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Dist. 4, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 105

Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine; quia cum praepositio de notet transitionem et ita diversitatem et distinctionem, videtur quod pari ratione et ab aequipollenti istae sunt verae: Deus est alius a Deo, Deus distinguitur a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est importare distinctionem sive diversitatem, scilicet ut modum1 vel ut rem, vel ut exercitam vel ut conceptam. Quoniam igitur praepositiones important distinctionem ut exercitam, et distinctio est in divinis quantum ad supposita, de2 facit terminum stare pro diversis suppositis. Quoniam ergo circa id ponit modum, circa quod exercet distinctionem, et tales sunt personae: ideo est vera locutio. Quia vero hoc nomen alius importat distinctionem ut conceptam, similiter hoc verbum distinguere: ideo simpliciter ponit distinctionem circa terminum ratione suae formae; ideo sunt falsae3.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de responsione, quam ponit Magister, ibi: Quod vero additur: Ergo genuit se Deum etc., quia Magister solvit interimendo conclusionem et videtur non recte solvere. Cum enim idem et diversum sufficienter dividant ens4, videtur necessario sequi: genuit Deum: ergo se, vel alium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister sustinendo primam et interimendo conclusionem innuit, conclusionem non sequi ex praemissis: et quod non sequatur, ostendit ferendo instantiam5 contra illud disiunctum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt6 ens; dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo falsum est. Nam pars nec est eadem toti omnino nec simpliciter diversa. Habet tamen veritatem secundum idem. Unde: «si non est idem alii, est diversum», verum est secundum illud, secundum quod non est idem7. Filius autem non est idem Patri in persona, et ideo in persona alius; nec tamen sequitur: alius Deus, quia significatur alietas in essentia8.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hac distinctione, quam ponit Magister de hoc praedicato Deus Pater, quod potest esse constructio appositiva et immediata, vel mediata9. Primo enim videtur, quod ista distinctio non sit intelligibilis, quoniam quae ex eadem parte intransitive construuntur, videntur solum immediate construi. Item videtur, quod non solvat, quia recta solutio est, cuius dantem oppositum non contingit solvere10; sed ista distinctione remota, adhuc manet sophisma, si loco eius quod est Deus Pater, solum ponatur Pater: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri bona est et secundum artem. Nam sicut vult Priscianus11, inter adiectivum et substantivum intelligitur media copula est vel quod est ens12. Et quoniam hoc quod est est sive quod est Pater potest teneri implicative; et sic restringitur et tenet locum appositivae constructionis et aequivalet uni termino: ideo dicitur, quod potest teneri sive construi immediate; et sic Deus Pater non est aliud quam ipse Pater. Vel ipsum relativum potest intelligi relative, et ita in quadam distantia; et tunc non restringitur, et sensus est: Deus Pater, id est Deus, qui est Pater; quod tantum valet est Deus, et ille est Pater. Haec autem solutio Magistri solvit quidem sophisma quantum ad unam deceptionem, et ideo est bona. Sed rursus cadit ibi alia deceptio de relativo, et ideo adhuc oportet solvere, non ad illam deceptionem, sed ad aliam. Ideo Praepositivus13 solvit ad hoc argumentum alio modo: ergo Deum qui est Pater, vel qui non est Pater, et dicit, quod non sequitur, nec14 sunt contradictoriae, quia suppositio huius relativi non est eadem. In affirmativa enim supponit pro Deo genito, quia non confunditur15; in negativa vero simpliciter. Unde sicut hae non contradicunt, sed ambae sunt falsae: Nullus homo est Petrus, Ioannes est Petrus, ita dicit in proposito, quia negatio confundit. Unde istae duae ambae sunt falsae: Deus Filius est Pater, Deus non est Pater. — Sed licet solutio Praepositivi locum habeat in proposito, quia non differt praeponere et postponere negationem huic termino Deus, tamen in aliis non habet locum. Negatio enim postposita relativo ipsum non confundit.

