Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46
Quaestio II. Utrum Deus velit mala fieri.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus velit mala fieri. Et quod sic, ostenditur:
1. Per Anselmum1: Deus non vult, inquit, quod impossibile est fieri; ergo per consequentiam e converso, quod possibile est fieri, Deus vult illud; sed malum possibile est fieri: ergo malum fieri est Deo volibile.
2. Item, omnis iustus vult omne quod iustitiae
est; sed « omnis poena iusta est », ut dicit Augustinus2, et omne malum poena: ergo omne malum, quod fit, a Deo est volitum fieri. Quod omne malum sit poena, patet per Augustinum primo Confessionum: « Iussisti, inquit, Domine, et sic est, quod omnis inordinatus animus sibi sit poena ».
3. Item, duobus oppositis propositis, inter quae non est medium, necesse est, alterum esse a Deo scitum: ergo pari ratione necesse est, alterum esse volitum. Sed demonstrato peccante, istum peccare, istum non peccare sunt opposita: ergo Deus vult alterum. Sed quidquid vult Deus, illud fit: ergo si vult istum non peccare, iste non peccat, quod est contra hypothesim3: vult ergo istum peccare. Sed hoc est malum: ergo malum fieri est a Deo volitum.
4. Item, omne volens aliquid voluntate consiliata et deliberata vult4 illud, sine quo illud non potest esse — quamvis enim aliquis velit esse abbas, sed non monachus, tamen, si deliberative velit esse abbas, vult pariter esse monachus — sed Deus vult aliquod bonum; quod nunquam potest esse sine malo, sicut Sanctos suos probari et pati Filium suum: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Nihil est ab aliquo volitum vel volibile, quod omnino displicet ei et est odiosum; sed Ecclesiastici duodecimo5 dicitur: Altissimus odio habet peccatores; sed non nisi ratione peccati sive mali: ergo multo magis odit malum: ergo non vult illud fieri.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum6: « Idem est fieri Deo volente et Deo auctore »; sed malum non fit Deo auctore: ergo malum non fit Deo volente. Primam supponit ipse, secundam probat, quia « nullo homine sapiente fit homo deterior »: ergo multo fortius nec Deo.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omnis voluntas aut denominatur a volito, aut denominat volitum7. Si ergo Deus vult malum, aut voluntas est mala, aut, si voluntas est bona, volitum est bonum: ergo aut nihil est malum, aut Deus est malus, si vult malum fieri. Sed utrumque falsum: ergo etc.
4. Item, omnis volens malum vult sub ratione apparentis boni8, ergo omnis volens malum decipitur: ergo si Deus vult fieri mala, Deus decipitur; quod est impossibile.
5. Item, omnis qui vult aliquid, quod non potest, est miser; sed Deus non potest malum, sicut supra probatum est9: ergo si vult illud, est miser. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Malum nec est a Deo volibile, nec Deus vult illud fieri ab aliis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut probant ultimae rationes, malum non est a Deo volibile, malum inquam culpae, quia omnis voluntas inordinata est, cui placet illud malum: et hoc omnes concedunt.
