Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially ¹–¹⁷ across the two printed pages bearing apparatus (792, 793). The small tail of DUB. IV that spills onto p.794 carries no apparatus of its own — p.794's footer belongs to DISTINCTIO XLV.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de ista solutione Magistri, qua dicit, quod non valet huius similitudinis inductio, quia Filium genuit de sua substantia¹. Videtur enim responsio ista non esse sufficiens. Nam invidia potest² attendi respectu diversi in substantia et natura, sicut Angelus invidit homini: ergo propter hoc non excluditur invidia a Deo respectu creaturae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad invidiam ista duo concurrunt, scilicet potestas³ ad aequalitatem et exigentia rei factae. Non enim invidet aliquis alicui, nisi quia parificatur ei aliquis vel excedit, vel quia timet, ne parificetur. Item, artifex non dicitur invidus, nisi quando non facit rem, secundum quod exigit, et ipse potest. Et propter hoc, quia ex parte rerum non erat exigentia, et iterum⁴ in nullo poterant parificari; ideo qualescumque faceret, non convincitur in Deo esse invidia, etiam si nullas res faceret. Sed in Filio Dei erat potentia ad aequalitatem et ulterius exigentia propter hoc, quod erat de substantia Patris⁵. Hinc est, quod non est simile ut dicit Magister; et est responsio eius bona. Ponit enim antecedens pro consequente, non quia velit dicere, quod invidia sit solum vel possit esse respectu similis in natura; sed propter rationem praedictam exigentiae scilicet et aequalitatis, quae erant in generatione Filii, quia erat de substantia Patris.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod potuit Deus hominem talem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse? Videtur enim dici contrarium in Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo⁶: Potuit transgredi et non est transgressus; hoc dicitur in laudem sancti viri. Et Augustinus ipse dicit super Genesim ad litteram⁷, quod « meliores iudicavit Deus homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent ». Et iterum, libro de Civitate Dei dicit, quod « melior est substantia, quae peccare potest, quam quae non potest ».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod melius dicitur dupliciter: aut simpliciter, aut in ordine ad finem. Si simpliciter loquamur, melior est homo confirma-

tus in gratia, quam potens labi; si in ordinatione ad finem, quae quidem consistit in perveniendo; sic melius fuit facere hominem in libertate peccandi, sed tamen primum melius est simpliciter, hoc autem est melius secundum quid. Et ideo verbum Augustini, simpliciter loquendo, habet veritatem.

Quod autem dicitur de viro iusto, laus accidentalis est sive quantum ad gloriam accidentalem. Constat enim, Christum non potuisse peccare, et tamen erat gloriosissimus. Similiter intelligendum est verbum illud Augustini super Genesim. Sed quod dicitur, quod melior est natura, quae potest peccare, quam quae non potest; dicendum, quod non posse peccare est duplici de causa, aut quia caret voluntate, aut vertibilitate voluntatis; et primo modo intelligit Augustinus, non secundo.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister⁸, quod potuit Deus meliora facere, quam fecit. Videtur enim istud non habere veritatem in omnibus, et specialiter in Christo, quem videtur nullo modo posse facere meliorem, per illud quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo⁹: Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen. Item, Ioannis tertio¹⁰: Datus est ei spiritus non ad mensuram; ergo nullo modo potuit Deus dare Christo plus de spiritu: ergo non potuit eum facere meliorem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de universo et eius partibus; et quoniam Christus nec est de universo nec eius pars, ideo non habet locum in ipso verbum¹¹. Tamen adhuc in Christo habet dubitationem. Si enim quidquid habet humanitas Christi, finitum est, ergo cum Deus possit supra omne finitum, potuit maius. Et iterum, Christus factus fuit passibilis et mortalis, et potuit fieri immortalis.

