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Dist. 26, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 462

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Hieronymus: Ab Arianorum praeside novellum nomen a me homini Romano exigitur. Si enim est novellum, cum Apostolus dicat primae ad Timotheum ultimo1, vocum novitates esse vitandas, nullo modo debuit concedere. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod «hypostasis est substantia cum accidentibus»; sed in divinis non cadit accidens, ergo nec nomen hypostasis: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod novitas uno modo sonat in vitium, alio modo non. Quando est talis adinventio, quod sententiam etiam facit, quae non habet ortum ex veritate antiqua, tunc est vere novellum; et sic dicit Apostolus esse fugiendum, unde addit profanas. Sed illud verbum quantum ad intellectum sanum non erat novum, sed quantum ad intellectum, quem haeretici supponebant. — Quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod nomen hypostasis de se non importat respectum ad accidens, sed solum ad proprietatem distinguentem, quae, quia in creaturis est accidens, ideo dicit substantiam2 cum accidentibus; non sic autem est in Deo.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod venenum latet sub melle; quia cum hoc non dicat nisi propter errorem coniunctum, videtur, quod talia nomina3 omnino essent fugienda.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod venenum non latebat sub nomine, sed sub eorum intentione, sive occasione4, qui ex hoc occasionaliter volebant inducere in haeresim. — Vel potest dici, quod venenum latebat non quantum ad significationem, sed propter dubitationem; et ideo nunc, cum determinata sit eius significatio, absque dubio est utendum5.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod aliud est genuisse et natum esse. Videtur enim male dicere, quia cum aliud dicat diversitatem in essentia, secundum hoc videtur6, quod generatio activa et nativitas differant per essentiam; quod est contra fidem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliud non dicit ibi diversitatem a parte rei absolutae, sed per comparationem ad dicentem et intelligentem, quasi dicat7: aliud est dicere sive intelligere, Patrem generare, et huiusmodi; sed huic alietati non subest diversitas essentiae, sed alietas proprietatis.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod proprium est Patris, non quia non est natus. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicitur infra distinctione vigesima octava8, ubi dicitur, quod hoc quod est ingenitus est proprium Patris, sed ingenitum non est aliud dicere quam non genitum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de hoc quod est non natus, secundum quod dicit puram negationem; et sic non dicit proprietatem. Ingenitus enim, prout est proprietas, non est negatio pura.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini, qua dicit, quod in Deo nihil dicitur secundum accidens, quia nihil est in eo mutabile aut amissibile. Videtur enim ratio non valere, quia aliqua sunt accidentia inseparabilia9; et talia non sunt amissibilia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut ipse idem Augustinus10 dicit, omne accidens aut est per naturam suam amissibile, aut potest circa subiectum suum intendi vel remitti. Et ipse non dicit, quod sit accidens tantum, quia potest amitti, sed quia potuit advenire rei prius existenti vel recedere a re iam existente, vel saltem intendi vel remitti sive variari. — Et si tu obiicias, quod accidentia non possunt alterari, secundum Boethium11; verum est de alteratione a subiecto in subiectum; tamen certum est, quod in eodem intenduntur et remittuntur. — Aliter

