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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 454

QUAESTIO II. Quid sint in divinis proprietates personarum.

Secundo quaeritur de proprietatibus, quid sint. Et quod sint relationes, videtur:

1. Quia dicit Hilarius duodecimo de Trinitate1: «Proprium est Deo nato esse filium»; sed filiatio est relatio: ergo etc.

2. Item, Damascenus2: «Dicimus divinam Verbi hypostasim, nativitatis modo et habitudine a paternali hypostasi differentem»; sed modus habitudinis est relatio: ergo etc.

3. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore in libro de Trinitate3 dicit, quod personae distinguuntur proprietate originis; sed origo in divinis non est motus, sed habitudo, ergo relatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia proprium est quod convenit soli4; sed nihil absolutum est incommunicabile in divinis et conveniens soli: ergo omnis proprietas personalis est relativa, ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Sicut paternitas est relatio, ita magnitudo quantitas, et ita bonitas qualitas; sed magnitudo Dei non est quantitas, nec bonitas qualitas5: ergo nec paternitas est relatio. Sed paternitas est proprietas: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia alia transeunt in substantiam, relatio non; contrarium ostenditur primo sic:

p. 455

2. Sicut quantitas est unum genus accidentis6 distinctum a substantia, ita et relatio; sed quia in Deo non cadit diversitas, ideo necessario genus quantitatis transit in substantiam, cum ibi non sit accidens nec diversitas generum: ergo pari ratione relatio.

3. Item, sicut Deus est sua magnitudo, ita Deus est sua7 paternitas; sed quia Deus est sua magnitudo, ideo quantitas non differt a substantia, sed in eam transit: ergo et paternitas similiter.

4. Item, videtur quod relatio magis transit, quia inter omnia genera accidentium relatio importat maiorem dependentiam, quia ad subiectum et obiectum; sed Deus omnino est independens: ergo et relatio minime manet in Deo.

5. Item, inter omnia genera entium relatio minus habet de entitate8, sicut patet, quia advenit et recedit sine mutatione illius quod refertur; sed in summo ente non debet poni, nisi quod multum habet de entitate: ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO. Proprietates personarum sunt relationes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod proprietates personales necesse est esse relationes. Et hoc duplici ratione: tum quia sunt incommunicabiles et soli conveniunt, tum etiam quia realiter differunt, ut

p. 456

ostensum est prius9. Sola autem relatio manet in divinis.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum, quod relatio in aliquibus convenit cum aliis generibus10, in aliquibus differt. Convenit enim11 in hoc, quod est praedicamentum et genus entis, et in hoc, quod est accidens; et disconvenit in hoc, quod praeter alia genera habet respectum non solum ad subiectum, sed etiam ad obiectum secundum habitudinem et dependentiam.

Quantum ad primas conditiones impossibile est relationem manere in divinis, sicut alia genera, et hoc propter summam simplicitatem. In Deo enim relatio non est praedicamentum nec accidens, sed substantia est. Quantum vero ad conditiones, quas habet respectu obiecti, necesse est quodam modo manere, scilicet quantum ad habitudinem12, et hoc propter veram distinctionem, quae est in divinis, et veram originem et habitudinem; et necesse est quodam modo non manere, scilicet quantum ad dependentiam, et hoc propter omnimodam absolutionem quae est in divinis. Alia igitur genera simpliciter transeunt, sed relatio quodam modo manet ibi, quodam modo transit; quia alia genera respectum solum ad subiectum dicunt et secundum illum transeunt. Sed relatio ultra13 dicit respectum ad obiectum, et secundum illum respectum dicit pluralitatem, quae vere est in divinis; et ita relatio manet. Patet etiam, quomodo transit, videlicet quantum ad omne quod dicit compositionem. Unde non est genus neque in genere, non est accidens nec est aliud.

1. 2. 3. Et sic patent prima14 tria obiecta circa solutionem oppositorum hoc, quia unum sumitur a natura generis, aliud a natura accidentis, tertium a praedicatione identitatis. Patet etiam, quomodo manet, scilicet quantum ad illud quod dicit distinctionem, non quantum ad id quod dicit dependentiam et inclinationem, quia sic privat absolutionis perfectionem.

4. Et per hoc patet quartum argumentum, quod obiicit de dependentia relationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minus habet de ente; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, cum differt essentialiter a substantia; in Deo autem non sic est. — Posset tamen praeter rationem praedictam haec ratio reddi, quod non transit: quia enim minimum habet de ente, ideo minimam vel nullam facit compositionem, etiam cum15 manet secundum suam proprietatem. Alia vero, quae habent aliquid de ente absoluto, faciunt compositionem; et hinc est, quod relatio melius valet in summo simplici quam aliquod aliorum.

