant for things subject to succession and motion, but not for things which are of a permanent nature. In the same sense the words of St. Thomas, who defends the opposite opinion, are usually explained by his disciples, as has been said above p. 22, note 2. Aegidius Romanus agrees with St. Thomas. Scotus chiefly attacks the arguments of Henry of Ghent in his usual manner and strives to resolve the arguments of both sides; but he seems rather to favor the position of St. Thomas. So also Biel and other Nominalists. — Moreover, on both sides it is asserted that before the beginning of the world there was no time but eternity, and that the world is not produced from something — although the second opinion denies that by reason alone it can be proved that it was made after nothing.

IV. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 12, m. 8; p. II, q. 14, m. 1, a. 1. 2, q. 9, m. 9. — Scotus, here q. 3; Reportata, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; Summa I, q. 46, a. 1. 2; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 18, c. 31–38; opusc. XXIII, De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; Summa p. II, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 2, a. 5, partic. 2, q. 1, incid. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3, a. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 4, a. 1. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I, q. 7. — Durandus, here q. 2. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Ut innuuntur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 4-7 (c. I.). — De minori primi arg. cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 73 (c. 8.), V. Phys. text. 7 seqq. (c. I.) et I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 11 seqq. (c. 3.), ubi, exclusa creatione, modos incipiendi reducit ad tres, scil. ad generationem, corruptionem et alterationem, quorum duos priores vocat mutationem, tertium vero motum.
As intimated by Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 4-7 (c. 1). — On the minor of the first argument cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 73 (c. 8), Physics V, text 7 ff. (c. 1), and On Generation and Corruption I, text 11 ff. (c. 3), where, creation being excluded, he reduces the modes of beginning to three, namely to generation, corruption, and alteration; the first two of these he calls "change" (mutatio), the third "motion" (motus).
Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 73 (c. 9.) et II. de Caelo, text. 23 (c. 4.) — Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 53-60 (c. 7.) probatur, motum ad situm sive localem esse perfectiorem aliis; et ibid. text. 73-78 (c. 8. seq.) ac II. de Caelo, text. 22-32 (c. 4.) ostenditur, motum circularem inter alios esse perfectiorem ipsumque convenire caelo, quod ratione huius motus est mensura omnium aliorum motuum.
Physics VIII, text 73 (c. 9), and On the Heavens II, text 23 (c. 4). — In Physics VIII, text 53-60 (c. 7) it is proved that motion with respect to place — i.e. local motion — is more perfect than the others; and at the same place, text 73-78 (c. 8-9), and On the Heavens II, text 22-32 (c. 4) it is shown that circular motion is the more perfect among them and is appropriate to the heaven, which by reason of this motion is the measure of all other motions.
Hoc et sequens arg. insinuantur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 10. seqq. (c. I.) et XII. Metaph. text. 29. (XI. c. 6.). — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut B E F H K V mundus incepit pro mundus incipit.
This and the following argument are intimated by Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 10 ff. (c. 1), and Metaphysics XII, text 29 (XI, c. 6). — A little below, several codices such as B, E, F, H, K, V read mundus incepit ("the world began") for mundus incipit ("the world begins").
Tempus ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 108 (c. 11.) ita definitur: «numerus motus secundum prius et posterius et continuum». De iis quae sequuntur, notentur haec ex Aristot., qui IV. Phys. text. 114 (c. 12.) ait: «Tempus est mensura motus ipsiusque moveri; metitur autem hoc motum determinando quendam motum, qui mensurabit totum». Text. 133 (c. 14.): «Quoniam autem est latio, et huius [primi] species est circularis... si igitur primum mensura omnium cognatorum est circumlatio regularis mensura maxime erit, quia numerus huius notissimus est... Quapropter et videtur tempus esse sphaerae motus... Etenim tempus ipsum esse videtur circulus quidam». Ibid. text. 121 (c. 13.): «Ipsum autem nunc est continuatio temporis... continuat enim tempus praeteritum et futurum et omnino terminus temporis est; est enim huius [futuri] quidem principium, illius [praeteriti] autem finis». — Aliquanto inferius cod. cc cum ed. 1 quod et finis pro quod finis, et dein cod. aa quod est terminus pro quod terminus.
