Bonaventure

QUAESTIO I. Utrum in divinis ponendae sint proprietates personarum.

Quod autem in divinis sit ponere proprietates non solum vocaliter, sed etiam realiter, ostenditur sic.

1. Hieronymus dicit, et habetur in fine praecedentis distinctionis¹: «Non tantum nomina, sed etiam nominum proprietates confitemur»: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit in libro de Fide ad Petrum²: «Proprium est Patris, quod unum filium genuit»: ergo a coniugatis, generatio est proprietas Patris; sed constat, quod generatio realiter est in Deo, constat etiam, quod convenit soli Patri: ergo secundum rem est Patris proprietas.

3. Item, proprietatis est distinguere, ergo ubi est vera distinctio, ibi est vera proprietas; sed in divinis est vera distinctio: unde Damascenus³: «Differentiam hypostaseon, id est personarum, in tribus proprietatibus, paternali, filiali et processibili recognoscimus».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia sicut alius est modus quaerendi de essentia et persona, ita alius est modus quaerendi de essentia et proprietate. De essentia enim quaeritur per quid, de proprietate per quomodo se habet: ergo sicut ponitur in divinis et essentia et persona secundum veritatem, ita debet poni proprietas.

5. Item, supra⁴ probatum est, quod differunt generatio et processio realiter — alioquin non differrent personae — ergo generatio et spiratio differunt realiter. Sed tam generatio, quam spiratio est in una persona non multiplicata, ut in persona Patris: ergo cum persona sit realiter una, et proprietates realiter plures, ergo ponere est proprietates realiter in divinis differentes; sed non differentia essentiali nec personali, cum sint in eadem persona: ergo notionali. Quodsi non differunt generatio et spiratio, sicut haec est vera: Pater spirat Spiritum sanctum, ita et haec: Pater generat Spiritum sanctum; et tunc sequeretur, quod Spiritus sanctus esset Filius.

6. Item, Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, hoc supra⁵ probatum est, et est ratio in promptu, quia unus omnino est qui spiratur. Hoc quod est unum dicit unitatem non essentiae nec personae: ergo oportet, quod proprietatis; et si hoc, necesse est ponere proprietates in divinis realiter, non nominaliter sive tantum in voce.

7. Item, in Patre est paternitas et innascibilitas: aut ergo eadem proprietas, aut alia. Si eadem proprietas, ergo et relatio eadem; sed secundum paternitatem refertur ad Filium: ergo et secundum innascibilitatem. Sed hoc est falsum, ergo est alia⁶; et persona est una: ergo necesse est ponere proprietates in divinis personis etiam realiter differentes.

Contra:

1. Hilarius de Trinitate⁷: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus solis differunt nominibus: ergo si differunt solis nominibus, non sunt ibi reales proprietates, sed vocales.

2. Item, Damascenus dicit primo libro⁸: «Oportet scire, quod aliud est differre re, aliud ratione», et dicit, quod in creaturis est differentia re et convenientia ratione, sed in divinis e contrario. Cum ergo sit distinctio secundum proprietates, videtur ergo, quod sint ibi solum secundum modum loquendi vel intelligendi: non ergo a parte rei.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in summe simplici non cadit differentia aliqua; sed divina persona est summe simplex: ergo aut ibi non est proprietas, aut est solo modo loquendi: ergo etc.

4. Item, ita simplex est persona, sicut essentia; sed proprietates essentiae non differunt nisi solo modo loquendi, non secundum rem: ergo similiter proprietates personae.

5. Item, divina essentia propter summam simplicitatem se ipsa refertur ad creaturam, et ideo relatio essentialis solo modo loquendi differt ab essentia, ut cum dicitur Dominus; omnino enim transit in substantiam⁹: ergo pari ratione persona se ipsa refertur ad personam.

