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Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum mala fieri sit bonum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum mala fieri sit bonum. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quod expedit facienti ad salutem, illud est bonum; sed malum est huiusmodi — unde super illud ad Romanos octavo1: Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, Glossa: « etiam ipse casus »; et Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate, capitulo decimo tertio: « Audeo, inquit, dicere, superbis utile esse incidere in aliquod apertum manifestumque peccatum, ut inde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo corruerunt » — ergo malum fieri est bonum et utile facienti ad salutem: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod est bonum Deo et universitati est bonum simpliciter, quia bonum commune praefertur bono privato; sed malum fieri est bonum universitati: ergo etc. Boethius in libro de Consolatione2: « Sola divina vis est, cui quaeque mala bona sunt ». Et Augustinus in libro Confessionum: « Tu cui nihil omnino malum, sed nec universae creaturae tuae, quia nihil est extra te, quod corrumpat ordinem, quem imposuisti ». Ergo si malum fieri est bonum universitati, patet etc.

3. Item, « cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum »3; sed usus malorum factorum est bonus: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum undecimo de Civitate: « Neque enim Deus malos esse praescisset, nisi pari ratione praesciret, quibus eos bonorum usibus accommodaret ».

4. Item, « omne quod iustum est, bonum est »4; sed mala fieri iustum est, quia poena est peccati praecedentis, sicut vult Gregorius: ergo malum fieri bonum est.

Contra:

1. Malum fieri est malum in esse productionis: si ergo malum fieri est bonum, productio mali est bona. Sed regula est in arte Topicorum5: « Cuius generatio vel productio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum »: ergo si productio mali est bona, malum est bonum.

2. Item, malum fieri est idem quod bonum privari sive corrumpi: ergo si malum fieri est bonum, corruptio boni est bona. Sed regula est: « Cuius corruptio bona, ipsum quoque malum »: ergo si corruptio boni est bona, bonum est malum, quod absurdum est.

3. Item, de duobus convertibilibus si unum est bonum, et reliquum6; sed malum fieri et malum facere sunt convertibilia: ergo si malum fieri est bonum, et malum facere est bonum. Sed pro bono nullus est puniendus: ergo nullus faciens mala est puniendus.

4. Item, « si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito »7: si ergo malum fieri est bonum: ergo bonum fieri est malum. Sed hoc absurdum est, quod malum sit facere bonum: ergo et primum.

5. Item, si malum fieri est bonum: aut ergo in se, aut quia ex ipso evenit vel consequitur bonum. Non in se, constat. Si ergo, quia inde evenit bonum, qui dicit: Faciamus mala, ut eveniant bona8, bene dicit: ergo male Apostolus reprehendit.

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Conclusio.

Conclusio. Mala fieri nullo pacto bonum est, sed potest esse occasio boni, quatenus a Deo ordinatur in bonum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod in operibus illud est dicere bonum vel utile sive conferens, quod in finem bonum ducit sive est via ad bonum. Ducere autem ad bonum tripliciter dicitur aliquid, scilicet per modum causae, vel per modum casus, vel per modum occasionis. Et differunt haec tria. Nam causa per se ducit ita in illud9, circa quod ponitur, quod sit producens et intendens. Sed casus privat intentionem, sed non operationem, sicut patet in fodiente, qui invenit thesaurum praeter intentionem. Occasio autem privat utrumque. Non enim dicit principium producens, sed magis dicit aliquid, quod principium afficit, ut efficiat10: sicut aliquis ex verbo audito percutit alium; verbum auditum fuit occasio, non efficiens percussionem nec cooperans efficienti, sed quodam modo afficiens.