Et propter hoc dicendum, quod tripliciter est loqui de Christo, aut quantum ad unionem, aut quantum ad gratiam singularis personae, aut quantum ad proprietates naturae. Si quantum ad unionem, nec Deus potest plus dare, nec creatura recipere, quia unionis gratia ex parte alterius extremi est dignitatis infinitae, scilicet quod homo sit Deus, quamvis ex parte humanitatis quidquid est ibi sit finitum: et ita non ponitur limitatio ex parte Dei, nec ex parte creaturae capacitas infinita nisi per unionem, videlicet quia unitur homo bono infinito, ita quod homo est Deus, qui est bonitatis infinitae. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad gratiam singularis personae, sic concedo, quod Deus potuit plus¹² dare, sed rationalis natura non potuit amplius recipere; non quia capacitas animae ad gratiam per collationem gratiae minuatur, quia nec minuitur nec augetur, sed consummatur¹³ et completur; et ideo non est possibilis ad amplius. Si autem loquamur quantum ad proprietates naturae, sic Deus et plus potuit de bonitate dare, et rationalis creatura recipere, quantum ad ea, scilicet, quae sunt corporis — quia nunc plura habet, quam quando factus est — sed non potuerunt nostrae¹⁴ saluti effici congruentiores. Nunquam enim salus nostra potuisset per substantiam incorruptibilem et immortalem ita reparari, sicut per mortem et passionem eius reparata est. Patet ergo, quomodo melior potuit esse Christus, et quomodo non¹⁵.

DUB. IV.

Item, obiicitur de beata Virgine. Videtur enim, quod non potuerit fieri melior, quia Anselmus de Conceptu virginali¹⁶ dicit: «Decebat, quod illius Hominis conceptio fieret de Matre purissima, qua puritate maior nequit sub Deo intelligi»: ergo videtur, quod non potuit fieri melior, et tamen ipsa fuit pars universi. Item, super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata est in gloria: ergo facta est in summa gratia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de beata Virgine quantum ad tres conditiones, scilicet quantum ad gratiam conceptionis, quantum ad gratiam iustificationis, quantum ad naturam¹⁷. Si quantum ad conceptionem prolis, sic quia fuit Mater Dei, quo nihil nobilius cogitari potest, et Mater nobilissimi Filii, sic tantam habuit bonitatis dignitatem,

quod nulla mulier amplius capere potuit. Si enim omnes creaturae, quantumcumque ascenderent in gradibus nobilitatis, essent praesentes, omnes deberent reverentiam Matri Dei. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad gratiam iustificationis, tantam habuit, quantam pura creatura humana sive rationalis, quae facta est sic, recipere potuit. — Si quantum ad naturalia, optima habuit, secundum quod sibi competens fuit: simpliciter tamen meliora potuit recipere, et Deus dare. — Et ita patet, quod in nullo creato habet instantiam hoc verbum Magistri: quod Deus ea quae fecit, potuit facere meliora. Patet etiam, quod in aliquibus capacitatem gratiae complevit et implevit; sed in Christo per omnem modum, in Matre eius secundum quod capit pura creatura rationalis in sexu femineo quantum ad ea quae spectant ad corpus, et in anima humana, quantum ad ea quae sunt gratiae.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that solution of the Master's, by which he says that the bringing-in of this similitude has no force, because he begot the Son from his own substance¹. For it seems that this response is not sufficient. For envy can² be considered in regard to one diverse in substance and nature, as the Angel envied man: therefore on this account envy is not excluded from God in regard to a creature.

I respond: It must be said that two things concur for envy, namely, the power³ toward equality, and the exigence of the thing made. For no one envies another unless someone is made equal to him or exceeds him, or unless he fears lest he be equalled. Likewise, an artisan is not called envious except when he does not make a thing according as it exacts, and as he is himself able. And on account of this, since on the side of things there was no exigence, and again⁴ in nothing could they be equalled, therefore whatever sort of things he made, envy is not convicted to be in God, even if he made no things at all. But in the Son of God there was a power toward equality and, beyond that, an exigence, on account of this, that he was of the substance of the Father⁵. Hence it is that it is not a like case, as the Master says; and his response is good. For he puts the antecedent for the consequent, not because he means to say that envy could be only or could be in regard to one similar in nature, but on account of the aforesaid ratio of exigence and equality, which were in the generation of the Son, because he was of the substance of the Father.

Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that God could have made such a man, who could neither sin nor wish to sin; and if he had made such a one, who doubts that he would have been better? For the contrary seems to be said in Ecclesiasticus thirty-one⁶: He was able to transgress, and did not transgress; this is said in praise of a holy man. And Augustine himself says on Genesis according to the letter⁷, that "God judged men to be better, if they served him freely". And again, in his book On the City of God he says, that "that substance is better which can sin than the one which cannot".

