Bonaventure

Quaestio IV.

Utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quarto quaeritur, utrum potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Secundae Petri ultimo: Mille anni apud Deum sicut una dies. Et in Psalmo: Mille anni ante oculos tuos tanquam dies hesterna, quae praeteriit; pari ratione centum millia annorum: ergo si Deus potuit facere mundum ante diem hesternam, potuit per centum millia annorum ante. Et si hoc, esset antiquior: ergo etc.

2. Item, divina potentia et operatio non dependet nec a materia nec a tempore: ergo qua ratione potest in uno instanti, potest in alio; sed qua ratione in posteriori, eadem ratione in priori. Et si hoc, mundus potuit fieri antiquior: ergo etc.

3. Item, divina essentia et potentia fuit ante temporis principium; aut ergo fuit potens producere ante, aut non. Si non: ergo erat impotens; si sic: ergo potuit facere mundum, antequam faceret.

4. Item, ego quaero, utrum potuerit facere post. Si sic; sed non est maior ratio de post quam de ante: ergo pari ratione potuit facere ante. Aut si non potuit post, nec ante, et ita necesse fuit quod tunc: ergo videtur, quod compulsus et non voluntarius mundum fecerit tunc.

Sed contra:

1. Ante principium temporis nihil erat nisi aeternitas¹: ergo si potuit mundum facere ante principium temporis, potuit facere et in aeternitate; sed quod habet esse in aeternitate caret principio, et nihil tale potest esse creatum ex nihilo: ergo etc.

2. Item, si potuit facere ante; ponatur. Similiter ergo quaero, utrum ante? et sic in infinitum; sed infinitum a parte ante est aeternum: ergo si potuit in infinitum ante facere, potuit etiam ab aeterno. Si ergo non potuit facere mundum aeternum, quia non esset factus, nec² antiquiorem.

3. Item, necesse est, mundum habere finitam durationem a parte ante; sed in omni finito necesse est alicubi stare, ultra quod non potest fieri progressus; sed qua ratione statur in aliquo instanti finito, statur in illo, in quo conditus est mundus: ergo etc.

4. Item, principio totius antiquitatis non potest aliquid fieri vel cogitari antiquius: sed tempus vel aevum, quod incepit cum mundo, est totius antiquitatis principium: ergo eo³ non potuit aliquid esse antiquius.

Conclusio.

Deus non potuit mundum sic facere antiquiorem, ut sit ab aeterno, nec sic, ut sit sine tempore; bene tamen potuit facere tempus ante hoc et in illo facere mundum.

Respondeo: Quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem; potest intelligi dupliciter: aut⁴ quod ipsum creaverit ab aeterno, cum produxerit ex tempore, et tunc esset antiquior; aut ita quod mundus durasset tempore longiori, tamen finito.

Primum credo impossibile simpliciter, quoniam implicat in se contradictionem. Ex hoc enim, quod ponitur fieri, ponitur habere principium. Ex hoc autem, quod ponitur aeternus, ponitur non habere principium. Unde idem est quaerere, utrum Deus potuerit ante mundum⁵ facere, quod mundus habendo principium non haberet principium: et hoc includit contradictionis utramque partem.