Et haec occasio duobus modis est. Quaedam enim est, quae quodam modo habet rationem activi, quia quodam modo excitat efficientem, sicut malum exemplum ad peccatum. Vel11 quae habet rationem passivi, ut ex quo aliquis sumit rationem, sicut aliquis ex malo alterius excitat se ad faciendum bonum.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod malum duo dicit, scilicet privationem et naturam ordinabilem; et ratione malitiae comparatur ad bonum, quod elicitur, sicut occasio passiva; ratione boni, quod substernitur, sicut occasio aliquo modo activa, propter quod dicitur malum occasio boni.

Cum igitur aliquid ducat in bonum his tribus modis, habet12 sic differentiam in ducendo. Aliquid enim potest ducere aliquid ad alterum aut ex se vel per aliquid sui; et tunc tenet rationem causae per se. Aut potest ducere per alterum, ad quod tamen non ordinatur, sed illud ordinatur13 ad tertium, sumta occasione ex illo; et sic tenet rationem occasionis. Aut ducit cum alio, ad quod tamen non ordinatur, nec illud ad tertium, sed ambo simul; et sic tenet rationem casus, qui est ex concursu causarum.

Ex hoc igitur patet, quod illud quod ducit per modum causae, habet in se rationem ordinationis in finem; et ideo in ipso est bonitas, et ideo recte denominatur bonum. Quod vero ducit per modum occasionis, nullam habet intra se rationem ordinationis in finem, ideo nec bonitatem; et propter hoc non potest denominari bonum per se nisi cum additione illius, per quod ordinatur, in quo scilicet consistit ratio ordinationis et bonitatis, et circa quod ponitur bonitas.

Cum igitur malum non ducat ad bonum ex se, sed per illud, quod elicitur ex ipso a sapiente Deo, absolute loquendo, malum fieri non est bonum; immo omnes consimiles sunt negandae, quia bonitas notatur poni circa ipsum malum. — Si autem addatur bonum, quod elicitur, vel ipse eliciens; secundario concedendae sunt huiusmodi locutiones: malum fieri est bonum ei qui novit ordinare in bonum; similiter: malum fieri est bonum, ut electi probentur.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1, 2. Ex hoc ergo patent duae primae rationes; procedunt enim cum determinatione, sicut patet in ipsis auctoritatibus.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: cuius usus bonus etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est usus rei: unus, ad quem res de se ordinatur; et de tali verum est, sicut patet de equo, qui est ad equitandum; alius usus, qui est aliquando et ex post facto; et iste potest esse bonus ex bonitate utentis, non utilis, quia bonus utens bene utitur malis. Et de tali usu non est regula vera: de tali autem loquitur Augustinus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod iustum est bonum est etc.; dicendum, quod iustum dicitur dupliciter: uno modo iuste ordinatum per iustitiam14, quae est in ipso, et omne quod sic iustum est, bonum est, quoniam intra se habet iustitiam; vel est declarativum iustitiae, et sic potest malum ostendere. Sicut enim malum potest ad retributionem iustitiae disponere, ita et ostendere. Et hoc modo dicit ordinationem iustitiae in altero; nec sequitur, quod sit bonum, quia iustum plus importat rationem ordinis. Nihilominus tamen sermo ille non est proprius, quo dicitur: Iustus est, ut qui in sordibus est, sordescat15, immo valde per accidens intelligitur, quia iustum est, ut relinquatur a Deo, et ad hoc sequitur, quod adhuc sordescat: unde per accidens intelligitur.

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Scholion

I. Magni momenti est haec quaestio, ab antiquis magistris subtiliter discussa, tum ut honor divinae providentiae defendatur, tum ut inconcussum axioma ethicae christianae recte intelligatur, quod scil. numquam licet facere mala, ut eveniat bonum. Opinio a Magistro (hic c. 4.) relata, quae simpliciter concedit, malum fieri esse bonum, fuit Hugonis a S. Vict. (l. de Sacram. p. IV. c. 13.); sed refutatur a Magistro, approbantibus S. Bonaventura, S. Thoma aliisque communiter.