Sed tamen aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod Deus vult malum fieri, cum ipse non sit causa eius, sed alius, Deo volente. Et hoc quidem dicebant Deum velle non ratione sui, sed ratione eius, quod inde elicit. — Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, sicut ostendit Magister in littera10, qui hanc opinionem improbat. Ideo neutrum est concedendum; sed si alicubi legitur, exponendum.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non vult quod impossibile est fieri; dicendum, quod non velle dicitur dupliciter, aut negative, aut privative. Si negative, non est verum illud, nec Anselmus ita intelligit. Si privative, tunc non vult est una dictio, et est tertia persona eius11
quod est nolo; et hoc modo dicitur Deus nolle, quod absolute vult non fieri. Hoc autem modo non est dicere, quod Deus nolit mala fieri; et hoc modo non tenet consequentia e contrario, quia non tenet in contrariis, sed in contradictoriis12.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet iustus vult iustitiam etc.; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur iustum dupliciter, in se scilicet et ex ordine. Quod iustum est in se, secundum id quod est, a Deo est volitum. Quod vero est iustum ex ordine13 est volitum a Deo, secundum quod ordinatum; et malum non est volitum, secundum quod malum, sed secundum quod punit, et ita secundum quod ordinatum, et ita, secundum id quod est, non est volitum.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod duobus oppositis propositis, necesse est alterum scire, ergo necesse est alterum velle; dicendum, quod loquendo de voluntate beneplaciti non est simile. Nam scientia est respectu omnium quae fiunt, voluntas autem beneplaciti non est nisi respectu eorum quae sunt ab ipso14.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui vult aliquid, vult omne illi annexum; dicendum, quod velle aliquid sine alio est dupliciter: aut voluntate antecedente, aut voluntate consequente. Quod vult aliquis voluntate antecedente, vult omne annexum illi necessario. Quod vero vult voluntate consequente, potest etiam velle sine annexo. Potest enim ex malo bonum elici, quod non eliceretur, nisi factum illud malum displiceret, et bonum elicitum complaceret ei qui novit elicere. — Potest tamen responderi per interemptionem15, quod volens voluntate consiliata vult aliquid, non tamen vult illud quod consequitur; sicut aliquis vult aliquem surgere, sed tamen non vult eum cecidisse.
Tamen potest aliter dici et melius, quod velle aliquid sine alio est dupliciter: aut velle hoc et non velle aliud, quia unum placet et aliud displicet; et sic possibile est in his quae inseparabiliter sunt coniuncta. Alio modo velle aliquid sine alio est dicere velle, aliquid sine illo esse; et hoc modo velle aliquid sine inseparabiliter annexo est velle impossibile. Primo modo non sequitur, quod velit illud, quamvis non sine illo. Sensus enim est, non sine illo ente, sed tamen sine illo volito. Et est exemplum sensibile: volo enim aliquem, qui cecidit, surgere, ita quod non volo, eum cecidisse; non tamen volo, quod surgat, ita quod non ceciderit.
I. De malo in se considerato praecipue agitur II. Sent. dd. 34, 35; Breviloq. p. III, c. 1; Sermo de Seminante, n. 42-46 (Supplem. Bonelli, t. I, col. 410 seqq.). — Cum triplex sit malum, scil. naturae, culpae et poenae, hic agitur de malo culpae, et quidem de eodem formaliter. — Et notandum, quod velle malum potest intelligi vel ita, quod ipsum malum sit immediatum obiectum voluntatis, ut est in eo qui vult malum facere, vel ita, quod malum fiat ab alio. In utroque sensu Deus non vult malum; sed respectu secundi sensus non defuerunt, qui opinati sint, Deum velle fieri ab aliis malum, cum de facto fiat. Inter hos est Hugo a S. Vict., qui de Sacram. l. p. I, c. 12, in principio quidem dicit: « Tali quaestione coarctamur et ducimur in ambiguum, ut non facile audeamus hoc vel hoc aliquid affirmare, vel quod Deus fieri praecepit quod noluit, vel quod quae noluit fieri permisit ». In fine autem de dicta sententia affirmat: « Et ideo refutat hoc mens pia, non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur, sed quia quod bene dicitur non bene intelligitur ». Similia docet idem in Summa Sententiarum, c. 13. Haec falsa sententia duce Magistro (hic c. 3, 4) a S. Bonaventura et aliis Scholasticis refellitur. Error Hugonis in eo consistit, quod non satis haec tria distinxit: Deus odit peccatum; hoc vere et formaliter de Deo dicitur. Deus non vult fieri peccata; hoc nolle non est proprie in Deo, quia alias nulla fieri possent peccata, unde Deus nec vult fieri peccata, nec vult ea non fieri; sed tertium verum est: Deus permittit fieri peccata. — Quoad solutionem ad 3. et distinctionem inter culpam in se, et culpam ordinatam cfr. supra d. 40, a. 4, q. 2, hic q. 5, et II. Sent. d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 40. m. 1. — Scot., I. Report. d. 47, q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19, a. 9; S. c. Gent. I. c. 95. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 20, q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. partic. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Question II. Whether God wills that evils come about.