Similiter quantum ad secundum sensum videtur aliquibus impossibile, quia implicat in se oppositionem, quoniam anterioritas sive antiquitas incipit simul cum tempore. Nam in aeternitate non est ante et post; et tempus incipit de necessitate simul cum mundo, sicut situs incipit simul cum loco, et locus cum orbe primo. Unde sicut, si quaereretur, utrum primus orbis potuerit fieri altior, nulla esset omnino⁶ quaestio, immo implicat contradictionem, scilicet extra omnem locum esse locum — et venit ex falsa imaginatione, quia imaginatur, totum mundum esse in locali spatio, sicut imaginamur, terram circumdari aqua — similiter intelligendum in proposito, quod est implicatio contradictionis et venit ex falsa imaginatione, quia imaginamur, ante principium mundi fuisse durationem temporis, in qua mundus potuisset ante fieri. Unde sicut⁷, si quaeratur, utrum totus mundus potuisset fieri extra totum mundum, vel supra, vel infra fieri, stulta est quaestio et implicans opposita et veniens ex mala imaginatione: per hunc modum respondent, si quaeratur, utrum mundus potuerit fieri ante vel antiquior. Unde dicunt, quod, si aliquid praecessisset, ante mensurans temporaliter, potuisset utique ante fieri⁸; similiter si locus esset extra, potuisset altior fieri. — Ratio autem istius malae imaginationis est: cum enim imaginamur, aeternitatem in infinitum ante tempus fuisse, intelligimus eam quasi durationem extensam, in qua sunt diversa nunc, in quorum quolibet potuisset fieri tempus. Sed hoc omnino nihil est, quia aeternitas est nunc simplicissimum, in quo nulla omnino cadit diversitas⁹. — Concedendum ergo, sicut probant rationes inductae ad hoc, quod, sicut non potuit mundum facere in alio loco, quia non est in loco¹⁰, sic nec ante, quia nulla est antiquitas nisi in eo. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud Deum non est vis aliqua in aliquanto tempore, et quod potentia eius non dependet etc.; dicunt ad omnia unica responsione, quod quamvis divina virtus ad nihil arctetur, tamen

principiatum non potest facere sine principio, et temporale non sine tempore, et primum temporale non potest facere nisi in principio temporis, et principium temporis non nisi in principio temporis. Oppositum enim non dicit potentiam, sed magis contradictionem et repugnantiam. Nec tamen arctatur ad sic faciendum, quia posset omnino non facere. Unde sicut stulta est quaestio si quaeratur, utrum potuerit¹¹ facere principium temporis ante principium temporis; similiter et praedicta.

Sed quoniam durum videtur dicere, quod Deus non potuit facere mundum antiquiorem, et quia¹² alium mundum facere potuerit, sed tantum istum; propterea dicunt alii, quod, sicut Deus potuit facere mundum ampliorem, ita etiam potuit facere antiquiorem sine omni distinctione. — Sed tamen istud non est omnino simile, quia Deus posset facere caelum amplius et magis distare a terra, salva utriusque natura; sed si Deus intelligatur fecisse, quod istud nunc magis distet a principio temporis, intelligitur illud nunc esse aliud¹³, quia etiamsi intelligatur mundus factus ante, adhuc non esset antiquior respectu istius nunc, quia tantum distaret, quantum distat a principio; et ita non esset antiquior.

Et ideo non est simpliciter neganda nec simpliciter concedenda, sicut nec ista: Deus potuit facere mundum altiorem. Si enim intelligas de hoc absolute, falsum est¹⁴, sicut dicit prima opinio, et non intelligibile, et implicatio contradictionis. Si autem intelligas per concomitantiam alterius loci, scilicet quia Deus potuit facere alium mundum amplectentem istum, in quo situm posset habere magis altum et minus, verum est. Similiter iudicandum de antiquitate. — Et ideo si quaeratur, utrum Deus potuerit ante facere mundum, distinguendum est sicut et haec: utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum in alio loco vel alibi; quia adverbialis determinatio potest cadere sub ampliatione verbi, vel extra¹⁵. Si sub ampliatione verbi, tunc est vera et est sensus, quod Deus potuit alium locum facere et in illo mundum istum totum ponere. Potuit enim facere centum tales mundos, et adhuc unum complectentem omnes, et unum in loco altiori quam alium. Sic et in tempore intelligendum est, quod Deus potuit facere tempus ante hoc, et in illo facere mundum.