II. Pro intelligentia responsionis notandum est, quod in quaestione terminus bonum non intelligitur pro bono honesto nec pro bono delectabili, sed pro bono utili, quod ut medium ad finem sive ut via ad bonum ducit. Sed bonum utile triplici modo potest ducere in finem, vel per se, et tunc dicitur causa, vel per accidens, et tunc dupliciter: vel per modum casus, in quo finis non intenditur, attamen operatio pertingit usque ad ipsum effectum, licet non intentum (ut patet in fodiente, qui casu in lucem protrahit thesaurum), vel per modum occasionis, quo effectus nec intenditur nec producitur (ut tyrannus occidendo martyrem coronam eiusdem nec intendit nec producit). Haec aliis verbis in prima responsionis distinctione dicuntur. — In secunda autem distinctione occasio iterum distinguitur dupliciter secundum rationem activi et passivi: quod intelligendum est, non quasi malum habeat aliquam actionem circa ipsum bonum, sed circa efficientem bonum, quem mala actio vel aliqua proportionalitate et causalitate ad bonum faciendum excitat, vel sine aliqua causalitate ex parte sua potius ad contrarium excitat. In hac secunda distinctione proprie positum est fundamentum subtilis et praeclarae solutionis, quae in eo consistit, quod formale peccati (privatio) Deo est occasio passiva ad operandum bonum malo oppositum; materiale vero peccati, quia habet naturam ordinabilem ad bonum, licet « nullam habet intra se rationem ordinationis in finem » per alium, nempe Deum, potest duci ad bonum. Ita crucifixio Christi a Deo ordinata est ad ingentia bona producenda, et facta est occasio boni per modum aliquatenus activum. Hic est sensus verborum, quod malum « ratione malitiae comparatur ad bonum, quod elicitur, sicut occasio passiva; ratione boni, quod substernitur, sicut occasio aliquo modo activa », non autem in ratione causae (« ex se vel per aliquid sui »), sed occasionis (« per alterum »).

III. His suppositis, etiam facile intelligitur solutio ad 3, et quod numquam et nullatenus sit bonum, malum facere, licet malum fieri per ordinationem Dei possit esse bonum. Ad rem Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 40. m. 2. ad 4.): « Nullo modo est concedenda: malum facere est bonum; non enim similis est ratio in activa et passiva. Nam cum dicitur: malum fieri est bonum, notatur potentia passiva; cum dicitur: malum facere est bonum, notatur potentia activa. Potentia autem activa mali non est bona; sed potentia passiva est bona, quia in malo est potentia passiva ad hoc, ut ordinetur; est enim malum ordinabile ad bonum » (cfr. infra q. 5.).

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 40. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 19. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3, et q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation
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Question III. Whether the coming-about of evils is a good.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the coming-about of evils is a good. And that it is, is shown thus:

1. What is expedient for the doer toward salvation, that is a good; but evil is of this sort — whence on that passage to the Romans eight1: To those who love God all things work together for good, the Gloss: « even the very fall [itself] »; and Augustine, fourteenth book On the City [of God], chapter thirteen: « I dare, he says, to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, that thereby they may become displeasing to themselves, who already had fallen by pleasing themselves » — therefore that evil come about is good and useful for the doer toward salvation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, what is good for God and for the universe is good simply, since the common good is preferred to the private good; but that evil come about is good for the universe: therefore etc. Boethius in the book On Consolation2: « Only the divine power is such that for it each [of the] evils is good ». And Augustine in the book of Confessions: « To you nothing at all is evil, and not even to your universal creation, because nothing is outside you that corrupts the order which you imposed ». Therefore if that evil come about is a good for the universe, it is plain, etc.

3. Likewise, « that whose use is good, [is] itself also good »3; but the use of evil deeds is good: therefore etc. The minor is plain through Augustine, eleventh book On the City: « For neither would God have foreknown evils to be, unless by parallel reasoning he had foreknown for what uses of good things he was to fit them ».

