Bonaventure

QUAESTIO IV. Quot sint in divinis proprietates personarum.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de proprietatibus quantum ad numerum. Et videtur:

1. Quod sint infinitae, quia proprietates sunt respectus per quos Deus nobis innotescit; sed illi sunt infiniti, sicut patet de respectibus idealibus¹: ergo etc.

2. Item, Pater et Filius ad invicem assimilantur secundum omnes conditiones essentiales; ergo secundum omnes comparantur et secundum omnes innotescunt nobis; sed illae sunt in numero indefinito: ergo etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto plures habet respectus, ut punctus quam linea, et linea quam superficies; sed divinum esse est simplicissimum: ergo in eo sunt infiniti respectus. Sed omnes sunt ratio innotescendi: ergo notiones sunt infinitae.

4. Sed quod tres sint tantum, videtur per Damascenum², qui dicit, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem; sed istae non sunt nisi tres proprietates: ergo etc.

5. Item, videtur ratione, quia proprietas convertitur cum eo cuius est proprietas³: sed proprietas est personae: ergo quot sunt personae, tot sunt proprietates et non plures. Sed personae sunt tres: ergo etc.

6. Item, fiat talis ratio: omnis persona est aliqua trium proprietatum⁴ — haec est vera — omnis notio est persona, igitur omnis proprietas sive notio est aliqua trium: ergo etc.

Quod autem sint plures tribus, sic ostenditur.

1. Notiones sive proprietates sunt relationes. In omni autem habitudine sunt duae relationes secundum duo extrema; sed in divinis sunt duae origines: ergo saltem quatuor relationes.

2. Item, proprietas est quae convenit uni soli⁵; sed innascibilitas convenit soli Patri: ergo est proprietas. Et non est aliqua illarum quatuor relationum: ergo sunt quinque.

Quaeritur ergo sufficientia et numerus notionum in divinis, et penes quid accipiantur, et utrum sit idem numerus proprietatum et relationum.

CONCLUSIO. Proprie loquendo, in divinis sunt quatuor relationes et proprietates, et quinque notiones; in sensu minus stricto nomina confunduntur et habent aequalem numerum quinarium.

Respondeo: Intelligendum est ad illud ultimum, quod vis consuevit fieri inter ista tria nomina: proprietas, relatio, et notio. Nam proprietas dicitur, in quantum convenit soli; relatio, in quantum dicit habitudinem ad alium; notio, in quantum est principium cognoscendi. Et quia omnis proprietas est ratio cognoscendi⁶, similiter et omnis relatio; ideo nomen notionis est in plus quam illa duo. Quia quaedam proprietas est relatio, ut paternitas, quaedam non, ut innascibilitas, quae non dicit respectum, sed privat; similiter quaedam relatio est proprietas, ut filiatio, quaedam non, ut activa spiratio — ideo quia convenit pluribus, non uni soli — et hinc⁷ est, quod nomen proprietatis et relationis se habent ut excedentia et excessa. Nomen vero notionis est in plus. Unde plures sunt notiones quam proprietates, plures etiam quam relationes. Sed proprietates et relationes mutuo se excedunt et aequaliter; ideo sunt numero aequales.

Tamen non oportet facere vim. Nam omnis relatio distinguit aliquo modo ab alio, et ita est aliquo modo proprietas. Similiter omne quod distinguit, aliquo modo importat relationem; ergo omnis relatio proprietas, et omnis proprietas relatio. Sed omnis notio est proprietas vel relatio: ergo omnis

notio est proprietas et similiter relatio. Et ita extenso nomine sunt aequalia; ideo idem est numerus et eadem ratio assignandi numerum in omnibus istis nominibus.