Scholion

I. Praeter solutionem quaestionis principalis explicatur etiam natura relationis in communi, nec non differentia, quae est inter relationes in Deo et relationes in creaturis. — Ex hoc loco manifeste apparet falsum esse, quod a quibusdam S. Bonaventurae imponitur, eum scilicet docere, quod personae divinae constituantur per aliquid absolutum, de quo vide quaest. seq. et d. 33. q. 1.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 2. — Scot., Report. I. Sent. d. 33. q. 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 40. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2, et d. 27. 1. princ. q. 1.

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English Translation

QUESTION II. What the properties of the persons are in divine matters.

Secondly, inquiry is made about the properties: what they are. And that they are relations, is shown:

1. Since Hilary says in book XII On the Trinity1: «It is proper to God once born to be a son»; but sonship is a relation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene2: «We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word differs from the paternal hypostasis by the mode of nativity and by relation»; but the mode of relation is a relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor in the book On the Trinity3 says that the persons are distinguished by a property of origin; but origin in divine matters is not a motion, but a relation, therefore [it is] a relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since proper is what belongs to one alone4; but nothing absolute is incommunicable in divine matters and belonging to one alone: therefore every personal property is relative, therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Just as paternity is a relation, so magnitude is a quantity, and so goodness is a quality; but the magnitude of God is not a quantity, nor is goodness a quality5: therefore neither is paternity a relation. But paternity is a property: therefore etc. If you say that this is not similar, since the others pass into the substance, [whereas] relation does not; the contrary is shown first thus:

2. Just as quantity is one genus of accident6 distinct from substance, so also is relation; but since in God no diversity falls, therefore necessarily the genus of quantity passes into the substance, since there is there neither accident nor diversity of genera: therefore by parity of reason [so does] relation.

3. Likewise, just as God is his own magnitude, so [God is his own]7 paternity; but since God is his own magnitude, therefore quantity does not differ from substance, but passes into it: therefore likewise also paternity.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation passes [into substance] more, since among all the genera of accidents relation imports a greater dependence, since [it has reference] to subject and to object; but God is altogether independent: therefore relation in no way remains in God.

5. Likewise, among all the genera of beings relation has the least of entity8, as is plain since it comes and goes without change of that which is referred; but in the supreme being there ought to be posited only what has much of entity: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION. The properties of the persons are relations.

I respond: It must be said that the personal properties must necessarily be relations. And this for a twofold reason: both because they are incommunicable and belong to one alone, and also because they really differ, as has been shown previously9. And only relation remains in divine matters.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that relation in some [respects] agrees with the other genera10, in some differs. For it agrees11 in this, that it is a predicament and a genus of being, and in this, that it is an accident; and it disagrees in this, that beyond the other genera it has a respect not only to a subject, but also to an object according to relation and dependence.

As to the first conditions, it is impossible for relation to remain in divine matters, just like the other genera, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. For in God relation is not a predicament nor an accident, but is substance. As to those conditions, however, which it has with respect to the object, it is necessary that it remain in some way, namely as to relation12, and this on account of the true distinction which is in divine matters, and the true origin and relation; and it is necessary that it not remain in some way, namely as to dependence, and this on account of the every-way absoluteness which is in divine matters. The other genera therefore simply pass over, but relation in some way remains there, in some way passes over; since the other genera express only a respect to the subject and according to that they pass over. But relation expresses moreover13 a respect to the object, and according to that respect expresses a plurality which truly is in divine matters; and so relation remains. It is plain also how it passes over, namely as to everything which expresses composition. Hence it is not a genus nor in a genus, it is not an accident nor anything else.

1, 2, 3. And so the first14 three objections in the [section of] solution to the opposed [arguments] are plain by this, since one is taken from the nature of the genus, another from the nature of the accident, the third from the predication of identity. It is plain also how it remains, namely as to that which expresses distinction, not as to what expresses dependence and inclination, since thus it would deprive [it of] the perfection of absoluteness.

4. And by this the fourth argument is plain, which objects from the dependence of relation.

5. To that which is objected, that it has less of being; it must be said that this is true when it differs essentially from substance; but in God it is not so. — Yet besides the aforesaid reason this reason could be given that it does not pass over: since precisely because it has the least of being, therefore it makes the least or no composition, even when15 it remains according to its own propriety. The others, however, which have something of absolute being, make composition; and hence it is that relation has more force in the supremely simple than any of the others.

