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Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum meliorem quantum ad ordinem partium.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quantum ad ordinem partium. Et quod non, primo videtur auctoritate.

1. Genesis primo1: Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; Glossa Augustini: « Singula quaeque bona in se, sed in universo optima ». Sed optimo nihil est melius: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus2 dicit, « quod quamvis alius modus nostrae liberationis esset Deo possibilis, nullus fuit nostrae salvandae miseriae congruentior ». Sed sicut Deus fuit sapientissimus redemptor, ita et sapientissimus conditor: ergo si ordinatissime redemit, ita quod nullus modus melior nec congruentior esse potuit, ergo similiter se habuit in faciendo res: et sic patet etc.

3. Item, si consideremus ordinem elementorum in mundo, constat ea optime esse ordinata. Unde non potest cogitari, quod illa quatuor corpora ordinentur melius, sive secundum qualitates, sive secundum formas nobiles, sive secundum proportiones numerales, sicut ligantur octo et viginti septem, qui sunt duo primi numeri solidi quadrati: ligantur per duos intermedios, scilicet duodecim et octodecim3: ergo etc.

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4. Item, « sapientis est ordinare4 »: ergo summe sapientis summe sive optime ordinare: ergo Deus res ita bene ordinavit, quod nullo modo potuit ordinare melius.

Sed contra:

1. Ordo ille est bonitatis finitae: ergo si sapientia Dei est infinita, et infinitum excedit finitum, ergo Deus scivit melius ordinare. Sed quidquid scivit, potuit: ergo etc.

2. Item, melior est et nobilior ordo, in quo nulla cadit inordinatio, quam in quo cadit5; sed in universo cadunt multae inordinationes et deformitates: ergo alius ordo potuit fieri melior.

3. Item, quod propinquius est fini, melius est ordinatum6: ergo si omnia sunt optime ordinata, omnia sunt aequaliter coniuncta fini: ergo omnia participant beatitudinem; quod absurdum est.

4. Item, bonitas ordinis pendet ex bonitate partium, sicut respectivum ab absoluto; sed res secundum esse absolutum non sunt optimae: ergo nec in ordine7.

Conclusio. Quoad ordinem partium in universo, primae et substantiales partes optime sunt ordinatae; partes vero corruptibiles absolute quidem melius potuerunt ordinari, non autem in relatione ad finem. Quoad ordinem in finem res, salvo ordine universi, optime ordinatae sunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est ordo partium in toto, et est ordo partium in finem. Primus ordo respicit sapientiam, secundus ordo respicit bonitatem. Et sunt isti duo ordines ita coniuncti, ut unus alteri conformetur, et ordo partium in universo est propter ordinationem ad finem.

Si ergo loquamur de ordine partium in universo, aut hoc est quantum ad partes primas substantiales; et sic absque distinctione optime sunt ordinatae, ita quod melius ordinari non potuerunt, quia in eis consistit ordo substantialis et pulcritudo universi immutabilis. Vel quantum ad partes corruptibiles et remotas, et hoc dupliciter: aut absolute et ut nunc; et sic potuerunt melius ordinari et aliquando8 erunt melius ordinatae; aut simpliciter et in relatione ad finem; et sic sunt res optime ordinatae in universo, secundum quod convenit ordini in finem.

Similiter optime ordinatae sunt res in finem, salvo ordine universi, quia universum est tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, quod decurrit secundum optimas consonantias, aliis partibus succedentibus aliis, quousque res perfecte ordinentur in finem9. Unde sicut in productione rerum manifestatur potentia sed in comparatione sive in ordine ad non-ens ostenditur summa potentia, creans ex nihilo10: sic ordo rerum in universo in se ostendit sapientiam, et ordo ad finem bonitatem; sed in comparatione unius ad alterum ostenditur summa sapientia et summa bonitas, quia nihil potest hunc ordinem deordinare, sicut melius infra patebit11.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes quod res sunt optime ordinatae, quia respiciunt utrumque ordinem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia est infinita; dicendum, quod quamvis sapientia sit infinita, tamen res non sunt capaces nisi ordinis finiti; et ipsa sapientia summa summum dat ordinem quem habere possunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cadit inordinatio; dicendum, quod, si consideremus hos ordines, scilicet ad finem et in universo, ita se ad invicem complectuntur, quod non potest ibi esse inordinatio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de propinquitate, dicendum, quod hoc est verum secundum propriam ordinationem12, sed secundum decursum universi necesse est, quod res sit primo longe a fine, et post appropinquet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo13 pendet ex partibus; dicendum, quod sicut aliqua contingentia in se habent esse absolutum contingens