4. Likewise, « everything which is just is good »4; but evils to come about is just, because it is the punishment of a preceding sin, as Gregory holds: therefore evil to come about is good.

On the contrary:

1. Evil to come about is an evil in the being of [its] production: if therefore evil to come about is good, the production of evil is good. But the rule is in the art of the Topics5: « That whose generation or production is good, is itself also good »: therefore if the production of evil is good, evil is good.

2. Likewise, evil to come about is the same as good being deprived [of] or corrupted: therefore if evil to come about is good, the corruption of good is good. But the rule is: « That whose corruption is good is itself also evil »: therefore if the corruption of good is good, the good is evil, which is absurd.

3. Likewise, of two convertibles, if the one is good, [so] also the other6; but evil-to-come-about and evil-to-be-done are convertible: therefore if evil-to-come-about is good, evil-to-be-done also is good. But for a good no one is to be punished: therefore no one doing evils is to be punished.

4. Likewise, « if the opposite [holds] in the opposite, then the proposed [holds] in the proposed »7: if therefore evil-to-come-about is good: therefore good-to-come-about is evil. But this is absurd, that it should be evil to do good: therefore also the first [is absurd].

5. Likewise, if evil-to-come-about is good: then either [it is good] in itself, or because from it good comes about or follows. Not in itself, that is established. If therefore [it is good] because thereby a good comes about, then the one who says: Let us do evils, that goods may come about8, speaks well: therefore the Apostle wrongly rebukes [him].

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Conclusion.

Conclusion. That evils come about is in no way a good, but it can be the occasion of good, insofar as it is ordered by God to a good.

I respond: It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that in [human] works that is called good or useful or conducive, which leads to a good end or is the way to a good. But [the term] to lead to a good is said of something in three ways, namely by the mode of cause, or by the mode of chance, or by the mode of occasion. And these three differ. For a cause per se leads into that9 about which it is set, in such a way that it is producing and intending. But chance takes away the intention, but not the operation, as is plain in the digger who finds a treasure besides [his] intention. Occasion, however, takes away both. For it does not name a producing principle, but rather names something which affects the principle, that it may effect10 [something]: as someone, on hearing a word, strikes another; the heard word was an occasion, not effecting the striking nor cooperating with the effector, but in some way affecting [him].

And this occasion exists in two ways. There is one which in some way has the character of active, since in some way it stirs the effector — as a bad example [stirs] to sin. Or11 that which has the character of passive, as that from which someone takes a ground, just as one [takes] from another's evil [and] stirs himself to doing good.

According to this it must be understood that evil says two things, namely privation and an orderable nature; and by reason of [its] malice it is compared to the good which is elicited, as a passive occasion; by reason of the good which is laid beneath, as an occasion in some way active, on account of which evil is called the occasion of good.

Since then a thing leads to a good in these three modes, it has12 this difference in [its] leading. For one [thing] can lead another to something either from itself or through something of its own; and then it holds the character of cause per se. Or it can lead through another, to which however it is not ordered, but that [other] is ordered13 to a third, with an occasion taken from it; and so it holds the character of occasion. Or it leads with another, to which however it is not ordered, nor that [other] to a third, but both together; and so it holds the character of chance, which is from the concurrence of causes.

Hence then it is plain that that which leads by the mode of cause has in itself the character of an ordering toward the end; and therefore in itself there is goodness, and therefore it is rightly called good. But that which leads by the mode of occasion has no character of ordering toward the end within itself, and therefore no goodness either; and on account of this it cannot be called good per se except with the addition of that through which it is ordered, in which there consists the character of ordering and of goodness, and around which goodness is placed.

Since then evil does not lead to good from itself, but through that which is elicited from it by the wise God, speaking absolutely, that evil come about is not a good; rather, all similar [statements] are to be denied, since the goodness is noted to be put around the evil itself. — But if there be added the good which is elicited, or the elicitor himself, then secondarily such expressions are to be conceded: that evil come about is a good for him who knows how to order [it] to a good; likewise: that evil come about is a good, that the elect may be proved.