I respond: It must be said that "better" is said in two ways: either absolutely, or in ordering to an end. If we speak absolutely, the man confirmed in grace is better

than the one able to fall; if [we speak] in the ordering to the end, which indeed consists in attaining it, then it was better to make man in the liberty of being able to sin, but yet the first is better absolutely, while this is better in a qualified sense. And so the word of Augustine, speaking absolutely, has truth.

But what is said about the just man is accidental praise, that is, as regards accidental glory. For it is settled that Christ could not sin, and yet he was most glorious. Similarly is to be understood that word of Augustine on Genesis. But as to what is said, that a nature is better which can sin than one which cannot, it must be said that not-being-able-to-sin is from a twofold cause, either because it lacks the will, or [because it lacks] the changeability of the will; and Augustine understands it in the first mode, not the second.

Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what the Master⁸ says, that God could have made things better than he did. For this seems not to have truth in all cases, and specially in Christ, whom he seems in no way able to make better, through what is said to the Philippians, chapter two⁹: He gave him a name, which is above every name. Likewise, John three¹⁰: The Spirit is given to him not by measure; therefore in no way could God give to Christ more of the Spirit: therefore he could not make him better.

I respond: It must be said that the Master speaks of the universe and its parts; and since Christ neither is of the universe nor a part of it, therefore the saying has no place in him¹¹. Yet still in Christ it has a doubt. For if whatever the humanity of Christ has is finite, then since God can do beyond every finite thing, he could have done a greater. And again, Christ was made passible and mortal, and could have been made immortal.

And on account of this it must be said that to speak of Christ is to do so in three ways: either as to the union, or as to the grace of the singular person, or as to the properties of [his] nature. If as to the union, neither can God give more, nor the creature receive more, because the grace of union on the side of one extreme is of infinite dignity, namely, that man should be God, although on the side of the humanity whatever is there is finite: and so no limitation is placed on the side of God, nor is there infinite capacity on the side of the creature except through the union, namely, because man is united to an infinite good, in such a way that man is God, who is of infinite goodness. — But if we speak as to the grace of the singular person, then I concede that God could give more¹², but the rational nature could not receive more; not because the soul's capacity for grace is diminished by the conferring of grace, since it is neither diminished nor increased, but consummated¹³ and completed; and therefore it is not capable of more. But if we speak as to the properties of the nature, then God could both give more out of his goodness, and the rational creature receive [it], as to those things, namely, which are of the body — since he now has more than when he was made — but they could not have been made more fitting to our¹⁴ salvation. For our salvation could never have been so repaired through an incorruptible and immortal substance, as it was repaired through his death and passion. It is plain therefore in what way Christ could have been better, and in what way not¹⁵.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, an objection is raised concerning the Blessed Virgin. For it seems that she could not have been made better, since Anselm On the Conception of the Virgin¹⁶ says: "It was fitting that the conception of that Man should be from a most pure Mother, by a purity than which a greater cannot be understood under God": therefore it seems that she could not have been made better, and yet she was a part of the universe. Likewise, she is exalted in glory above all the choirs of Angels: therefore she was made in the highest grace.

I respond: It must be said that one can speak of the Blessed Virgin as to three conditions, namely, as to the grace of the conception, as to the grace of justification, and as to the nature¹⁷. If as to the conception of the offspring, then since she was the Mother of God — than whom nothing more noble can be thought of — and Mother of a most noble Son, she had so great a dignity of goodness,

that no woman could receive more. For if all creatures, however high they might rise in degrees of nobility, were present, all would owe reverence to the Mother of God. — But if we speak as to the grace of justification, she had as much as a pure human or rational creature, which was made as she was made, could receive. — If as to the natural endowments, she had the best, according to what was fitting for her: yet absolutely speaking she could have received better things, and God could have given them. — And so it is plain that in no created thing does this word of the Master fail to find application: that the things which God made, he could have made better. It is also plain that in some he filled and completed the capacity of grace; but in Christ in every way, in his Mother according as a pure rational creature in the female sex is capable, as to those things which pertain to the body, and in the human soul, as to those things which are of grace.

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