Bonaventure

Articulus II. De immutabilitate divinae potentiae.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de immutabilitate divinae potentiae, utrum videlicet quod semel potest semper possit.

Quaestio Unica.

Utrum Deus quod semel potest semper possit.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia omnis potentia, quae est idem cum essentia, habet idem posse quod esse¹, et omne illud cuius posse est idem quod esse, si habet esse immutabile et aeternum, habet et posse; sed quod Deus semel est semper est, quia eius esse est immutabile: ergo et quod semel potest semper potest.

2. Item, omnis potentia, quae est infinita et non potest non esse infinita, semper est respectu aequalium², quia si respectu paucorum esset, aliquando desineret esse infinita et desineret esse omnipotens; sed divina potentia semper est infinita et omnipotens: ergo nihil possibilium accrescit ei nec decrescit: ergo quod semel potest semper potest.

3. Item, omnis potentia, quae est omnino sufficiens et nullo modo dependens a possibili, omne quod potest³ semper potest, si in se ipsa maneat non mutata; sed divina potentia est huiusmodi, et non mutatur in se: ergo etc.

4. Item, quidquid Deus potuit, adhuc potest, si nihil de eo factum est⁴; sed nihil potest fieri ab ipso, quod non subiaceat divinae virtuti: ergo propter illud factum non impeditur, quin adhuc possit: ergo potest quidquid potuit.

Sed contra:

1. Si Deus potest semper quidquid potuit semel⁵; sed potuit⁶ Christum resuscitare a mortuis et mundum creare: ergo et modo potest; quod stultum est dicere.

2. Item, si quidquid semel potest semper potuit; sed modo potest mundum creasse: ergo ab aeterno potuit creasse.

3. Item, si quidquid potest semel, et semper; sed ante mundum potuit facere quod mundus non fuisset: ergo et modo potest facere, quod mundus non fuisset.

4. Item, cum dicitur: Deus potest hoc sive potest facere hoc⁷, aliquo demonstrato, aut connotatur aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo aeque vere potest dici quod Deus potest malum ut bonum. Si autem aliquid connotatur, hoc non est nisi possibilitas ad fieri; sed quod factum est, idem ipsum non habet possibilitatem ad fieri: ergo Deus non potest facere quod factum est: et prius potuit: ergo non potest quidquid potuit.

Conclusio. Quamvis divina potentia in se sit immutabilis, ratione tamen connotati, quod fuit aliquando possibile et postea factum est impossibile, Deus non quidquid potuit semper potest.

Respondeo: Ad hoc est duplex modus respondendi, sicut ad sophisma de scientia⁸. Concesso enim, quod divina potentia secundum veritatem omnino sit immutabilis, secundum positionem tamen Nominalium concedunt hanc: potest quidquid potuit. Et respondent illationi: sed potuit Christum suscitare: ergo et modo potest; respondent, quod non debet inferri sub illo tempore, sed sub alio: ergo potest Christum suscitasse, quia hoc enuntiabile, adiunctum verbis diversorum temporum, non⁹ est idem. Ideo dicunt, quod propositio est vera, et si aliter inferatur, assignant peccatum in processu secundum figuram dictionis sive secundum accidens.

Tamen, sicut supra probatum fuit¹⁰, haec positio non habet veritatem — quamvis ista positio videatur fuisse probabilis, et Magister fuerit huius positionis — quia per hoc non solvit; et iterum non solvit in proposito. Primum, quia si diceretur Deus posse quidquid potuit, quia potest fecisse quod¹¹ potuit facere; pari ratione qui nunc est caecus potest quidquid potuit, et truncatus, quia potest fecisse quod potuit facere, et potest nunc vidisse, quod potuit videre. Praeterea, dantem oppositum huius solutionis adhuc contingit solvere¹², hoc modo formata ratione: potest quidquid potuit; sed potuit non fecisse mundum, antequam faceret: ergo et modo potest non fecisse: loco eius quod est non fecisse non est aliud dare aequivalens. — Ergo illa responsio non solvit, maxime cum ipse Magister dicat in littera¹³, quod Deus non potest facere omne quod potuit aliquando facere, nec vult facere vel esse vel fieri quod aliquando voluit facere vel esse vel fieri.