Et ideo moderni aliter solvunt distinguendo, quod16 hoc relativum qui potest facere relationem simplicem vel personalem. Si simplicem, affirmativa vera est, negativa falsa; si personalem, e converso negativa vera, affirmativa falsa. Quod patet, quia haec est falsa: persona Filii est Pater, et haec est vera: «persona Filii non est Pater»17.

p. 106

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod unus Deus est tres personae. Sed contra: Quaecumque praedicantur de uno et eodem, praedicantur de se invicem: ergo si unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius. Si tu dicas, quod verum est, quando praedicantur de uno singulari, sed non est verum, quando praedicantur de uno communi; contra: nihil subiicitur duobus in unica18 suppositione, quamvis sit commune ad illa. Unde haec est falsa: homo est Socrates et Plato: ergo similiter in proposito.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut patet, de suppositione huius nominis Deus secus est quam de suppositione alicuius alterius termini. Quia enim19 habet naturam termini communis et discreti, ideo simul stat pro pluribus, sicut pro uno: et ideo non sequitur: Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Deus Pater est Filius, vel e converso20. Similiter nec licet inferre ex hoc, quod Pater sit Filius. Et notandum, quod talis praedicatio est per identitatem21: ideo suppositum de termino formali vere praedicatur.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Magister dicit: Unum solum Deum verum esse Trinitatem; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicit inferius22, scilicet quod trinitas est nomen collectivum, unus et solus nomen partitivum et discretivum: ergo sicut haec est falsa: unus solus homo est omnis homo, ita et haec.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen trinitas est23 collectivum personarum; unus autem et solus, addita huic termino Deus, non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliis. Unde unus

p. 107

solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; et quoniam in divinis est idem natura et res naturae sive suppositum, ideo praedicatione per identitatem Trinitas de Deo25 praedicatur. Nec est simile de hoc quod est omnis homo et unus solus homo. Nam iste terminus homo est terminus, qui potest confundi et multiplicari, et ideo haec est vera: omnis homo est homo, nec stat simul pro pluribus26, nisi confundatur; et ideo haec est falsa: homo est omnis homo, quia nec ratione supponendi est vera, nec per identitatem, nec est idem in homine natura et res naturae27.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Satis est christiano rerum creatarum causam etc. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quoniam aut dicit satis quantum ad fidem; et sic est falsum, quia multa alia oportet credere; aut satis quantum ad scientiam; et illud similiter est falsum, quia nunquam scitur ex hoc causa rei sufficienter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligitur satis quantum ad scientiam, non quamlibet, sed necessariam ad salutem.

Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater genuit alterum se. Videtur enim male coniungere illa duo, quia se dicit omnimodam identitatem, et alterum diversitatem, et ita sunt opposita, et ita28 opposita implicantur. Si dicas, quod unum diminuit de altero, quaero: quid et de quo?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod oppositio directa intelligitur semper circa idem. Quoniam ergo in divinis simul est identitas in natura et alietas in supposito, et hoc sine oppositione; ideo nomen identitatis et alietatis in sermone24 iunctae sine oppositione, immo ad singularis modi expressionem.

Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Pater ut haberet Filium, non minuit se, quia videtur dicere falsum; quia illud argumentum valet: quicumque generat unum filium, ut non possit amplius generare, minuitur eius potentia; sed sic est in Patre: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Quod illud verum est, si generare alterum sit potentiae; sed quod, uno genito, possit alterum generare, dicit imperfectionem potentiae in generando, quia ex hoc ostenditur, quod non totum dedit uni29.

Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: De se alterum se genuit, sed non alterum deum, sed alteram personam, utrum dicatur magis proprie alterum, vel alium; et30 videtur quod alterum, quia minorem dicit diversitatem, quia Socrates dicitur alter a se; sed in divinis minima est diversitas. Sed contra: differentiae accidentales faciunt dici alterum31; sed in divinis nullum est accidens: ergo non debet dici alterum.

Item videtur, quod neutrum bene dicatur. Si enim differentiae substantiales faciunt dici aliud, et accidentales alterum, cum neutrum cadat in divinis, neutrum videtur esse dicendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia Pater differt a Filio et in supposito et in proprietate, ideo potest dici alius, et potest dici alter. Sed quoniam proprietas illa non accidit personae, ideo magis proprie dicitur alius. Et quia alius respicit suppositum, aliud essentiam: ideo, etsi recipiatur32 ibi alius in masculino, non tamen aliud in neutro33.

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English Translation

Dub. I.

