Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 26
QUAESTIO III. Utrum actus personalium proprietatum sit hypostases distinguere, an distinctas ostendere.
Tertio quaeritur de proprietatibus quantum ad actum. Et quaeritur, utrum actus1 huiusmodi proprietatum sit hypostases distinguere, aut distinctas ostendere. Et quod sit distinguere, videtur:
1. Per Boethium de Trinitate2: «Substantiam continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem»: sed si multiplicat, ergo distinguit.
2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore de Trinitate3 dicit, quod
persona distinguitur proprietate originis; sed proprietas dicit originem et relationem: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione4, quia, cum personae distinguantur, aut distinguuntur per aliquid absolutum, aut respectivum. Per absolutum non, quia, sicut vult Augustinus5, «quod ad se dicitur de singulis dicitur»: ergo necesse est, quod differant per aliquid respectivum.
4. Item, proprietas Patris aut accidit ipsi hypostasi, aut est ei consubstantialis; quod si6 accidit, ergo sunt ibi aliqua accidentia: ergo est ibi aliqua compositio. Si autem est consubstantialis et connaturalis: ergo cum non consequatur esse hypostasis, non tantum est ratio innotescendi, sed etiam distinguendi.
5. Item, in summe simplici idem est omnino ratio essendi et cognoscendi; sed persona Patris est summe simplex: ergo eodem distinguitur, quo distingui cognoscitur. Hoc autem est per proprietatem: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Omne respectivum reducitur ad absolutum; sed quod reducitur ad aliquid secundum rationem intelligendi consequitur illud: ergo cum proprietates sint respectivae, hypostases absolutae, proprietates reducuntur ad hypostases: ergo hypostases sunt7 priores. Sed quod prius est non distinguitur eo quod est posterius, quia ab eodem est esse et esse distinctum: ergo etc.
2. Item, omne8 quod distinguit aliquid, dat ei tale esse, quale ipsum est vel habet; sed proprietates habent de se solum esse respectivum: ergo si hypostases per proprietates distinguuntur, habent solum esse respectivum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia cum sint supposita essentiae, habent esse substantiae absolutum.
3. Item, in divinis personis est plurificatio per originem, ergo et distinctio. Sed origo dicit emanationem vel exitum, relatio autem per se non emanat nisi prius alio emanante, quia in ad aliquid non est motus9: ergo prius oritur hypostasis ab hypostasi secundum rationem intelligendi, quam sit intelligere relationem esse. Et si hoc, relatio consequitur esse distinctum in hypostasibus: ergo etc.
4. Item, «omne quod relative dicitur, est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur», sicut ratio dictat, et Augustinus dicit septimo libro de Trinitate10. Sed Pater et Filius dicuntur relative: ergo uterque eorum est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur; ergo abstracta relatione, contingit aliquid intelligere. Quaero ergo, quid sit illud: aut essentia, aut hypostasis. Si essentia, ergo relatio est in essentia: ergo multiplicat eam. Si hypostasis: aut ergo una, aut duae. Non una, quia impossibile est intelligere, quod Pater et Filius sint una hypostasis: ergo duae. Et si hoc, patet etc.
5. Item, abstractis omnibus proprietatibus duorum individuorum, ut Petri et Pauli, solis hypostasibus remanentibus, adhuc contingit intelligere, remanere distinctionem: ergo pari ratione in hypostasibus divinis. Quod si verum est, tunc ergo sunt11 solum ratio distinguendi quoad nos.
CONCLUSIO. Proprietates personales sunt rationes non tantum manifestandi distinctionem, verum etiam distinguendi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex opinio fuit. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod abstractis proprietatibus, impossibile est intelligere hypostases distinctas, quia huiusmodi proprietates in divinis non solum dant personis innotescere, immo etiam dant esse12; unde ipsis abstractis, abstrahitur esse et esse distinctum.
Aliorum opinio fuit, quod proprietatibus abstractis, adhuc est intelligere distinctionem in hypostasibus, quoniam proprietates secundum ipsos non sunt ratio distinguendi secundum rem, sed distinctionem manifestandi13. Unde dicunt, quod abstracta paternitate et filiatione, adhuc contingit intelligere qui ab alio, et a quo alius. — Et si quaeras, quomodo distinguuntur, dicunt14, quod se ipsis, sicut prin-
cipia et genera generalissima se ipsis distinguuntur et differunt. Unde haec est immediata: substantia non est quantitas.