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potest dici, quod accidens potest comparari ad subiectum primum et ad subiectum proximum12. Et habito respectu ad subiectum primum, omne accidens dicit adveniens, quod est possibile etiam abesse, quamvis non respectu subiecti, quod est subiectum et causa13. — Tertius modus dicendi est iste, quod illud solum est per naturam immutabile, quod est omnino simplex. Si ergo Deus est omnino immutabilis, ergo est omnino simplex; et in nullo simplici est accidens14: ergo in nullo immutabili est ponere accidens. Si ergo Pater est immutabilis, et in eo est paternitas: ergo non est accidens.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod filii Dei sumus per facturam; quia secundum istum modum dicendi, cum asinus sit factus, videtur quod possit dici Dei filius; et similiter, quod arca, quae facta est ab artifice, possit dici filia artificis; quorum neutrum conceditur. Si tu dicas, quod oportet quod sit ad imaginem Dei factus; contra: diabolus est ad imaginem Dei factus: ergo diabolus est filius Dei.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc quod dico filius duo dicit, scilicet ortum et imitationem. Dicendum ergo, quod est imitatio per omnimodam assimilationem; et sic Filius naturalis imitatur Patrem, et quia non habet socium in imitando sic, ideo solus ipse est Filius naturalis. Est iterum15 imitatio expressa; et haec consistit in imagine, et haec tenet adhuc rationem filii et facturae. Est iterum imitatio longinqua; et haec tenet tantum rationem facturae, non filii. Sed attendendum, quod imitatio expressa aut16 consistit in sua conditione, aut est insignita ulterius sua perfectione et decore, aut est privata honore et deformata a sua conditione. Primo modo dicitur filius factura; secundo modo, filius factura et adoptione: tertio modo, neutro modo dicitur filius, nisi valde improprie et cum additione distrahente; quia Dominus Ioannis octavo17 dicit, peccatores habere patrem diabolum, propterea quod a Deo recedunt, et imitantur eum.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de distinctione illorum trium, quae ponit Hilarius, scilicet originem, veritatem et nativitatem; et dicendum, quod haec tria dicit ad excludendum tres haereses. Contra Photinum dicit origine, non adoptione; quia Photinus dicebat, Christum esse filium Dei adoptivum. Contra Sabellium dicit veritate, non nuncupatione; quia ipse dicebat, quod idem ipse primo nuncupabatur18 pater, postea filius. Contra Arium dicit nativitate, non creatione; quia Arius dicebat, Filium Dei esse creaturam.

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod dicitur relative, quamvis ei vicissim non respondeat vocabulum. Videtur enim falsum, quia «proprium19 est relativorum dici ad convertentiam»: ergo si non dicuntur ad convertentiam, non dicuntur relative.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud verum est, si nomen impositum est utrique extremo; alioquin si deficit ex una parte, non dicitur: ut si dicatur remus navis20. Similiter vult dicere Augustinus, quod sub istis nominibus Pater et Filius non referuntur ad Spiritum sanctum. Sed tamen, ubi deficiunt nomina, Philosophus docet fingere21, sed in divinis

p. 464

melius est tacere quam fingere, propter vitandum errorem.

DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ibi non potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum. Videtur enim falsum, quia ita bene spirator dicitur ad spiritum, sicut donator ad donum.

Respondeo: Unus modus dicendi est, quod Augustinus non loquitur simpliciter de hoc nomine Spiritus, sed de hoc toto Spiritus sanctus. — Vel aliter, hoc dicit, quia spirator tunc non erat nomen usitatum, ut donator.

DUB. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod donator non dicitur nisi ex tempore; quia secundum hoc nec donum dicitur nisi ex tempore, cum relativa sint simul natura22.

Et ad hoc dicendum, quod potest dici ab actu donandi vel ab habitu. Primo modo dicitur solum ex tempore, sic et23 donum; secundo modo dicitur ab aeterno.

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English Translation

DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what Jerome says: From the leader of the Arians a new name is being demanded of me, a Roman man. For if it is new, since the Apostle says in the last [chapter] of the first [Letter] to Timothy1 that novelties of words are to be avoided, [Jerome] in no way ought to have conceded [it]. Furthermore, Damascene says that «hypostasis is substance with accidents»; but in the divine [things] no accident falls, therefore neither [does] the name hypostasis: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that novelty in one way sounds [as] a vice, in another way not. When such is the invention that it also produces a meaning which does not have its origin from the ancient truth, then it is truly novel; and so the Apostle says it is to be fled, whence he adds profane. But that word, as to the sound understanding, was not new, but [only] as to the understanding which the heretics supposed. — As to what is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that the name hypostasis of itself does not import a respect to accident, but only to a distinguishing property which, because in creatures it is an accident, [Damascene] therefore says substance2 with accidents; but it is not so in God.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that poison lurks under honey; because since he does not say this except on account of the error attached [to it], it seems that such names3 ought altogether to be fled.

I respond: It must be said that the poison did not lurk under the name, but under the intention or occasion4 of those who from this wished occasionally to lead [people] into heresy. — Or it can be said that the poison lurked not as to the signification, but on account of the doubt; and therefore now, since its signification has been determined, it is to be used without doubt5.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that to have begotten and to have been born are different (aliud). For he seems to say [it] ill, because since aliud (different) states diversity in essence, according to this it seems6 that active generation and nativity differ through essence; which is against the faith.