Replies to the arguments:

Ad 1, 2. Hence then the first two reasons are plain; for they proceed with [a] qualification, as is plain in the authorities themselves.

Ad 3. To that which is objected thirdly: that whose use is good etc.; it must be said that the use of a thing is twofold: one to which the thing of itself is ordered; and of such [a use] it is true, as is plain in [the case of] a horse which is for riding; another use, which is sometimes also after the fact; and this [use] can be good from the goodness of the user, [though] not [from any] usefulness [of the thing], since a good user uses evils well. And of such a use the rule is not true: but of such [a use] Augustine is speaking.

Ad 4. To that which is objected: what is just is good etc.; it must be said that just is said in two ways: in one way [as] justly ordered through the justice14 which is in [the thing] itself, and everything which is so just is good, since it has justice within itself; or it is declarative of justice, and so evil can show [it]. For as evil can dispose toward the retribution of justice, so also [it can] show [it]. And in this way it expresses an ordering of justice in another; nor does it follow that it is good, because just implies more the character of an ordering. Yet nevertheless that saying is not properly spoken in which it is said: He is just, [in such a way] that he who is in filth, let him be befouled15; rather it is understood very much per accidens, since it is just that he be left by God, and to this it follows that he be further befouled: hence it is understood per accidens.

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Scholion

I. This question is of great moment, subtly discussed by the ancient masters, both that the honor of divine providence may be defended, and that an unshaken axiom of Christian ethics may be rightly understood, namely that it is never permitted to do evils that good may come about. The opinion related by the Master (here c. 4) — which simply concedes that evil to come about is a good — was [the opinion] of Hugh of St. Victor (On the Sacraments bk. I, p. IV, c. 13); but it is refuted by the Master, with the approval of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and others commonly.

II. For the understanding of the response it should be noted that in the question the term good is not understood for the honest good nor for the delectable good, but for the useful good, which as a means to an end or as a way leads to a good. But useful good can lead to the end in a threefold mode: either per se, and then it is called a cause; or per accidens, and then in two ways — either by the mode of chance, in which the end is not intended, yet the operation reaches as far as the effect itself, although [the effect was] not intended (as is plain in the digger who by chance brings a treasure into the light), or by the mode of occasion, by which the effect is neither intended nor produced (as the tyrant in killing the martyr neither intends nor produces the crown of the same). These [things] are said in other words in the first division of the response. — But in the second division occasion is again distinguished in two ways according to the character of active and of passive: which must be understood not as if evil had any action upon the good itself, but [an action] upon the effector of good, whom an evil deed either rouses to doing good by some proportionality and causality, or, without any causality on its part, rather rouses to the contrary. In this second division is properly set the foundation of the subtle and excellent solution, which consists in this: that the formal [aspect] of sin (the privation) is for God a passive occasion for working a good opposed to the evil; whereas the material [aspect] of sin — since it has a nature orderable toward good, although « it has within itself no character of ordering toward the end » — can be led to a good through another, namely God. Thus the crucifixion of Christ was by God ordered toward the producing of immense goods, and was made an occasion of good by a mode in some way active. This is the sense of the words [of Bonaventure], that evil « is compared, by reason of [its] malice, to the good which is elicited, as a passive occasion; and by reason of the good which is laid beneath, as an occasion in some way active »: but not in the character of a cause (« from itself or through something of its own »), but of an occasion (« through another »).

III. These things being supposed, the reply to [objection] 3 is also easily understood — namely that it is never and in no way good to do evil, although that evil come about can by God's ordering be good. To the point Alexander of Hales (S. p. I q. 40 m. 2 ad 4): « In no way is it to be conceded that to do evil is good; for the case is not similar in the active and in the passive. For when it is said: that evil come about is good, a passive potency is denoted; when it is said: to do evil is good, an active potency is denoted. But the active potency for evil is not good; whereas the passive potency is good, since in evil there is a passive potency for this — that it may be ordered [to a good]; for evil is orderable to a good » (cf. below q. 5).