Et si respiciamus interius, utraque opinio continet aliquid probabilitatis; et hoc patet sic. In divinis enim hypostasibus intelligimus originem sive emanationem, intelligimus etiam habitudinem. Secundum rationem intelligendi origo praecedit ipsum qui oritur; et secundum rationem intelligendi habitudo consequitur ipsum qui refertur. Potest igitur proprietas relativa importare solum habitudinem; et hoc modo consequitur rationem distinctionis et est ratio innotescendi distinctionem, non distinguendi, sicut dicit secunda opinio, et probant rationes inductae ad secundam partem de ipsa relatione. Potest enim intelligi tunc distinctio, quia intelligitur qui ab alio, et a quo alius. — Potest etiam utrumque proprietas importare, scilicet habitudinem et originem; et tunc non tantum est ratio innotescendi, sed etiam distinguendi. Circumscripta enim origine sive emanatione, impossibile est intelligere in divinis pluralitatem, immo sicut est essentia una, ita etiam intelligitur hypostasis una. Et sic procedit prima opinio et rationes ad primam partem.
Sed notandum, quod cum idem sit divinis15 personis oriri et esse et ad alterum se habere, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi sunt ordinata, ut primum sit oriri, deinde esse intelligatur in his quae habent esse ab alio, et deinde se ad alterum habere. Quia vero idem sunt in Deo, ideo eodem nomine designantur. Unde generatio dicit originem et habitudinem; tamen proprie loquendo generatio dicit originem, et paternitas habitudinem16. Quoniam igitur proprietas divina secundum communem usum loquendi importat habitudinem et originem, ideo tenendum, quod proprietates non solum sunt ratio innotescendi distinctionem, sed etiam distinguendi.
1. Et ad illud quod obiicitur, quod respectivum reducitur ad absolutum; dicendum, quod reduci ad aliquid est dupliciter: aut sicut ad principium, aut sicut ad terminum. Proprietas originis his duobus modis reducitur ad absolutum: ad hypostasim Patris reducitur innascibilitas17 sicut ad principium, ad hypostasim autem Geniti et Spirati sicut ad terminum. Quoniam igitur quod reducitur ad aliquid sicut ad principium ipsum consequitur, ideo abstracta origine, solum intelligitur Deus innascibilis non ens ab alio, et ita in unitate hypostasis. Quia vero quod reducitur ad aliquid18 sicut ad terminum, intelligitur praecedere; hinc est, quod abstracta origine, iam non est intelligere hypostasim procedentem. — Vel illud intelligendum, ubi respectivum dicit dependentiam, ratione cuius19 deficit a summa simplicitate, quod non est in Deo.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod respectivum solum dat esse respectivum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de respectivo, quod dicit solum habitudinem; sed non est verum de respectivo, quod dicit originem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio non oritur per se; dicendum, quod relatio est proprietas, secundum quod est ipsa, origo vero, prout est id quod oritur; et quia origo proprie non oritur20, sed est illud quo oriens oritur, ita quod non consequitur tempore vel natura, sed secundum rationem intelligendi, vel est simul necessario vel praecedit. Ideo patet illud.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod relative dicitur est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur21; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem in summe simplici quod sic differat esse et referri, quod unum possit ab altero separari secundum rem — sed22 — quia ibi unum sunt — solum secundum intellectum nostrum; nec adhuc intellectus noster sic abstrahit, ut intelligat hypostases distinctas, abstractis proprietatibus et relationibus. Si enim ab hypostasi Patris abstrahatur paternitas, vel e converso, iam non habet23 aliquid speciale, quod sit principium intelligendi ipsam; et ita consideratur sub ratione generali et incompleta. Unde et bene videntur mihi dicere qui dicunt, quod remanet intellectus huius nominis res, secundum quod est generale vocabulum. Et sic patet, quod, abstractis proprietatibus, non remanet distinctio nec re nec intellectu; et ideo utroque modo sunt ratio distinguendi.
5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Petrus et Paulus distingui intelliguntur, abstractis proprietatibus; dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam distinctio est ibi a parte propriae materiae et propriae formae, quae innotescit per proprietates accidentales; sed in divinis solum est distinctio per originem. Ideo patet illud.
I. Differentiae attribuuntur tres actus, scilicet dividere genus, constituere speciem, distinguere. Hinc data est occasio quaerendi, quos actus in divinis habeat proprietas personalis, quae est quasi loco differentiae. Primus ille actus dividendi genus manifeste impossibilis est in Deo. Sed de duobus aliis actibus inquiri potest, utrum scilicet proprietates et distinguant et constituant hypostasim, an solummodo quasi adventitiae iam distinctas hypostases manifestent, ut nomen Socratis personam iam distinctam notificat. Haec quaestio fere coincidit cum difficillima magisque subtili quam utili quaestione, per quid praecise constituantur divinae personae. Cum autem recta intelligentia et solutio plurium quaestionum in dd. 27. 29. 33. dependeat ab hac quaestione, nonnulla dicenda videntur primum de statu quaestionis, deinde de sententia principalium magistrorum.