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sed ordinem necessarium: sic et in proposito intelligendum, quod quamvis aliquid non sit optimum in se, tamen optime ordinatur. Et exemplum huius patet in partibus corporis et in re artificiali, in qua est consonantia et harmonia, sicut in cithara. Quamvis enim nobilior sit situs oculi quam pedis, tamen si consideremus utrumque secundum suum officium, tam oculus quam pes optime situati sunt in toto, ita quod nec oculus melius pede, nec e converso. Et ita dicit Augustinus super Ioannem14, quod sicut Angelus optime in caelo, ita vermiculus optime in imo, sicut in terra. Et similiter apparet in cithara: possunt enim omnes chordae ita proportionari, quod si aliqua tendatur, ut detur ei melior sonus, nunquam remanebit consonantia. Similiter dictiones possunt ordinari ad faciendum versum, ita quod ex illis dictionibus impossibile est fieri versum melius ordinatum: sic in proposito intelligendum.

Scholion

I. Pro intelligentia praeclarae doctrinae huius quaestionis attendendum est ad plures distinctiones circa ordinem alicuius rei. Non agitur de ordine particulari alicuius rei, sive « secundum propriam ordinationem », ut dicitur in solut. ad 3, sed de ordine universali partium mundi, quae ordinantur non tantum ad proprios actus et ad propriam perfectionem, sed etiam ordinantur tum ad invicem, quia ignobiliora ordinata sunt tanquam media ad nobiliora, tum ad perfectionem totius, tum ad finem toto universo superiorem, ut est salus electorum et gloria Dei. Scholastici acceperunt has distinctiones praecipue ex Aristotele (XII. Metaph. text. 32.). Cfr. etiam infra d. 46. q. 3, et praecipue S. Thom., S. I. q. 65. a. 2.

II. In arg. 3. fundam., ubi sermo est de mundo elementari, supponitur iuxta sententiam tunc communem, quatuor esse elementa, et ea esse ordinata tum secundum quatuor qualitates (calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum) tum secundum multas formas nobiles, tum « secundum proportiones numerales ». Has proportiones elementorum, quae respondent proportionibus numeralibus, hic paucis verbis potius insinuantur, quam explicantur. Unde praeter ea quae supra d. 2. q. 4. in Scholio dicta sunt, haec ex Brulifero notamus. Ignis et terra, ut extrema inter se colligantur per duo intermedia (scil. aer et aqua), et similem inter se proportionem habent, ac numeri extremi 8 et 27 et intermedii 12 et 18. Scilicet numerus quadratus solidus oritur, quando idem numerus ducitur in se ipsum, ut 2 × 2 × 2 = 8; 3 × 3 × 3 = 27; unde 8 et 27 sunt duo primi numeri quadrati solidi (cubi). Si autem aliquis numerus bis ducitur in alium numerum, tum oritur quidem solidus (cubus), sed non quadratus, ut 2 × 2 × 3 = 12; et 2 × 3 × 3 = 18. Sic eficiuntur duo numeri intermedii inter primum et secundum numerum solidum quadratum. Eandem autem proportionem habet 8 ad 12, quam 12 ad 18, et 18 ad 27. Nam 12 = 8 + 4; 18 = 12 + 6; 27 = 18 + 9. Simili modo distribuebantur qualitates elementorum, ut ignis sit simul calidus et siccus; aer calidus et humidus, aqua frigida et humida, terra frigida et sicca.