I respond: It must be said that aliud there does not state a diversity on the side of the absolute thing, but [only] by comparison to the one speaking and understanding, as if he were saying7: it is one thing to say or to understand the Father to generate, and another thing [to say or understand] the like; but under this otherness no diversity of essence underlies, but [only] otherness of property.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that it is proper to the Father, not because he is not born. For he seems to say [something] against what is said below in the twenty-eighth distinction8, where it is said that this which is unbegotten (ingenitus) is proper to the Father, but to say unbegotten (ingenitum) is not other than [to say] not begotten (non genitum).

I respond: It must be said that Augustine speaks of this which is not born (non natus) inasmuch as it states a pure negation; and so it does not state a property. For ingenitus, insofar as it is a property, is not a pure negation.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine's, by which he says that in God nothing is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable or losable. For the argument seems not to hold, because some accidents are inseparable9; and such are not losable.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine himself says10, every accident either is by its own nature losable, or it can be intensified or remitted in regard to its subject. And he does not say that it is an accident only because it can be lost, but because it could come upon a thing previously existing or recede from a thing already existing, or at least be intensified or remitted or varied. — And if you object that accidents cannot be altered, according to Boethius11; this is true of alteration from subject to subject; nevertheless it is certain that in the same [subject] they are intensified and remitted. — Otherwise

it can be said that an accident can be compared to its first subject and to its proximate subject12. And, having regard to the first subject, every accident states something supervening, which it is also possible to be absent, although not in respect of the subject which is the subject and cause13. — A third way of saying [it] is this, that that alone is by nature unchangeable which is altogether simple. If therefore God is altogether unchangeable, therefore he is altogether simple; and in nothing simple is there an accident14: therefore in nothing unchangeable is there to be posited an accident. If therefore the Father is unchangeable, and in him is paternity: therefore it is not an accident.

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that we are sons of God by making (per facturam); because according to this manner of speaking, since an ass has been made, it seems that he could be called a son of God; and likewise, that an ark which has been made by a craftsman could be called a daughter of the craftsman; neither of which is conceded. If you say that he ought to have been made to the image of God; on the contrary: the devil has been made to the image of God: therefore the devil is a son of God.

I respond: It must be said that this which I call son states two [things], namely origin and imitation. It must therefore be said that there is an imitation by every-mode assimilation; and thus the natural Son imitates the Father, and because he has no companion in imitating thus, therefore he alone is the natural Son. There is, again15, an expressed imitation; and this consists in [the] image, and this still keeps the account of son and of factura (made-thing). There is, again, a remote imitation; and this keeps only the account of factura, not of son. But it must be attended to that an expressed imitation either16 consists in its [proper] condition, or is further marked out by its perfection and adornment, or is deprived of honor and deformed from its condition. In the first way it is called a son a factura; in the second way, a son by making and by adoption: in the third way, in no way is one called a son, except very improperly and with a distracting addition; because the Lord, in John 817, says that sinners have the devil for father, on account of the fact that they recede from God and imitate him.

Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about the distinction of those three [things] which Hilary posits, namely origin, truth, and nativity; and it must be said that he states these three to exclude three heresies. Against Photinus he says by origin, not by adoption; because Photinus said that Christ was an adopted son of God. Against Sabellius he says by truth, not by name (nuncupatione); because he said that the same one was first named18 father, [and] afterwards son. Against Arius he says by nativity, not by creation; because Arius said that the Son of God was a creature.

Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that it is said relatively, although a [reciprocal] vocable does not in turn correspond to it. For it seems false, because «it is proper19 to relatives to be said in convertibility»: therefore if they are not said in convertibility, they are not said relatively.

I respond: It must be said that this is true if a name has been imposed on each extreme; otherwise, if it fails on one side, it is not said: as if one were to say the oar of a ship20. Similarly Augustine wishes to say that under these names Father and Son [the relations] are not referred to the Holy Spirit. But yet, where names fail, the Philosopher teaches one to fashion [a name]21, but in the divine [things]

it is better to be silent than to fashion [one], on account of avoiding error.

Doubt IX.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that there a customary vocable could not be found. For it seems false, because spirator (one who breathes) is just as well said in relation to spirit, as donator (giver) [is said in relation] to gift.