II. Pro declarando quaestionis statu haec notamus.
1. In Deo quatuor distinguuntur: natura divina absoluta; principia duarum emanationum immediata, quae sunt intellectus et voluntas; ipsae emanationes sive origines; denique relationes et subsistentes et formales, quae sunt quasi termini illarum emanationum sive originum.
2. Natura est absoluta sine relatione ad aliud; intellectus et voluntas etiam sunt absoluta, tamen respiciunt aliquo modo suas emanationes, quarum sunt immediata principia. Emanationes sive origines in se quidem non sunt aliquid relativum, at ipsae sunt «viae quaedam ad personas» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 2. et 4.).
3. Ratio hypostasis in divinis est relativa. Cum autem in omni relatione distinguendum sit fundamentum relationis (esse in) et ipsa relatio (esse ad), etiam relationes divinae considerantur, tum quatenus consistunt in natura divina, tum quatenus referuntur ad invicem. Sub ultimo respectu non sunt nisi aliquid relativum; sub primo vero quodammodo aliquid absolutum.
4. Omnino constat, personas divinas non constitui nec per naturam, nec per intellectum et voluntatem; remanent igitur tantum duae rationes, de quibus quaeri possit, utrum sint personarum distinctivae et constitutivae, scilicet origines et relationes, et hae quidem secundum esse in et esse ad.
III. Diversae de quaestione sic proposita propugnatae sunt sententiae.
1. Praepositivus, cui favet Petrus Lombardus, aliique putaverunt, per solas origines distingui personas; proprietates autem non distinguere personas, sed distinctas ostendere. Haec opinio, secundo loco in respons. posita, a S. Thoma et Scoto reprobatur, nec ab ipso S. Bonav. approbatur, quidquid nonnulli dixerint, contradicentes perspicuis verbis S. Doctoris.
2. Thomas, Scotus et alii communiter tenent opinionem hic primo loco positam, quod personae et constituuntur et distinguuntur per proprietates relativas. Eandem sententiam etiam S. Bonaventuram sustinere, comprobatur praesertim ex ultima responsionis propositione. Ipse tamen eam sic explicat, ut etiam secundae sententiae aliquid veri inesse demonstret.
In ulteriore huius sententiae explicatione modus loquendi principalium doctorum, quos in re omnino convenire opinamur, non parum discrepat, et quod mirum est, expositores posteriores S. Bonaventurae, S. Thomae et Scoti in sensu vario eorum verba intelligunt. — Nonnulli Scotum graviter censurant, quod cum Ioan. a Ripa docuerit, personas constitui per aliquid absolutum. Sed ex ipsius Scoti verbis (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. 4, 3; Report. d. 28. q. 4, 3; Report. d. 26. q. 1.) et ex melioribus eius commentatoribus constat, eum tenere opinionem communem, quod personae constituantur per relationes. Opinionem autem Ioan. a Ripa in sensu differente ab illo, quem censores huius opinionis supponunt, at probabilem admittit (cfr. Report. hic q. 3; Rada, controv. 23; Macedo, col. 7. diff. 4. sect. 1-5.). Attamen in nonnullis specialioribus rebus Scotus tum a S. Thoma tum a S. Bonav. dissentit, de quo consuli possunt eiusdem Commentatores.
3. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 40. a. 2.) opinionem Praepositivi reprobat et addit: «Unde melius dicitur, quod personae seu hypostases distinguantur relationibus quam per originem. Licet enim distinguantur utroque modo, tamen prius et principalius per relationes secundum modum intelligendi» (cfr. ibid. a. 3, et I. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 2.). — Quomodo autem relationes constituunt personas? Ad hoc explicandum S. Thomas (ibid. a. 4.) utitur distinctione inter proprietatem, relatio, quatenus praesupponit actum notionalem, et proprietatem, quatenus est constitutiva personae et praeintelligitur actui notionali. Haec distinctio a Scoto (I. Sent. d. 28. q. 3.) impugnatur; sententia autem S. Thomae non eodem modo exponitur a Commentatoribus eius, qui de hoc consuli possunt.