Alio modo potest cadere adverbialis determinatio extra ampliationem de ly¹⁶ potest, et est sensus, quod Deus potest facere mundum istum in alio loco, qui est extra mundum: et hic¹⁷ est implicatio falsi, quia non est locus nisi intra mundum; et similiter de tempore intelligendum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ante non erat nisi aeternitas; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen Deus poterat facere, quod ante esset tempus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito a parte ante, dicendum, quod infinitum a parte ante potest esse apponendo aut secundum actum, aut secundum potentiam. Primo modo dicit aeternitatem; secundo modo minime, quia aeternitas dicit infinitum actu.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necesse est ponere statum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed status possunt esse infiniti; et licet in potentia¹⁸ sit ponere statum, tamen quia actus non consequitur totam potentiam, sed in aliquo statu est, ideo in statu finito. Sed quare magis in hoc quam in alio, ratio summa et potissima est voluntas facientis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod antiquitas coepit cum mundo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed Deus potuit facere, quod ante inciperet; ideo non valet ratio illa. Rationes ad oppositum sunt concedendae: procedunt enim secundum primam viam.

Scholion.

I. Praeter quaestionem principalem breviter resolvitur alia quaestio, scil. utrum potuerit mundus creari ab aeterno. Si verba ab aeterno non copulantur cum verbo potuit, sed cum terminis mundus creari, sive, ut hic dicitur (ad 2.), apponendo infinitum a parte ante non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum; tunc S. Doctor hic et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. omnino negat, possibile esse, aliquid creari ab aeterno. Ipsi consentiunt Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand. aliique plurimi, praesertim nostrae aetatis. Alii vero cum S. Thoma et Scoto (qui tamen dubius haeret), duce Aristotele, argumenta ex ratione sumta non sufficienter istam impossibilitatem probare censent.

II. Ad quaestionem autem, utrum mundus, qui supponitur

creatus non ab aeterno, potuerit creari prius, quam in hoc ordine providentiae creatus est, prima opinio respondet negative; vel potius nonnulli ipsam quaestionem in se irrationalem esse affirmant, quippe quia ipsa quaestio falso supponat, esse tempus ante initium mundi. Sed quaestionem rationabiliter poni posse, patet, si initium mensurandi durationem ponimus non in initio mundi nostri, sed in hoc momento, quo nos vivimus, si scil. quaerimus, utrum duratio mundi ab instanti praesenti usque ad initium mundi possit esse maior. Recte ad hoc respondet S. Doctor cum distinctione. Nam nunc praesentis temporis, si magis distaret a principio temporis (et etiam primum nunc) non esset idem nunc, sed aliud; quia ad mundum, qui supponitur ante decursum nostri temporis, etiam aliud tempus ordinatum esset, et tunc esset etiam alius mundus, quem Deus facere potuisset. Si autem idem nunc praesens et idem initium temporis esse supponitur, tunc creatio mundi caderet extra tempus, si mundus realis antiquior esset; quod est impossibile.

Explicite et in eadem cum Seraphico sententia hanc quaestionem tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

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Question IV.

Whether God could have made the world older.

In the fourth place it is asked whether [God] could have made the world older. And that he could, it seems.

1. Second [Letter] of Peter, last [chapter]: A thousand years before God are as one day. And in the Psalm: A thousand years before thy eyes are as yesterday's day, which is past; by parallel reasoning, a hundred thousand years also: therefore if God could make the world before yesterday, he could [make it] a hundred thousand years before. And if this, it would be older: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, divine power and operation does not depend either on matter or on time: therefore by whatever reason [he can act] in one instant, [he can act] in another; but by whatever reason in a later [instant], by the same reason in an earlier; and if this, the world could have been made older: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the divine essence and power existed before the beginning of time; therefore either it was able to produce before, or not. If not, then it was impotent; if so, then it could have made the world before he made it.

4. Likewise, I ask whether he could have made [it] later. If so, but there is no greater reason about "later" than about "earlier": therefore by parallel reasoning he could have made [it] earlier. Or if he could not [make it] later, neither earlier, and so it was necessary that [it be] then: therefore it seems that he made the world then under compulsion and not voluntarily.