Time is so defined by Aristotle, Physics IV, text 108 (c. 11): «the number of motion according to before and after, and continuous». For what follows note these from Aristotle, who at Physics IV, text 114 (c. 12) says: «Time is the measure of motion and of being-moved itself; and it measures this motion by determining a certain motion which will measure the whole». Text 133 (c. 14): «Since there is local motion, and the [first] species of this is the circular... if therefore the first measure of all things akin to it is the regular revolution, it will be the measure to the highest degree, because the number of this is the most known... Wherefore time also seems to be the motion of a sphere... For time itself seems to be a certain circle». Ibid., text 121 (c. 13): «The now itself is the continuation of time... for it continues past time and future, and is altogether the terminus of time; for it is the beginning of this [future] and the end of that [past]». — A little below, codex cc with ed. 1 reads quod et finis for quod finis, and then codex aa reads quod est terminus for quod terminus.
Verba fuit productum desunt in codd. et primis edd., sed cum Vat. sunt supplenda (melius suppleretur producitur), pro quibus cod. cc et ed. 1 ponunt coepit. Conclusionem argumenti integre cod. V exhibet ergo tempus non producitur.
The words fuit productum ("was produced") are absent in the manuscripts and the first editions, but with the Vatican ms. are to be supplied (producitur, "is produced," would supply more elegantly); in their place codex cc and ed. 1 put coepit ("began"). Codex V exhibits the conclusion of the argument entirely as ergo tempus non producitur ("therefore time is not produced").
Aristot., II. Phys. text. 37 (c. 3.) ait: «Quod [causae] actu quidem existentes et singulares et ea quorum sunt causae, simul sunt et non sunt». Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 10 (VIII. c. 5.). Avicenna, cuius est hoc argumentum, IX. Metaph., c. 1 dicit: Quod causa, quantum in se est, facit necessario esse causatum; quae si fuerit semper, facit causatum necessario esse semper. Cfr. eius Tractatus de definitionibus et quaesitis, ed. Venet. 1546, fol. 136.
Aristotle, Physics II, text 37 (c. 3), says: «That the causes existing in act and singular and the things of which they are causes, are and are not together». Cf. Metaphysics IX, text 10 (VIII, c. 5). Avicenna, whose argument this is, Metaphysics IX, c. 1, says: That the cause, so far as in itself, makes the caused necessarily be; which if it should be always, makes the caused necessarily be always. Cf. his Treatise on Definitions and Questions, ed. Venice 1546, fol. 136.
Libr. XII. Metaph. text. 30 (XI. c. 6.): «Oportet igitur esse tale principium, cuius substantia actus sit». Idem dicitur ibid. text. 35 (c. 7.). Text. 39 (c. 7.) autem ait: «Delectatio actus huius [primi principii] est», de quo textu vide tom. I. pag. 798, nota 6. — De iis quae sequuntur, cfr. tom. I. pag. 135, nota 8, et ibid. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — Post Et Sancti dicunt ex codd. aa cc et ed. 1 supplevimus quod.
Metaphysics XII, text 30 (XI, c. 6): «There must therefore be such a principle, whose substance is act». The same is said ibid., text 35 (c. 7). Text 39 (c. 7) however says: «Delight is the act of this [first principle]»; on which text see tom. I, p. 798, note 6. — On what follows, cf. tom. I, p. 135, note 8, and ibid. d. 8 p. II q. 2 in corp. — After Et Sancti dicunt we have supplied quod from codices aa cc and ed. 1.
Haec ratio innuitur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 7-10 et 13 (c. 1.), et XII. Metaph. text. 30 seqq. (XI. c. 6.), eamque recitat August., XI. Confess. c. 10 n. 12 et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17 n. 1. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 137, nota 6 et 8. — In maiori argumenti plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 post quod incipit agere perperam inserunt prius, pro quo cod. cc et ed. 1 bene ponunt nunc. Aliquanto inferius cod. bb pro sed circa omne tale habet sed contra, in omni tali, Vat. vero sed in omni tali, quae etiam circa finem argumenti cum pluribus mss. legit et blasphemum pro et blasphemia.