Secondly, it is asked whether God wills that evils come about. And that he does, is shown as follows:
1. From Anselm1: God, he says, does not will what is impossible to come about; therefore by consequence by conversion, what is possible to come about, God wills it; but evil is possible to come about: therefore that evil come about is willable by God.
2. Likewise, every just [agent] wills everything which belongs to justice;
but « every punishment is just », as Augustine says2, and every evil is a punishment: therefore every evil that comes about is willed by God to come about. That every evil is a punishment is clear from Augustine in Confessions I: « You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered mind should be a punishment to itself ».
3. Likewise, given two opposed [propositions], between which there is no middle, it is necessary that the one be known by God: therefore by parallel reasoning it is necessary that the one be willed [by him]. But, given the case of a sinner, that he sins and that he does not sin are opposites: therefore God wills the one. But whatever God wills, that comes to pass: therefore if he wills that this man not sin, this man does not sin, which is contrary to the hypothesis3: therefore he wills that this man sin. But this is evil: therefore that evil come about is willed by God.
4. Likewise, every agent willing something by a deliberated and counseled will4 wills that thing without which it cannot come about — for although someone may will to be an abbot, but not a monk, yet, if he deliberatively wills to be an abbot, he equally wills to be a monk — but God wills some good which can never come about without an evil, as he wills his saints to be tested and his Son to suffer: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. Nothing is willed or willable by anyone which altogether displeases him and is hateful [to him]; but in Ecclesiasticus twelve5 it is said: The Most High hates sinners; but [he hates them] only by reason of [their] sin or evil: therefore much more does he hate the evil [itself]: therefore he does not will it to come about.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of Eighty-three Questions6: « It is the same [thing] to come to pass with God willing [it] and with God [as its] author »; but evil does not come about with God [as its] author: therefore evil does not come about with God willing [it]. He himself supposes the first [proposition]; the second he proves, because « no man is made worse by a wise man »: therefore much more strongly [is no one made worse] by God.
3. Likewise, [the matter] appears from reason: because every will either is denominated from the willed [object], or denominates the willed [object]7. If therefore God wills evil, either the will is evil, or, if the will is good, the willed [object] is good: therefore either nothing is evil, or God is evil, if he wills that evil come about. But both [conclusions] are false: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, everyone willing evil wills [it] under the aspect of an apparent good8; therefore everyone willing evil is deceived: therefore if God wills that evils come about, God is deceived; which is impossible.
5. Likewise, everyone who wills something which he cannot [bring about] is miserable; but God cannot do evil, as has been proved above9: therefore if he wills it, he is miserable. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. Evil is neither willable by God, nor does God will that it come about [as caused] by others.
I respond: It must be said that, as the last arguments prove, evil is not willable by God — evil, I mean, of fault [malum culpae] — because every will is disordered to which that evil is pleasing: and this all concede.
Yet some have wished to say that God wills that evil come about, while he himself is not its cause, but another [is], with God willing [it]. And this indeed they said, that God wills [it] not by reason of itself, but by reason of that which he elicits from it. — But this is against Augustine, as the Master shows in his text10, who refutes this opinion. Therefore neither [way of speaking] is to be conceded; but if anywhere [such language] is read, it must be explained [away].
Ad 1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side — that God does not will what is impossible to come about: it must be said that not to will is spoken of in two ways, either negatively or privatively. If negatively, that [proposition] is not true, nor does Anselm so understand [it]. If privatively, then non vult ['does not will'] is a single expression, and is the third person of [the verb] that11
is nolo ['I am unwilling']; and in this way God is said to be unwilling [for] that which he absolutely wills not to come about. But in this way one cannot say that God is unwilling [for] evils to come about; and in this way the consequence by contrariety does not hold, because it does not hold in contraries, but only in contradictories12.
Ad 2. To that which is objected — that every just [agent] wills justice etc.: it must be said that something is called just in two ways, namely in itself and from [its] order. What is just in itself, according to what it is, is willed by God. But what is just from [its] order13 is willed by God insofar as it is ordered; and evil is not willed insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it punishes, and so insofar as it is ordered, and so, according to what it is, is not willed.