In this part concerning the text, a question is raised about what he says: God from God, light from light; for since the preposition de ("from") signifies transition and thus diversity and distinction, it seems that by parallel reasoning and from an equipollent expression these are true: God is other than God, God is distinguished from God.

I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold way of conveying distinction or diversity, namely as a mode1 or as a thing, or as exercised or as conceived. Since therefore prepositions convey distinction as exercised, and there is distinction in divine things with respect to the supposits, de2 makes the term stand for the diverse supposits. Since therefore it places a mode about that around which it exercises distinction, and such are the persons: therefore it is a true expression. But because this name alius ("other") conveys distinction as conceived, and likewise the verb distinguere ("to distinguish"): therefore it simply places distinction about the term by reason of its form; therefore they are false3.

Dub. II.

Likewise a question is raised about the response which the Master gives, there: But as to what is added: Therefore he begot himself God etc., because the Master resolves it by overturning the conclusion and seems not to resolve it correctly. For since the same and the diverse sufficiently divide being4, it seems necessarily to follow: he begot God: therefore [he begot] himself, or another.

I respond: It must be said that the Master, by upholding the first [premise] and overturning the conclusion, indicates that the conclusion does not follow from the premises: and that it does not follow, he shows by bringing an instance5 against that disjunct.

But to that which is objected, that the same and the diverse sufficiently divide6 being; it must be said that, simply speaking, this is false. For a part is neither altogether the same as the whole nor simply diverse from it. It has truth nevertheless according to the same [respect]. Whence: «if it is not the same as another, it is diverse», is true according to that respect according to which it is not the same7. But the Son is not the same as the Father in person, and therefore in person other; nor however does it follow: another God, because otherness is signified in essence8.

Dub. III.

Likewise a question is raised about this distinction which the Master sets forth concerning this predicate Deus Pater ("God the Father"), namely that it can be an appositive and immediate construction, or a mediate one9. For first it seems that this distinction is not intelligible, since [terms] which on the same side are intransitively constructed seem only to be immediately constructed. Likewise it seems that he does not resolve [the difficulty], because a correct solution is one whose opposite he who grants cannot resolve10; but with this distinction removed, the sophism still remains, if in place of Deus Pater there be set only Pater: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that the Master's distinction is good and according to art. For as Priscian wishes11, between an adjective and a substantive there is understood a mediating copula est ("is") or quod est ens ("which is being")12. And since this est or quod est Pater can be taken implicatively; and so it is restricted and holds the place of an appositive construction and is equivalent to one term: therefore it is said that it can be taken or constructed immediately; and so Deus Pater is nothing other than the Father himself. Or the relative itself can be understood relatively, and thus at a certain distance; and then it is not restricted, and the sense is: Deus Pater, that is, Deus, qui est Pater ("God, who is the Father"); which amounts to: est Deus, et ille est Pater ("there is God, and that one is the Father"). Now this solution of the Master indeed resolves the sophism with respect to one deception, and therefore is good. But again another deception falls there concerning the relative, and therefore it is still necessary to resolve [it], not against that deception, but against another. Therefore Praepositivus13 resolves this argument in another way: therefore [he begot] God who is the Father, or who is not the Father, and he says that it does not follow, nor14 are they contradictories, because the supposition of this relative is not the same. For in the affirmative it supposits for the begotten God, because it is not confounded15; in the negative, however, simply. Whence as these do not contradict, but both are false: No man is Peter, John is Peter, so he says in the matter at hand, because the negation confounds. Whence these two are both false: God the Son is the Father, God is not the Father. — But although Praepositivus's solution has place in the matter at hand, because it makes no difference to put the negation before or after the term Deus, nevertheless in other [cases] it has no place. For a negation placed after the relative does not confound it.

And therefore the moderns resolve [it] otherwise by distinguishing, that16 this relative qui can effect a simple or a personal relation. If simple, the affirmative is true, the negative false; if personal, conversely the negative is true, the affirmative false. Which is plain, because this is false: the person of the Son is the Father, and this is true: «the person of the Son is not the Father»17.

p. 106

Dub. IV.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says, that one God is three persons. But on the contrary: Whatever things are predicated of one and the same are predicated of one another: therefore if one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son. If you say, that this is true when they are predicated of one singular, but is not true when they are predicated of one common [thing]; on the contrary: nothing is subjected to two [predicates] in one18 supposition, although it be common to them. Whence this is false: man is Socrates and Plato: therefore likewise in the matter at hand.