Intelligendum igitur⁸, quod circa numerum proprietatum tres fuerunt opiniones. Quidam dixerunt, quod sunt infinitae; quidam, quod tres; quidam, quod quinque. — Ratio autem huius⁹ diversae opinionis fuit, quia diversimode notiones consideraverunt. Qui consideraverunt illas in comparatione ad eos quibus innotescunt, dixerunt, eas infinitas esse, quia per infinitas comparationes et similitudines et respectus Deus nobis innotescit. — Qui vero consideraverunt in comparatione ad hypostases, quae distinguuntur vel innotescunt, dixerunt, esse tantum tres, quia tantum tres sunt personae; ideo tantum tria habent¹⁰ propria, per quae sufficienter innotescunt. — Qui vero consideraverunt per comparationem ad rationes, quibus innotescunt, dixerunt, esse quinque.

Eadem enim est ratio innotescendi et distinguendi. Sed ratio distinguendi accipitur a parte originis: aut quo positive, aut privative. Si privative; aut privat originem per modum producentis, et hoc non dicit nobilitatem, scilicet non producere, ideo non est notio; aut privat originem per modum producti, et hoc vel specialiter, vel generaliter. Si specialiter, non dicit nobilitatem; si generaliter, sic dicit nobilitatem; et ita notio est una sola¹¹. Si autem accipiatur a parte originis positive, cum duplex sit origo, et cuilibet respondeat de necessitate duplex habitudo; de necessitate erunt quatuor, scilicet generatio activa et passiva, et spiratio activa et passiva: et in universo quinque¹².

Prima opinio sumsit rationem magis a longinquo, et ideo magis a veritate recessit; secunda magis de propinquo, et ideo magis veritati appropinquavit; tertia, sicut debuit, et ideo veritatem posuit et invenit. Et haec est positio, quam tenet communis opinio magistrorum, notiones esse quinque; et ratio huius prius visa est.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de respectibus et comparationibus infinitis, dicendum, quod nec proprietates nec relationes sunt notiones, nisi quae important respectum distinguentem personam a persona; et hic est respectus originis, qui tantum quinque modis, spectantibus ad dignitatem, potest comparari; ideo patet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum tres, per verbum Damasceni; dicendum, quod sub generatione comprehendit duas generationes¹³, similiter sub processione.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas debet converti cum persona; dicendum, quod verum est de illa quae est proprietas personalis, faciens personam esse personam¹⁴; tamen non sequitur, si convertitur, quod tot sint, et non plures, quoniam unum et idem potest habere plura convertibilia.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de syllogismo illo, dicendum, quod in processu illo est fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: Pater est innascibilitas, et Pater est paternitas; ergo paternitas est innascibilitas; quia quod attribuitur subiecto sive hypostasi attribuitur habitudini. — Posset tamen poni figura dictionis ex mutatione modi praedicandi, quia in divinis essentia praedicatur ut quid, persona ut quis, et notio ut quae; et proceditur a persona ad notionem.

QUESTION IV. How many properties of the persons there are in divine matters.

Fourthly and lastly it is asked concerning the properties as to number. And it seems:

1. That they are infinite, since the properties are respects through which God becomes known to us; but those are infinite, as is plain concerning the ideal respects¹: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Father and the Son are likened to one another according to all essential conditions; therefore they are compared according to all and according to all become known to us; but those are in an indefinite number: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more respects it has, as a point [more] than a line, and a line [more] than a surface; but the divine being is most simple: therefore in it there are infinite respects. But all are an account of becoming-known: therefore the notions are infinite.

4. But that they are only three, seems [to be shown] through Damascene², who says that in divine matters all things are one apart from generation, ingeneration, and procession; but these are only three properties: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems by reason, since a property is converted with that of which it is the property³: but a property is of the person: therefore as many as the persons are, so many are the properties and not more. But the persons are three: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, let such an argument be made: every person is one of the three properties⁴ — this is true — every notion is a person, therefore every property or notion is one of the three: therefore etc.

That, however, they are more than three is shown thus.

1. Notions or properties are relations. But in every relation there are two relations according to the two extremes; but in divine matters there are two origins: therefore at least four relations.

2. Likewise, a property is what belongs to one alone⁵; but unbegottenness belongs to the Father alone: therefore it is a property. And it is not any of those four relations: therefore there are five.