4. S. Bonaventurae a pluribus auctoribus perperam imputatur opinio Ioannis a Ripa, quod per solam originem et per aliquid absolutum personae distinguantur; immo ab iisdem asseritur, ipsum Scotum (hic q. 1. n. 23. 24.) ita S. Bonaventuram intellexisse. Inter alios Lychetus ad hunc locum dicit: «Est D. Bonaventurae et Ioan. de Ripa»; etiam Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 40. a. 2.) reprehendit Scotum, quod hanc sententiam falso attribuerit S. Bonaventurae. Revera autem nec S. Bonav. hoc docuit, nec Scotus eundem reprehendit (cfr. auctor Scholiorum et notarum marginalium in editione Scoti, Lugduni 1639, et Macedo, coll. 7. diff. 4. Prolog.). Unde dicendum est, Scotum nec illud asserere de S. Bonaventura, nec improbasse genuinam eius sententiam. Nam (loc. cit.) postquam protulit sententiam, «quod proprietates, secundum quod sunt habitudines non distinguant personas, sed secundum quod sunt origines», addit: «Quod verbum, licet forte ipse non sic intelligat, potest exponi, quod origines non distinguunt personas formaliter sed quasi principiative». Et d. 28. q. 3. n. 3. dicit, quod origo sit quasi via ad personam; deinde subnectit: «Si tamen ista via intelligitur de distinguere quasi principiative alicuius correspondentis causae effectivae in creaturis, sicut expositum est d. 26, et non per modum principii formalis, tunc ista positio posset habere veritatem, nec hoc argumentum esset contra eam».
Genuina sententia S. Bonaventurae non differt a sententia communi, nisi in hoc quod (ut opinionem antiquorum doctorum, praesertim Magistri, aliquo modo sane exponat) in modo loquendi mediam viam tenet, scilicet quod personae constituuntur tum per origines tum per proprietates: per origines quidem inchoative, per relationes formaliter. Intelligit autem relationes, non quatenus nudae relationes sunt, sed cum originibus, et iterum origines non sine relationibus. Haec nostra assertio iam satis patet ex collatione eorum quae hic in corp. et ad 1. 2. 4; d. 27. p. I. q. 2; d. 28. q. 2. proferuntur, et peremptorie probatur authentica suae sententiae interpretatione, quam Seraphicus Doctor facit in anecdoto suo Prologo ad II. Sent., loquens de quaestione infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. tractata (vide ibi Scholion). Cum S. Bonaventura convenit praeter Dionysium Carth. Richard. a Med., qui duas opiniones in respons. tactas conciliat dicens, quod emanationes sint principium quasi effectivum distinctionis personarum, relationes vero eiusdem principia formalia. S. Thomam quoad rem idem docere, iam patet ex loco eius supra relato, scil. S. I. q. 40. a. 2.
IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 38. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. unica, et d. 28. q. 3; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 1. a. 2; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. et 3. — Biel, hic q. 1. et seqq.
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QUESTION III. Whether the act of the personal properties is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as already distinct.
Thirdly, inquiry is made about the properties as to their act. And it is asked whether the act1 of properties of this kind is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as distinct. And that it is to distinguish, is shown:
1. Through Boethius On the Trinity2: «Substance contains unity, relation multiplies trinity»: but if it multiplies, therefore it distinguishes.
2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor On the Trinity3 says that the person is distinguished by a property of origin; but the property expresses origin and relation: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason4, since, when persons are distinguished, either they are distinguished through something absolute, or [something] respective. Through an absolute, no, since, as Augustine wills5, «what is said with reference to itself is said of each one severally»: therefore it is necessary that they differ through something respective.
4. Likewise, the property of the Father either is accidental to the hypostasis itself, or is consubstantial to it; if it6 is accidental, then there are some accidents there: therefore there is some composition there. If, however, it is consubstantial and connatural: therefore since it does not follow upon the being of the hypostasis, it is not only an account for being made known, but also for being distinguished.
5. Likewise, in the supremely simple the account of being and the account of being known are altogether the same; but the person of the Father is supremely simple: therefore he is distinguished by the same [account] by which he is known to be distinguished. But this is by a property: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Every respective is reduced to an absolute; but what is reduced to something according to the account of understanding follows it: therefore since the properties are respective, [and] the hypostases absolute, the properties are reduced to the hypostases: therefore the hypostases are7 prior. But what is prior is not distinguished by what is posterior, since being and being-distinct are from the same [source]: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every8 [thing] which distinguishes something gives it such being as it itself is or has; but the properties have of themselves only respective being: therefore if hypostases are distinguished by properties, they have only respective being. But this is false, since since they are supposits of the essence, they have absolute substantial being.