Ideo dicendum, sicut dictum fuit de scientia¹⁴, quod divina scientia, in se omnino immutabilis, desinit scire aliquod enuntiabile ratione connotati, quia scibile desinit esse verum, et ipsa scientia sive scire connotat uno modo in cognito veritatem. Similiter intelligendum, quod divina potentia connotat in re, respectu cuius dicitur, possibilitatem; et talem, inquam, possibilitatem, quae respicit potentiam agentem sub ratione potentiae, non impotentiae. Quoniam igitur ita est, quod multa possibilia fiunt impossibilia per accidens¹⁵ et multa possibilia fiunt entia et iam sunt impossibilia ad fieri — facere enim, quod non-ens non sit, nihil est facere; similiter facere quod factum est nihil est facere, et ita impossibile est fieri — hinc est, quod¹⁶ quia Deus non potest nisi possibile, quod posse est potentiae, quod nulla mutatione facta in potentia, sed aequaliter Deo existente potente, fit aliquid Deo impossibile propter mutationem a parte rei. Et haec concedenda est, quod divina potentia est immutabilis, et haec neganda: quidquid Deus semel potest, semper potest.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1, 2, 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod divinum posse est esse et infinitum et independens; totum illud concludit, quod ipsa¹⁷ non mutetur; sed nihil sequitur de connotato. Verum est tamen, quod posse Dei respectu connotati semper est infinitum, quia si auferatur finitum ab infinito, nihilominus remanet infinitum: et ideo quamvis desinat aliquid posse facere, semper tamen infinita potest.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo — quia alia patent — ex hoc, quod divina potentia dominatur omnibus quae sunt; dicendum, quod omnia ei subsunt; tamen non sequitur, quod possit facere et quod factum est; potest tamen illud destruere, sed facere non potest, quia faciendo aut facit aliquid, aut nihil. Si aliquid: ergo aliquid plus est nunc quam prius: ergo non facit quod factum est. Si nihil: ergo faciendo nihil facit. Similiter, de eo quod fuit quod non fuerit, aut facit hoc quiescendo aut operando, aut destruendo. Quiescendo non: si enim Deus nihil faciat, cum hoc¹⁸ est praeteritum, semper est praeteritum.

Si vero faciat operando, cum nihil ex hoc fiat — hoc enim non fuisse praeteritum non est aliquid — ergo faciendo nihil facit. Si vero destruendo, cum praeteritum sive quod fuit non sit, nihil facit destruendo, et destruendo nihil destruit¹⁹. — Concedendum est ergo, quod non potest quidquid potuit, quia fuit aliquando possibile quod factum est impossibile, non propter arctationem potentiae, sed propter hoc, quod necessario connotat impotentiam. Et sic patent obiecta.

Article II. On the immutability of the divine power.

Next, with respect to the second article, the question is asked concerning the immutability of the divine power, namely whether what He once can do, He can always do.

Question Unica.

Whether God can always do what He once can do.

That He can, it seems:

1. Because every power which is the same as essence has the same can-be as being¹, and everything whose can-be is the same as its being, if it has immutable and eternal being, has also its power; but what God once is, He always is, since His being is immutable: therefore also what He once can, He always can.

2. Likewise, every power which is infinite and cannot fail to be infinite is always exercised with respect to equal things², because if it were with respect to fewer, at some time it would cease to be infinite and would cease to be omnipotent; but the divine power is always infinite and omnipotent: therefore nothing among the possibles is added to it nor subtracted from it: therefore what He once can, He always can.

3. Likewise, every power which is altogether sufficient and in no way dependent on the possible, whatever it can, it always can³, if it remains itself unchanged; but the divine power is of this kind, and is not changed in itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, whatever God once could, He still can, if nothing has come of it⁴; but nothing can be done by Him which is not subject to the divine power: therefore on account of that having-been-done He is not hindered from still being able: therefore He can do whatever He once could.

On the contrary:

1. If God can always [do] whatever He once⁵ could; but He could⁶ raise Christ from the dead and create the world: therefore He can also now; which is foolish to say.

2. Likewise, if whatever He once can, He always could; but now He can have-created the world: therefore from eternity He could have created it.

3. Likewise, if whatever He can once, also always; but before the world He could bring it about that the world should not have existed: therefore even now He can bring it about that the world should not have existed.