I respond: It must be said that, as is plain, concerning the supposition of this name Deus it is otherwise than concerning the supposition of any other term. For because19 it has the nature of a common and a discrete term, therefore it stands at once for many, just as for one: and therefore it does not follow: God is the Father and the Son: therefore God the Father is the Son, or conversely20. Likewise neither is it permitted to infer from this, that the Father is the Son. And it must be noted that such predication is by identity21: therefore the supposit of the formal term is truly predicated.

Dub. V.

Likewise a question is raised about what the Master says: That one only true God is the Trinity; for it seems to be against what he says below22, namely that trinitas is a collective name, unus and solus a partitive and discretive name: therefore as this is false: one sole man is every man, so also this.

I respond: It must be said that this name trinitas is23 collective of the persons; but unus and solus, added to this term Deus, do not signify the distinction of person, but of nature from others. Whence one

p. 107

sole God is said [to be] one sole nature; and since in divine things the nature and the res naturae ("thing of the nature") or supposit are the same, therefore by predication through identity Trinitas is predicated of God25. Nor is it like in the case of every man and one sole man. For this term homo is a term which can be confounded and multiplied, and therefore this is true: every man is a man, nor does it stand at once for many26 unless it is confounded; and therefore this is false: man is every man, because neither is it true by reason of supposition, nor by identity, nor is the nature and the res naturae the same in man27.

Dub. VI.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: It is enough for a Christian [to believe that] the cause of created things etc. For he seems to say something false, since either he says enough with respect to faith; and so it is false, because many other things must be believed; or enough with respect to knowledge; and that likewise is false, because the cause of a thing is never sufficiently known from this.

I respond: It must be said that enough is understood with respect to knowledge, not any whatever, but [knowledge] necessary for salvation.

Dub. VII.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says, that the Father begot another self. For he seems to conjoin those two badly, since se ("self") signifies altogether identity, and alterum ("another") diversity, and thus they are opposites, and thus28 opposites are implicated. If you say, that one diminishes from the other, I ask: what, and of what?

I respond: It must be said that direct opposition is always understood concerning the same. Since therefore in divine things there is at once identity in nature and otherness in supposit, and this without opposition; therefore the names of identity and of otherness in speech24 are joined without opposition, indeed for the expression of a singular mode.

Dub. VIII.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: That the Father might have a Son, he did not diminish himself, for he seems to say something false; because that argument holds: whoever begets one son, in such a way that he can no longer beget, his power is diminished; but so it is in the Father: therefore etc.

I respond: That this is true, if to beget another belongs to power; but that, with one having been begotten, he should be able to beget another, signifies an imperfection of power in begetting, because by this it is shown that he did not give the whole to one29.

Dub. IX.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: Of himself he begot another self, but not another god, but another person, whether alterum or alium is more properly said; and30 it seems that alterum, because it signifies a lesser diversity, since Socrates is called alter from himself; but in divine things diversity is least. But on the contrary: accidental differences cause [things] to be called alterum31; but in divine things there is no accident: therefore it ought not to be called alterum.

Likewise it seems that neither is well said. For if substantial differences cause [things] to be called aliud, and accidental [ones] alterum, since neither falls in divine things, neither seems fit to be said.