On the contrary:

1. Before the beginning of time there was nothing except eternity¹: therefore if he could have made the world before the beginning of time, he could have made [it] also in eternity; but what has being in eternity lacks a beginning, and no such [thing] can be created out of nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if he could have made [it] before; let it be posited. Similarly therefore I ask, whether before [that]? and so on to infinity; but the infinite on the prior side is eternal: therefore if he could have made [it] infinitely before, he could also [have made it] from eternity. If therefore he could not make the world eternal, since it would not be made, neither² [could he have made it] older.

3. Likewise, it is necessary that the world have a finite duration on the prior side; but in everything finite it is necessary to stop somewhere, beyond which no progress can be made; but by whatever reason a halt is made at some finite instant, [a halt] is made at that [instant] in which the world was founded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, than the beginning of all antiquity nothing can be made or thought more ancient: but time or aevum, which began with the world, is the beginning of all antiquity: therefore than it³ nothing could be more ancient.

Conclusion.

God could not so make the world older that it be from eternity, nor so that it be without time; he could nevertheless well have made time before this [time] and in it have made the world.

I respond: That when it is asked whether God could have made the world older, [the question] can be understood in two ways: either⁴ that he created it from eternity, while producing it [in fact] from time, and then it would be older; or so that the world endured for a longer time, yet finite.

The first I believe to be impossible without qualification, since it implies a contradiction in itself. For from this, that [the world] is posited to be made, it is posited to have a beginning. But from this, that it is posited to be eternal, it is posited not to have a beginning. Hence it is the same to ask whether God could have made [the world] before the world⁵, [as to ask] whether the world, having a beginning, would not have a beginning: and this includes both parts of a contradiction.

Similarly, as to the second sense, it seems impossible to some, because it implies in itself an opposition, since priority or antiquity begins together with time. For in eternity there is no before and after; and time begins of necessity together with the world, just as situation begins together with place, and place [together] with the first sphere. Hence just as, if it were asked whether the first sphere could be made higher, there would be no question at all⁶, indeed it would imply a contradiction, namely that outside every place there be a place — and this comes from a false imagination, because one imagines the whole world to be in local space, just as we imagine the earth to be surrounded by water — likewise it must be understood in the present case, that it is an implication of contradiction and comes from a false imagination, because we imagine a duration of time to have existed before the beginning of the world, in which the world could have been made before. Hence just as⁷, if it be asked whether the whole world could be made outside the whole world, or above, or below, [it is asked], the question is foolish and implies opposites and comes from a bad imagination: in this way they respond, if it be asked whether the world could be made before or older. Hence they say that, if something had preceded, measuring beforehand temporally, [the world] could indeed have been made before⁸; similarly, if there were a place outside, [the world] could have been made higher. — But the reason for this bad imagination is: for when we imagine eternity to have existed for an infinity before time, we understand it as a kind of extended duration, in which there are diverse "nows", in any one of which time could have been made. But this is altogether nothing, because eternity is a most simple "now", in which no diversity at all falls⁹. — Therefore it must be granted, as the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] prove, that just as he could not make the world in another place, since [the world] is not in a place¹⁰, so neither before, since there is no antiquity except in [the world]. — To that which is objected, that with God there is no force in any amount of time, and that his power does not depend etc.; they say to all [these objections] by a single response, that although the divine power is bound to nothing, nevertheless

a thing having a beginning cannot be made without a beginning, and a temporal [thing] not without time, and the first temporal [thing] cannot be made except in the beginning of time, and the beginning of time only in the beginning of time. For the opposite does not state a power, but rather a contradiction and a repugnance. Yet it is not bound to make in this way [only], because it could entirely not make. Hence just as the question is foolish if it be asked whether he could¹¹ have made the beginning of time before the beginning of time; similarly also the aforesaid.