This argument is intimated by Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 7-10 and 13 (c. 1), and Metaphysics XII, text 30 ff. (XI, c. 6); and Augustine rehearses it at Confessions XI, c. 10, n. 12, and City of God XII, c. 17, n. 1. Cf. tom. I, p. 137, notes 6 and 8. — In the major of the argument, most codices with editions 2, 3, 4 wrongly insert prius ("before") after quod incipit agere; in its place codex cc and ed. 1 rightly put nunc ("now"). A little below, codex bb in place of sed circa omne tale has sed contra, in omni tali; and the Vatican ms. has sed in omni tali, which also near the end of the argument, with several manuscripts, reads et blasphemum for et blasphemia.
Inter quos eminent Alexander de Aphrodisia (circa a. 200 post Chr.) et Themistius; et quidam philosophi Arabes, scil. Avicenna (980-1037) in IX. Metaph., c. 1 et in Tractatu de defin. et quaes., et Averroes, qui nomine Commentatoris insignitur et vixit saec. 12, in suo Commentario super Aristotelis Phys. et Metaph. locc. supra citt., in opere Destructio destructionum, disp. 1 et 3, et in Epitome Metaph. tract. 4. Argumenta istorum philosophorum collegerunt et refutarunt Algazel († 1111) et Rabbi Moyses Maimonides (1135-1204), simul addentes argumenta pro impossibilitate aeternae creationis, quae tamen a Moyse Maimonide non demonstrationes, sed probationes maioris probabilitatis esse iudicantur in libro, cui titulus: Doctor perplexorum, p. II. c. 16. seq., ubi etiam dicit: «Illos, qui gloriantur, se demonstrationes conficere in quaestione aliqua per fallacias, nequaquam robur afferre... sed potius... occasionem ad contradicendum praebere; quando enim defectus et infirmitas rationum illarum detegitur, tum anima debilitatur ad fidem adhibendam illi rei, de qua probationes afferuntur» etc. Hisce verbis similia profert S. Thomas (Sum. p. I. q. 46. a. 2; II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. a. 5. et Quodl. 3. a. 31).
Among them stand out Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. A.D. 200) and Themistius; and certain Arab philosophers, namely Avicenna (980-1037) in Metaphysics IX, c. 1, and in his Treatise on Definitions and Questions; and Averroes, who is marked by the title of "the Commentator" and lived in the 12th century [recte 12th c. CE], in his Commentary on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics at the places cited above, in the work Destruction of Destructions, disp. 1 and 3, and in the Epitome of the Metaphysics, tract. 4. The arguments of these philosophers were gathered and refuted by Al-Ghazālī († 1111) and by Rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), who at the same time add arguments for the impossibility of an eternal creation — although Maimonides judges these to be not demonstrations but proofs of greater probability, in the book entitled The Guide of the Perplexed, p. II, c. 16 seq., where he also says: «Those who boast that they construct demonstrations in some question by fallacies bring no force at all to bear... but rather... offer occasion for contradiction; for when the defect and weakness of those arguments is uncovered, then the soul is enfeebled in giving faith to that thing for which the proofs are offered» etc. St. Thomas brings forward things similar to these words (Summa I, q. 46, a. 2; II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 5; and Quodl. 3, a. 31).
Aristot., I. de Caelo, text. 130 (c. 12.), ubi tempus innuitum definit, quo non est maius. Cfr. etiam III. Phys. text. 62 seqq. (c. 6.). — In prima propositione cod. cc et ed. 1 verbo addi praemittunt aliquid. — Vocabulum revolutio, quod sequitur, intelligendum est de circumactionibus corporum caelestium.
Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 130 (c. 12), where he defines that being-intimated than which there is nothing greater. Cf. also Physics III, text 62 ff. (c. 6). — In the first proposition codex cc and ed. 1 prefix aliquid ("something") to the verb addi. — The word revolutio which follows is to be understood of the rotations of the celestial bodies.
Ita S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 3. et 4.
So St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5, ad 3 and 4.
Similiter argumentatur Algazel, ut refert Averroes, Destr. destr. disp. 1. dub. 5. — Aliquanto superius in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 perperam omittitur et sol.
Algazel argues similarly, as Averroes reports, Destructio destructionum, disp. 1, dub. 5. — A little above, in most manuscripts and in ed. 1, et sol ("and the sun") is wrongly omitted.