Ad 3. To that which is objected — that given two opposed [propositions], it is necessary to know the one, therefore it is necessary to will the one: it must be said that, speaking of the will of [divine] good-pleasure, the case is not parallel. For knowledge is with respect to all things that come about, but the will of good-pleasure is only with respect to those things which are from him14.
Ad 4. To that which is objected — that he who wills something wills everything joined to it: it must be said that to will something without another [is taken] in two ways, either by an antecedent will, or by a consequent will. What one wills by an antecedent will, he necessarily wills everything joined to it. But what one wills by a consequent will, he can also will without [its] adjunct. For from an evil a good can be elicited, which would not be elicited unless that evil deed displeased [him], and the elicited good pleased him who knows how to elicit [it]. — Yet a reply can also be given by interception15: that one willing by a counseled will wills something, but does not however will that which follows upon it; just as someone wills another to rise, but yet does not will that he should have fallen.
Yet it can be said otherwise and better: that to will something without another is twofold: either to will this and not to will the other, because the one pleases and the other displeases; and this is possible in those things which are inseparably joined. In another way, to will something without another is to say [that one wills] something to be without it; and in this way, to will something without [its] inseparably-joined [adjunct] is to will the impossible. In the first way it does not follow that he wills it, although [he does not will it] not without [the other]. For the sense is, not without that [other] existing, but yet without that [other] being willed. And there is a perceptible example: I will that someone who has fallen rise up, in such a way that I do not will that he had fallen; not, however, do I will that he rise up in such a way that he had not fallen.
I. Of evil considered in itself, [the question] is treated principally at II Sent. dd. 34, 35; Breviloquium p. III, c. 1; Sermon on the Sower, n. 42–46 (Supplement of Bonelli, t. I, coll. 410ff.). — Since evil is threefold, namely of nature, of fault, and of punishment, here we treat of the evil of fault, and indeed of the same formally [considered]. — And it should be noted that to will evil can be understood either as [meaning] that the evil itself be the immediate object of the will, as is the case in one who wills to do evil, or as [meaning] that the evil come about [as caused] by another. In either sense God does not will evil; but with respect to the second sense there were not lacking those who held that God wills evil to be done by others, since in fact it is done. Among these is Hugh of St. Victor, who in On the Sacraments bk. I, p. 4, c. 12, at the outset indeed says: « By such a question we are hard pressed and led into ambiguity, so that we hardly dare to affirm this or that — either that God commanded that to come about which he did not will, or that he permitted those things to come about which he did not will ». But at the end, regarding the said opinion, he affirms: « And therefore the pious mind refuses this, not because what is said is not well said, but because what is well said is not well understood ». The same teaches similar things in the Summa Sententiarum, c. 13. This false opinion, with the Master as guide (here c. 3, 4), is refuted by St. Bonaventure and the other Scholastics. The error of Hugh consists in this, that he did not sufficiently distinguish these three: God hates sin — this is said truly and formally of God; God does not will sins to come about — this nolle is not properly in God, since otherwise no sins could come about, whence God neither wills sins to come about nor wills them not to come about; rather, the third is true: God permits sins to come about. — As to the solution to objection 3 and the distinction between fault in itself and fault as ordered, cf. above d. 40, a. 4, q. 2; here q. 5; and II Sent. d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.
II. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 40, m. 1. — Scotus, I Report. d. 47, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 19, a. 9; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 95. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Summa p. I, tr. 20, q. 80, m. 2, a. 3, partic. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.