But since it seems harsh to say that God could not make the world older, and that¹² he could have made another world, but only this one; therefore others say that, just as God could make the world larger, so also he could make it older without any distinction. — Yet this is not entirely similar, because God could make heaven larger and more distant from the earth, the nature of each being preserved; but if God be understood to have made it so that this now be further removed from the beginning of time, that now is understood to be another¹³, because even if the world be understood to have been made before, still it would not be older with respect to this now, since it would be just as distant as it is from the beginning; and so it would not be older.

And therefore [the question] is neither to be denied absolutely nor granted absolutely, just as neither this: that God could make the world higher. For if you understand [this] of this [world] absolutely, it is false¹⁴, as the first opinion says, and unintelligible, and an implication of contradiction. But if you understand [it] by way of the concomitance of another place, namely because God could make another world enclosing this one, in which it could have a position more high or [less] low, it is true. The same is to be judged concerning antiquity. — And therefore if it be asked whether God could have made the world before, distinction must be made, just as also concerning this: whether God could have made the world in another place or elsewhere; because an adverbial determination can fall under the ampliatio of the verb, or outside [it]¹⁵. If under the ampliatio of the verb, then it is true and the sense is that God could have made another place and in it have set this whole world. For he could have made a hundred such worlds, and yet one [more] enclosing them all, and one in a place higher than another. So also it must be understood in [the matter of] time, that God could have made time before this, and in it have made the world.

In another mode the adverbial determination can fall outside the ampliatio of [the word] potest¹⁶, and the sense is that God can make this world in another place which is outside the [actual] world: and this¹⁷ is an implication of falsity, since there is no place except within the world; and likewise [it] must be understood concerning time.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that before [there] was nothing except eternity; it must be said that it is true, yet nevertheless God could have made [it so] that before [the world] there be time.

2. To that which is objected concerning the infinite on the prior side, it must be said that the infinite on the prior side can be [understood] by adding, either according to act, or according to potency. In the first mode it states eternity; in the second mode by no means, because eternity states an infinite in act.

3. To that which is objected, that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; it must be said that it is true; but stopping-points can be infinite [in number]; and although in potency¹⁸ there is to posit a stopping-point, nevertheless because act does not follow the whole of potency, but is in some [particular] state, therefore [it stops] in a finite state. But why rather in this [state] than in another, the supreme and most powerful reason is the will of the maker.

4. To that which is objected, that antiquity began with the world; it must be said that it is true; but God could have made [it so] that it began earlier; therefore that reasoning is not valid. The reasonings to the contrary are to be granted: for they proceed according to the first way.

Scholion.

I. Besides the principal question, another question is briefly resolved, namely whether the world could be created from eternity. If the words from eternity are not joined with the verb could, but with the terms the world be created, that is, as is said here (at 2.), by adding the infinite on the prior side not according to potency, but according to act; then the holy Doctor here and in II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, altogether denies that it is possible for anything to be created from eternity. To him consent Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, and very many others, especially of our age. Others, however, with St. Thomas and Scotus (who however remains in doubt), with Aristotle as guide, judge that the arguments drawn from reason do not sufficiently prove this impossibility.

II. As for the question whether the world, which is supposed to be created

not from eternity, could have been created earlier than it has been created in this order of providence, the first opinion responds negatively; or rather some affirm the question itself to be irrational, inasmuch as the question itself falsely supposes that there was time before the beginning of the world. But that the question can be reasonably posed is clear, if we place the beginning of measuring duration not in the beginning of our world, but in this moment in which we live, that is, if we ask whether the duration of the world from the present instant up to the beginning of the world could be greater. To this the holy Doctor rightly responds with a distinction. For the now of present time, if it were further distant from the beginning of time (and also the first now), would not be the same now, but another; because to the world, which is supposed [to exist] before the course of our time, also another time would be ordered, and then there would also be another world, which God could have made. But if the same now present and the same beginning of time is supposed, then the creation of the world would fall outside time, if the real world were older; which is impossible.

Explicitly and in the same opinion as the Seraphic [Doctor], the following treat this question: Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3.

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