Sub hoc respectu Philo Iudaeus, de Mundi opificio, dicit: Ordo est consequentia et series rerum praecedentium et sequentium. — De minori nota verba Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 34 (c. 5.): Infinitorum enim nihil est primum. — In eadem minori et conclusione huius argumenti plures codd. principium, nonnulli alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 primam pro primum.
Under this aspect Philo the Jew, On the Making of the World, says: Order is the consequence and series of things preceding and following. — On the minor note the words of Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 34 (c. 5): For of infinites nothing is first. — In the same minor and the conclusion of this argument several codices read principium, and not a few others with editions 1, 2, 3 read primam for primum.
Aristoteles hoc demonstrat VIII. Phys. text. 34 seqq. (c. 5.) et II. Metaph. text. 3 seqq. (1. brevior, c. 2.).
Aristotle demonstrates this at Physics VIII, text 34 ff. (c. 5), and Metaphysics II, text 3 ff. (i.e. the Lesser Metaphysics, c. 2).
Vide notam praecedentem. — Cod. F finem argumenti sic exhibet: ergo mundus non est infinitus, sed habet principium.
See the preceding note. — Codex F exhibits the end of the argument thus: ergo mundus non est infinitus, sed habet principium ("therefore the world is not infinite, but has a beginning").
Aristot., I. Poster. c. 18 (c. 22.), XI. Metaph. c. 9 (X. c. 10.) et multis aliis locis, ubi textus originalis pro pertransiri habet pertransire (διελθεῖν), quod etiam paulo inferius fere omnes codd. contra ed. 1 et Vat. ponunt.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 18 (c. 22), Metaphysics XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10), and in many other places, where the original text has pertransire (διελθεῖν, "to traverse") for pertransiri ("to be traversed"); and a little below, almost all the codices, against ed. 1 and the Vatican ms., put [the active form].
Secundum intentionem S. Thomae, Sum. p. I. q. 46. a. 2. ad 6. et hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 3. et 4. — Post pertransita supple: infinita. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. cum primis edd. praecessit pro praecesserit.
According to the intention of St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 6, and here q. 1, a. 5, ad 3 and 4. — After pertransita supply: infinita. — A little below most codices with the first editions read praecessit for praecesserit.
Codd. P Q in marg. addunt octavo Physicorum, in fine (text. 79. seqq.), ubi Aristot. probat, in magnitudine finita non posse esse infinitam potentiam.
Codices P and Q add in the margin Physics VIII, at the end (text 79 ff.), where Aristotle proves that in a finite magnitude there cannot be an infinite power.
Haec suppositio fit secundum systema Aristotelicum.
This supposition is made according to the Aristotelian system.
Cod. F prosequitur: quod virtus finita comprehendit infinita, si mundus non coepit; quod est impossibile etc.
Codex F continues: that a finite power comprehends infinites, if the world did not begin; which is impossible etc.
Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 40. seqq. (c. 5.), I. de Caelo, text. 33. seqq. (c. 5.) et XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.), quibus locis ostendit, in rebus naturalibus dari non posse infinitum actu sive in magnitudine sive in multitudine. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 40 ff. (c. 5), On the Heavens I, text 33 ff. (c. 5), and Metaphysics XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10), at which places he shows that in natural things an actual infinite — whether in magnitude or in multitude — cannot be given. See also I Sent. d. 43, q. 3.
Aristot., II. Phys. text. 24 (c. 2.): Et utimur tanquam propter nos omnibus, quae sunt; sumus enim quodammodo et nos finis.
Aristotle, Physics II, text 24 (c. 2): And we use all things that are as though for our sake; for we are in a certain manner ourselves an end.
Prima opinio, quae vocatur metempsychosis, est Pythagorae et Platonis, X. de Republ. circa finem (ed. Serrani, tom. II. p. 620); Tim. Locri de Anima mundi (tom. III. pag. 104), de qua August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 26. Secunda opinio est Averrois, quam diversis locis proponit, v. g. III. de Anima, text. 4 et 17 seq., ac in tractatibus de Animae beatitudine et de Connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. Contra errorem hunc Averrois tum B. Albertus tum S. Thomas composuerunt specialem librum, cui titulus: de Unitate intellectus contra Averroem. — Verba paulo inferius ex Aristotele citata inveniuntur II. de Anima, text. 26 (c. 2.): Uniuscuiusque enim actus in eo quod potentia existit, et in propria materia aptus natura est fieri. Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 33 (c. 3.). — Aliquanto superius cod. Q Si tu dicas, quod non est inconveniens propter hoc pro Si tu dicas propter hoc. Paulo inferius codd. V aa quae fuit corporis perfectio unius pro quae fuit perfectio unius.