Auctores ut in Scholio ad 1. quaestionem, et praeterea B. Albert., hic a. 3.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts.

Thirdly, it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts. And that he could not, seems first from authority.

1. Genesis 11: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good; Augustine's Gloss: "Each thing good in itself, but in the whole most good." But than the most good nothing is better: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine2 says, "that although another mode of our liberation was possible for God, none was more congruent for healing our miserable state in need of salvation." But just as God was the wisest redeemer, so also the wisest founder: therefore if he redeemed in the most ordered way, such that no mode could have been better or more congruent, then likewise he did so in making things: and thus the matter is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, if we consider the order of the elements in the world, it is clear that they have been most well ordered. Hence it cannot be conceived that those four bodies should be ordered better, whether according to qualities, or according to noble forms, or according to numerical proportions, as eight and twenty-seven are bound together — which are the first two solid square numbers — they are bound together by two intermediates, namely twelve and eighteen3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, "it belongs to the wise man to order4": therefore to the highest wise man it belongs to order in the highest or best way: therefore God so well ordered things that in no way could he have ordered better.

On the contrary:

1. That order is of finite goodness: therefore if the wisdom of God is infinite, and the infinite exceeds the finite, then God knew how to order better. But whatever he knew, he could do: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, an order in which no disorder falls is better and nobler than one in which disorder does fall5; but in the universe many disorders and deformities fall: therefore another order could have been made better.

3. Likewise, that which is nearer to the end is better ordered6: therefore if all things are most well ordered, all things are equally conjoined to the end: therefore all things share in beatitude; which is absurd.

4. Likewise, the goodness of order depends on the goodness of the parts, as the relative on the absolute; but things according to absolute being are not optimal: therefore neither in order7.

Conclusion. As to the order of parts in the universe, the first and substantial parts are most well ordered; the corruptible parts, taken absolutely, could indeed have been ordered better, but not in relation to the end. As to the order to the end, things, saving the order of the universe, are most well ordered.

I respond: It must be said that there is an order of parts in the whole, and an order of parts to the end. The first order respects wisdom, the second respects goodness. And these two orders are so conjoined that the one conforms to the other, and the order of parts in the universe exists for the sake of the ordering to the end.

If, then, we speak of the order of parts in the universe, this is either as to the first substantial parts; and these without distinction are most well ordered, so that they could not have been ordered better, because in them consists the substantial order and the unchanging beauty of the universe. Or as to the corruptible and remote parts, and this in two ways: either absolutely and as of now; and so they could have been ordered better, and at some time8 will be ordered better; or simply and in relation to the end; and so things are most well ordered in the universe, insofar as it accords with the ordering to the end.

Likewise, things are most well ordered to the end, saving the order of the universe, because the universe is like a most beautiful song which proceeds according to the best consonances, with some parts succeeding others, until things are perfectly ordered to the end9. Hence, just as in the production of things power is manifested, but in the comparison or in the order to non-being is shown highest power, creating from nothing10: so the order of things in the universe in itself shows wisdom, and the order to the end shows goodness; but in the comparison of the one to the other is shown highest wisdom and highest goodness, because nothing can disorder this order, as will appear better below11.

The arguments proving that things are most well ordered are therefore to be conceded, because they regard each order.

1. To what is objected, that wisdom is infinite; it must be said that although wisdom is infinite, yet things are not capable of more than a finite order; and the highest wisdom itself gives the highest order which they are able to have.

2. To what is objected, that disorder falls; it must be said that, if we consider these orders, namely to the end and in the universe, they so embrace each other mutually that there cannot be any disorder there.

3. To what is objected concerning nearness, it must be said that this is true according to proper ordering12, but according to the course of the universe it is necessary that the thing first be far from the end, and afterward draw near.