I respond: One way of saying [it] is that Augustine does not speak simply about this name Spiritus (Spirit), but about this whole [name] Spiritus sanctus (Holy Spirit). — Or otherwise, he says this because spirator was at that time not a customary name, as donator [was].

Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that donator is not said except from time; because according to this, neither is donum (gift) said except from time, since relatives are simultaneous in nature22.

And to this it must be said that [donator] can be said either from the act of giving or from a habitus. In the first way it is said only from time, and so also23 donum; in the second way it is said from eternity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 20. — Verba Damasceni vide supra pag. 410, nota 2.
    Verse 20 (1 Tim. 6, 20). — For the words of Damascene see above page 410, note 2.
  2. Maior pars codd. cum Vat. subiectum pro substantiam, at cod. T rectius et cum praecedentibus magis convenienter substantiam.
    The greater part of the codices, with the Vatican [edition], [read] subiectum (subject) in place of substantiam (substance), but codex T more correctly and more in agreement with what precedes [reads] substantiam.
  3. Agitur de nomine hypostasis et usia. — Pro immediate sequenti voce omnino plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omnia. Paulo superius Vat. cum aliquibus mss. non bene per errorem loco propter errorem.
    The matter concerns the name hypostasis and usia. — In place of the word that immediately follows, omnino (altogether), several codices with edition 1 [read] omnia (all). A little above, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] non bene per errorem in place of propter errorem.
  4. Codd. aa bb omittunt sive occasione.
    Codices aa bb omit sive occasione (or occasion).
  5. Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 nec non verbis Magistri, tenendum.
    The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1 as well as the words of the Master, [reads] tenendum (to be held).
  6. Verbum videtur a mss. et ed. 1 exhibitum, a Vat. abest.
    The word videtur (it seems), exhibited by the manuscripts and by edition 1, is absent from the Vatican [edition].
  7. Codd. G Y cum ed. 1 diceret. Deinde post huiusmodi Vat. et pro sed.
    Codices G Y with edition 1 [read] diceret (he might say). Then, after huiusmodi, the Vatican [edition] [reads] et (and) in place of sed (but).
  8. Lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq. Cfr. ibid. in Comment. q. I. 2.
    Letter of the Master, c. 1 and following. Cf. ibid. in the Commentary, q. 1, 2.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3.), et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Accidente.
    Cf. Aristotle, I. Physics text 28 (c. 3), and Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On Accident.
  10. Libr. V. de Trin. c. 1. n. 8. seq., ubi et mentionem facit divisionis accidentium separabilium et inseparabilium. — Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. tantum post naturam suam inserit mutabile aut.
    Book V On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 8 and following, where he also makes mention of the division of separable and inseparable accidents. — The Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, after naturam suam inserts mutabile aut (changeable or).
  11. Libr. I. Comment. in Categorias seu Praedicam. Aristotelis: «Sed si quis quoque obiiciat, posse locum accidentia per[?]mutare, malum namque si in manu teneatur, manus mali odore completur, adeo odor quod est accidens, in aliud subiectum transire potest. Sed non hoc ait Aristoteles, quoniam mutare accidens locum non potest, nec ita dixit impossibile esse sine eo in quo erat, sed sine eo in quo est; hoc enim significat mutare quidem posse locum, sed sine aliquo subiecto non posse subsistere». Lib. V. Comment. in Porphyr. recensens communitates et differentias generis et accidentis ait: «Accidentis vero participatio et intenditur et remittitur. Invenies enim quemlibet paulo diutius ambulantem, et paulo amplius nigrum, et si in ipsis Aethiopibus considerabis, omnes non aeque nigro colore esse obductos invenies». Idem repetit in fine libri de Proprio et accidente.
    Book I, Commentary on the Categories or Predicaments of Aristotle: «But if anyone should also object that accidents can change place, for if an evil [thing] is held in the hand, the hand is filled with the odor of the evil [thing], so that the odor, which is an accident, can pass over into another subject — [we reply that] Aristotle does not say this, since an accident cannot change place, nor did he say [it] to be impossible without that in which it was, but [only] without that in which it is; for this means [that an accident] can indeed change place, but cannot subsist without some subject». Book V of the Commentary on Porphyry, reviewing the commonalities and differences of genus and accident, says: «The participation of accident, however, is both intensified and remitted. For you will find anyone who has walked a little longer [to be] also a little more black, and if you consider [it] among the Ethiopians themselves, you will find them not all to be invested with equally black color». He repeats the same at the end of the book On Property and Accident.