The first opinion, which is called metempsychosis, is that of Pythagoras and Plato, Republic X, near the end (ed. Serranus, vol. II, p. 620); and of Timaeus of Locri, On the Soul of the World (vol. III, p. 104), concerning which Augustine, City of God XII, c. 26. The second opinion is that of Averroes, which he proposes in various places, e.g. On the Soul III, text 4 and 17 ff., and in the treatises On the Beatitude of the Soul and On the Connection of the Abstract Intellect with Man. Against this error of Averroes both Blessed Albert and St. Thomas composed a special book, entitled: On the Unity of the Intellect against Averroes. — The words a little below cited from Aristotle are found in On the Soul II, text 26 (c. 2): For the act of each thing is by nature apt to come to be in that which exists potentially, and in its proper matter. Cf. On the Soul I, text 33 (c. 3). — A little above codex Q reads Si tu dicas, quod non est inconveniens propter hoc for Si tu dicas propter hoc. A little below codices V and aa have quae fuit corporis perfectio unius for quae fuit perfectio unius.
De hac 5. ratione, quam etiam Algazel adducit (cfr. Averroes, Destr. destr. disp. 1. dub. 7.), ait S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 6: «quod illa obiectio inter alias fortior est», et S. p. I. q. 46. a. 2. ad 8: «quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset dicere aliquis, quod mundus fuit aeternus vel saltem aliqua creatura, ut Angelus, non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno». Similia his dicit etiam in opusculo de Aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes. Hinc ii qui S. Thomam sequuntur, communiter tenent, quod mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno quantum ad entia permanentia, non autem quantum ad entia successiva, ut sunt generationes et corruptiones, motus et tempus.
On this fifth argument, which Al-Ghazālī also adduces (cf. Averroes, Destructio destructionum, disp. 1, dub. 7), St. Thomas says, here q. 1, a. 5, ad 6: «that this objection is stronger than the others»; and Summa I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 8: «that this argument is a particular one. Whence someone could say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, such as an Angel, but not man. We, however, intend universally, whether any creature has been from eternity». He says similar things also in the opusculum On the Eternity of the World against the Murmurers. Hence those who follow St. Thomas commonly hold that the world could have been from eternity as to permanent beings, but not as to successive beings — such as generations and corruptions, motion and time.
Vat. sed non ex nihilo materialiter, nec causaliter: ergo originaliter, quae lectio convenit cum iis, quae in fine quaest. praeced. habentur, sed non cum codd. et ed. 1. Aliquanto superius post ab aliquo sola Vat. adiicit donante (differente?) per essentiam, et dein ponit ergo mundus producitur ex nihilo a Deo pro ergo mundus ex nihilo, ubi codd. aa cc cum ed. 1 post mundus interserunt est. Cod. 1 post habet esse a Deo addit sicut supra probatum est in primo problemate.
The Vatican ms. reads sed non ex nihilo materialiter, nec causaliter: ergo originaliter, a reading which agrees with what is said at the end of the preceding question, but not with the codices and ed. 1. A little above, after ab aliquo the Vatican ms. alone adds donante (differente?) per essentiam, and then puts ergo mundus producitur ex nihilo a Deo for ergo mundus ex nihilo, where codices aa cc with ed. 1 insert est after mundus. Codex 1, after habet esse a Deo, adds sicut supra probatum est in primo problemate ("as was proved above in the first problem").
Scil. ex quaest. praeced.
Namely, from the preceding question.
Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 ponenti.
Most codices with ed. 1 read ponenti ("for [one] positing").
August., X. de Civ. Dei, c. 31: Sicut enim, inquiunt [Platonici], si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset; sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati et semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. — Vat.: vestigium pedis esse... a pede esse vestigium. Mox cod. T materiale pro potentiale, et dein codd. U aa bb prohiberet pro prohibet.