6. Item, creatura propter essentialem comparationem ad suum principium se ipsa refertur ad suum Creatorem — alioquin inter Creatorem et creaturam caderet medium, quod non esset nec Creator nec creatura — ergo si multo essentialior est comparatio personae ad personam, ergo se ipsa refertur. Et si hoc: ergo videtur, quod ipsa proprietas vel relatio non differat nisi solo modo loquendi a persona.

CONCLUSIO. Proprietates personarum ponendae sunt in divinis, quae non solum secundum vocem, sed etiam realiter a se invicem, et aliquo modo etiam a personis differunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes catholici tractatores posuerunt proprietates personarum in divinis. Cum enim sint plures personae et distinctae, necesse est, quod sit ibi distinguens; hoc autem proprietatem appellamus. Sed diversificati sunt in modo positionis.

Quoniam ergo viderunt aliqui¹⁰ summam simplicitatem in persona sicut in essentia, posuerunt, quod sicut in essentia omnino est idem quo est et quod est, ita in persona omnino idem¹¹ qui distinguitur et quo, et ita suppositum et proprietas, differens autem solo modo loquendi; sicut si dicatur: rogo te benignum vel benignitatem tuam.

Sed ista positio non potest stare, quoniam, sicut in opponendo¹² probatum est, in eadem persona sunt proprietates differentes non solum modo loquendi, sed et realiter. Videmus enim, quod una persona uno modo comparatur ad unam, ut Pater ad Filium; et videmus, unam personam uno modo sive una habitudine comparari ad plures, ut Spiritus sanctus ad Patrem et Filium; et iterum, unam personam pluribus modis comparari ad plures, ut Filius ad Patrem et Spiritum sanctum. Similiter videmus, plures personas eodem modo comparari ad unam, ut Pater et Filius ad Spiritum sanctum: ergo unitas habitudinis non potest accipi a parte essentiae — certum est — nec a parte personae quae refertur; nec ex parte personae, ad quam refertur. Restat ergo, quod sit alius modus dicendi, sumtus a parte rei.

Et ideo nunc communis opinio tenet, in divinis esse proprietates personarum realiter differentes a se invicem, et per hoc etiam differentes a personis aliquo modo. Sicut enim, quia in una essentia non plurificata plures ponimus personas, modi¹³ dicendi essentialiter et personaliter differunt non solum differentia sumta a parte nostra, sed etiam a parte rei; sic etiam dicendum de modo dicendi personaliter et notionaliter. Et ideo distinguunt magistri tres modos dicendi in divinis, qui sumuntur a parte rei, scilicet essentialem, personalem et notionalem. Et dicitur communiter, quod tres sint modi praedicandi, scilicet in quid, in quis et in quae sive in quo modo se habet. Et incidit peccatum secundum figuram dictionis ex commutatione¹⁴ horum modorum, sicut in creaturis ex commutatione praedicamentorum. Sicut ergo in divinis vera est essentia, et verae sunt personae, ita verae sunt personarum proprietates.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium primo de Hilario, dicendum, quod Hilarius accipit nomina

non pro ipsis vocibus, sed pro intellectibus sive significatis importatis per illa tria nomina. Important enim ibi proprietates. Nam solis non excludit ibi proprietatis veritatem, sed excludit diversitatem formae vel substantiae vel naturae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod differunt solum ratione; dicendum, quod differre ratione est tripliciter. Uno modo a parte nostrae apprehensionis, sicut differunt in Deo bonitas et magnitudo. Alio modo differre ratione est secundum differentiam attributionis, quia aliquis modus ponitur circa unum vel attribuitur uni, qui non attribuitur alteri; et sic differunt ratione essentia et persona et notio. Tertio modo differre ratione est differre secundum pluralitatem distinctionis, quae non inducit diversitatem in essentia vel natura, tamen tantam inducit differentiam, quod unum non dicitur de altero; et sic differt ratione persona a persona et proprietas a proprietate. Et prima quidem differentia secundum rationem est minima, quia nihil ei respondet a parte rei; sed ultimae respondet. Non vult ergo Damascenus dividere rem contra rationem, nisi secundum quod res accipitur pro natura, nec etiam sic omnino dividit, sed quasi a principali denominat. Nam in creaturis non solum est communitas rationalis, immo etiam naturalis. Nam Petrus et Paulus non tantum in ratione conveniunt, sed etiam in natura communi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec¹⁵ tollit summam simplicitatem; dicendum, quod differentia rationis quaedam fundatur super quid absolutum sive substantiale sive accidentale, quaedam super respectum sive modum se habendi. Et prima differentia omnino repugnat simplicitati, et non potest esse in Deo; secunda vero non repugnat. Nam videmus, respectum aliquem de novo esse circa aliquid, illo nullo modo mutato¹⁶. Videmus etiam, aliquid habere plures respectus, ipso sine compositione existente. Dicendum ergo, quod proprietates personales sunt respectivae, non absolutae; et ideo possunt differre ratione respectuum; quia persona suppositum sive hypostasim dicit, sed proprietas dicit habitudinem ad alterum.