3. Likewise, in the divine persons there is plurification through origin, therefore also distinction. But origin expresses an emanation or going-out, and relation per se does not emanate unless something else has emanated first, since in the [category of] toward something there is no motion9: therefore hypostasis arises from hypostasis according to the account of understanding before there is an understanding that relation is. And if so, relation follows distinct being in the hypostases: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, «everything that is said relatively, is something, except that which is said relatively», as reason dictates, and Augustine says in the seventh book On the Trinity10. But Father and Son are said relatively: therefore each of them is something, except that which is said relatively; therefore with the relation abstracted [away], it happens that something is understood. I ask therefore what that is: either essence, or hypostasis. If essence, therefore relation is in the essence: therefore it multiplies it. If hypostasis: then either one, or two. Not one, since it is impossible to understand that Father and Son are one hypostasis: therefore two. And if so, the rest is plain etc.
5. Likewise, with all the properties of two individuals abstracted, e.g. of Peter and of Paul, the hypostases alone remaining, it still happens that one understands the distinction to remain: therefore by parity of reason in the divine hypostases. But if this is true, then they are11 only an account of distinguishing as far as we are concerned.
CONCLUSION. The personal properties are accounts not only of manifesting distinction, but also of distinguishing.
I respond: It must be said that on this point a twofold opinion has existed. For some have said that, with the properties abstracted, it is impossible to understand the hypostases as distinct, since properties of this kind in divine matters not only give the persons to be made known, but also give being12; whence with these themselves abstracted, [their] being and distinct being are abstracted [away].
The opinion of others was that, with the properties abstracted, it is still [possible] to understand a distinction in the hypostases, since according to them properties are not the account of distinguishing according to the thing, but [an account] of manifesting the distinction13. Whence they say that, with paternity and filiation abstracted, it still happens that one understands [the one] who [is] from another, and from whom [is] another. — And if you ask how they are distinguished, they say14 that [they are distinguished] by themselves, just as principles and most general genera are distinguished and differ by themselves. Whence this is immediate: substance is not quantity.
And if we look more deeply, both opinions contain something of probability; and this is plain thus. For in the divine hypostases we understand origin or emanation, we also understand relation. According to the account of understanding, origin precedes him who arises; and according to the account of understanding, relation follows him who is referred. The relative property therefore can import only relation; and in this mode it follows the account of distinction and is the account for making the distinction known, not for distinguishing, as the second opinion says, and the reasons brought forward to the second part concerning relation itself prove. For the distinction can then be understood, since the one [is] understood [as] from another, and from whom [is] another. — The property can also import both, namely relation and origin; and then it is not only the account of making known, but also of distinguishing. For with origin or emanation circumscribed [away], it is impossible to understand a plurality in divine matters, but rather just as the essence is one, so also is the hypostasis understood [as] one. And so the first opinion proceeds, and the reasons to the first part.
But it must be noted that, since in the divine15 persons it is the same to arise and to be and to stand toward another, yet according to the account of understanding [these] are ordered, so that the first [thing] is to arise, then being is understood in those things which have being from another, and then [for them] to stand toward another. But since they are the same in God, therefore they are designated by the same name. Hence generation expresses origin and relation; yet properly speaking generation expresses origin, and paternity [expresses] relation16. Since therefore divine property according to the common usage of speaking imports relation and origin, therefore it must be held that the properties are not only an account of making the distinction known, but also of distinguishing.
1. And to that which is objected, that the respective is reduced to the absolute; it must be said that to be reduced to something is twofold: either as to a principle, or as to a term. The property of origin in these two ways is reduced to the absolute: to the hypostasis of the Father unbegottenness17 is reduced as to a principle, but to the hypostasis of the Begotten and the Spirated as to a term. Since therefore what is reduced to something as to a principle follows it, therefore with origin abstracted, only God is understood [as] unbegotten, [as] not being from another, and so in the unity of hypostasis. But since what is reduced to something18 as to a term is understood to precede [it], hence it is that, with origin abstracted, there is no longer [any way] to understand a proceeding hypostasis. — Or that is to be understood [of cases] where the respective expresses dependence, by reason of which19 it falls short of supreme simplicity, which is not [the case] in God.
2. To that which is objected, that the respective gives only respective being; it must be said that this is true of a respective which expresses only relation; but it is not true of a respective which expresses origin.
3. To that which is objected, that relation does not arise per se; it must be said that relation is a property, according as it is itself, but origin [is] as it is that which arises; and since origin properly does not arise20, but is that by which the arising thing arises, in such wise that it does not follow in time or in nature, but according to the account of understanding, [origin] either is necessarily simultaneous or precedes. Therefore that is plain.