Scholion

I. Beyond the solution of the principal question, the nature of relation in general is also explained, as well as the difference which is between relations in God and relations in creatures. — From this place it manifestly appears to be false what is imputed to St. Bonaventure by certain ones, namely that he teaches that the divine persons are constituted by something absolute, on which see the following question and d. 33, q. 1.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 68, m. 2. — Scotus, Reportata I Sent. d. 33, q. 3. — St. Thomas, Summa q. 40, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ. q. 2, and d. 27, 1 princ. q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Num. 15. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    n. 15. See here the littera of the Master, c. 3.
  2. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 7.
    Book III On the Orthodox Faith, c. 7.
  3. Libr. IV. c. 18: Nullatenus possunt iuxta aliquam qualitatis proprietatem alternatim differre; relinquitur, ut credantur iuxta modum originis aliquam differentiam habere.
    Book IV, c. 18: In no way can they differ alternately according to any property of quality; it remains that they be believed to have some difference according to the mode of origin.
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 152, nota 1.
    Cf. above p. 152, note 1.
  5. Vide supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 4, et Boeth. de Trin. c. 4.
    See above d. 8, p. II, dub. 4, and Boethius On the Trinity, c. 4.
  6. Vat. et cod. cc omittunt accidentis.
    The Vatican [edition] and cod. cc omit accidentis ("of accident").
  7. Supple cum Vat. Deus est sua.
    Supply with the Vatican [edition] Deus est sua ("God is his own").
  8. Cfr. Aristot., XIV. Metaph. c. 3. (XIII. c. 1.), ubi hoc fusius probatur; et Averroes, XII. Metaph. text. 19. ait: Quia (relatio) est debilioris esse aliis praedicamentis, ita quod quidam reputaverunt, ipsam esse ex secundis intellectis. — De ratione proxime allata cfr. quaest. praec. solut. ad 3. — Codd. K V cc et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 falso ad quod refertur pro quod refertur.
    Cf. Aristotle, XIV Metaph. c. 3 (XIII, c. 1), where this is more fully proved; and Averroes, XII Metaph. text 19, says: Because (relation) is of weaker being than the other predicaments, so that some have reputed it to be from second intentions. — On the reason most recently adduced cf. preceding question, sol. ad 3. — Codices K V cc and edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 wrongly [read] ad quod refertur in place of quod refertur.
  9. Quaest. praeced.
    The preceding question.
  10. Pro generibus Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. I praedicamentis, i. e. supremis rerum generibus, quae praedicari possunt de individuo, quae sunt decem secundum Aristotelem. — Pro enim, quod sequitur verbum Convenit, ed. I quidem.
    In place of generibus the Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and ed. I, [reads] praedicamentis, that is, supreme genera of things which can be predicated of an individual, which are ten according to Aristotle. — In place of enim, which follows the word Convenit, ed. I [reads] quidem.
  11. [Lectional note attached to Convenit enim; see note 10.]
    [Lectional note attached to Convenit enim; see note 10.]
  12. Auctoritate praestantiorum mss. et ed. I restituimus hic scilicet quantum ad habitudinem, quae verba in Vat. desunt.
    On the authority of the more excellent manuscripts and ed. I we restore here scilicet quantum ad habitudinem ("namely as to relation"), which words are missing in the Vatican [edition].
  13. Cod. V addit hoc. Non multo post pro dicit pluralitatem, quae complures codd. ut FGMTZ aa bb ff manet, quae; aliqui codd. ut AHR omittunt dicit pluralitatem, subinde qui exhibentes pro quae. Paulo inferius pro ita cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 illa.
    Cod. V adds hoc ("this"). Not much later, in place of dicit pluralitatem, several codices such as FGMTZ aa bb ff [read] manet, quae; some codices such as AHR omit dicit pluralitatem, thereupon exhibiting qui in place of quae. A little below, in place of ita cod. cc with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [reads] illa.
  14. Sensus est: sicut alia praedicamenta divinae essentiae identificantur, sic etiam relatio, tam quantum ad conditiones, in quibus convenit cum aliis praedicamentis, quam, ut paulo inferius dicetur, quantum ad aliquam conditionem ipsi specialem, scil. dependentiam. — Ed. I immediate superius post voculam sicut apte interiicit nec.
    The sense is: just as the other predicaments are identified [with] the divine essence, so also relation, both as to the conditions in which it agrees with the other predicaments, and, as will be said a little below, as to some condition special to itself, namely dependence. — Ed. I immediately above, after the particle sicut, aptly interjects nec.
  15. In pluribus codd. et ed. I deest prima. Mox cod. M contra pro circa, et dein cod. Y secundum pro aliud.
    In several codices and ed. I, prima is missing. Soon cod. M [reads] contra in place of circa, and then cod. Y [reads] secundum in place of aliud.
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