4. To what is objected, that order13 depends on the parts; it must be said that just as certain contingent things have in themselves absolute contingent being

but a necessary order: so also in the matter at hand it must be understood that although something is not optimum in itself, yet it is most well ordered. And an example of this appears in the parts of the body and in an artificial thing, in which there is consonance and harmony, as in a harp. For although the place of the eye is nobler than that of the foot, yet if we consider each according to its office, both the eye and the foot are most well situated in the whole, so that neither is the eye better than the foot, nor conversely. And so Augustine says on John14, that just as the angel is most well in heaven, so the little worm is most well in the lowest, as on earth. And likewise it appears in the harp: for all the strings can be so proportioned that if any one were tightened in order to give it a better sound, the consonance would not remain. Likewise, words can be ordered for making a verse, in such a way that from those words it is impossible that a better-ordered verse should come to be: so in the matter at hand it must be understood.

Scholion

I. For grasping the splendid doctrine of this question, attention must be paid to several distinctions concerning the order of some thing. The question is not about the particular order of some thing, or "according to proper ordering," as is said in the solution to 3, but about the universal order of the parts of the world, which are ordered not only to their own acts and to their own perfection, but are also ordered mutually, because the less noble are ordered as means to the more noble; and to the perfection of the whole; and to an end higher than the whole universe, namely the salvation of the elect and the glory of God. The Scholastics took these distinctions chiefly from Aristotle (Metaphysics XII, text 32). Cf. also below d. 46, q. 3, and especially St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 65, a. 2.

II. In argumentum 3 of the fundamenta, where the discussion concerns the elemental world, it is supposed, according to the then-common opinion, that there are four elements, and that they are ordered both according to four qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) and according to many noble forms, and "according to numerical proportions." These proportions of the elements, which correspond to numerical proportions, are here insinuated in a few words rather than explained. Hence, besides what was said above at d. 2, q. 4 in the Scholion, we note these things from Brulifer. Fire and earth, as extremes, are bound together by two intermediates (namely air and water), and have a similar proportion to each other as the extreme numbers 8 and 27 and the intermediates 12 and 18. Namely, a solid square number arises when the same number is multiplied by itself, as 2 × 2 × 2 = 8; 3 × 3 × 3 = 27; whence 8 and 27 are the first two solid square (cube) numbers. But if any number is multiplied twice into another number, then a solid (cube) arises indeed, but not a square, as 2 × 2 × 3 = 12; and 2 × 3 × 3 = 18. Thus two intermediate numbers are produced between the first and second solid square number. And the same proportion holds of 8 to 12 as of 12 to 18, and 18 to 27. For 12 = 8 + 4; 18 = 12 + 6; 27 = 18 + 9. In a similar way the qualities of the elements were distributed, so that fire is at once hot and dry; air hot and moist; water cold and moist; earth cold and dry.