I respond: It must be said that because the Father differs from the Son both in supposit and in property, therefore he can be called alius, and he can be called alter. But since that property is not accidental to the person, therefore he is more properly called alius. And because alius regards the supposit, aliud the essence: therefore, although32 alius in the masculine be received there, nevertheless not aliud in the neuter33.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit Vat. hic ita. Supple: se habendi. — De hac distinctione vide infra d. 26.
    Against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican edition here repeats ita. Supply: se habendi ("of being so disposed"). — On this distinction see below d. 26.
  2. In mss. et edd. excidit particula de, quam contextus requirit.
    In the manuscripts and editions the particle de has dropped out, which the context requires.
  3. Pro maiore intelligentia et explicatione huius dubii cfr. q. 1. et 2. huius distinctionis. — Quoad praepositionem de vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.
    For a fuller understanding and explanation of this doubt, cf. qq. 1 and 2 of this distinction. — Concerning the preposition de, see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
  4. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): Omne etenim, quodcumque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): For everything whatsoever that is being is either the same or diverse.
  5. Vide Aristot., II. Prior. c. 26. (c. 28.) de Instantia.
    See Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] II, c. 26 (c. 28), on the instance.
  6. Cod. S dividant.
    Codex S [reads] dividant ("[that they] divide").
  7. Codd. T aa bb satis bene addunt non, secundum illud, secundum quod est idem, a quibus cod. A in eo tantum divergit, quod particulam non minus bene transponit post quod est.
    Codices T, aa, bb add, with reasonable propriety, non, secundum illud, secundum quod est idem ("not, according to that according to which it is the same"); from which codex A differs only in this, that it less well transposes the particle non after quod est.
  8. De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 3.
    On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
  9. Vat. post appositiva omittit et, quod tamen cum ed. 1 habent codd., quorum nonnulli deinde indebite omittunt vel mediata; codd. V X omittunt et immediata, quod tamen propter subnexa melius retinetur, licet, quod ad rem attinet, omitti possit, cum immediata hic idem sit cum appositiva; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4. constructioni appositivae opponit mediatam. — Distinctio Magistri, de qua hic agitur, respicit istam propositionem: Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Si haec verba Deus Pater immediate coniuncta intelliguntur, ita quidem ut terminus Pater, tanquam determinans alterum terminum Deus, sit terminus principalis, tunc propositio est vera. Sensus enim est: Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, sed Deus Filius. Si vero disiunctim intelliguntur, ita ut terminus principalis sit Deus, cui deinceps adiungitur, qui est Pater, sic erit falsa; sensus siquidem est: Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus, et Deus Pater est.
    The Vatican edition omits et after appositiva, which however the codices, with ed. 1, retain; some of these then improperly omit vel mediata; codices V, X omit et immediata, which however on account of what follows is better retained, though, as far as the matter goes, it could be omitted, since immediata here is the same as appositiva; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, opposes the mediate construction to the appositive. — The Master's distinction here at issue concerns this proposition: He begot God, who is not God the Father. If these words Deus Pater are understood as immediately joined, namely so that the term Pater, as determining the other term Deus, is the principal term, then the proposition is true. For the sense is: He begot God, who is not God the Father, but God the Son. But if they are understood disjunctively, namely so that the principal term is Deus, to which is then adjoined qui est Pater, then it will be false; for the sense is: He begot God, who is not God, and God is the Father.
  10. Modus iste loquendi, qui occurrit etiam infra d. 15. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et d. 44. a. 2. q. unic. in corp., sumptus est ex Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. secundum translationem Boethii: Nam si esset haec solutio, dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere. Secundum translationem autem ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot.) c. 22. sic habetur: Nam si esset haec solutio, quam afferunt, qui contrarium daret solvere non posset. — Paulo infra cod. X maneret, cod. Z remaneret loco manet.
    This manner of speaking, which occurs also below d. 15, p. II, q. 1, in corp., and d. 44, a. 2, q. unic., in corp., is taken from Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3, according to Boethius's translation: For if this were the solution, it would not be possible for one granting the opposite to resolve it. According to the translation of the Paris edition (Firmin-Didot), c. 22, it is given thus: For if this were the solution which they bring forward, he who would grant the contrary could not resolve [it]. — A little below codex X [reads] maneret, codex Z remaneret in place of manet.