4. Likewise, when it is said: God can [do] this or He can do this⁷, something being indicated, either something is connoted, or nothing. If nothing: then it can be said equally truly that God can [do] evil as good. But if something is connoted, this is nothing other than the possibility of coming-to-be; but what has been done does not itself have possibility of coming-to-be: therefore God cannot do what has been done: and previously He could: therefore He cannot [do] whatever He could.

Conclusion. Although the divine power is in itself immutable, nevertheless by reason of what is connoted — which was once possible and afterward became impossible — God cannot always [do] whatever He could.

I respond: To this there is a twofold mode of replying, as to the sophism concerning knowledge⁸. For granting that the divine power according to truth is altogether immutable, according to the position of the Nominalists they concede this: He can [do] whatever He could. And they reply to the inference: but He could raise Christ: therefore He also now can; they reply that it ought not to be inferred under that tense, but under another: therefore He can have-raised Christ, since this proposition, joined to verbs of different tenses, is not⁹ the same. Therefore they say that the proposition is true, and if it is inferred otherwise, they assign a fault in the inferential process according to figure of speech or according to accident.

Nevertheless, as has been proved above¹⁰, this position does not have truth — although that position may have seemed probable, and the Master held this position — because by it he does not solve [the problem]; and again it does not solve the matter at hand. First, because if it were said that God can [do] whatever He could, because He can have-done what¹¹ He could do; by parallel reasoning he who is now blind can [do] whatever he could, and the maimed man too, because he can have-done what he could do, and can now have-seen what he could see. Furthermore, even granting the opposite of this solution, it can still be solved¹², with the reasoning formed thus: He can [do] whatever He could; but He could not-have-made the world before He made it: therefore even now He can not-have-made it: in place of not-having-made there is nothing equivalent to give. — Therefore that response does not solve [the matter], especially since the Master himself says in the text¹³, that God cannot do everything which He at some time could do, nor does He will to do or to be or to come-to-be what He at some time willed to do or to be or to come-to-be.

Therefore it must be said, as was said concerning knowledge¹⁴, that the divine knowledge, in itself altogether immutable, ceases to know some enunciable by reason of what is connoted, because the knowable ceases to be true, and the knowledge itself or to-know connotes in one mode in the cognized the truth. Similarly it must be understood that the divine power connotes in the thing, with respect to which it is spoken, a possibility; and such, I say, a possibility, which regards the agent power under the character of power, not of impotence. Therefore since it is so, that many possible things become impossible by accident¹⁵ and many possibles become beings and now are impossible to-be-made — for to make that the non-being should not be is to do nothing; likewise to make what has been done is to do nothing, and so it is impossible to come-to-be — hence it is that¹⁶, because God cannot [do] except the possible, that can belongs to power, because with no change made in the power, but with God existing equally able, something becomes impossible to God on account of a change on the part of the thing. And this is to be conceded, that the divine power is immutable, and this to be denied: whatever God once can, He always can.

Replies to the affirmative arguments:

To 1, 2, 3. To what is objected, that the divine can-be is both being and infinite and independent: all that concludes only that it itself¹⁷ is not changed; but nothing follows about what is connoted. Yet it is true that the can-be of God with respect to what is connoted is always infinite, because if a finite be subtracted from an infinite, the infinite still remains: and therefore, although He cease to be able to do some thing, He can still always [do] infinite things.

To 4. To what is objected last — since the other points are clear — from the fact that the divine power dominates all things that are; it must be said that all things are subject to it; nevertheless it does not follow that He can also do what has been done; He can however destroy it, but cannot do it, because in doing He either does something or nothing. If something: then there is now something more than before: therefore He is not doing what has been done. If nothing: then doing nothing He does nothing. Similarly, concerning that-which-was being made not-to-have-been, He either does this by being still, or by operating, or by destroying. By being still — no: for if God should do nothing, since this¹⁸ is past, it is always past.

If however He should do [it] by operating, since nothing comes about from this — for this not having been past is not anything — therefore in doing He does nothing. But if by destroying, since the past or what was is not, He does nothing by destroying, and by destroying He destroys nothing¹⁹. — Therefore it must be conceded, that He cannot [do] whatever He could, because what was once possible has become impossible — not on account of a constriction of the power, but on account of this, that it necessarily connotes impotence. And thus the objections are clear.