4. Ex hoc patet sequens. Quia enim proprietates essentiales sunt absolutae, non possunt dicere realem differentiam, nisi essentialem habeant; et ideo solo modo loquendi differunt. Non sic proprietates personales. Unde proprietates essentiales omnino transeunt in essentiam, sed personales non.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia se ipsa refertur; dicendum, quod essentia divina non potest referri nisi ad aliam essentiam; ad illam autem non refertur, quoniam relatio dicit ordinem et habitudinem. Sicut autem vult Philosophus¹⁷: «Deus non ordinatur ad res, sed res ad ipsum»; et ideo non est ibi relatio nisi solo modo loquendi. Sed cum persona ad personam refertur, ibi vere est ordo originis, et ideo habitudo, et ideo vera relatio. Et sic patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura se ipsa refertur; dicendum, quod referri se ipso potest intelligi tripliciter: aut quia inter rei respectum et essentiam non cadit medium, quia ipsa essentia essentialiter dependet; et sic quidem reperitur in creaturis. Sic enim refertur materia ad formam et forma ad materiam; unde dicit Philosophus¹⁸, quod «materia hoc ipsum quod est ad alterum est»; tamen nec materia est suus respectus, nec forma, quia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem. Alio modo est referri se ipso, quia inter id quod refertur et suum correlativum non cadit aliquod medium, quod non sit alterum eorum; et sic Pater refertur se ipso ad Filium, et e converso. Nam Pater est sua paternitas, et hoc propter summam simplicitatem. Tertio modo referri se ipso est, quia ipsum quod refertur non est nisi relatio et respectus purus; et hoc est impossibile esse neque in Deo neque in creatura, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁹, «omne quod refertur est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur»; alioquin relationis esset relatio. Et ita patet, quod omnis

proprietas relativa sive sit in Deo sive in creatura necessario differt aliquo modo ab eo cuius est proprietas, et magis in creatura quam in Creatore. Et intelligantur omnia haec, sicut prius, quoniam omne respectivum fundatur super aliquid absolutum.

QUESTION I. Whether properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters.

That in divine matters there is to be a positing of properties not only verbally, but also really, is shown thus.

1. Jerome says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction¹: «We confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter²: «It is proper to the Father, that he begot one son»: therefore by [the rule] from conjugates, generation is a property of the Father; but it is established that generation really is in God, and it is also established that it belongs to the Father alone: therefore according to the thing it is the Father's property.

3. Likewise, it belongs to a property to distinguish; therefore where there is a true distinction, there is a true property; but in divine matters there is a true distinction: whence Damascene³: «We recognize the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties — the paternal, the filial, and the processible».

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since just as the mode of inquiring about essence and person is one [thing], so the mode of inquiring about essence and property is another. For about essence one inquires through what, about property through how it stands: therefore just as essence and person are posited in divine matters according to truth, so a property must be posited.