  11. Libr. XVIII. c. 1. post medium: Subauditur enim participium verbi substantivi ens, quod in usu nunc nobis non est, pro quo possumus qui est vel qui fuit dicere vel subaudire. Similiter, aliis casibus nominativum consequentibus, vel supradictum participium vel quae pro eo accipiuntur subaudire necesse est ad nominativum. — Hac Prisciani regula posita, S. Doctor eam applicat, ulteriore addita distinctione respectu ipsius copulae cum termino adiuncto. Nam appositio, si per participium ens sive per relativum (quod est, qui est) cum substantivo coniuncta est, respectu eiusdem potest teneri vel implicative, vel non implicative seu in quadam distantia (sive relativum ut relativum). Si implicative, tunc est constructio appositiva et immediata, et dictio haec: Deus, qui est Pater (Deus i. e. Pater) aequivalet huic: Deus, qui est ipse Pater; si non implicative, tunc constructio habetur mediata, et dictio haec: Deus, qui est Pater aequivalet huic: Deus, et ille Deus est Pater, sive etiam: Deus, qualis est Pater.
    Book XVIII, c. 1, after the middle: For there is understood the participle of the substantive verb ens ("being"), which is no longer in use among us, in place of which we can say or understand qui est ("who is") or qui fuit ("who was"). Likewise, for other cases following the nominative, it is necessary to understand for the nominative either the aforesaid participle or what is taken in its place. — With this rule of Priscian set down, the holy Doctor applies it, adding a further distinction with respect to the copula itself together with the adjoined term. For an apposition, if through the participle ens or through the relative (quod est, qui est) it is joined to the substantive, can be taken with respect to the same either implicatively or non-implicatively, that is, at a certain distance (or [taking] the relative as relative). If implicatively, then it is an appositive and immediate construction, and this expression: Deus, qui est Pater (God, that is, the Father) is equivalent to this: Deus, qui est ipse Pater ("God, who is the Father himself"); if non-implicatively, then the construction is had as mediate, and this expression: Deus, qui est Pater is equivalent to this: Deus, et ille Deus est Pater ("God, and that God is the Father"), or also: Deus, qualis est Pater ("God, such as the Father is").
  12. Ens videtur hic esse superfluum iuxta verba Prisciani. — Mox ex codd. F T etc. addidimus Et. Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut H I P Q cum ed. 1 et tunc loco et sic.
    Ens seems to be superfluous here according to the words of Priscian. — Soon after, from codices F, T, etc., we added Et. A little later some codices such as H, I, P, Q, with ed. 1, [read] et tunc in place of et sic.
  13. Substituimus fide multorum codd. ut A F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1 quidem loco quoddam; lectio certe melior.
    We have substituted, on the faith of many codices such as A, F, G, H, I, R, S, T, etc. and ed. 1, quidem in place of quoddam; certainly the better reading.
  14. Natione Italus, ab an. 1206 Cancellarius Universitatis Parisiensis, scripsit Summam theologicam ex dictis SS. Patrum, a S. Bonav. et S. Thom. non raro allegatam et adhuc ineditam. De Sermonibus eiusdem cfr. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge p. 80. — Mox Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit ad. Paulo post codd. ergo Deus, sed minus conforme textui Magistri.
    [Praepositivus,] an Italian by nation, from the year 1206 Chancellor of the University of Paris, wrote a Summa theologica drawn from the sayings of the holy Fathers, not infrequently cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and as yet unedited. On his Sermons cf. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge, p. 80. — Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits ad. A little later the codices [read] ergo Deus, but less conformable to the Master's text.
  15. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 et quod non pro nec. Mox cod. Z contradictorie opposita loco contradictoriae. Paulo infra post relativi supple: qui. — Mox codd. O Z post eadem satis bene addunt in affirmativa et negativa, supple: propositione.
    The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] et quod non in place of nec. Soon after, codex Z [reads] contradictorie opposita in place of contradictoriae. A little below, after relativi supply: qui. — Soon after, codices O, Z after eadem add, with reasonable propriety, in affirmativa et negativa, supplying: propositione.
  16. Hoc est, non supponit confuse et indiscriminatim pro tribus personis, sed determinate solum pro persona Filii; e contra in negativa supponit simpliciter, i. e. indiscriminatim et confuse pro personis et etiam pro essentia. Cfr. hic q. 1. Hinc patet, quid sibi velit paulo infra negatio confundit (codd. confunditur), scil. negatio efficit, ut relativum qui supponere possit tam pro tribus personis quam pro essentia.
    That is, it does not supposit confusedly and indiscriminately for the three persons, but determinately only for the person of the Son; on the contrary, in the negative it supposits simply, i. e. indiscriminately and confusedly for the persons and also for the essence. Cf. here q. 1. Hence it is clear what is meant a little below by negatio confundit ("the negation confounds") (codices confunditur), namely that the negation brings it about that the relative qui can supposit both for the three persons and for the essence.
  17. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus apte transponit quod post relativum qui. Paulo post plures codd. distinctionem pro relationem; ed. 1 vero distinctionem vel relationem. Retinuimus relationem, utpote quod supra dictis q. 1. in corp. magis correspondet. Ibidem et divisio relationis in simplicem et personalem occurrit.