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- Haec sententia desumta et formata videtur ex II. Cur Deus homo, c. 18: « Nihil enim est necessarium aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult; ipsum vero aut velle aut nolle aliquid propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem, alienum est a veritate ». In quo textu propositio Anselmi a S. Doctore hic allata necessario supponitur, quia impossibilitas rerum nullam necessitatem sive coactionem voluntati Dei imponere demonstratur. — Verba per consequentiam e converso sive e contrario, ut in ed. 1 et etiam infra in solut. huius obiect. habetur, occurrunt in Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3 (c. 8). Et est notandum, quod haec consequentia comprehenditur sub consequentia oppositorum, quae in eo generatim differt a consequentia simplici, quod ipsa est inter talia, quorum unum sequitur aliud et vice versa. Et duplex est haec consequentia: consequentia in ipso (εἰς ταὐτό), et e contrario (ἀντίστροφος) — directo et inverso ordine — prout vel eodem ordine terminorum oppositum infertur, vel non eodem ordine, sed ordine inverso. Consequentia in ipso invenitur tantum in convertibilibus, v. g. si homo est, risibile est; sed non est homo: ergo non est risibile. Exemplum consequentiae e contrario: si homo est, animal est; sed animal non est: ergo nec homo est. Ut brevius loquamur: consequentia in ipso est, quando ex proposito infertur oppositum praedicati de opposito subiecti; consequentia e contrario, quando ex proposito infertur oppositum subiecti de opposito praedicati. De consequentia e contrario Aristot., loc. cit., nec non S. Bonav. infra in solut. huius obiect. docent, quod valeat in contradictoriis, sed non in contrariis, saltem non in omnibus.This sentence seems to be drawn and shaped from Cur Deus Homo II c. 18: « For nothing is necessary or impossible except because he so wills [it]; but for him to will or not-will something on account of necessity or impossibility is foreign to the truth ». In which text the proposition of Anselm here adduced by the Holy Doctor is necessarily presupposed, since it is shown that the impossibility of things imposes no necessity or coercion on the will of God. — The words per consequentiam e converso or e contrario — as is found in ed. 1 and also below in the solution of this objection — occur in Aristotle, Topics II c. 3 (c. 8). And it is to be noted that this consequence is comprised under consequentia oppositorum, which differs in general from consequentia simplex in that it is between things one of which follows the other and vice versa. And this consequence is twofold: consequentia in ipso (εἰς ταὐτό) and e contrario (ἀντίστροφος) — in direct and in inverted order — according as either the opposite is inferred in the same order of terms, or not in the same order but in the inverted order. Consequentia in ipso is found only in convertible [propositions], e.g. if man is, capable-of-laughter is; but he is not man: therefore he is not capable-of-laughter. An example of consequentia e contrario: if man is, animal is; but animal is not: therefore man is not. To speak more briefly: consequentia in ipso is when from a proposition is inferred the opposite of the predicate of the opposite subject; consequentia e contrario is when from a proposition is inferred the opposite of the subject of the opposite predicate. On the consequentia e contrario Aristotle, loc. cit., and also St. Bonaventure below in the solution of this objection teach that it holds in contradictories, but not in contraries, at least not in all.
- Libr. I. Retract. c. 26, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18, n. 51. — Textus mox e primo libro Confess. citatus habetur ibi c. 12, n. 19, ubi in edit. Oper. S. August. post poena additur sua. In textu cit. pro inordinatus animus codd. cum ed. 1 motus inordinatus. In propos. maiori huius argum. pro quod iustitiae est Vat. quod iustum est.Book I Retractations c. 26, and On Free Choice III c. 18, n. 51. — The text soon afterward cited from the first book of the Confessions is found there at c. 12, n. 19, where in the edition of Augustine's works sua is added after poena. In the cited text, for inordinatus animus the codices with ed. 1 read motus inordinatus. In the major premise of this argument, for quod iustitiae est the Vatican edition reads quod iustum est.
- Pro hypothesim Vat. positionem.For hypothesim the Vatican edition reads positionem.
- Post vult Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. subiicit omne, et in fine argumenti cum multis codd. et ed. 1 verbo Filium praemittit et.After vult the Vatican edition with one or another codex adds omne, and at the end of the argument, with many codices and ed. 1, prefixes et to the word Filium.
- Vers. 3.Verse 3.
- Quaest. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.Question 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.
- Obiectum voluntatis sive volitum est bonum; hinc voluntas aut denominatur a volito bona, in quantum scil. vult aliquid, quod in se bonum est; sic est respectu voluntatis creatae; aut ipsa denominat volitum, in quantum scil. bonitas voluntatis obiecto tribuit bonitatem; sic est respectu voluntatis divinae.The object of the will, or that-which-is-willed, is good; hence the will is either denominated good from the willed, namely insofar as it wills something which is in itself good — and so it is with respect to a created will; or it itself denominates the willed [as good], namely insofar as the goodness of the will confers goodness on its object — and so it is with respect to the divine will.