IV. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I q. 40 m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 2; Summa I q. 19 a. 9. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 80 m. 2 a. 3 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 3, and q. 2 a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 28. — Glossam integram ex S. Augustino videsis in lit. Magistri, hic c. 6. in princip. Pro etiam, ipse casus non pauci codd. indebite etiam ratione ipse casus. Textus ex August. subinde cit. paulisper differt a textu in ed. Oper. S. August. exhibito. Etenim pro incidere ibi habetur cadere, pro ut inde sola particula unde, pro corruerunt verbum ceciderant.
    Verse 28. — For the integral Gloss from St. Augustine see in the text of the Master, here c. 6 at the beginning. For etiam, ipse casus not a few codices [have] unduly etiam ratione ipse casus. The text from Augustine cited soon afterward differs a little from the text presented in the edition of Augustine's Works. For instead of incidere there is found cadere; for ut inde only the particle unde; for corruerunt the verb ceciderant.
  2. Libr. IV. prosa 6, ubi in textu originali habetur quoque pro quaeque. — Textus ex August. libro Confess. cit. habetur ibi VII. c. 13. n. 19, et sic sonat integre: Et tibi omnino non est malum, non solum tibi, sed nec universae creaturae tuae, quia extra [te] non est aliquid quod irrumpat et corrumpat ordinem, quem posuisti ei. — Nomini Boethius Vat. praemittit Quod sit bonum, dicit. Similiter codd. P Q praemittunt Quod sit bonum Deo, et subinde nomini Augustinus praeligunt quod sit bonum utrique.
    Book IV prose 6, where in the original text is found quoque for quaeque. — The text from Augustine's book of the Confessions cited [shortly] is found there at VII c. 13 n. 19, and sounds integrally thus: And to you there is nothing at all evil, not only to you, but not even to your universal creation, since outside [you] there is not anything that should burst in and corrupt the order which you have set for it. — Before the name Boethius the Vatican [edition] prefixes That it is good, he says. Similarly codices P and Q prefix That it is good for God, and soon afterward before the name Augustinus they prefix that it is good for both.
  3. Boeth., II. de Differentiis topicis. Cfr. supra pag. 31, nota 1. — In textu Augustini (XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18.), qui mox allegatur et iam supra pag. 786, nota 7. integre allatus est, Vat. post Deus intericit illos crearet quos.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences II. Cf. above p. 31, note 1. — In the text of Augustine (On the City of God XI, c. 18), which is shortly alleged and was already adduced integrally above at p. 786 note 7, the Vatican edition after Deus inserts illos crearet quos.
  4. August., Enchirid. c. 96. n. 24. Gregorius in libr. XXV. Moral. c. 9. n. 22. ait: Omne quippe peccatum, quod tamen citius poenitendo non tergitur, aut peccatum est et causa peccati, aut peccatum et poena peccati.
    Augustine, Enchiridion c. 96 n. 24. Gregory in book XXV of the Morals c. 9 n. 22 says: Every sin, indeed, which is not the more swiftly wiped away by repenting, is either sin and cause of sin, or sin and punishment of sin.
  5. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 9.): Quorum enim generationes bonae sunt, et ipsa bona sunt; et si ipsa bona sunt, et generationes bonae; si autem generationes malae, et ipsa mala. In corruptionibus autem e contrario: nam si corruptiones bonae, ipsa mala; si autem corruptiones malae, ipsa sunt bona. Eadem ratio et in effectivis et corruptivis: quorum enim effectiva bona, et ipsa bona; quorum vero corruptiva bona, ipsa mala. Cfr. et III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.); Regula de corruptionibus recurrit in argumento seq.