    The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the manuscripts and ed. 1, less aptly transposes quod after the relative qui. A little later several codices [read] distinctionem in place of relationem; but ed. 1 [reads] distinctionem vel relationem. We have retained relationem, inasmuch as it corresponds better to what was said above at q. 1, in corp. There also the division of relatio into simplex and personalis occurs.
  18. De solutione huius dubii vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4. et S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 5. — Biel, hic q. 1.
    On the solution of this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, and Summa Theol. I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 5. — Biel, here q. 1.
  19. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 una.
    The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] una.
  20. Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 cum pro enim.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] cum in place of enim.
  21. Codd. inter se non conveniunt; cod. T quoad sensum cum Vat. convenit ponendo vel Filius est Pater loco e converso. Plures codd. ut A G N S V W aa bb ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter; alii ut C O ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter; alii aliter corrupte; sed nihil immutandum duximus.
    The codices do not agree among themselves; codex T agrees with the Vatican edition as to the sense by placing vel Filius est Pater in place of e converso. Several codices such as A, G, N, S, V, W, aa, bb [read] ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter; others such as C, O [read] ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter; others otherwise corruptly; but we have judged nothing should be changed.
  22. De praedicatione per identitatem vide infra d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4. et Scot., hic q. 2.
    On predication by identity see below d. 3, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; d. 33, q. 3, and d. 34, q. 2. — On this doubt cf. above q. 4, and Scotus, here q. 2.
  23. Dist. XXII. c. 3. et dd. XXIV. et XXV.
    Distinction XXII, c. 3, and Distinctions XXIV and XXV.
  24. Cod. T addit nomen.
    Codex T adds nomen ("name").
  25. Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 po pro Deo.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] po in place of Deo.
  26. Cod. W omnibus. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut F H T V cc cum edd. 2, 3 suppositi loco supponendi.
    Codex W [reads] omnibus. A little below some codices such as F, H, T, V, cc, with edd. 2, 3, [read] suppositi in place of supponendi.
  27. De re naturae sive supposito vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 34. q. 1. — Quoad ipsam solutionem cfr. infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 6.
    On the res naturae or supposit see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2 and d. 34, q. 1. — As to the solution itself cf. below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 7. — St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q. 39, a. 6.
  28. Vat. contra fere omnes mss. et ed. 1 illa pro ita, quod unus vel alter codex omittit.
    The Vatican edition, against nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] illa in place of ita, which one or another codex omits.
  29. Fide mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum uno et paulo post ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus immo, loco cuius edd. 2, 3 in uno. — De hoc dubio cfr. hic q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 4.
    On the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3 we have struck out the uno added here, and a little later from the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied immo, in place of which edd. 2, 3 [read] in uno. — On this doubt cf. here q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 3. — St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 4.
  30. Cfr. supra d. 2. q. 3. ad ult.
    Cf. above d. 2, q. 3, ad ult.
  31. Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.
    We have supplied from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the particle et.
  32. Cfr. Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.
    Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter on Difference.
  33. Licet plurimi codd. et ed. 1 habeant si, praeferimus tamen cum codd. L R etc. etsi. Codd. cit. et ed. 1 deinde legunt recipiatur (multi codd. falso respiciatur) pro recipitur. — De solutione huius dubii cfr. hic q. 2. et infra d. 9. dub. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. ad ult. et a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 31. a. 2. ac S. III. q. 17. a. 1. ad 7, ubi de differentia inter alium et alterum eadem sententia profertur.
    Although very many codices and ed. 1 have si, we prefer however with codices L, R etc. etsi. The codices cited and ed. 1 then read recipiatur (many codices wrongly respiciatur) in place of recipitur. — On the solution of this doubt cf. here q. 2 and below d. 9, dub. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2, ad ult. and a. 4. — St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q. 31, a. 2, and Summa Theol. III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 7, where the same opinion concerning the difference between alius and alterum is set forth.
← Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 4