Augustine, City of God X, c. 31: For just as — they [the Platonists] say — if a foot had been in dust from eternity, a footprint would always have been under it; which footprint no one would doubt to have been made by the one treading, nor would one have been before the other, even though one was made by the other; so — they say — the world and the gods created in it both have always been, with the one who made them always existing, and yet they were made. — The Vatican ms. has vestigium pedis esse... a pede esse vestigium. Then codex T reads materiale for potentiale, and afterwards codices U, aa, bb read prohiberet for prohibet.
Vat. interpunctione mutata: Rursus aliud exemplum. Rationalis enim creatura procedit, quae lectio minus congruit cum iis, quae S. Bonav. docuit de differentia naturae, vestigii et imaginis, I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. in fine. — In hoc exemplo alluditur ad illud Hebr. I, 3: Qui cum sit splendor gloriae etc. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. ut C K R T et statim est ibi umbra pro et statim est umbra; dein non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 3 vel (cod. I velut) obiectum, cod. aa vel obscurum pro ei obiectum.
The Vatican ms., with altered punctuation: Rursus aliud exemplum. Rationalis enim creatura procedit ("Again, another example. For the rational creature proceeds..."), a reading which agrees less well with what St. Bonaventure has taught concerning the difference of nature, vestige, and image, I Sent. d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, in fine. — In this example there is an allusion to Hebrews 1:3: Who, being the splendor of [his] glory, etc. — A little below several codices, such as C, K, R, T, read et statim est ibi umbra for et statim est umbra; then not a few codices with editions 1, 3 read vel (cod. I velut) obiectum; codex aa reads vel obscurum for ei obiectum.
In cod. 1 additur quod obiiciatur, in Vat. luci. Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 aeternum, cod. Z aeterni pro coaeternum, et dein cod. T est ponere pro videtur.
In codex 1 there is added quod obiiciatur ("which is set against"), in the Vatican ms. luci ("to the light"). Then not a few codices with ed. 1 read aeternum, and codex Z reads aeterni for coaeternum; and then codex T reads est ponere for videtur.
Cfr. quaest. praeced.; Aristot., III. de Caelo, text. 21 (c. 2.), ubi etiam recitat opinionem Platonis ex Timaeo, nempe quod elementa inordinate movebantur, antequam mundus factus esset. Idem asserit Augustinus, X. de Civ. Dei, c. 31 et XII. c. 12. — Paulo superius post secundum quod Sancti cod. aa interserit et.
Cf. the preceding question; Aristotle, On the Heavens III, text 21 (c. 2), where he also rehearses the opinion of Plato from the Timaeus, namely that the elements were moved without order before the world was made. Augustine asserts the same, City of God X, c. 31, and XII, c. 12. — A little above, after secundum quod Sancti, codex aa inserts et.
Scilicet generatione, quae supponit subiectum et in tempore peragitur.
Namely [not] by generation, which presupposes a subject and is carried out in time.
Hic in fundam. — Infra primum disiunctionis membrum Vat. ita exhibet: aut mundum esse factum ex tempore, quae lectio contradicit verbis praecedentibus Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit, et est contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
Here in the fundamenta. — For the first member of the disjunction below, the Vatican ms. exhibits aut mundum esse factum ex tempore ("or that the world was made in time"), a reading which contradicts the preceding words Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit ("But if he held this, that it began in no manner at all"), and is against the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.
Cfr. August., X. de Civ. Dei, c. 30; XI. c. 4. n. 2; et XII. c. 20.
Cf. Augustine, City of God X, c. 30; XI, c. 4, n. 2; and XII, c. 20.
Cod. L supplet caeli, cod. R circulari, Vat. habet primi mobilis, qui est etc.
Codex L supplies caeli, codex R circulari, and the Vatican ms. has primi mobilis, qui est etc.
Sive creatione. — In cod. U additur secundo.
That is, [of] creation. — In codex U secundo is added.
Hic a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — Ad verba in primis supple: intentionibus.
Here at a. 3, q. 2, ad 5. — To the words in primis supply: intentionibus ("in first intentions").
Plures codd. etsi; dein cod. U in prima productione pro in ipsa productione. In seq. prop. post Si autem de tempore cod. A prosequitur et de nunc postquam factum est loquimur, verum est.