4. To that which is objected, that everything that is said relatively is something, except that which is said relatively21; it must be said that this does not have truth in the supremely simple, [namely] that being and being-referred should differ in such wise that one could be separated from the other according to the thing — but22 — since there they are one — only according to our intellect; and even so our intellect does not abstract in such a way as to understand the hypostases [as] distinct, with the properties and relations abstracted [away]. For if from the hypostasis of the Father paternity be abstracted, or conversely, [the hypostasis] no longer has23 anything special which would be the principle of understanding it; and so it is considered under a general and incomplete account. Whence those also seem to me to speak well who say that there remains the understanding of this name thing, according as it is a general vocable. And so it is plain that, with the properties abstracted, no distinction remains either in thing or in intellect; and therefore in both modes they are an account of distinguishing.
5. To that which is finally objected, that Peter and Paul are understood to be distinguished, with their properties abstracted; it must be said that the case is not similar. For there the distinction is on the side of the proper matter and proper form, which is made known through accidental properties; but in divine matters there is distinction only through origin. Therefore that is plain.
I. To difference are attributed three acts, namely to divide a genus, to constitute a species, [and] to distinguish. Hence the occasion was given for asking what acts in divine matters the personal property has, which [property] stands as it were in the place of difference. The first act, that of dividing a genus, is manifestly impossible in God. But concerning the other two acts it can be inquired, namely whether the properties both distinguish and constitute the hypostasis, or only as it were adventitiously manifest the hypostases [as] already distinct, as the name of Socrates makes known a person already distinct. This question almost coincides with that most difficult and more subtle than useful question, by what precisely the divine persons are constituted. But since the right understanding and solution of several questions in dd. 27, 29, 33 depends on this question, some [things] seem to need to be said first about the state of the question, then about the judgement of the principal masters.
II. For declaring the state of the question we note these [things].
1. In God four [things] are distinguished: the absolute divine nature; the immediate principles of the two emanations, which are intellect and will; the emanations or origins themselves; and finally the relations both subsistent and formal, which are as it were terms of those emanations or origins.
2. The nature is absolute without relation to another; the intellect and the will also are absolute, yet they regard in some way their emanations, of which they are the immediate principles. The emanations or origins in themselves are not anything relative, but they themselves are «certain ways to the persons» (St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 40, a. 2 and 4).
3. The account of hypostasis in divine matters is relative. But since in every relation must be distinguished the foundation of the relation (esse in) and the relation itself (esse ad), the divine relations also are considered both insofar as they consist in the divine nature, and insofar as they are referred to one another. Under the latter respect they are nothing but something relative; but under the former, in some way something absolute.
4. It is altogether established that the divine persons are not constituted either by the nature, or by the intellect and will; therefore there remain only two accounts about which it can be asked whether they are distinctive and constitutive of the persons, namely origins and relations, and these indeed according to esse in and esse ad.
III. Various opinions have been defended on the question thus proposed.
1. Praepositivus, whom Peter Lombard favors, and others have thought that persons are distinguished by origins alone; but that the properties do not distinguish the persons, but manifest them [as already] distinct. This opinion, placed in the second place in the response, is reproved by St. Thomas and Scotus, and is not approved by St. Bonaventure himself, whatever some have said, contradicting the perspicuous words of the holy Doctor.
2. Thomas, Scotus, and others commonly hold the opinion placed here in the first place, that the persons are both constituted and distinguished through relative properties. That St. Bonaventure also sustains the same judgement is corroborated especially from the last proposition of the response. He himself, however, so explains it that he shows that something true is also in the second judgement.
In the further explanation of this judgement, the mode of speaking of the principal doctors, whom we judge altogether to agree on the matter, differs not a little, and what is wonderful, the later expositors of St. Bonaventure, of St. Thomas, and of Scotus understand their words in a varied sense. — Some gravely censure Scotus, that with John of Ripa he has taught that the persons are constituted by something absolute. But from Scotus's own words (I Sent. d. 2, q. 2, 4, 3; Reportata d. 28, q. 4, 3; Reportata d. 26, q. 1) and from his better commentators it is established that he holds the common opinion, that the persons are constituted by relations. The opinion of John of Ripa, however, in a sense different from that which the censurers of this opinion suppose, he admits as probable (cf. Reportata here q. 3; Rada, controv. 23; Macedo, col. 7, diff. 4, sect. 1–5). Yet in some more particular matters Scotus dissents both from St. Thomas and from St. Bonaventure, on which his Commentators may be consulted.