- Cfr. supra pag. 804, nota 6. De propositione subsequenti cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1 et 5, ubi docetur, omnem malum esse ignorantem. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4, § 32, ostendit, malum esse per accidens, cum propter bonum fiat. « Quam ob rem quod non bonum, bonum arbitramur », i. e. decipimur. — Mox pro mala cod. T malum.Cf. above p. 804, note 6. On the subsequent proposition cf. Aristotle, Ethics III c. 1 and 5, where it is taught that every evil [agent] is ignorant. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4 § 32, shows that evil is per accidens, since it comes about on account of a good. « On which account we judge to be good that which is not good », i.e. we are deceived. — Soon, for mala codex T [reads] malum.
- Dist. 42, q. 2. Quoad propos. maiorem argumenti afferimus dictum August. de Beata Vita, n. 11: Omnis igitur, inquam, qui quod vult non habet, miser est? Placuit omnibus. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 798, nota 8.Distinction 42, question 2. As to the major premise of the argument we adduce the saying of Augustine On the Happy Life, n. 11: Therefore everyone, I say, who does not have what he wills, is miserable? It pleased all. Cf. also above p. 798, note 8.
- Hic c. 4.Here c. 4.
- Sensus est: non velle negative est non habere volitionem; non velle privative (contrarie) est habere nolitionem. Quod aliis verbis sic exprimi potest: non velle, negative sumtum, dicit negationem voluntatis, non voluntatem negationis; sed non velle, privative acceptum, dicit voluntatem negationis, non negationem voluntatis. Primo modo sumtum illud dictum Anselmi non est verum, quia multa fieri possunt, quorum esse vel fieri Deus positive non vult, et sic dicitur Sine ipso factum est nihil, i. e. peccatum; at verum est, si non vult in secundo sensu accipitur, et tunc istius dicti sensus est: impossibile est, id quod Deus vult non esse vel non fieri. Attamen hoc modo non dicitur, Deum nolle mala fieri; neque tenet consequentia a nolle fieri ad velle fieri: quia inter haec duo medium est, scilicet non velle fieri, negative sumtum. — In medio argumento pro tunc non vult est una dictio, et est tertia persona Vat. tunc non velle una dictio est, et tertia persona.The sense is: non velle taken negatively is not to have a volition; non velle taken privatively (contrarily) is to have a nolition. Which can be expressed in other words thus: non velle, taken negatively, expresses the negation of will, not the will of a negation; but non velle, taken privatively, expresses the will of a negation, not the negation of will. Taken in the first way, that saying of Anselm is not true, because many things can come about whose being or coming-about God does not positively will, and in this sense it is said Without him was made nothing [Jn 1:3], i.e. sin; but it is true if non vult is taken in the second sense, and then the sense of this saying is: it is impossible that what God wills should not be or not come about. Yet in this way one does not say that God is unwilling [for] evils to come about; nor does the consequence hold from to be unwilling that [it] come about to to will that [it] come about: because between these two there is a middle, namely not to will that [it] come about, taken negatively. — In the middle argument, for tunc non vult est una dictio, et est tertia persona the Vatican edition has tunc non velle una dictio est, et tertia persona.
- Intellige: Deo. — Cod. R ipsa. Paulo ante pro fiunt codd. S V sunt.Understand: by God. — Codex R [reads] ipsa. A little earlier, for fiunt codices S and V read sunt.
- Cod. G W sic: ex ordine et volitum a Deo, est volitum secundum etc. Paulo inferius pro punit cod. R punitivum.Codices G and W read thus: from the order and willed by God, is willed according to etc. A little below, for punit codex R [reads] punitivum.
- Cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4. — Mox in Vat. deest quod, ante consequitur.Cf. above p. 87, note 4. — Soon, in the Vatican edition quod is missing before consequitur.
- Vat. omittit in, et paulo post dicere. Paulo inferius verbis inseparabiliter annexo codd. V X praemittunt alio.The Vatican edition omits in, and a little after [omits] dicere. A little below, before the words inseparabiliter annexo codices V and X prefix alio. ---