    Aristotle, Topics II c. 3 (c. 9): For those things whose generations are good, are themselves also good; and if they themselves are good, [so] also [are their] generations good; but if the generations are evil, they themselves [are] also evil. In corruptions, however, [it is] the contrary: for if the corruptions are good, they themselves [are] evil; but if the corruptions are evil, they themselves are good. The same reasoning [holds] also in [things relating to] effectives and corruptives: for those whose effectives are good, are themselves also good; but those whose corruptives are good, [are] themselves evil. Cf. also Topics III c. 4 (c. 6); the rule about corruptions recurs in the following argument.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 1. — In Vat. deest duobus.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics II c. 1. — In the Vatican [edition] duobus is wanting.
  7. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1, ubi ad confirmandum axioma propositum hoc affertur exemplum: « Ut si caecitas insensibilitas [privatio visus] quaedam, et visus [erit] sensus ». Axioma memoratum aliis verbis sic exprimi potest: si alicui subiecto convenit aliquod praedicatum, etiam termino, qui huic subiecto opponitur, conveniet praedicatum priori praedicato oppositum.
    Aristotle, Topics IV c. 1, where for confirming the proposed axiom this example is adduced: « As if blindness is some insensibility [privation of sight], then sight [will be] a sense ». The axiom mentioned can be expressed in other words thus: if some predicate belongs to a certain subject, then to the term opposed to this subject there will belong a predicate opposed to the prior predicate.
  8. Rom. 3, 8.
    Romans 3:8.
  9. Pro ita in illud plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. circa illud; solus cod. T exhibet ita illud, quam lectionem ut saniorem et veriorem in textum recepimus, addita praepositione in, quam verbum ducit exigit. Subinde auctoritate codd. F P Q ee ff etc. nec non ed. 1 substituimus quod sit pro quod est, pro quo cod. X quia est.
    For ita in illud very many codices with the first six editions [read] circa illud; only codex T exhibits ita illud, which reading we have received into the text as the sounder and truer one, with the preposition in added — which the verb ducit requires. Then on the authority of codices F P Q ee ff etc., and also edition 1, we have substituted quod sit for quod est, for which codex X [reads] quia est.
  10. Pro afficit, ut efficiat non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 efficit vel efficiat. Paulo inferius pro efficienti ed. 1 percutienti.
    For afficit, ut efficiat not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] efficit vel efficiat. A little below, for efficienti ed. 1 [reads] percutienti.
  11. Pro Vel cod. M (Q in marg.) Quaedam, cod. R Quaedam etiam est. Mox pro sumit cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. assumit.
    For Vel codex M (Q in margin) [reads] Quaedam; codex R [reads] Quaedam etiam est. Shortly afterward, for sumit codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican [edition read] assumit.
  12. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene habent, intellige: hi tres modi. Paulo inferius post aut ex se, ut evitetur confusio, pro altero aut, quod in Vat. nec non in multis codd. habetur, posuimus cum ed. 1 vel.
    Very many codices with ed. 1 less well have, understand: these three modes. A little below, after aut ex se, in order to avoid confusion, for the other aut — which is found in the Vatican [edition] and in many codices — we have put with ed. 1 vel.
  13. Vat. cum cod. cc ordinat, et aliquanto inferius intra se pro in se.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] ordinat, and somewhat below intra se for in se.
  14. Supple cum cod. Y iustitiam.
    Supply with codex Y iustitiam ("justice").
  15. Apoc. 22, 11. In exponendo hoc textu Glossa interlin. et Beda recurrunt ad iustum Dei iudicium. — Post sordescat cod. Y cum Vulgata adiicit adhuc.
    Apocalypse 22:11. In expounding this text the interlinear Gloss and Bede have recourse to the just judgment of God. — After sordescat codex Y with the Vulgate adds adhuc ("still").
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