3. St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 40, a. 2) reproves the opinion of Praepositivus and adds: «Whence it is better said that the persons or hypostases are distinguished by relations rather than through origin. For although they are distinguished in either mode, yet first and principally through relations according to the mode of understanding» (cf. ibid. a. 3, and I Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 2). — But how do the relations constitute the persons? For explaining this St. Thomas (ibid. a. 4) makes use of a distinction between property [as] relation, insofar as it presupposes a notional act, and property, insofar as it is constitutive of the person and is pre-understood to the notional act. This distinction is impugned by Scotus (I Sent. d. 28, q. 3); but the judgement of St. Thomas is not expounded in the same way by his Commentators, who may be consulted on this.
4. To St. Bonaventure is wrongly imputed by several authors the opinion of John of Ripa, that the persons are distinguished through origin alone and through something absolute; indeed, by the same it is asserted that Scotus himself (here q. 1, n. 23, 24) so understood St. Bonaventure. Among others, Lychetus on this place says: «It is [the opinion] of D. Bonaventure and of John de Ripa»; also Cajetan (on Summa I, q. 40, a. 2) reproves Scotus that he falsely attributed this judgement to St. Bonaventure. But in fact neither did St. Bonaventure teach this, nor does Scotus reprove the same (cf. the author of the Scholia and marginal notes in the edition of Scotus, Lyon 1639, and Macedo, coll. 7, diff. 4, Prol.). Whence it must be said that Scotus neither asserts that of St. Bonaventure, nor disapproves his genuine judgement. For (loc. cit.) after he has put forward the judgement, «that properties, according as they are relations, do not distinguish persons, but according as they are origins», he adds: «Which word, although perhaps he does not so understand it, can be expounded as [meaning] that origins do not distinguish persons formally but as it were principiatively». And in d. 28, q. 3, n. 3 he says that origin is as it were a way to the person; then he adds: «If, however, that way is understood concerning a distinguishing as it were principiatively of some corresponding effective cause in creatures, as has been expounded in d. 26, and not by way of a formal principle, then this position could have truth, nor would this argument be against it».
The genuine judgement of St. Bonaventure does not differ from the common judgement, except in this that (so as to expound the opinion of the ancient doctors, especially of the Master, in some sound mode) in his mode of speaking he holds a middle way, namely that the persons are constituted both through origins and through properties: through origins indeed inchoatively, through relations formally. He understands the relations, however, not as bare relations are, but [taken] with origins, and again the origins not without relations. This our assertion already is sufficiently plain from the collation of those things which here in the body and ad 1, 2, 4; d. 27, p. I, q. 2; d. 28, q. 2 are brought forward, and is peremptorily proved by the authentic interpretation of his judgement, which the Seraphic Doctor makes in his anecdotal Prologue to the II Sent., speaking of the question treated below in d. 27, p. I, q. 2 (see the Scholion there). With St. Bonaventure agrees, besides Dionysius the Carthusian, Richard of Mediavilla, who reconciles the two opinions touched in the response, saying that the emanations are an as-it-were effective principle of the distinction of the persons, but the relations [are] formal principles of the same. That St. Thomas teaches the same as to the matter is already plain from his place referred to above, namely Summa I, q. 40, a. 2.
IV. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 38, m. 7. — Scotus, here q. unica, and d. 28, q. 3; Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 1, a. 2; Summa loc. cit. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ. q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 36, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 and 3. — Biel, here q. 1 and following.
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- Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. et tamen pro etiam cum; male. Circa finem solutionis nonnulli codd. ut GH aa et ed. 1 manet pro valet.The Vatican [edition], with only a few codices, [reads] tamen in place of etiam cum; badly. Near the end of the solution some codices such as GH aa and ed. 1 [read] manet in place of valet.
- In multis codd. et ed. I desideratur actus.In many codices and ed. I, actus is missing.
- Cap. 6.Chapter 6.
- Libr. IV. c. 15. Vide pag. 453, nota 3. — Minorem huius argumenti fere omnes codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1 ita exhibent: sed habitudo dicit originem relativam (plures codd. respectivam); melius cod. O: sed origo dicit habitudinem relativam; sed utraque lectio hic non videtur esse conveniens; ipsae sumtae videntur ex fundam. 3. quaest. praec.Book IV, c. 15. See p. 453, note 3. — The minor of this argument almost all the older codices with ed. 1 thus exhibit: sed habitudo dicit originem relativam ("but relation expresses a relative origin"; several codices [read] respectivam); better cod. O: sed origo dicit habitudinem relativam ("but origin expresses a relative relation"); but neither reading here seems to be fitting; they themselves seem to be taken from fundamentum 3 of the preceding question.