Therefore the question concerns the sufficiency and number of the notions in divine matters, and on what basis they are taken, and whether the number of properties and of relations be the same.

CONCLUSION. Properly speaking, in divine matters there are four relations and properties, and five notions; in a less strict sense the names are blurred together and have an equal quinary number.

I respond: It must be understood as to that last [point], that a kind of force is wont to occur between these three names: property, relation, and notion. For property is so called insofar as it belongs to one alone; relation, insofar as it expresses a relation to another; notion, insofar as it is a principle of knowing. And since every property is an account of knowing⁶, likewise also every relation; therefore the name notion extends further than those two. Since some property is a relation, as paternity, [and] some is not, as unbegottenness, which does not express a respect but rather privates [it]; likewise some relation is a property, as filiation, [and] some is not, as active spiration — therefore because it belongs to several, not to one alone — and hence⁷ it is, that the name property and the name relation stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded. But the name notion is in [the position of] more. Whence there are more notions than properties, [and] more also than relations. But properties and relations mutually exceed one another and equally; therefore they are equal in number.

Yet one need not press the point. For every relation distinguishes in some mode from another, and so is in some mode a property. Likewise everything which distinguishes in some mode imports a relation; therefore every relation [is a] property, and every property [a] relation. But every notion is a property or a relation: therefore every notion is a property and likewise a relation. And so by the extended use of the name they are equal; therefore the number is the same and the same the account of assigning the number in all these names.

It must be understood, therefore⁸, that concerning the number of the properties there have been three opinions. Some have said that they are infinite; some, that [they are] three; some, that [they are] five. — But the reason of this⁹ diverse opinion was, that they considered the notions in diverse modes. Those who considered them in comparison to those to whom they become known, said them to be infinite, since through infinite comparisons and likenesses and respects God becomes known to us. — But those who considered [them] in comparison to the hypostases, which are distinguished or become known, said [them] to be only three, since there are only three persons; therefore they have only three things proper¹⁰, through which they sufficiently become known. — But those who considered [them] by comparison to the accounts by which they become known, said [them] to be five.

For the same is the account of becoming-known and of distinguishing. But the account of distinguishing is taken from the side of origin: either positively or privatively. If privatively; either it privates origin by way of producing, and this does not express nobility, namely not to produce, and therefore it is not a notion; or it privates origin by way of [being] produced, and this either specifically or generally. If specifically, it does not express nobility; if generally, then it does express nobility; and so the notion is one alone¹¹. If, however, [it be] taken from the side of origin positively, since the origin is twofold, and to each there corresponds of necessity a twofold relation; of necessity there will be four, namely active and passive generation, and active and passive spiration: and in all, five¹².

The first opinion took its reason rather from afar, and therefore receded farther from the truth; the second [took it] more from near at hand, and therefore drew nearer to the truth; the third [took it] just as it ought, and therefore posited and found the truth. And this is the position which the common opinion of the masters holds, that the notions are five; and the reason of this has been seen before.

1. 2. 3. To that, then, which is objected concerning infinite respects and comparisons, it must be said that neither properties nor relations are notions, except those which import a respect distinguishing person from person; and this is the respect of origin, which can be compared in only five modes pertaining to dignity; and so that is plain.

4. To that which is objected, that [there are] only three, by the word of Damascene; it must be said that under generation he comprehends two generations¹³, likewise under procession.

5. To that which is objected, that a property must be converted with the person; it must be said that this is true of that [property] which is a personal property, making the person to be the person¹⁴; nevertheless it does not follow, if it is converted, that there be only so many and not more, since one and the same [thing] can have several convertible [terms].

6. To that which is objected concerning that syllogism, it must be said that in that procedure there is the fallacy of accident, as here: the Father is unbegottenness, and the Father is paternity; therefore paternity is unbegottenness; since what is attributed to a subject or hypostasis is attributed to a relation. — Yet a figure of speech could be assigned, from the change of mode of predicating, since in divine matters the essence is predicated as what, the person as who, and the notion as which; and one proceeds from person to notion.