  12. Subiectum primum est materia prima, subiectum proximum est compositum ex materia et forma.
    First subject is prime matter; proximate subject is the composite of matter and form.
  13. Libr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. S. Doctor ait: «Notandum est, quod aliquod accidens est quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et ad causam; aliquod, quod solum comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et ad aliud sicut ad causam; v. g. nigredo in corvo comparatur ad ipsum corvum sicut ad subiectum et causam; lumen in aere vel species in speculo comparatur solum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam, quia etsi ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum».
    Book II Sentences, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, the holy Doctor says: «It must be noted that some accident is that which is compared to something as to subject and as to cause; another, which is compared only to something as to subject and to another as to cause; e. g. blackness in a raven is compared to the raven itself as to subject and cause; the light in the air or the species in a mirror is compared only as to subject, not as to cause, because although it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin from elsewhere».
  14. Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 2. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thoma, hic circa lit.
    Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity c. 2. — This doubt is also solved by St. Thomas, here near the littera.
  15. Cod. F etiam, cod. tamen, plures codd. perperam igitur.
    Codex F [reads] etiam (also); a [further] codex [reads] tamen (yet); several codices erroneously [read] igitur (therefore).
  16. Vat. cum aliquibus mss. et, ed. 1 ut pro aut; fortasse lectio genuina est aut est ut.
    The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] et (and); edition 1 [reads] ut (as) in place of aut (or); perhaps the genuine reading is aut est ut.
  17. Vers. 44. — Paulo superius post secundo modo cod. V repetit dicitur. — Hoc dubium solvit etiam B. Albert., hic a. 15; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Verse 44 (John 8, 44). — A little above, after secundo modo, codex V repeats dicitur. — This doubt is also solved by Bl. Albert, here a. 15; [and by] St. Thomas, here near the littera.
  18. Aliqui codd. ut F G T W nuncupatur. Mox tenendum [?] in Vat., pro nativitate ponentis nuncupatione, auctoritate codd. correximus. — Huius dubii solutionem exhibet etiam S. Thomas, hic circa lit.
    Some codices such as F G T W [read] nuncupatur (he is named). Soon [we have read] tenendum [?]; in the Vatican [edition], which sets nuncupatione (by name) in place of nativitate (by nativity), we have corrected on the authority of the codices. — This doubt's solution is also presented by St. Thomas, here near the littera.
  19. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione.
    Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter On Relation.
  20. Aristot. loc. cit. ait: Neque enim eo quod navigium est, eo ipsius temo dicitur; sunt enim navigia, quorum temones non sunt; quare non convertitur; navigium enim non dicitur temonis navigium.
    Aristotle, in the place cited, says: For neither, because it is a ship, is its rudder said in that respect; for there are ships whose rudders are not [theirs]; whence it is not converted; for a ship is not said [to be] a ship of the rudder.
  21. Ita codd. P Q; Vat. nomina decet fingere. Lectioni a nobis receptae favent etiam alii plurimi codd. cum ed. 1, ponentes docet pro decet, omittendo Philosophus. Revera Philosophus loc. cit. ait: Aliquoties autem forte et nomen fingere necesse erit, si non fuerit nomen impositum, ad quod convenienter assignetur. — Paulo post multi codd. cum ed. 1 carere pro iacere.
    Thus codices P Q; the Vatican [edition] [reads] nomina decet fingere (it is fitting to fashion names). Several other codices with edition 1 also favor the reading we have received, putting docet (teaches) for decet (is fitting), and omitting Philosophus. The Philosopher in the place cited actually says: But it will sometimes perhaps be necessary even to fashion a name, if there has not been a name imposed, to which it might be conveniently assigned. — A little after, many codices with edition 1 [read] carere in place of iacere.
  22. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione.
    Aristotle, Categories, chapter On Relation.
  23. Vers. 44. — Paulo superius post secundo modo cod. V repetit dicitur. — Hoc dubium solvit etiam B. Albert., hic a. 15; S. Thom., hic circa lit.[?]
    Verse 44. — A little above, after secundo modo codex V repeats dicitur. — This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 15; St. Thomas, here on the littera.[?]
← Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4