- Verba ipsum et ratione desunt in antiquioribus codd. et ed. I. Cum Vat. ea retinuimus, quia a S. Doctore apponi solent.The words ipsum and ratione are missing in the older codices and ed. I. With the Vatican [edition] we have retained them, since they are usually appended by the holy Doctor.
- Libr. V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9: Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis singulariter dicitur.Book V On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 9: Whatever therefore is said of God with reference to himself, is also said of each person severally.
- Plures codd. cum Vat. quia si.Several codices with the Vatican [edition] [read] quia si ("since if").
- Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: Id autem, quod per se est et substantia, illo quod est ad aliquid prius est natura; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.Aristotle, I Ethics c. 6: But that which is per se and substance is prior in nature to that which is toward something; for this [latter] being seems to be a certain appendix and accident of that which is.
- Ed. I adiicit proprietatibus. Mox pro distinguitur eo fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. distinguitur ab eo quod male sonat: melius cod.: distinguitur per illud.Ed. I adds proprietatibus ("by properties"). Soon, in place of distinguitur eo, almost all the codices with the first six editions [read] distinguitur ab eo, which sounds badly: better the cod.: distinguitur per illud.
- In multis codd. deest omne, et paulo inferius post Sed hoc verbum est.In many codices omne is missing, and a little below, after Sed, [there is] this word est.
- Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.).Aristotle, V Phys. text 10 (c. 2).
- Cap. 1. n. 2.Chapter 1, n. 2.
- Codd. F P Q pro sunt substituunt non sunt nisi, cui lectioni favent plerique codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibentes non sunt, omisso tamen perperam nisi.Codices F P Q in place of sunt substitute non sunt nisi ("are nothing but"), which reading is favored by very many codices with the first six editions exhibiting non sunt ("are not"), with nisi, however, wrongly omitted.
- Intellige: esse personale.Understand: personal being.
- Verba sed distinctionem manifestandi, in Vat. desiderata, restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.The words sed distinctionem manifestandi ("but [an account] of manifesting the distinction"), wanting in the Vatican [edition], we restore from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.
- In quibus est Praepositivus. — Mox post principia et ex cod. T restauravimus genera.Among whom is Praepositivus. — Soon after principia, also from cod. T, we have restored genera ("genera").
- Sola Vat. relatio.The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] relatio ("relation").
- Plures codd. ut F H X Z bb cc nec non edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 voci divinis praemittunt in; cod. cc cum dictis edd. dein omittit subsequens vocabulum personis.Several codices such as F H X Z bb cc as well as edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 prefix in to the word divinis; cod. cc with the said editions then omits the subsequent word personis.
- Cfr. infra d. 27. p. I. q. 1. in fine corp.Cf. below d. 27, p. I, q. 1, at the end of the body.
- Sic Vat., quam sequimur contra lectionem mss. et ed. I: innascibilis.Thus the Vatican [edition], which we follow against the reading of the manuscripts and ed. I: innascibilis ("unbegotten").
- Vat. cum cod. cc aliud.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] aliud ("another").
- Pro ratione cuius cod. T tunc enim.In place of ratione cuius cod. T [reads] tunc enim ("for then").
- Plures ex antiquioribus codd. omittunt et quia origo proprie non oritur, substituentes etiam paulo ante origo non pro origo vero; perperam. Mox aliqui codd. ut FIT sequitur pro consequitur. — Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 brevius sic: obiicitur, quod est aliquid excepto quod relative dicitur. — Fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 nisi pro sed; minus congrue. Paulo superius post verbum separari Vat. cum nonnullis codd. adiungit sive abstrahi. — Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 habetur pro habet, et paulo ante, paucis tantum suffragantibus codd., abstraheretur pro abstrahatur.Several of the older codices omit et quia origo proprie non oritur, substituting also a little before origo non in place of origo vero; wrongly. Soon, some codices such as FIT [read] sequitur in place of consequitur. — The older codices with ed. 1 [give it] more briefly thus: obiicitur, quod est aliquid excepto quod relative dicitur. — Almost all the codices with ed. 1 [read] nisi in place of sed; less fittingly. A little above, after the word separari, the Vatican [edition] with some codices adds sive abstrahi ("or to be abstracted"). — The Vatican [edition], against the trust of the codices and ed. 1, [reads] habetur in place of habet, and a little before, with only a few codices supporting [it], abstraheretur in place of abstrahatur.