Several codices read etsi; then codex U reads in prima productione ("in the first production") for in ipsa productione. In the following proposition, after Si autem de tempore codex A continues: et de nunc postquam factum est loquimur, verum est ("and we are speaking of the now after it has been made, it is true").
Cod. F interserit et tunc clauditur inter extrema primi et ultimi temporis; cod. Y post non extra addit vel. Paulo superius codd. V aa quaestionem pro conclusionem.
Codex F inserts et tunc clauditur inter extrema primi et ultimi temporis ("and then it is closed between the extremities of the first and the last time"); codex Y after non extra adds vel. A little above codices V and aa have quaestionem for conclusionem.
Intellige: successiva quatenus successiva. — Paulo superius Vat. et non valet illatio, quae etiam circa principium solutionis ponit quod pro quando.
Understand: successive [things] insofar as they are successive. — A little above the Vatican ms. reads et non valet illatio ("and the inference is not valid"); it also at the beginning of the solution puts quod for quando.
Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. omittit scilicet; codd. V aa habent sed non pro scilicet nec.
The Vatican ms., with one or two other codices, omits scilicet; codices V and aa have sed non for scilicet nec.
In mss. et primis edd. hic additur et; forte excidit rationem.
In the manuscripts and the first editions et is added here; perhaps rationem has fallen out.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. 2.
Cf. I Sent. d. 45, a. 2, q. 1 and 2.
Intellige secundam obiectionem commentatorum Aristotelis; cod. cc et ed. 1 ultimo.
Understand the second objection of the commentators on Aristotle; codex cc and ed. 1 read ultimo ("at last").
In cod. A adiicitur et tale est agens creatum.
In codex A is added et tale est agens creatum ("and such is a created agent").
Sequimur codd. aa cc et ed. 1 ponentes erat pro infuit, quod habet Vat.
We follow codices aa, cc and ed. 1, which put erat ("was") for infuit ("was in"), which the Vatican ms. has.
Vat. immutationem.
The Vatican ms. reads immutationem ("non-change" / "immutability").
Cod. I interserit cum et ipse non incipiat. Paulo ante multi codd. cum ed. 1 posset pro possit, minus congrue.
Codex I inserts cum et ipse non incipiat ("when he himself also does not begin"). A little before, many codices with ed. 1 read posset for possit, less congruously.
Codd. F Y cc ff et ed. 1 retrahat intelligibilia (cod. cc et ed. 1 intellectualia) aspiciendo; Vat. a sensibus se trahat ad... aliquo modo perciperet. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius lutum pro potum i. e. vasculum vel poculum (cfr. Du Cange, glossarium), quod cod. H ponit; plures codd. potum.
Codices F, Y, cc, ff, and ed. 1 read retrahat intelligibilia (cc and ed. 1 intellectualia) aspiciendo; the Vatican ms. has a sensibus se trahat ad... aliquo modo perciperet. The same Vatican ms. a little below reads lutum ("clay") for potum — i.e. a small vessel or cup (cf. Du Cange's glossary) — which codex H gives; several codices read potum.
Hic modus loquendi sumtus est ex Libro de Causis, prop. 20 (alias 21), ubi dicitur de prima unitate, quod sit in fine simplicitatis; et ex Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39 (XI. c. 7.), ubi verbum ἄριστον, i. e. optimum, in translatione Arabico-latina vertitur in fine nobilitatis. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 638, nota 1, et pag. 806, nota 6. — Mox cod. cc et ed. 1 vocis imperio pro voluntatis imperio.
This manner of speaking is taken from the Book of Causes, prop. 20 (alias 21), where it is said of the First Unity that it is at the end of simplicity; and from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 39 (XI, c. 7), where the word ἄριστον (i.e. best) is rendered in the Arabic-Latin translation as at the end of nobility. Cf. tom. I, p. 638, note 1, and p. 806, note 6. — Then codex cc and ed. 1 read vocis imperio ("by the command of the voice") for voluntatis imperio.
Boeth., III. de Consol. Metro 9. — Vat. nec ponunt ullam varietatem pro nullam varietatem.
Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] III, meter 9. — The Vatican ms. reads nec ponunt ullam varietatem for nullam varietatem. ---

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