5. Likewise, above⁴ it has been proved that generation and procession really differ — otherwise the persons would not differ — therefore generation and spiration differ really. But both generation and spiration are in one person not multiplied, as in the person of the Father: therefore since the person is really one, and the properties are really many, therefore there is to be a positing of properties really differing in divine matters; but not by an essential or personal difference, since they are in the same person: therefore by a notional [difference]. But if generation and spiration do not differ, just as this is true: the Father spirates the Holy Spirit, so also this: the Father generates the Holy Spirit; and then it would follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son.

6. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, this has been proved above⁵, and the reason is at hand, since the one who is spirated is altogether one. This [fact] that he is one expresses a unity not of essence nor of person: therefore it must be that of a property; and if so, it is necessary to posit properties in divine matters really, not nominally or only in voice.

7. Likewise, in the Father there is paternity and unbegottenness: either then [it is] the same property, or another. If the same property, then also the same relation; but according to paternity he is referred to the Son: therefore also according to unbegottenness. But this is false, therefore it is another⁶; and the person is one: therefore it is necessary to posit properties in the divine persons even really differing.

On the contrary:

1. Hilary, On the Trinity⁷: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ by names alone: therefore if they differ by names alone, there are not real properties there, but vocal ones.

2. Likewise, Damascene says in the first book⁸: «It is needful to know that to differ in thing is one [matter], to differ in account is another», and he says that in creatures there is a difference in thing and an agreement in account, but in divine matters [it is] the contrary. Since therefore there is a distinction according to properties, it seems then that they are there only according to the mode of speaking or of understanding: therefore not on the side of the thing.

3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since in what is supremely simple no difference falls; but the divine person is supremely simple: therefore either there is no property there, or it is only by mode of speaking: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the person is just as simple as the essence; but the properties of the essence do not differ except only by mode of speaking, not according to the thing: therefore likewise the properties of the person.

5. Likewise, the divine essence on account of its supreme simplicity refers itself to the creature, and therefore an essential relation differs from the essence only by mode of speaking, as when [God] is called Lord; for it altogether passes into the substance⁹: therefore by parity of reason a person refers itself to a person.

6. Likewise, a creature on account of its essential comparison to its principle refers itself to its Creator — otherwise between Creator and creature there would fall a middle, which would be neither Creator nor creature — therefore if the comparison of person to person is much more essential, then it refers itself. And if so: it seems that the property or relation itself differs from the person only by mode of speaking.

CONCLUSION. Properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters, which differ from one another not only according to voice, but also really, and in some way also from the persons.

I respond: It must be said that all Catholic treatise-writers have posited properties of the persons in divine matters. For since there are several and distinct persons, it is necessary that there be a distinguishing [factor] there; this we call a property. But they have varied in the mode of positing.

Since therefore some¹⁰ saw the supreme simplicity in the person as in the essence, they posited that just as in the essence that by which it is and that which is are altogether the same, so in the person there is altogether the same¹¹ [item] who is distinguished and that by which [he is distinguished], and so [the same] supposit and property, differing only by mode of speaking; as if one were to say: I beg you, kindly one or your kindness.

But this position cannot stand, because, as has been proved in the opposing [arguments]¹², in the same person there are properties differing not only by mode of speaking, but also really. For we see that one person is compared to one in one mode, as the Father to the Son; and we see one person to be compared in one mode or by one relation to several, as the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son; and again, one person to be compared in several modes to several, as the Son to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise we see several persons to be compared in the same mode to one, as the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit: therefore the unity of the relation cannot be taken from the side of the essence — this is certain — nor from the side of the person which refers; nor from the side of the person to which it refers. It remains, therefore, that there is another mode of speaking, taken on the side of the thing.