Authors as in the Scholion to the 1st question, and besides, B. Albert, here a. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 31. — Glossa subinde allata sumta est ex August., III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 24. n. 37, et sic ibi sonat: « Et singula bona, et in universo bona valde sunt ». Similiter S. August. loquitur in Enchir. c. 10. n. 3: Sed tamen bona etiam singula; simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo.
    Verse 31. — The Gloss next adduced is taken from Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter III, c. 24, n. 37, and reads thus there: "Both the single things are good, and in the universe they are very good." Similarly St. Augustine speaks in the Enchiridion c. 10, n. 3: Yet the single things are also good; but together the whole is very good, because from all of them is composed the admirable beauty of the universe.
  2. Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 10. n. 13. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In textu cit. post nullus Vat. interiicit tamen, et deinde pro salvandae codd. K P Q cum ed. 1 et cum ed. oper. August. sanandae, Vat. levandae.
    Book XIII On the Trinity c. 10, n. 13. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — In the cited text, after nullus the Vatican edition inserts tamen, and then for salvandae codd. K P Q, with ed. 1 and the edition of Augustine's works, have sanandae; the Vatican has levandae.
  3. Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 8, et Boeth., I. de Arithmet. c. 20, et hic Scholion. — Paulo superius pro numerales non pauci codd. perperam numerabiles. Mox pro solidi quadrati Vat. solidi cubi, cod. O solidi cubici. Idem cod. O deinde verbo intermedios adiungit solidos quadratos.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IV, c. 2, n. 8; and Boethius, On Arithmetic I, c. 20; and here the Scholion. — A little above, for numerales not a few codices wrongly read numerabiles. Soon after, for solidi quadrati the Vatican has solidi cubi, and cod. O solidi cubici. The same cod. O then adds after the word intermedios the words solidos quadratos.
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 685, nota 1.
    Cf. above p. 685, note 1.
  5. Nam, ut ait Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1. (c. 5.): Quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, sunt magis talia, ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius. — Codd. et ed. 1 arg. 3. ponunt 4. loco.
    For, as Aristotle says, Topics III, c. 1 (c. 5): Those things which are less mixed with their contraries are more such, as the whiter is the more unmixed with black. — The codices and ed. 1 place argument 3 in the 4th position.
  6. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: Et duorum (melius est), quod propinquius est fini.
    Aristotle, Topics III, c. 1: And of two [things, the better is] that which is nearer to the end.
  7. Pro in ordine ed. 1 ordinatae.
    For in ordine ed. 1 has ordinatae.
  8. Cod. R ordinem. Proxime post pro ergo Vat. cum cod. cc autem.
    Cod. R has ordinem. Soon after, for ergo the Vatican with cod. cc has autem.
  9. Scilicet post iudicium finale.
    Namely after the final judgment.
  10. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18: Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset, quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordinem saeculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret... Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulcritudinem reddunt, ita quadam non verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulcritudo componitur. Cfr. ibid. c. 22, et de Vera Relig. c. 22. n. 52. seq. et c. 41. n. 77. — In principio huius propositionis pro Similiter sola Vat. Simpliciter enim, quae et aliquanto inferius cum cod. cc in ordine non-entia exit eas pro in ordine ad non-ens. Mox plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt creans. Loco huius verbi creans codd. K P Q T V X. ponunt prius, et tunc supplendum est: producit.
    Augustine, City of God XI, c. 18: For God would not have created any — I do not say of the Angels, but even of men — whom he foresaw was going to be evil, unless he equally knew with what good uses he would put them to service, and so adorned the order of the ages, like a most beautiful song, by certain quasi-antitheses... Just as therefore those contraries set against contraries give the speech its beauty, so by a certain eloquence not of words but of things, the beauty of the world is composed by the opposition of contraries. Cf. ibid. c. 22, and On True Religion c. 22, n. 52 ff., and c. 41, n. 77. — At the beginning of this proposition, for Similiter the Vatican alone reads Simpliciter enim, which a little further on, with cod. cc, also has in ordine non-entia exit eas for in ordine ad non-ens. Soon after, very many codices, with the first six editions, omit creans. In place of the word creans, codd. K P Q T V X have prius, and then must be supplied: producit.
  11. Dist. 46. q. 3. C, n. 4, cl. 17. q. 1. nec non II. Sent. d. 12. n. 3. q. 1. praesertim per E.
    Distinction 46, q. 3, C, n. 4, cl. 17, q. 1, and also II Sent., d. 12, n. 3, q. 1, especially through E.
  12. Plures codd. ac F P V Z cum ed. 1 bene id.
    Several codices, including F P V Z, with ed. 1, read bene id.
  13. In cod. T hic additur: cum enim res sit quid in ipsam, nullum perfectius est posse, quod eo perpetuo melius ordinetur. Loco proprium ordinationem ed. 1 primum ordinationem. — Supple cum Vat. in universo. Paulo inferius codd. cum ed. primis edd. omittunt et cum in universo.
    In cod. T is here added: for since the thing is something into itself, no power is more perfect than that by which it is perpetually ordered the better. In place of proprium ordinationem ed. 1 has primum ordinationem. — Supply with the Vatican in universo. A little below, the codices with the first editions omit et cum in universo.
  14. Cap. 1. tract. 1. n. 13. — Vat. ordinis bonitas.
    Chapter 1, tractate 1, n. 13. — The Vatican has ordinis bonitas.
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