And therefore now the common opinion holds that in divine matters there are properties of the persons really differing from one another, and through this also differing in some way from the persons. For just as, because in one not-pluralified essence we posit several persons, the modes¹³ of speaking essentially and personally differ not only by a difference taken on our side, but also on the side of the thing; so also it must be said of the mode of speaking personally and notionally. And therefore the masters distinguish three modes of speaking in divine matters, which are taken on the side of the thing, namely the essential, the personal, and the notional. And it is commonly said that there are three modes of predicating, namely in quid ("in what"), in quis ("in who"), and in quae ("in which") or in quo modo se habet ("in how it stands"). And the fault according to the figure of speech is incurred from the interchange¹⁴ of these modes, just as in creatures from the interchange of predicaments. Therefore, just as in divine matters the essence is true, and the persons are true, so the properties of the persons are true.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary first concerning Hilary, it must be said that Hilary takes the names not for the voices themselves, but for the understandings or things signified imported through those three names. For they import properties there. For alone does not exclude there the truth of the property, but excludes a diversity of form or substance or nature.

2. To that which is objected concerning Damascene, that they differ only in account; it must be said that to differ in account is threefold. In one mode on the side of our apprehension, as in God goodness and magnitude differ. In another mode to differ in account is according to the difference of attribution, since some mode is posited around one or attributed to one, which is not attributed to another; and thus essence and person and notion differ in account. In a third mode to differ in account is to differ according to the plurality of distinction, which does not bring in a diversity in essence or nature, yet brings in so great a difference that one is not said of the other; and thus person differs in account from person and property from property. And the first difference according to account is the least, since nothing corresponds to it on the side of the thing; but to the last [something] does correspond. Therefore Damascene does not mean to divide thing against account, except according as thing is taken for nature, nor even thus does he altogether divide, but rather denominates [it] from the principal [aspect]. For in creatures there is not only a rational community, but indeed even a natural one. For Peter and Paul agree not only in account, but also in common nature.

3. To that which is objected, that this¹⁵ takes away the supreme simplicity; it must be said that a difference of account is in some cases founded upon some absolute thing, whether substantial or accidental, [and] in some cases upon a respect or mode of standing. And the first difference altogether resists simplicity, and cannot be in God; the second, however, does not resist [it]. For we see that some respect comes about anew around something, [the latter] in no way being changed¹⁶. We see also that something has several respects, [it] itself existing without composition. It must be said therefore that the personal properties are respective, not absolute; and therefore they can differ according to the account of the respects; since person expresses a supposit or hypostasis, but property expresses a relation to another.

4. From this what follows is plain. For since the essential properties are absolute, they cannot express a real difference, unless they have an essential [one]; and therefore they differ only by mode of speaking. Not so the personal properties. Hence the essential properties altogether pass into the essence, but the personal [properties] do not.

5. To that which is objected, that the essence refers itself; it must be said that the divine essence cannot be referred except to another essence; but to that [other] it is not referred, since a relation expresses an order and a relation. As, however, the Philosopher holds¹⁷: «God is not ordered to things, but things to him»; and therefore there is no relation there except only by mode of speaking. But when person refers to person, there truly is the order of origin, and therefore relation, and therefore true relation. And so that is plain.

6. To that which is objected, that a creature refers itself; it must be said that to be referred by itself can be understood in three ways: either since between the respect of the thing and the essence no middle falls, since the essence itself depends essentially [on its principle]; and thus indeed it is found in creatures. For thus matter is referred to form and form to matter; whence the Philosopher says¹⁸ that «matter, this very [thing] which it is, is in relation to another»; yet neither is matter its own respect, nor form, since they do not have every-way simplicity. In another mode it is to be referred by itself, since between that which is referred and its correlative no middle falls which is not one of them; and thus the Father is referred by himself to the Son, and conversely. For the Father is his own paternity, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. In a third mode to be referred by itself is, since that which is referred is nothing but a relation and pure respect; and this is impossible to be either in God or in a creature, since, as Augustine says¹⁹, «everything which is referred is something, except that which is said relatively»; otherwise there would be a relation of a relation. And so it is plain that every relative property, whether it be in God or in a creature, necessarily differs in some way from that of which it is the property, and more in a creature than in the Creator. And let all these [statements] be understood, as before, since every respective [thing] is founded upon something absolute.